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THE

WORKS

OF

PLATO

ABRIDG'D.

WITH

An Account of his Life, Philoſophy, Morals, and Politicks.

Together with a Tranſlation of his choiceſt Dialogues, *viz.*

Of
1. *Human Nature*,
2. *Prayer*,
3. *Wiſdom*,
4. *Holineſs*,
5. *What one ought to do.*
6. *Immortality of the Soul*,
7. *Valour*,
8. *Philoſophy.*

In Two Volumes.

Illuſtrated with Notes. By M. *DACIER.*

Tranſlated from the *French.*

VOL. I.

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WORKS

OF

PLATO

In Two Volumes.

VOL. I.

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Contained in these two Volumes.

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THE

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING *PLATO.*

WHat is every Day seen to befal the Noblest Houses, whose Great Names are usurp'd by obscure Families, so that the true Heirs who only have right to bear 'em are in time no longer distinguished, has been the fate of Philosophy. A great number of Arts and Sciences which indeed may be of use in their places, but are worthy only to be the Slaves of that Science which alone renders our Lives equally good and happy, have seiz'd on this Magnificent Name, and render'd it contemptible in the Eyes of Men. We have now no Idea of a true Philosopher, since this August Title is lavishly bestowed on a sort of curious and lazy People, who make it their only business to understand some of the secrets of Nature, and spend the time of their Life in making Experiments on the weight of the Air, and the vertues of the Loadstone. This Name has been still more degraded in being given to those, whose unsatiable Avarice chains 'em Day and Night to a Furnace; as if Gold, the greatest quantity of which is not comparable to the least Vertue, were the end of Philosophy. In fine Men are not content with having given it such blemishes as these, but have also render'd the Name

odious in throwing it away on thoſe Libertines, who by a pretended *Force d' Eſprit*, or ſtrength of Thought, which at bottom is no better than Weakneſs and Ignorance, live rather like Beaſts than Men. Is it then to be wonder'd at that Philoſophy is miſtaken and neglected, and that Men no longer pay her that reſpect and veneration, which ſhe formerly excited in their Minds? Aſham'd of being confounded with the Daughters of the Earth, ſhe is reaſcended to Heaven, from whence *Socrates* brought her.

The Athenians heretofore by a publick decree forbad, that the Names of *Harmodius*, and *Ariſtogiton*, who had deliver'd their Countrey from the Tyranny of *Hippias* and *Hipparchus*, ſhould ever be given to Slaves: for they thought it a horrible Indignity by ſo ſhameful a Communication to blaſt thoſe Names that were devoted to the publick Liberty. Philoſophy is another Deliverer, ſhe triumphs over Vices, overthrows Impiety, and confounds the Wiſdom of the World. 'Tis ſomewhat greater than the Arts, and than what Men commonly call the Sciences; 'tis the love of true Wiſdom, the knowledg of Divine and Humane Things, that is to ſay, the Science of God, a Science which teaches us to know the relation which our Souls neceſſarily bear to their Creator, and by and in him, to all rational Creatures, and which produces the certain knowledge of all our Duties, towards God, our Neighbours and our Selves.

To be truly a Philoſopher is to have Temperance, Juſtice and Fortitude, to love the Truth, to avoid Senſual Pleaſures, to deſpiſe Riches, to weaken, as much as may be, the bands that faſten the Soul to the Body, to hate and contemn this Body which is always oppoſing Wiſdom, to renounce all our Deſires, to fear neither the Poverty, nor Shame, nor Reproach we may be expos'd to, for the ſake of Righteouſneſs and Truth; to do good to Mankind even our very Enemies: to have nothing in view, but

bnt how to die well; and for this end to renounce one's self and every thing else. This is the Idea the wisest Heathens had of Philosophy.

This being suppos'd, nothing can be more fit and useful, than to follow the certain, and visible Progress which they made in their research after those Truths, and to see to what degree of knowledge it pleased God to lead 'em. If we don't make such an Examen as this, we can't speak of 'em with Judgment, and without falling into a false account of Things, as it has often happen'd, and still happens every day to the most Learned Men. Whenever they speak of the Heathens, they bear witness against themselves that they never well read 'em, and that they have only an imperfect Idea of 'em, for they impute such Sentiments to 'em as they never had, and deny 'em others which they had in reality; which is a great piece of Injustice: nay it seems (if I may so speak) to diminish somewhat from the Mercy and Justice of God, not to acknowledg all the Testimonies he was pleased to give of himself among the Pagans, in those Times that were corrupted with the most abominable Idolatry, in order to reduce 'em to the true Religion.

This Negligence is the more blamable; in that a Man needs only to read *Plato*, to be perfectly inform'd of the extent of their Knowledg: For his Writings have amassed together all the Truths that were scatter'd up and down in the Works of other Philosophers; and with the advantage of new Discoveries of his own, they compose as it were a Body of Doctrine which contains the highest perfection of Knowledg to be found among the Heathens.

Let a Man read never so little of him with attention, and reflect upon what he teaches, and he'll easily discern, that God, to stop the mouth of Incredulity, was long since preparing the way for the conversion of the Heathens, which had been so often predicted by the Prophets; for was it not the work of God, and a kind of Preludium of their

Conversion, that a Heathen in the most Idolatrous City in the World, and almost 400 years before the light of the Gospel illuminated the Universe, should declare and prove a good part of the Truths of the Christian Religion.

The Circumstance of the Time is remarkable, for *Plato* began to write immediately after the three last Prophets that were in *Israel*. So that as soon as the Prophets ceased among the Jews, God raises up Philosophers to enlighten the Gentiles; and divers of the Principles of the Gospel are taught at *Athens*. Where 'tis prov'd,

That there is but one God, that we ought to love and serve him, and to endeavour to resemble him in Holiness and Righteousness; that this God rewards Humility, and punishes Pride.

That the true Happiness of Man consists in being united to God, and his only Misery in being separated from him.

That the Soul is mere Darkness, unless it be illuminated by God; that Men are uncapable even of praying well, unless God teaches 'em that Prayer, which alone can be useful to 'em.

That there is nothing solid and substantial but Piety, that this is the Source of Vertues, and that it is the gift of God.

That 'tis better to die than to sin.

That we ought continually to be learning to die, and yet to endure life, in obedience to God.

That 'tis a Crime to hurt our Enemies, and to revenge our selves for the Injuries we have received.

That 'tis better to suffer wrong than to do it.

That God is the sole Cause of Good, and cannot be the Cause of Evil, which always proceeds only from our Disobedience, and the ill use we make of our Liberty.

That Self-love produces that Discord and Division which reign among Men, and is the cause of their Sins; that the love of our Neighbours, which proceeds from the love of God as its Principle, produces that sacred Union which makes Families, Republicks, and Kingdoms happy. That

That the World is nothing but Corruption, that we ought to fly from it, to join our selves to God, who alone is our Health and Life; and that while we live in this World we are surrounded by Enemies, and have a continual Combate to endure, which requires on our part a resistance without intermission; and that we cannot conquer, unless God or his Angels come to our help.

That the WORD fram'd the World, and render'd it visible; that the knowledg of the WORD makes us live very happily here below, and that thereby we obtain Felicity after Death. λόγος.

That the Soul is immortal, that the Dead shall rise again, that there shall be a final Judgment both of the Righteous and of the Wicked, when Men shall appear only with their Vertues or Vices, which shall be the occasion of their eternal Happiness or Misery.

But I forbear to proceed, that I may not repeat that here, which will be found in its full extent elsewhere. Yet I cannot chuse but add, that *Plato* had so great and true an Idea of perfect Righteousness, and was so throughly acquainted with the corruption of Mankind, that he makes it appear, * that if a Man perfectly righteous should come upon Earth, he would find so much opposition in the World, that he would be imprison'd, reviled, scourg'd, and in fine crucified by such who, tho they were extremely wicked, would yet pass for righteous Men. *Socrates* was the first proof of this Demonstration. For as St. *Justin* says, the Devils seeing this Philosopher made their Nullity appear by the discovery of the Truth, and that he endeavour'd to reclaim Men from giving them religious Worship; these malicious Spirits so order'd the matter by means of Men who were corrupt and took pleasure in Vice, that this righteous Man was put to Death as if he had been an impious Person, that liv'd without God in World, and introduc'd new Gods.

* In the II. Book of his Common-wealth. *Tom.* 2.

There are ſome who pretend the abovementioned Paſſage of *Plato* is a Propheſy, becauſe the Terms don't agree with the Circumſtances of *Socrates*, who was put to death only by a draught of Poyſon, but preciſely ſute with thoſe of the Saviour of the World, who was both ſcourged and crucified.

But we ſhall not preſume to make a Prophet of our Philoſopher, from whom Reaſon alone, when mov'd by the injuſtice of Men, might extort ſuch exaggerated Expreſſions; but ſhall content our ſelves to enquire what there may be in his Writings conformable to the deſigns of God, who always deſir'd the Salvation of Men, and often made uſe of the Pagans for the execution of his eternal Decrees.

We underſtand by the Holy Scripture, which is the only Lamp of Truth, that natural Religion was the firſt uſe Men made of their Reaſon; that Luſt and irregular Paſſions having corrupted their Reaſon, they abandon'd themſelves to the ſacrilegious worſhip of Idols; and that God to ſtop the courſe of this Abomination made himſelf known a ſecond time, and gave the Jewiſh Law; which as it reviv'd in the minds of Men the Principles of the Law of Nature, ſo it promis'd a more ſacred and perfect Covenant which the Righteous were to expect, and which alone was capable of triumphing over Death; and ſo alone able to conduct Men to a glorious Immortality.

Plato ſeems to have been acquainted with the Divine Conduct in this matter, and to endeavour to reclaim the Heathens by the ſame means.

He endeavours to reeſtabliſh Natural Religion by oppoſing Paganiſm which was the corruption of it.

He gives a Law which in its principal heads is entirely conformable to the Tradition of the Hebrews, and the Precepts of *Moſes* and the Prophets; from whom he has borrowed that which is moſt rational and ſubſtantial in his Works.

And he ſupports this Law by a great many Principles more ſublime than thoſe of natural Religion, and

and of the Law of *Moses*; and by clear and expres Promises of spiritual and eternal Blessings, which the Christian Religion alone can make Men enjoy, and which *Moses* and the Prophets only promised under the Veil, and Figures of temporal Enjoyments. So that *Plato* is not content to give a Testimony only to natural Religion, and the Jewish Law, but also in some sort pays Homage to Christianity; in piercing by a supernatural Light into a part of those Shadows and Figures that cover'd it; and in proposing most of the greatest Motives and glorious Objects, which it has always employ'd to raise Men above themselves, and to make them Masters of their Passions.

* *A happy Immortality* (says he) *is a great Prize set before us, and a great Object of Hope, which should engage us to labour all the time of our Life to acquire Wisdom and Vertue.* This the reading only of these two first Volumns will compleatly set in its true Light.

'Tis commonly enquir'd on this Subject, how the Books of *Moses* and those of the Prophets could come to *Plato*'s knowledg. I will not undertake to prove that there were Greek Translations of 'em before that of the Septuagint, 'tis too difficult a matter to support that Supposition, and I must confess I can find no solid foundation for it. But I'll declare what seems most probable to me.

After the departure of the Israelites out of *Egypt*, they almost always continued their Commerce with the Egyptians. They traded in their Country, they sometimes desir'd their assistance against their Enemies, and often enter'd into Treaties and Alliances with them. By these means the memory of all that had happen'd to their Nation was easily preserv'd among those People. † The Captivity of King *Jehoachaz*, whom *Pharaoh Necheh* carried away Prisoner about the beginning of the 42 Olympiade; and ‡ the dwelling of the Prophets *Jeremiah* and

* Vol. 2. † 2 Kings 23. ‡ Jer. 43.

Barach in *Egypt* some years after with the miserable remainder of the Jews, that the King of *Babylon* had left in *Judæa*, could not suffer the Egyptians to forget these things.

About this time *Pythagoras* travell'd into *Egypt*, from whence he brought these Traditions into *Greece*; his Disciples communicated them to *Socrates*, who acquainted *Plato* with 'em; and he, to be more perfectly instructed in 'em, went to the same place where he might see not only the Grand-Children but the Children of such as had convers'd with the Fugitives that retired thither with those Prophets. And perhaps 'tis no ill-founded Supposition, that by his frequent Conversation with them he learned enough of their Language to read those Originals himself, of which the Egyptians, who were a very curious People, might have Copies. But whether he read 'em, or knew nothing of 'em, but what he learned in Conversation, 'tis certain he could draw that Tradition which he calls *Sacred* from no other Source. For he harmonizes so well with those Originals in many things, not only in respect of the Truths themselves, but moreover in the very manner of his Expressions, that one would often think he translates 'em. From whom, unless from the Hebrews, could the Egyptians have a Tradition containing such wonderful Doctrine, and of which never any other People had heard, before the peculiar People of God were instructed in it?

But 'tis said there are many Errors intermix'd with the Writings of *Plato*; that in his Explication of the greatest Truths, he is full of Doubts and Uncertainty; and 'tis observ'd that *Socrates* constantly professes that *he knows nothing:* What advantage can be received from a man that knows nothing but his own Ignorance? And 'tis fit these Objections should have an Answer.

'Tis certain *Plato* is not without his Errors; but when they come to be strictly examin'd, there are to be found in 'em some Traces of ancient Traditi-

ons,

ons, and Predictions of the Prophets; and if these Traces are compar'd with the Doctrine of the Holy Scripture, one may discover the Source of those Errors, which by this means become one of the Proofs of the Truth of the Christian Religion. For we must be forc'd to acknowledg that the Heathens had a dim sight of divers great Truths, which because they were not to be fully unveiled till the coming of the *Messiah*, were involved in Darkness too thick to be penetrated by their Eyes. And this was predicted by the Prophets, who all declar'd that *Christ should be the Light of the World.* None but Jesus Christ was able to discover to 'em those Mysteries, which were to be kept secret before his coming. Therefore 'tis no very surprizing thing, that such Persons as attempted to penetrate * these Mysteries, only by the Light of their Reason, did evaporate into vain Imaginations. And for this reason we ought not to pretend to give a clear Explication of the Truths of Religion by the Notions of this Philosopher; but on the contrary should explain his Notions by these Truths, this is the way to display Light every where, and dissipate all Errors. And when his Principles accord well with those Truths, we may with very good advantage make use of the proofs he has given of 'em.

The Doubts and Uncertainty, of which he is reproached, about the most essential Points, are so far from shaking his Principles, that they only give the greater Confirmation to 'em, and one may say that Certainty and Conviction spring from these very Doubts. For instance in his *Phædon*, where he is treating of the great Objects of our Hope in the other Life, he insinuates that 'tis a very difficult matter certainly to know the Truth of these things, while we live here, and that how strong soever the proofs are, on which we may found an

* Such as the Doctrine of the Trinity, the Resurrection, the Fall of Man, and the Creation of the Souls of Men before their Bodies.

Ex-

Expectation of a happy Eternity, the greatneſs of the Subject and the natural Infirmities of Man are inexhauſtible Springs of Doubts and Uncertainties; for theſe ſpring up in multitudes from the ſtock of corrupt Nature, which oppoſes the moſt manifeſt Truths, and reſiſts the moſt evident proofs which Reaſon can produce. What was to be done then to diſſipate theſe Doubts? The Prophets had ſpoken, but their Oracles were yet obſcure, and men might not diſcern in their Words the Divine Spirit that animated 'em. It was neceſſary that God himſelf ſhould ſpeak. Nothing leſs than an expreſs Promiſe, nothing leſs than a plain Divine Revelation could entirely diſperſe the Clouds of Ignorance and Incredulity, and convert theſe Doubts into Certainties. This is what * *Plato* confeſſes in expreſs Terms. For he brings in ſome Philoſophers that render Homage to God, calling his Promiſes *the Veſſel in which no danger is to be feared, and the only one in which we can happily accompliſh the Voyage of this Life, on a Sea ſo tempeſtuous and full of Rocks.* Thus we ſee where his Doubts terminated; they lead Men to acknowledg the need they had of a God, to aſſure 'em of the reality of the great Bleſſings for which they hop'd. And this is accompliſhed in the Chriſtian Religion; which as it is the only Religion that has God for its Teacher, ſo has alſo the Promiſes of Eternal Happineſs, of which the Prophets ſpake, and of which *Plato* had a glimpſe; and for which the word of this God, by the confeſſion even of theſe Pagans, is a moſt certain Security. So that, by the acknowledgment of the moſt enlighten'd Heathens, there are now no reaſonable Doubts concerning the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion; that being the only Veſſel in which we can never be loſt. And this is what the Prophets predicted, that in Jeſus Chriſt Life and Immortality ſhould be fully brought to Light, and that he ſhould be the deſire of Nations.

* In his Phœdon. Vol 2.

'Tis

'Tis not only in these principal Points that *Plato* doubts, but almost in every thing; and his doubts have given occasion to many to make a wrong judgment of the Academick Philosophy; for it has been imagined that it asserted nothing, but accounted all things equally uncertain, which is a very unjust Supposition. *Socrates* and *Plato* were not of the number of those Philosophers, whose fluctuating minds kept 'em continually wandering, so that they had no fix'd and steady Principles. This was their Principle and Rule; They taught that men could not of themselves have any Opinion but what was founded only on Probabilities; but that when God enlighten'd 'em, that which was no more than Opinion before now became Science: And this they explain'd by a pretty Comparison. *Dedalus* made two sorts of Statues that could walk, with this difference, the one sort had a Spring which stop'd 'em when one pleas'd, and the other had none; so that when they were let go, they run along to the end of their Line, and could not be stop'd. The latter were not of so great a Price, but the former were very dear. Now *Socrates* and *Plato* compar'd Opinion to these Statues, that could not be stop'd; for Opinion is not stable, but is subject to change. but when 'tis restrain'd and fix'd by reasoning drawn from Causes which the Divine Light discovers to us, then Opinion becomes Science, and is fix'd and steady, like those Statues which had that governing Spring added to 'em. So that their meaning was, that Opinion turns only on Probability, which is always like moving Sand, but that Science rests on Certainty and Truth, which are a firm Foundation. Thus *Socrates* and *Plato* disputed about every thing, while they had only Opinions; but when these Opinions after serious researches and long labour, were become Science by the Divine Light; then they affirm'd what they knew. Till then all was doubtful and uncertain to 'em. But these Doubts were more wise and safe than the Arrogance of those positive

poſitive Philoſophers, that raſhly affirm'd every thing, and always took Opinion for Science.

The Third Objection againſt *Socrates*; *That he only knew that he knew nothing*, is no more ſolid than the former; and is to be anſwer'd by the ſame Principle: and if I am not miſtaken, we ſhall find in this Ignorance a marvellous Fund of Knowledg.

There are two ſorts of Ignorance, the one Natural, which is good or evil, according to the good or ill uſe that is made of it, and the other Acquired, and always good: For this latter is the Ignorance of thoſe who after they have learned all that Men can know, are convinc'd that they know nothing. This was *Socrates* his Ignorance, it was * *a learned Ignorance that knows it ſelf.* He had run through Aſtronomy, Geometry, Phyſicks, Metaphyſicks, Poetry, Polite Learning, *&c.* and ſaw the vanity of 'em. He even undertakes to prove that all theſe Sciences are either uſeleſs or dangerous, and that nothing but the knowledg of God can make us happy, that where this Divine Science is not, there can be no Good, and conſequently that there is a ſort of Ignorance more uſeful than the Sciences; for this Ignorance ſeeks not for knowledg in it ſelf, well knowing it has none, but only in God who is pleas'd to fill its *Vacuum*. It was for this reaſon, *Socrates* always began his Inſtructions with an Affirmation that he knew nothing. By this he ſignified that our Souls have no true knowledg of any thing, any farther than they are enlightned by God. That they ſhould always look on that piercing Light, in which alone they can ſee Light; and that when they turn their Looks another way they neceſſarily fall back into Obſcurity, and produce nothing but the Works of Darkneſs. Let the Proud Wiſe Men of the World appear, and compare themſelves with this Ignorant Man.

* 'Tis an Expreſſion of *Socrates*, which ſtates two ſorts of Ignorance, one that is ignorant of it ſelf, and t'other that knows it ſelf.

So

So much for one of the uses that may be made of *Plato*'s Writings, which ought to be look'd upon as so many Titles belonging to Christianity, found long ago among the Pagans, and are so much the more venerable, in that so much as is found in 'em is faithfully copied from those which the Prophets have left us; and in that which we find altered and corrupted, we may however discover the Vestiges of those Truths which these irreproachable Witnesses publish'd.

The second use that may be made of 'em, and which is no less considerable than the former, is that by this means we may be confirm'd in the knowledg of a great many Christian Truths which are prov'd in 'em with such a Strength and Evidence, as no reasonable Man can resist.

Religion only proposes them; for it belongs not to the Majesty of a God to prove the Necessity, Justice, and Truth of all he commands. He makes Men love what he requires, and that is more than to prove it to be reasonable. But a Philosopher, who has no Authority over us any farther than he perswades us by his Reasons, is obliged to give Proofs of every thing he advances; and thus *Plato* does, and his Proofs can't chuse but be very agreeable to them that believe, and very useful to Unbelievers, if they are but willing to attend a little to 'em for their Instruction.

Some Learned and Zealous Person, who is well read in *Ecclesiastical History*, will perhaps say; if *Plato* be so useful, whence come those thundering Censures, which some of the Fathers of the Church, and above all, St. *Chrysostom* have let fly against him? It would be a sufficient Answer to this, should I only oppose to it those great Praises, which other Fathers have given him, especially St. *Augustin*: But is it to be imagin'd, that that the same Principles that charm'd St. *Augustin*, were displeasing to St. *Chrysostom*? No certainly: The Spirit of God is not divided, and Truth always appears to those

thoſe whom God is pleaſed to illuminate. I'll therefore endeavour to ſhew from whence this difference of their Sentiments proceeded.

The Philoſophy of *Plato* was look'd on two different ways, which have given occaſion to two very oppoſite Opinions concerning it.

Chriſtian Philoſophers look'd upon it as a Doctrine, which by it's Principles naturally led to the Chriſtian Religion.

And Pagan Philoſophers conſidered it as a Doctrine, which contain'd Morals as perfect as thoſe of Chriſtianity, and which might even take place of this holy Religion.

In the firſt reſpect it was worthy of all the Encomiums that have been given it by the greateſt Doctors of the Church, who came out of his School.

And on the ſecond Account it deſerved the greateſt *Anathema*. The defects of this Philoſophy could not be too much aggravated, nor could thoſe haughty Philoſophers that valued themſelves ſo much upon it, be too much abaſed; for the Wiſdom of the Wiſe, and the Knowledg of the Learned are no better than Folly, if they lead us not to the knowledg of Jeſus Chriſt. *Plato* himſelf, by his Principles, would furniſh us with Arms, to oppoſe thoſe of his Admirers, that ſhould be ſo ſenſeleſs, as to take up with his Opinions, and ſhut their Eyes againſt the bright Truths of Religion.

But this Difference is now ceaſed: There are now none of thoſe ignorant Perſons. No Body is ſo blind to prefer, or even compare *Plato* and *Socrates*, I will not ſay to the Evangeliſts or Apoſtles, but to the meaneſt Chriſtian. So that there is no danger in ſetting a value on thoſe Truths which are found in *Plato*, and in rendering them all the Honour they deſerve. They are not the leſs worthy of our reſpect, becauſe they proceed from the mouth of a Heathen. Did not God take *Balaam* from among the Gentiles, to communicate his Spirit to him

him? When we render homage to the Truths foretold by that covetous and corrupt Prophet, we don't honour the Prophet, but Him by whom he was inspir'd. For as St. *Ambrose* says, * *'Tis not the desert of him who propheſies, but the Oracle of him who calls, and which the Grace of God reveals.* The greater the Darkneſs was that benighted thoſe Times, the more eſteem we ought to have for *Plato* and *Socrates*, whom God ſeems to have choſen to be the firſt Heraulds of thoſe great Truths, and if I may venter to ſay it, the fore-runners of St. *Paul*, in the moſt ſuperſtitious, and idolatrous City in the World. 'Twas the Doctrine of theſe Philoſophers that had produced and cheriſhed thoſe Sparks of knowledg, which this great Apoſtle found in the Hearts of ſome of the *Athenians*, concerning the Reſurrection of the Dead, and the Immortality of the Soul.

What reſpect we have for this Doctrine will turn to the Glory of the Chriſtian Religion: For if the Conformity of a part of *Plato*'s Opinions, with what is revealed to us in the Goſpel, has ſo raiſed this Philoſopher's Name, that he is called *the divine Philoſopher*: What Eſteem and Veneration do they deſerve, whoſe Minds and Hearts are fill'd with all the Truths of Chriſtianity, and who are fed with the Celeſtial Doctrine, which our Lord Jeſus Chriſt learned of God the Father, and came himſelf to teach us?

This Conformity of *Plato*, with the Doctrines of the Goſpel, laſt Year engag'd a Learned and Pious Eccleſiaſtique, to give a ſmall Extract of it, which was very well received by the Publick. This Extract, which was made in the Pallace, and under the Eye of one of the beſt and moſt learned Arch-Biſhops God has given his Church, is a great Elogium on the Doctrine of this Philoſopher. What greater Appprobation can it have than that

* Non confitentis meritum, ſed vocantis oraculum eſt revelante Dei Gratiâ. *S. Ambr. Lib. 6. Epiſt.* 37.

of

of a Prelate, who ſo ſtrongly adheres to the word of Truth, and is ſo diligent in inſtructing the People in it himſelf, as well as in cauſing others to inſtruct 'em.

Another great Advantage to be gained out of *Plato*'s Writings, is that a Man may form his Judgment by 'em; and acquire that juſtneſs of Mind, and accuracy of reaſoning, which are neceſſary in all conditions of Life, in order to diſcern Truth from Error, that he may take the right ſide in all Affairs that occur. For the Philoſophy of *Socrates* is the ſource of good Senſe, as * *Horace* himſelf acknowledges.

There is no Book in the World that teaches, ſo well as this, the Art of confuting Sophiſts, who by their poyſonous Maxims, labour to corrupt the Minds of Men, and to deſtroy Truth and good Senſe. As there will always be ſuch Impoſtors to be found, this Art will always be of very great uſe, and there's no Man teaches it like *Plato*. There is nothing more compleat than his Logick, which infallibly gains its Point in every thing it undertakes; and 'tis impoſſible for a Man to defend himſelf from the force of it. It may be compar'd to the Sun, which when it riſes, ſcarce makes us feel its Heat, but gradually encreaſes it, ſo that at length it becomes to hot to be endur'd.

I ſhall not ſpeak of the Charms of his Dialogues, which are unexpreſſible: There are no Satyrs or Comedies that come near 'em. We can no where find ſuch ſharpneſs of Wit, ſo many Graces, and decent turns of Thought, nor ſo much variety either of Conceptions or Expreſſions: Nor were Ironies ever ſo finely manag'd; ſo that 'tis not ſo much an Entertainment of Reading as an Inchantment. In the Life of *Plato* I have ſufficiently expos'd to view the advantages of Dialogue above all other ways of treating a Subject. I ſhall here only add that that which contributes moſt to render

* In Arte Poetic. V. 310

it

it so agreeable and useful, is that Truth comes gradually out of the Bowels of the Dispute; Just as when Pictures are unrolled we see the Persons represented rise up by degrees, till at last they appear in their full Proportion: and there is nothing more agreeable to the Mind than the springing up of Truth after this manner, the insensible progress of which even leaves the Soul time to be before hand with it, and to foresee its appearance. Now a Truth which our Minds have as it were divined, pleases us much more than that which has been formally prov'd to us, which most commonly only irritates and makes us uneasy.

These Dialogues have been the admiration of all Ages: In the Reign of *Trajan* they were still so much esteemed at *Rome*, that they occasion'd the introducing of a Custom which was received with great applause; they us'd to chuse the finest of these Dialogues, and make their Children learn them by Heart, that so they might at their Feasts recite 'em at Table, with those different Tones and Gestures that were suitable to the Manners and Characters of the different Persons whom *Plato* brings in speaking.

'Tis true this Custom lasted not long; but that which put an end to it was no less honourable than that which introduc'd it. For the Philosophers that condemn'd and abolished it, did so only because they accounted *Plato* too sublime to be so used, and because they could not endure that Dialogues so serious and solid should serve for a Divertisement at Table, and be heard amidst the Merriment, Noise and Tumult of a Feast. And this Sentiment of theirs was supported by the Authority of *Plato* himself; who in his Banquet, being to speak of the End of Man, of the Sovereign Good and other Theological Matters, does not push on his Demonstrations very far; he does not, according to his ordinary Custom, imitate a vigorous Wrestler, who never lets go his Hold, and who locks his Adversary so closely that he can't escape him; but he softens his Proofs and

makes 'em pleasant, and attracts his Auditors by the insinuation of Fables and Examples, which seem to be contriv'd not so much to convince as to divert 'em. For no Questions ought to be started at Table but such as may move the Soul after an agreeable and useful manner, and such as every one may easily understand, and those ought to be banish'd (to use the Words of *Democritus*) that are thorny, and out of which 'tis difficult to extricate one's self. The Discourse at Table ought to be for every one, like the Wine, and such as propose there abstracted and difficult Questions, exile thence this kind of Community, and renew the Feast of the Fox and the Crane.

If I had only consider'd the Eloquence, the Strength and Harmony of these Writings, I confess I should never have had the courage to translate 'em; in doing which, either through my own defect, or that of the Language in which I write, I have had the uneasiness of finding my self unable to preserve a multitude of Beauties and Elegancies that render these Dialogues Master-pieces, not to be equall'd. But I consider'd, that seeing they contain'd Matters of so great Importance and Necessity, it would be a great piece of Folly, to be so superstitious about Terms, as to deprive Mankind of so great an Advantage. And by good hap, that which is the most useful can't be hurt by my Translation. It preserves the Art of Logick, and all the Truth which *Socrates* proves by that means, and that's enough. Those Beauties which consist only in Expression are not so necessary, and we may easily forego 'em, provided we enjoy others; and not do like a certain Writer of the last Age, who after he had made very good Reflections on *Socrates*, and had acknowledged him to be *an admirable pattern in all great Qualities*, amuses and perplexes himself with Trouble, that a Soul so lovely had met with a Body so deform'd, and disagreeable to its Beauty. Which is as if a Souldier in reading the great Actions of *Cesar* or *Alexander*

Alexander instead of making advantage of his reading, and learning the Art of War, should distress and afflict his Mind, because one was bald, and t'other inclin'd his Head on one side.

But it may be I have less reason to fear how it will go with my Translation, than how *Socrates* himself will escape. Our Age so much resembles that wherein this Philosopher liv'd, that in all appearance, if this wise Man now finds some intelligent Judges who will do him Justice, he'll find a greater number of Persons extreamly prejudic'd, who will be sure to condemn him. In an Age wherein nothing is esteem'd but Riches; wherein that Slavery, which leads to Wealth, is prefer'd to Liberty, and Men chuse rather to nourish the Vices of others by their Flatteries, than to augment their own Vertues by their Labour. The Temperance, Frugality, Fortitude, Justice and Liberty of *Socrates* will be laugh'd at; and this will be but the accomplishment of what he predicted. * *If my Fellow-Citizens* (says he) *have not been able to endure my Maxims, much less will they be tolerable to Strangers.*

The greatest part will not give themselves so much trouble as to read him. † They will much sooner read the *Milesian Fables*, as St. *Jerome* says, that is such Pieces as corrupt the Heart and Mind, than Dialogues which inspire nothing but Wisdom. And among those that will read him, many will do it only out of Curiosity, for in our Time we may make the same Complaint that was made heretofore by *Taurus* the Philosopher, an ancient Commentator on *Plato*. One asks for *Plato*'s *Dialogue of the Banquet*, to have the pleasure of seeing the Excesses of *Alcibiades*. Another for his *Phædrus*, because 'tis a Treatise of Criticism, and the Oration of *Lysias* is examin'd in it; and others desire

* Apology 69. † Multoq; pars major est Milesias Fabulas revolventium, quam Platonis Libros. *St.* Jerome *in the Preface of his* XII *Book on* Isaiah.

thoſe Dialogues which have the greateſt Reputation, and are accounted the beſt Pen'd, only for a frivolous Pleaſure; and not one of all theſe thinks of embelliſhing his Mind by reading of theſe Books, ſo as to become more Modeſt, Temperate, Juſt, Patient, and Pious.

But thoſe who will prove the leaſt favourable to *Socrates*, are a ſort of Men who highly value themſelves upon their refin'd Wit; and a great many of thoſe who are taken with the Pomp and Gay appearances of the World.

The former not having Eyes piercing enough to diſcover the ſecret Light of thoſe hidden Beauties that adorn theſe Dialogues, will count *Socrates* a Dull and Languid Author, becauſe he has no Witticiſms, nor Gentile Turns. An obſcure Perſon who never did any thing worthy to be read, ſhall call in queſtion the Reputation of *Socrates*, a Perſon who has been an honour to Humane Nature by the Excellency of his Underſtanding; and ſhall prefer himſelf to him, trampling under his Feet * *the Teſtimonies which all the learned Men of Antiquity, and all* Greece *have rendred him, that for good Senſe, Wit, Pleaſantneſs, Subtilty, Strength, Variety and Abundance, he excelled all that ever had appeared in the World.* A Man muſt have a great Stock of good Opinion of himſelf, to appeal from ſo ſolemn a Judgment, and to make his appeal to himſelf too.

The latter are commonly corrupted by reading frivolous Books, which are wholly Compos'd for Oſtentation, and as *Montagne* ſays, *can't perceive Riches unleſs they make a pompous Show*, and ſo have a diſguſt for every thing that is Plain and Simple; being perſuaded that what is Natural and Eaſy, is a Kin to Dulneſs and Stupidity. Theſe will think it below 'em to attend to a Philoſopher who entertains 'em only with ſuch Diſcourſes as they count Vulgar and Trivial, who is ſcarce ever to be found out of Shops; who talks only of Husband-men, Smiths,

* *Cicero* in his 3d Book of Oratory.

Maſons,

Masons, Carpenters, Shoemakers, and Taylors, and is eternally hammering on the same Subjects, and representing the same Images.

There are not wanting good Reasons to prove to 'em, that as a Man sometimes is thought plump and in good Case, when he is only *swell'd* and *bloated*; so that which is frequently taken for Accuracy of Judgment, is the Effect of some Distemper, and not at all the mark of a nice and fine Relish. The highest and most sublime Conceptions are often hid under a form that appears Vile and Contemptible. Are not the most Celestial Truths propos'd to us in the Gospel under Popular Images and Modes of Expression, like those us'd by *Socrates*? That which creeps on the Earth, is no less capable than that which is rais'd to the Heavens, of serving for a Representation to let the greatest Secrets, both of Nature and Grace into our Understanding. Nay, many times the most Simple and Common Ideas are the most proper to impress Truth on the Minds of Men, for besides that these are more proportionate to us, they do not Transport us out of our selves as the most Magnificent Ideas do. If none but great and dazling Images could strike us, God would not have fail'd to have constantly employ'd 'em, and since 'tis no more difficult for him to change Men than to illuminate 'em, he would have been so far from making his Spirit stoop to the Manners and Customs of those whom he inspired; that on the contrary he would have transform'd their Manners and Customs, to subject 'em in some sort to his Spirit, and yet he did not do thus. When he inspires *Daniel*, he leaves him to speak like a Man Educated in a Royal Court, he uses only Great and Magnificent Ideas; and when he inspires a Shepherd, such a one as *Amos*, he leaves him to explain himself by such Terms as were most familiar to him; but the Truth is every where equally sublime, and as it receives no accession to its Lustre by the Majesty of Figures, so neither does it lose any thing of its Glory by their Simpli-

city. *Socrates* was ſo well perſuaded, that this Simplicity was alone capable to move and correct the Minds of Men, that when *Critias*, the moſt Cruel of the Thirty Tyrants, commanded him to let all the Artificers alone, and talk no more of 'em, he anſwer'd; * *I muſt then let all thoſe Conſequences alone too, which I draw from 'em, and muſt ſpeak no more, either of Holineſs or Juſtice, or any other Duties that become a Good Man.*

But perhaps our Cenſors will have leſs deference for the Authority of Reaſons, that for that of Examples: 'Tis therefore neceſſary to give them an Account of what paſs'd in the Time of *Socrates* himſelf; and to ſhew 'em the Characters, both of his Friends and Enemies.

On the one ſide were the moſt ſtupid and moſt corrupt among the People, ſome of whom, through ignorance, laugh'd at his Morality, and the manner of his Behaviour: Others through the Corruption of their Hearts, could not endure his Generous Liberty.

On the other ſide, Perſons of the greateſt Honour, and of chief Note in the Commonwealth; *Pericles*, *Nicias*, *Xenophon*, *Apollodorus*, *Criton*, *Critobulus*, *Eſchinus*, *Antiſthenes*, &c. Theſe found infinite Charms in his Converſation. Who is it that is ignorant of *Alcibiades?* No Man had more Wit, or a truer guſt of things; he was one of the beſt made, Braveſt, moſt Gallant, moſt Magnificent, moſt Ambitious, and Niceſt Men in the World; he was at the Head of the Athenians, he commanded their Armies, he had won ſeveral Battles, he had glitter'd in the Courts of Kings, and had not been rudely treated by Queens. According to the Maxims of the World, there's nothing more Bright and Illuſtrious than ſuch a Man as this. Yet this ſame *Alcibiades* amidſt all this Glory and Pomp, is ſo far from being offended at *Socrates* his way and manner of Deportment, which were ſo oppoſite to his own, that he no ſooner became acquainted with him,

* *Xenoph.* in the 1ſt Book of the Memorable Things of *Socrates*.

but

but he was struck with such a sense of his Merit, and the solid Gracefulness of his Conversation, that he knew not how to leave him; he was enchanted with his Discourses, which he prefer'd to the most excellent Musick; * he confesses, that a Man could neither hear him speak, nor even hear others repeat what he had said, without being transported. The Force and Truth of his Words drew Tears from him, and made him even leap for Joy. He compar'd him to certain Statues of *Satyrs* and *Silenes*, which were made to open and shut; to look on the out-side of 'em, nothing was more ugly; but when they were open'd, all the Deities were found in 'em together. He hardly lov'd or respected any one besides him, and he never met with him, but he took off from his own Head the Crown, which he, according to the Custom, wore on days of Ceremony, and put it on the Head of *Socrates*.

Therefore there is no *medium*, we must judge of *Socrates* either as the worst and meanest of the Athenians did, or like *Pericles* and *Alcibiades*; we may take our Choice.

All these Contradictions which I have foreseen, and which indeed may make these Dialogues become to the greatest part of Readers † *like those exquisite Dainties that were formerly set on Tombs*, have not discourag'd me, but only convinc'd me that a bare Translation, though never so exact and faithful, would not make a sufficient impression on the Minds of some Men, if it were not supported by something, that might prevent all these Inconveniencies, or at least a good part of 'em; and I could think but of two ways to succeed in this.

The first was, to place an Argument at the Head of every Dialogue, to explain the Subject of it, to unfold the Art and Method of it, and to take particular notice of every thing in it of the greatest im-

* In the Dialogue of the Banquet.

† Quasi appositiones Epularum circumpositæ Sepulchro, *Ecclesiastic.* 30, 18.

portance. The Arguments of *Marsilius Ficinus* do not go to the Matter of Fact; besides, they are too abstracted, and are abundantly more difficult to be understood than the Dialogues themselves. And those of *De Serres* are too wide and indefinite, they never well fix the State of the Question, or the Quality of the Proofs; nor do they ever explain either *Plato*'s Design, or his Address. Now an Argument ought to be a faithful Guide always to attend the Reader, to conduct him where-ever he goes, and always to set him into the right Path.

The second way was to make Remarks to elucidate the principal Difficulties, to render the hidden Beauties discernable, to explain the Train of Reasoning, and the Solidity of the Principles and Proofs, and to help to discover what is false, from that which is true.

Marsilius Ficinus did not so much as think of this; *De Serres* on this Account is more useful than he; for by his Marginal Notes he at least hinders you from losing the Thread of *Plato*'s Reasoning, and makes you comprehend the Train and Progress of his Proofs: But yet he abandons you in the greatest difficulties.

In the Time of *Maximus Tyrius*, that is in the second Age, it was very earnestly desired, that some one would undertake to elucidate those obscure and knotty Passages of *Plato*; above all in what respects his Opinions in Theology, and many Philosophers labour'd in this Work, as may be seen in his Life; but with so little success, that instead of resolving the Difficulties, they have increased 'em. They have scarce assisted me once or twice in the Ten Dialogues which I have Translated; and they would have very often led me into Mistakes if I would have followed 'em.

The cause of their Errors was, that they did not draw from the true Fountain, and had a mind to explain *Plato* by *Aristotle*'s Principles, which are very different from those of *Plato*. The latter is most commonly

commonly conformable to ſound Theology, or may be very eaſily reduc'd to it by his own Principles well explain'd: But 'tis otherwiſe with his Diſciple, and where *Plato* may be once corrected by *Ariſtotle*, *Ariſtotle* may be corrected a hundred times by *Plato*.

I don't preſume ſo much on my own Ability, as to think I have filled up all the Devoirs of a good Interpreter; without doubt ſome Difficulties will yet be found in that which I have Tranſlated, but perhaps all of 'em ought not to be imputed to me. Obſcurities ordinarily ariſe from three Cauſes, from the Sublimity of the Subject, from the Ignorance of the Interpreter, and from the Incapacity or Unattention of the Reader. It will be reaſonable for the Reader to accuſe me of ſome of 'em; but let him alſo ſometimes accuſe either the Subject or himſelf: If this Conduct be obſerved, I may venture to hope for the Diminution of theſe Difficulties.

At the end of the firſt Volume the Reader will find an Abridgment of Three Dialogues, which are alſo entirely Tranſlated in the ſame Volume. That which has given occaſion to this Repetition, is as follows; I had a very great deſire to publiſh *Plato* in French, but I made this Reflection; that Philoſophy, as *Plato* himſelf ſomewhere ſays, requires Free Men who are Maſters of their Time; and who, provided they find the Truth, don't enquire whether the Diſcourſes that lead to it, are long or ſhort: But nothing in our Time is more rarely found, than theſe Free Men. Some are ſo oppreſs'd with Care and Buſineſs, that they are ſcarce ever at their own diſpoſal; and others are ſo continually agitated and ſhuffled by a Thouſand Paſſions, that they are always in Action, without doing any thing, and reſemble ſo many fugitive Slaves.

Therefore to Accomodate *Plato* to the Occupations of the former, and the reſtleſs Humour of the latter, I thought ſuch Abridgments might be made, as would be of very great Uſe; and I made ſome, in which I preſerved, the beſt I could, the Spirit of

Socrates

Socrates and his Method, ſo that none of his Principal Strokes might be loſt. From hence I ſuppos'd two conſiderable Advantages might be drawn. Firſt, That by this means *Plato* might be read in a Weeks time, and then, that the Truths he teaches, would be more deeply fix'd in the Mind; becauſe the Proofs being more contracted, would make a more lively Impreſſion. I was farther confirm'd in this Thought by obſerving the effect theſe Abridgments produced on all that heard 'em read; every one was mov'd by 'em, and could not chuſe but feel the force of 'em.

But it muſt be confeſs'd to the Glory of *Plato*, and perhaps ſomewhat to my Shame too, that when I was on the point of committing 'em to the Preſs, and was willing to review 'em by the Original, I was my ſelf diſguſted with my Work, and found in the Original ſo many Elegancies which I had not been able to preſerve; that I was afraid I ſhould make it ſuſtain too great a loſs in not publiſhing it entire, for nothing can be taken from it, that is not worthy to be admired. And to think there are any Vacuities and uſeleſs parts in his Writings, is but to deceive ones ſelf. There is a great deal of difference between a Man's quitting his Subject, and ſounding it to the bottom. *Plato* always goes back to firſt Principles, and examines every Subject on all its different ſides; he maintains that this is the only way to make ſure Demonſtrations; and he is every where ſuch an Enemy to long Diſcourſes, that is, ſuch as are uſeleſs, that he looks upon 'em as the Rock on which Truth is ſplit, and as the Character, not of a Philoſopher, but of a Sophiſt. This obliged me to alter my Reſolution: However, in Obedience to ſome Perſons of very great Merit, who deſired theſe Abridgments of me, I have publiſhed three, that the Publick may draw ſome profit from 'em, or at leaſt may make a Judgment of 'em.

I might here have a fair occasion to answer the Invectives that have been made against *Plato* in our Time: But since they come only from such Persons as never read so much as one of his Dialogues; perhaps they'll change their Sentiments when once they have read him. Besides, 'tis wasting of ones Time to defend *Plato*; for he sufficiently defends himself; and that may be said of him with yet more Justice, which the greatest of the Latin Historians said of *Cato*, equally ridiculing the Praises *Cicero* had given him, and the Satyrs *Cesar* had made on him. * *None could ever augment the Glory of this Great Man by his Praises, nor diminish it by his Satyrs.*

* Cujus Gloriæ neque profuit quisquam laudando, nec vituperando quisquam nocuit. *Titus Livius.*

THE

THE LIFE of *PLATO*, WITH An Account of the Principal of his Opinions in Philoſophy.

GOD was pleas'd to endow the firſt Man with true Wiſdom; but the Paſſions ſoon communicated to him their Mortal Poyſon, and precipitated him into a ſtate of Rebellion againſt his Maker, and ſo made him loſe all the advantages of his Origin. 'Tis from this Fountain his Poſterity have deriv'd all their Errors. Being unhappily taught what Good they had loſt, by the Evils they ſuffer'd, they made their beſt Efforts to repair their loſs. But ſince Man in a ſtate of Perfection had not ſtrength enough to keep that Happineſs he enjoy'd; how ſhould he be able when in a ſtate of Corruption, to put himſelf in poſſeſſion of that true Good, of which Sin had deprived him? No, 'tis not to be expected from him, that he ſhould conduct us back to our former Felicity. This is the work of God and not of Man. All the wiſe Pagans may in this reſpect be compar'd to drunken Men, who while they have a mind to return Home, knock at every Door, and take every Houſe for their own. Some remains of Reaſon ſtill gave 'em a diſcovery of what they ought to ſeek; and an inexhauſtible Source of Blindneſs and Corruption, ſtill hinder'd 'em from finding it, or if they found it from embracing it. *Socrates* was the firſt of 'em, who was eminently diſtinguiſh'd from others by a clearer and purer Light (which perhaps was

The Riſe of all the different Sects of Philoſophers.

was the Reward of his Modesty and Humility) and acquir'd a more sublime and certain knowledg of the Duties of Man, of the Nature of God, of the Law of Nature, and of Justice. Therefore *Plato* says of him, that he added Fire to Fire, thereby signifying, that by amassing together those degrees of Light, which he found scatter'd up and down; and giving 'em a new Lustre by his luminous and fruitful Mind, he spread Light far and near, and rais'd a great Flame out of that, which before his time, was but a number of little Sparks almost buried under the Ashes: But this sublime knowledg of his, was not without a mixture of many Errors; so that to gain advantage by his Doctrine, which has been preserv'd and improv'd by *Plato*, care must be taken to separate the Truths which it pleas'd God to discover to him, from the Falshoods and Illusions, in which he himself involv'd 'em. This we may most certainly do, since we have the true measure of Truth in our Hands, which is the Word of God. All he says, that is conformable to this, is undoubtedly true; and may moreover serve to prove the Truths of the Christian Religion; and whatever is opposite to it, is the fruit of Falshood and Error. And the Doctrine of *Plato* it self has this advantage, that such an Examen as we plead for is one of his principal Rules, and his first Principle; for he maintains, that nothing ought ever to be received in any Science, but what agrees with * Eternal Truth, and with the Oracles of God.

Plato founded the Old Academy on the Opinions of *Pythagoras*, those of *Heraclitus*, and those of *Socrates*, and by adding to the discoveries of these great Men that Light which he had acquir'd in his Travels, and had deriv'd from the same Springs, he establish'd a Sect of Philosophers much more perfect than those that had appear'd in the World before him. However, I shall not look back so far as those

* By this Eternal Truth *Plato* means an ancient Tradition, which he pretends the first Men received from God, and transmitted to their Posterity.

Philoso-

Philoſophers I have mention'd, whoſe Opinions may be ſeen in *Diogenes Laertius*. I'll ſay but a Word of them by the way, and confining my ſelf only to what relates to *Plato*. I ſhall firſt give an Account of his Life; after this I ſhall explain his Doctrine, and examin it with reſpect to Morality, Religion, Policy, Phyſicks and Logick. I ſhall as much as in me lies, diſcover the Source, both of the Truths and Errors he teaches: I ſhall ſpeak of his way of treating the Subjects on which he inſiſts: From thence I ſhall proceed to make a Judgment of his Stile; I ſhall ſpeak of his Principal Interpreters, and in fine ſhall give a Tranſlation of ſome of his Dialogues; the Method and Subjects of which I ſhall explain; and here I ſhall remark whatever I think may be ſtill of uſe to us. 'Tis with ſuch a diſpoſition of Mind as this, that we ſhould read the Works of the Heathens; for thoſe who are too much enamour'd of 'em, and take up with them, never find enough Truth in 'em to give 'em Satisfaction and Righteouſneſs enough to fortifie 'em againſt Vice, but continue to want the true Food of Souls, and remain indigent of ſolid Vertue. This Method I ſpeak of, is taught us by a * Learned Father of the Church, and was followed by himſelf, as he informs us in the † Letter he wrote to Pope *Damaſus*; in which, after he had applied to this purpoſe, the ‡ Law God gave his People, concerning a ſtrange Woman, when taken Captive in War, who was not to be married to an Iſraelite, till he had caus'd her to change her Clothes, to be purified, and to have her Nails and her Hair cut; he adds. ‖ "*We do the ſame when we read the Hea-*
"*then Philoſophers (who to us are that ſtrange Wo-*

* St. *Jerome*. † Letter 146. ‡ *Deut. Chap.* 21.

‖ Itaque & nos facere ſolemus quando Philoſophos legimus, quando in manus noſtras libri veniunt ſapientiæ ſæcularis; ſi quid in eis utile reperimus, ad noſtrum dogma convertimus, ſi quid verò ſuperfluum, de Idolis, de amore, de cura ſæcularium rerum, hæc radimus, his Calvicium inducimus, hæc in unguium morem ſecto acutiſſimo reſecamus.

"*man*)

" *man) and when the Books of the Wisdom of this* " *World fall into our hands. If we find any thing* " *in 'em that is profitable, we make use of it by re-* " *ferring it to our own Principles; and when we* " *find any thing useless and superfluous, as when they* " *treat of Idols, of Love, and of the Care of Earth-* " *ly and Perishable things, this we pare away. These* " *are the Clothes which we take from this strange* " *Woman; these are the Nails and Hair we cut off* " *with a sharp Instrument.*

By this means we restore to the good Philosophy and sound Theology of the Ancient *Hebrews*, what the *Greeks* have stollen from 'em, for they are enrich'd only with their Spoils.

Plato descended from a Brother of *Solon*, and consequently was of the Family of *Codrus* King of *Athens*, and thus his Genealogy may be Trac'd to *Neptune* by *Neleus* King of *Pylos*, from whom *Codrus* descended in the Fifth Generation: So that in respect of his Birth, his Nobility was as great as any the Pride of any Man can flatter themselves withal. *Ariston* having espous'd his Cousin German *Perictione*, * 'tis pretended that *Apollo* appear'd to him in a Dream, and forbad him to approach his Wife, because she was with Child by Him. *Ariston* obey'd; and now look'd upon *Perictione* no more as his Wife, but as a Goddess, till she was deliver'd of *Plato*, on the Day of *Apollo*'s † Nativity, as the Delians affirm. *Plutarch* makes a Reflection upon this, which deserves not to be forgot. He says, Those that have made *Apollo Plato*'s Father, have done that God no dishonour in attributing to him the Production of a Man, who is the Physician of Souls; and labours to cure 'em of the most violent Passions, and most dangerous Distempers. And St. *Jerome*

* These Suppositions were usual in those Times, for instance, there was soon after this, a Woman of the Kingdom of *Pontus*, who persuaded a multitude of People that she was with Child by *Apollo*, and was brought to Bed of a Son, who was nam'd *Silenus*, whom *Lysander* was willing to make use of to carry on the Design he had laid to make himself King of *Sparta*. † The 7th of *Feb.*

some-

ſomewhere obſerves, That thoſe Philoſophers who firſt gave out this Fable, did not believe that he whom they look'd upon as the Prince of Wiſdom, could be born of any other than a Virgin.

Plato was born the firſt Year of the Eighty eighth Olympiade, that is 426 Years before the Nativity of *Jeſus Chriſt*. He was at firſt call'd *Ariſtocles*, after the Name of his Grand-Farher: His Wreſtling-Maſter call'd him *Plato*, from his broad ſquare Shoulders; and he continued ever after to bear this Name. In his Infancy as he was one Day ſleeping under a Myrtle Tree, 'tis ſaid a Swarm of Bees ſettled upon his Lips, which was taken as an Omen to ſignifie that his Style would be extreamly ſweet. He began his Studies under a Grammarian call'd *Dionyſius*, made his Exerciſes under *Ariſton* of *Argos*, learn'd Muſick of *Draco* the Athenian; and under *Metellus* of *Agrigentum*, he apply'd himſelf to Painting and Poeſy; he even made ſome Tragedies which he burnt when he was 20 Years of Age, after he had heard *Socrates*. To this Philoſopher he entirely adher'd; and having a marvellous Inclination to Vertue, made ſo good a Proficiency by the Diſcourſes of this Righteous Man, that at 25 Years of Age he gave ſuch proofs of his extraordinary Wiſdom, as made it appear that he was already capable of Governing a State.

The Lacedemonians had then made themſelves Maſters of *Athens*, and *Lyſander* eſtabliſhed there the Government of 30, who at firſt Rul'd with ſome kind of Mildneſs, but ſoon after made uſe of a Tyrannical Power. At this Juncture *Plato* gave a very conſiderable Inſtance of the freedom of his Soul, and ſhew'd he could not truckle to make his Court to a Tyrant. *Lyſander*, who made all ſtoop to him, and had render'd himſelf formidable by his Cruelties, kept ſome Poets about him, who made it their buſineſs to celebrate his Glory, and flatter his Vanity. *Antimachus* and *Niceratus* were of this Number; they made Verſes in Praiſe of *Lyſander*, by way of Emula-

lation; he being made Judge of their Performance, gave the Prize to *Niceratus*. *Antimachus* overborn with this Disgrace, suppressed his Poem. *Plato* who lov'd him for his fine Poetry, endeavour'd to encourage him, and without fearing *Lysander*'s Resentment, told him, that he was not so much to be blam'd as his Judge; for (said he) Ignorance is as bad a Distemper in the Eyes of the Mind, as blindness in those of the Body.

Plato's Merit which now began to be much taken notice of, induc'd the Ministers of Tyranny to make the greatest efforts they could to draw him to their Party, and to engage him to concern himself in the Government. Nothing was propos'd to him but what was suitable to his Age, and agreeable to his Maxims. Indeed all his Ambition lay in a desire of making the Knowledge he had acquir'd, serviceable to his Countrey; and he was so far perswaded by the Promises of those Thirty Tyrants, that he did not despair of inducing 'em at length to abandon their Arbitrary Methods; and Govern the City with all the Wisdom and Moderation of good Magistrates. While he employ'd his Thoughts to this purpose Night and Day, and was in search of the most proper means to make this Design successful, he carefully observ'd all their Steps: But soon perceiv'd that the Mischief grew worse and worse; and that the Spirit of Tyranny was too deeply rooted, to leave him any hope of being able to destroy it. * These Thirty Tyrants filled the whole City with Murders and Proscriptions; and while he had a share in the Publick Affairs, it came to this Point, that he must either be a Confederate in their Crimes, or a Victim to their Fury. The pressure of this Misfortune, which none but God himself could redress; gave a check to his Ambition, and made him willing to wait for more favourable Times.

Fortune soon appear'd willing to second his good Intentions; for the Thirty Tyrants were expell'd,

* See Xenophon's History of Greece. Lib. 2.

and the Form of the Government quite changed. This gave a little Revival to *Plato*'s Hopes, when almoſt extinguiſhed. But it was not long before he perceiv'd that this new form of Government was no better than the former; and that the State every day receiv'd new Wounds. Nay *Socrates* himſelf was ſacrific'd upon this Revolution. The Laws were trampled under foot, Order and Diſcipline were no more regarded, and all Authority was in the Hands of the People, who were always more formidable than any Tyrants could be. It was impoſſible to rectify this Diſorder, for a Man that ſhould undertake it had need of good Friends; and in ſo great a Confuſion, the Fidelity of old Friends becomes as ſuſpected as that of new ones is dangerous.

Plato knew not what to determine under theſe Circumſtances. He had no expectation of help from the neighbouring Cities, where Confuſion reigned no leſs than it did at *Athens*. In an Age wherein Philoſophy was advanc'd to its higheſt perfection, Injuſtice was carried to the laſt extremity, which is the ordinary effect of that Contempt of Truth which Men ſometimes manifeſt, when it ſhines upon 'em with the greateſt evidence. This Inundation of Injuſtice and Violence augmented the love which *Plato* bore to Philoſophy; He caſt himſelf into its Arms as into a ſafe Port, fully convinc'd that the Welfare of Cities and of particular Perſons depend on it; and that it is impoſſible to be happy without it. At this time he heard the Diſcourſes of *Cratylus* who taught the Philoſophy of *Heraclitus*, and *Hermogenes* who taught that of *Parmenides*. He afterward went to *Megara* to ſee *Euclid* who founded the *Megarick* Sect. From *Megara* he paſs'd to *Cyrene* to perfect himſelf in the Mathematicks under *Theodorus*, who was the greateſt Mathematician of his Time. He then viſited *Egypt*, and convers'd a long time with the Egyptian Prieſts, who taught him a great part of their Traditions, and made him acquainted with the Books of *Moſes*, and thoſe of the Prophets.

While

While he was at *Memphis* there arriv'd a Lacedemonian who was ſent by *Ageſilaus* to deſire the Prieſt *Connuphis* to explain a certain Inſcription which was found on a Copper Plate in the Tomb of *Alcmene*. This Prieſt after he had ſpent three days in looking over all ſorts of Figures and Characters, anſwer'd, that the Letters of this Plate were ſuch as were uſed in *Egypt*, in the time of *Proteus*, that *Hercules* had carried them into *Greece*, and that they contain'd an Admonition which God gave the Greeks to live in Peace; by inſtituting Sports in honour of the Muſes, by the ſtudy of Philoſophy, and other parts of Learning, and by diſputing one againſt another with Reaſons, and Words of Juſtice, with a deſign only to know the Truth and to follow the Dictates of it. 'Tis probable this Prieſt was not able to read the Inſcription, but wiſely made uſe of ſo favourable an occaſion to appeaſe the Grecian Wars, which was infinitely better than if he had read it.

This Stratagem of *Connuphis* was ſoon ſerviceable to *Plato* for a like deſign; for when he was upon his return with *Simmias*, and on the Coaſt of *Caria*, he met ſome Men that came from *Delos*, who entreated him to explain a very terrible Prediction which they had received from the Oracle of *Apollo*. The Purport of it was, that the Miſeries under which the Greeks labour'd ſhould not ceaſe, till they had doubled the Cubical Altar which was in his Temple. They told him they had attempted to put this Order in execution, but that when they had doubled each ſide of the Altar, inſtead of making it double as they hop'd to have done, and as the God requir'd, they made it eight fold; which made 'em fear the continuation of their Calamities. *Plato* calling to mind what the Egyptian Prieſt had done, told 'em, that God did but mock the Greeks for their Contempt of Sciences; and by reproaching 'em of their Ignorance and Stupidity, exhorted 'em ſeriouſly to apply themſelves to the ſtudy of Geometry, which alone would make 'em able to find

two proportional Lines to double a Cubical Body by equally augmenting all its Dimensions. And added, that if they had a mind to correct their Work, it was but to addresse themselves to *Eudoxus* or *Helicon*; but that God had no design at all to have his Altar doubled, and that the only thing he requir'd by the Oracle was, that they should lay down their Arms to converse with the Muses, and moderate their Passions by the Study of Letters, and Sciences; in rendering mutual Love and Service, instead of hating and destroying one another. He went after this into *Italy*, where he heard *Philolaus* and *Eurytus*, who were Pythagorean Philosophers. From thence he pass'd into *Sicily* to see the Wonders of that Island: By this time he had arrived to forty Years of Age.

This Voyage, which was purely the effect of his Curiosity, laid the first foundations of the Liberty of *Syracuse*, and made way for those great things that were put in Execution by *Dion*, * the Brother-in-Law and Favourite of *Dionysius* the Elder.

There was at that time a Young Man who was naturally Couragious and Magnanimous; but having had a Servile Education under a Tyrant, and being accustom'd to the Submissions and Slavery of a Cringing and Timerous Courtier, and which is yet more pernicious, brought up in Luxury, Opulence, and Lazineſs, would have suffer'd those precious Seeds of Vertue to die in his Soul, had not *Plato* reviv'd them by his Discourses. He had no sooner heard the Precepts of this Philosopher, but his Mind was so inflam'd with the love of Vertue, that he desir'd nothing so much as to embrace and follow it. And perceiving with what facility *Plato* had chang'd his Mind, he believ'd he might produce the same effect upon that of *Dionysius* too, and could not rest till he had engag'd this Prince to have a Conference with him. *Dionysius*, who then

See Plutarch *in the Life of* Dion.

* For he was the Son of *Hipparinus*, whose Daughter *Dionysius* had married.

enjoy'd

enjoy'd a great deal of Leisure, consented to this Enterview. Their Discourse was wholly on Vertue, and they presently fell into a Dispute about the Nature of true Fortitude: *Plato* prov'd that this could by no means be attributed to Tyrants, who are so far from being Valiant and Brave, that they are more Weak and Timorous than Slaves. They afterwards came to speak of Utility, and of Justice. *Plato* shew'd that nothing could be properly said to be useful, but that which is Honest and Just; and made it appear, that the Life of Just Men was happy amidst the greatest Adversity; and that of the Unjust miserable in the very bosom of Prosperity. *Dionysius* who found himself convinc'd by his own Experience, could no longer hold the Discourse, but with a pretence of making a Jest of his Morals, told him *his Discourses savour'd of Old Age*; to which *Plato* replied, *that his savour'd of Tyranny.* This Prince not accustom'd to hear such odious Truths, ask'd him very importunately *for what he came into* Sicily? *Plato* answer'd that, *He came thither to seek a good Man. And by thy Speech*, replied Dionysius, *it seems thou hast not yet found one.*

In another Conference which was no less smart than the former, the Tyrant to intimate to *Plato*, that he ought to conduct himself with more Caution before him, and not to use so provoking a Liberty of Speech, mention'd these two Verses to him,

——* *In every Tyrant's Court*
He a meer Slave becomes, who enters free.

Plato return'd him these two Lines, changing the latter thus,

——*In every Tyrant's Court*
Who enters free, shall ne're become a Slave.

to signifie that a True Philosopher can never lose

* These are two Lines of *Sophocles.*

his Liberty. *Dion* fearing the Prince's Diſpleaſure hereupon would have ſome fatal effect, ask'd a Diſmiſſion for *Plato*, that he might take the advantage of a Veſſel that was to carry back *Poluides* the Lacedemonian Ambaſſador. *Dionyſius* gave him leave to go; but preſſed the Ambaſſador with great importunity, either to take *Plato*'s Life away by the way, or at leaſt to ſell him; aſſuring him, this would do him no injury. *For if he is a Juſt Man* (ſays he) *he'll be as happy in Slavery as in the enjoyment of Liberty.* 'Tis ſaid *Poluides* carried him to the Iſle of *Ægina*, where a Law had been publiſhed, by which all Athenians that ſhould come aſhoar there, were order'd to be put to death. *Plato* therefore was taken, and brought before the Judges. He expected his Sentence without ſhewing any token of fear; which made one of 'em think fit to ſay, that he was a Philoſopher, and not an Athenian. This word ſpoken after a jeſting manner, ſav'd his Life. He was only condemn'd to be ſold, and was immediately bought for Thirty * Mina's by a Cyrenian named *Anniceris*, who ſet him at Liberty, ſent him back to *Athens*, and would by no means be reimburs'd; telling them, That as the Athenians were not the only Perſons who knew *Plato*'s Merit, ſo they were not the only Perſons who were worthy to render him Service. However, *Plato* ſays nothing of all theſe particulars in his Seventh Letter, where he ſpeaks of this Voyage into *Sicily*; and t'is probable he would not have forgotten to ſpeak at leaſt of his Benefactor.

After the Death of *Dionyſius* the Elder, his Son *Dionyſius* the Younger ſucceeded; who had been very ill Educated; for his Father, who was jealous even of his own Children, had always ſtrictly kept him from Company; leſt if he ſhould come to know himſelf, and to converſe with Men of Senſe, who were weary of Slavery, he ſhould Conſpire againſt him. This Young Prince was no ſooner up-

* About Sixty Pound Sterling, or ſomething more.

On

on the Throne, but he was so dazzled with his Grandeur, that he knew not where he was, and so became an easie prey to his Courtiers, who forgot nothing that might corrupt him, and became the ingenious and industrious Ministers of his Pleasures. Nothing was to be seen in the Pallace but horrible Corruption of Manners and Excesses. They had Debauches that held for Three Months together, during which time, all Wise and Sober Men, whose presence alone would have condemn'd or disturb'd these shameful Divertisements, were forbidden to enter. *Dion*, whose concern for the State made him fear the Pleasures of the Young *Dionysius* more than ever he had fear'd the Cruelty of his Father, lost no opportunity of letting him know what Precipices were before him, and how certain his Fall would be; and believing his Vices sprang only from Ignorance and Idleness, he endavoured to put him upon some Honourable Exercises, and to make him in Love with the Sciences, especially that which aims at the Reformation of Manners. He told him, nothing but Vertue could give him a solid Happiness, which would extend its Influence to all his People. That his Father had in vain flatter'd himself, that he had left him an Empire bound with Adamantine Chains, since these Chains would soon be soften'd by his Debauches. That Fear and Force were not the true Supports of a Throne, but the Affection and Love of Subjects, which, he said, was always the consequence of the Vertue and Justice of Princes. He represented to him, that True Grandeur consists not in having great Equipages, superb Pallaces, sumptuous Furniture, and fine Clothes; but in having the Pallace of the Mind royally adorn'd: And that none but *Plato* was capable of communicating to him all the Vertues that ought to embellish a Prince's Soul. By entertaining him with such Discourses as these, in which he always thus intermix'd the great Truths he had learn'd from this Philosopher; he inspir'd him with such

an ardent, or rather furious desire to draw him to his Court, and to put himself under his Direction, that he sent Couriers to *Athens* with very pressing Letters of his own, accompanied with other Letters of *Dion*'s, and of all the Pythagorean Philosophers that were in *Great Greece*; who entreated him very earnestly to take the advantage of the favourable Opportunity the Divine Providence offer'd him, to make a Philosopher of a King; and conjur'd him to come with expedition, before the Debauches of the Court had made this Prince alter his Resolution, who at present was passionately in Love with Philosophy.

These great Promises did not immediately move *Plato*, who knew Young People too well, to promise himself any thing certain from the Flashes of a Young Prince, whose Inclinations commonly are various and opposite, and frequently pass suddenly off; and in whom the Love of Vertue does not always take root deeply enough to resist the Efforts of those Vices which attaque him on all sides. So that *Plato* did not know how to resolve on this Voyage; but at length, after he had consider'd, that in curing only one Man, he should make a whole Nation happy, and that perhaps God was opening a way for him here, actually to set on foot that Perfect Government of which he had already given the Idea in the first Books of his Commonwealth; he resolv'd to go, not out of Vanity, or to acquire Riches, as his Enemies have accused him; but was overcome only by the respect he bore to himself, that he might not give the World an occasion to reproach him, that he only discours'd of Vertue, but never voluntarily put himself in a Condition to reduce it to practise.

To these Reasons there was added another Motive much more pressing; and that was, that it would be a shame for him to abandon *Dion* in the dangerous Circumstances he was in, attack'd on all sides by the Calumnies of his Enemies; who because they could

not

not bear the Severity of his Manners, and the Wisdom of his Conduct, endeavour'd to render him suspected to *Dionysius*, and who would infallibly destroy him, if this Prince had time given him to relapse into his former Disorders. This cast the Ballance in detetmining *Plato* to quit his Employments at 64 years of Age, to go, it may be with too much Confidence, as himself confesses, to deal with the Caprices of a young Tyrant.

He was received in *Sicily* with all possible marks of Honour. *Dionysius* was not content only to send him a Galley adorn'd with Ribbands, as if he had been a God, but also went himself to receive him at the Port in a magnificent Charriot, into which he took him; and render'd thanks to the Gods by a publick Sacrifice for his Arrival, as the greatest Felicity that could happen ro his Government.

This so happy beginning had yet happier Consequences; for, as if some God had appear'd and taken pleasure in changing of Hearts; the whole Court became so reform'd, at least in appearance, that the Pallace of *Dionysius* was more like a School of Philosophers, or a sacred Temple, than the place of a Tyrant's Residence.

Some days after *Plato*'s Arrival the time of an Anniversary Sacrifice came about, which was wont to be offer'd in the Castle for the Prince's Prosperity.

The Herald having according to the Custom, pronounced with a loud Voice the solemn Prayer in this Form, *May it please the Gods long to maintain the Tyranny, and to preserve the Tyrant.* *Dionysius* who began to hate those Names, cry'd aloud to him. *What wilt thou never leave cursing me?* By which words 'twas judg'd the Discourses of *Plato* had made a real and strong Impression on his Mind: This made all those that favour'd this Tyrannical Form of Government, believe 'twas best to lose no time, and that it was necessary to ruine *Dion* and *Plato* before they had acquir'd Authority and Power enough over the Tyrant, to render all their Efforts useless. They

soon

ſoon found an occaſion very favourable to their deſign, nor did they fail to make their advantage of it. *Plato* had already perſwaded *Dionyſius* to diſmiſs ten thouſand Forreigners which compos'd his Guard, to disband ten thouſand Horſe, with the greateſt part of his Infantry, and to reduce the 400 Galleys, which he always kept equip'd, to a very ſmall number. Thoſe ill deſigning Men miſrepreſented this Advice, and would have perſwaded *Dionyſius* that *Dion* had engag'd this Sophiſt to induce him to diſtruſt his Guards, and the reſt of his Troops, that ſo the Athenians finding him without defence might come and ravage *Sicily*, and revenge themſelves for the Loſſes they had ſuſtained under *Nicias*; or elſe with a deſign to expel him, and to take his place himſelf in the Throne. This Calumny, which was plauſible enough to ſurprize a Tyrant, did not however produce half the effect they expected from it. Only *Dion* became a Victim to the Anger of *Dionyſius*, who caus'd him to be put on board a Veſſel in his Preſence; and ſhamefully baniſhed him.

At the ſame time it was reported at *Syracuſe*, that he had alſo put *Plato* to death; but this Story had no foundation; for *Dionyſius* on the contrary redoubled his Careſſes towards him, either becauſe he believed, that he had been firſt deluded by the Artifices of *Dion*, or elſe becauſe indeed he himſelf could not tell how to live without ſeeing and hearing him.

The Love he had for *Plato* augmented every day, and advanc'd to that exceſs, that he became as jealous of him, as of a Miſtreſs, and us'd his utmoſt Efforts to oblige him to prefer his Friendſhip to that of *Dion*: But, as *Plato* ſaid, he took a wrong Courſe to obtain this Preference; for he endeavour'd to acquire it only by demonſtrarions of an ambitious and tyrannical Love, inſtead of meriting it, if that had been poſſible, by a conformity of Manners, in making an Improvement of his Maxims, and uniting himſelf to him by the bonds of Vertue. His Ti-

mouſneſs

mourousneſs rather than his Ill humour hinder'd him from taking this method: for tho he paſſionately lov'd *Plato*, he ſcarce dar'd to ſee him but by ſtealth, for fear of irritating ſuch as were diſpleas'd with this Intimacy between 'em; ſo that he always fluctuated between deſire, and fear, and thereby render'd all *Plato*'s Exhortations uſeleſs to him, and remain'd a Slave to his Vices. However becauſe he fear'd he would leave *Sicily* without his permiſſion, he order'd him to lodge in the Caſtle, on pretence to do him honour, but in reality to ſecure his Perſon. There he endeavour'd to gain his Heart by the moſt magnificent Offers he could think of. He ſhew'd him his Treaſures, and told him all that he deſir'd of him was to become Maſter of his Forces, and of all his Power, provided he would love him more than *Dion*. Few Philoſophers would have reſiſted ſuch powerful Temptations. But *Plato*, who could make Vertue give place to Vice in his Soul, conſtantly told him, that he would love him as much as *Dion*, when once he was as truly vertuous as He. This threw the Tyrant into an horrible Rage; he threaten'd him with Death, and the next moment beg'd pardon for all his Violence. *Plato* would have found his Priſon more tolerable, if he had been the Object of his Hatred; for he was every day oblig'd to uſe new Management to make the Obligations of Hoſpitality agree with the Intereſts of Philoſophy. In fine, he had the good Fortnne to be deliver'd from this Captivity. For a War broke out, which forc'd *Dionyſius* to ſend him back into *Greece*. At his departure he would have loaded him with Preſents, which *Plato* refus'd, contenting himſelf with the Promiſe he made him of recalling *Dion*, when the War ſhould be once ended. When he was ready to embark *Dionyſius* ſaid to him. Plato, *when thou art in the Academy with thy Philoſophers thou wilt ſpeak ill of me.* *God forbid* (reply'd Plato) *that we ſhould have ſo much time to loſe in the Academy as to talk of* Dionyſius. The diſintereſſedneſs of *Plato* appear'd on many

many occaſions, as his Rivals themſelves could not chuſe but grant. *Dionyſius* having a mind to make Preſents to the Philoſophers of his Court, and putting it to their choice what to have, *Ariſtippus* deſir'd Money, and *Plato* ask'd only for Books; upon which *Ariſtippus* being rallied for his Avarice, made anſwer, *Plato loves Books, and I love Money.*

As he return'd into *Greeee* he paſs'd by *Olympia* to ſee the Games; and there gave marks of a Modeſty not much differing from deep Humility, and ſuch as deſerve to be remark'd. He happen'd to lodge with ſome Strangers of conſiderable Note; He eat with 'em, paſs'd whole Days in their Company, liv'd after a moſt ſimple and ordinary manner, without ever ſpeaking a word to 'em either of *Socrates* or the Academy; and without letting them know any thing more of himſelf than that his Name was *Plato.* Theſe Strangers were extremely pleas'd that they had found a Man of ſo ſweet and ſociable a Temper; but becauſe he ſpoke only of very common Matters, they never thought he was that Philoſopher, whoſe Name was ſo well known.

The Games being ended, they went with him to *Athens*, where he furniſhed 'em with Lodgings; they were no ſooner come thither, but they entreated him to carry 'em to ſee that great Man, who bore the ſame Name with him, and was the Diſciple of *Socrates*. *Plato* told 'em ſmiling, that himſelf was the Man. Theſe Strangers were ſurpriz'd, that they had ſo long poſſeſs'd ſo great a Perſon among 'em without knowing him; and could not ſufficiently admire that he had liv'd with 'em after ſo plain and ſimple a manner, and that he had ſhown that by the ſweetneſs of his Manners alone, without the help of his Wit and Eloquence, he could gain the friendſhip of all Perſons with whom he convers'd.

Some time after this, he gave the People * Plays, for which *Dion* furniſhed the Habits, and was at

* They were Tragedies.

all

all the Charge: *Plato* being willing to let him have this Honour, that his Magnificence might acquire him a yet greater Intereſt in the Good-Will of the Athenians. It is not known whether *Dion* made a long ſtay at *Athens*; this only is certain, that *Plato* forgot nothing that might induce him to moderate his Reſentment, and not to attempt any thing againſt *Dionyſius*. He repreſented to him, that the Injuſtice that had been done him, and the ill Conduct of that Prince, were not a lawful occaſion of taking up Arms againſt him; That he ought to reduce him by Reaſon, or to wait for ſome Change of Fortune; that he could not have recourſe to force, without doing himſelf a very great injury; and bringing entire ruin upon *Sicily* beſides. And to diſpoſe him the better to reliſh theſe Maxims, he endeavoured to make him pleaſant and gay by innocent Divertiſements; and above all, by the Converſation of his Nephew *Pſeuſippus*, which was very agreeable, and this ſucceeded for ſome time.

After *Dionyſius* had ended the War, he fear'd the Treatment he had given *Plato*, would give him diſcredit among the Philoſophers and make him paſs for their Enemy, therefore he ſent for the moſt Learned Men of *Italy*, and held Aſſemblies in his Pallace, where he ſtrove by a fooliſh Ambition to ſurpaſs 'em all in Eloquence, and depth of Knowledge, and impertinently utter'd what he had retain'd of *Plato*'s Diſcourſes: But theſe having place only in his Memory, without reaching his Heart, the Source was ſoon exhauſted. He then became ſenſible of what he had loſt, in not making a better improvement of that Treaſure of Wiſdom, and in not retaining it with him. So that he began to long for *Plato* again with extream impatience; which he ſignified to him by frequent Letters. *Plato* excus'd himſelf on account of his Age, and of the failure of *Dionyſius* in not performing any thing that he had promiſed. In fine, *Dionyſius* not able to bear his Refuſal any longer, oblig'd *Archytas* to write to him,

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and to engage his Word, that he might come in ſafety, and that *Dionyſius* would perform his Promiſe to him. At the ſame time he ſent a Galley with ſome of his Friends, of which number *Archidemus* the Philoſopher was one; they aſſur'd *Plato* of *Dionyſius* his vehement Love to Philoſophy, and preſented the following Letter from him.

What I deſire with the greateſt ardor is, that thou wouldſt ſuffer thy ſelf to be perſuaded to come ſpeedily into Sicily. *I will do for* Dion *whatever thou ſhalt deſire; for I am perſuaded thou wilt deſire nothing but what is Juſt, to which I will always very readily ſubmit: But if thou refuſe to come, I declare to thee, that I will never do any thing that ſhall be agreeable to thee, either in the Affairs of* Dion, *or in any thing elſe wherein thy Intereſt is concerned,* &c.

This Letter, which favour'd more of a Tyrant than of a Philoſopher, would have had an effect contrary to his wiſhes, if *Dion* had not added his Solicitations, and Entreaties, conjuring *Plato* not to abandon him; and if all the Philoſophers of *Italy* and *Sicily* had not written to him, that if he refus'd to come, he would render 'em all ſuſpected in the mind of *Dionyſius*, who would certainly imagine, that he had inſinuated them into his favour, only that they might betray him. And it was this that determin'd *Plato* to go the third time into *Sicily*, when he was Seventy Years of Age.

His Arrival rais'd the hopes of all the People, who flatter'd themſelves that his Wiſdom would at laſt ſubdue the Tyranny they were under; and *Dionyſius* expreſs'd, on this occaſion, a Joy not to be deſcrib'd by Words. He order'd him to Lodge in the Apartment of the Gardens, and had ſuch Confidence in him, that he allow'd him acceſs to his Perſon at all times without being ſearch'd. *Plato* immediately uſed all the Addreſs he had to know if he had a true deſire of becoming Vertuous. He

* tells

* tells us himself after what manner he made the Tryal of it; but he soon perceiv'd, that he was called thither only out of Vanity, and to deprive *Dion* of the Society of a faithful Friend. When he would have propos'd the recalling of this Exile, he was so far from accommodating his Affairs, that he entirely ruin'd 'em. *Dionysius* forbad his Intendants to send *Dion* his Revenues, on pretence that all his Estate belong'd to his Son *Hipparinus*, who was his Nephew; to whom by consequence he was the Natural Guardian. *Plato* highly provok'd by this Act of Injustice, desir'd leave to be gone. *Dionysius* promised to order him a Vessel, but put it off from one Day to another, and after he had thus amus'd him for a considerable time, he one Day told him, *That if he would continue with him one Year longer, he would send* Dion *all his Estate, provided he would place it in* Peloponelus *or at* Athens, *that he should only enjoy the Revenue of it, and that he should not have power to take away the Principal, without the consent of* Plato *and his Friends. For,* said he, *I cannot trust him, but am jealous he would employ this Money against me.* ***Plato*** accepted this offer, but *Dionysius* deceiv'd him again; for after the Season fit for his Embarking was past, he said he would restore but one half of *Dion*'s Estate, and would reserve the other half for his Son: And some time after he caus'd all he had to be publickly sold, at any Rate, and without speaking a word of it to *Plato*; who at length wearied with his Dissimulation and Lyes, and convinc'd that Philosophy was too weak and tender a thing to oppose to the rigour of a Tyrant, thought of nothing else but how to quit *Sicily*. But it was impossible for him to go without Permission, and a very difficult thing to obtain leave, new Obstacles being every day rais'd against it. *Dionysius* continued still in publick to shew him all manner of respect, and continually multiplied his Caresses. But at last *Plato* having warmly espous'd

* In his VII. Letter, Tom. 3.

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the Intereſts of *Theodotus* and *Heraclides*, who were wrongfully accus'd of cauſing Troops to be Levy'd, their miſunderſtanding openly broke out. *Dionyſius* order'd *Plato* to leave the Apartment of the Gardens, on pretence that the Ladies of the Court were to make a Sacrifice there, which was to continue ten Days; and appointed him a Lodging without the Caſtle in the midſt of his Guards, that ſo (as it was ſuppos'd) the Soldiers, who had been long incenſed againſt him, becauſe he was for having 'em disbanded, or their Pay diminiſhed, might ſacrifice him to their Reſentment. Some Athenians warn'd *Plato* of his danger, and *Plato* inſtantly gave advice of it to *Archytas*, who was at *Tarentum*. *Archytas* immediately diſpatch'd away a Galley with 30 Oars, and wrote to *Dionyſius* to put him in mind, that he had promis'd *Plato*, that he ſhould be entirely ſecure; and that he could neither detain him, nor ſuffer any Indignities to be offer'd him, without an open Violation of his own Word, of which he deſir'd both him, and all Men of Honeſty and Honour to be Guarantees. This awaken'd that remainder of ſhame which was in the Tyrant's Mind, ſo that he at laſt permitted *Plato* to return into *Greece*.

Thus much for the occaſion of *Plato*'s third Voyage; for which his Enemies have made ſo many Efforts to decry him; as if he return'd into *Sicily* only for the ſake of the delicious Table *Dionyſius* kept; and to immerſe himſelf in all the Pleaſures that reign'd in this Prince's Court. *Diogenes*, who had a great deal of Wit, but a very ſatyrical Genius; and who could not ſee the great State *Plato* liv'd in without Envy, was the firſt who thought good to throw this Reproach on him. For ſeeing him one day eat nothing but Olives at a great Feaſt, he ſaid to him; *ſince the Love of Dainties made you go into* Sicily, *why do you deſpiſe 'em ſo much here? I aſſure you* Diogenes, *replied* Plato, *I for the moſt part eat nothing but Olives when I was in* Sicily: *What need had you then to go to* Syracuſe, *ſays* Diogenes? *Was*

it

it at a time when Attica *produced no Olives?*

Never was any Calumny more ill founded than this; therefore an * Ancient Philosopher speaking of the Advantages of an active Life, made no difficulty of commending *Plato* for this Voyage of his, of the true Motive of which he gives us an account. For he says, *it was for one of his Friends, who was depriv'd of his Estate and banished, that* Plato *had the Courage to go and face a very formidable Tyrant, and to expose himself to his Hatred, and all the dangers with which that threaten'd him.* In the Letter which *Plato* wrote to *Dion*'s Friends soon after this Voyage, he takes notice in expres Terms, *That the splendid Tables of* Italy *and* Sicily *extremely displeas'd him; and that he could not without Horror look on the Custom these People had of filling themselves with Wine and Meat twice a day, and of abandoning themselves to all manner of Debauchery. When a Man* (says he) *has been accustomed to these Excesses from his Youth, 'tis hardly possible for him ever to be reclaim'd (how good soever his natural Disposition may otherwise be) so as to become temperate and wise: How much less may he pretend to other Virtues?* He afterwards adds; *My Life would be insupportable to me, if I were such a Slave to those Passions.* Tom. 3

As *Plato* pass'd through *Peloponnesus* he found *Dion* at the Olympick Games, and gave him an account of all the Proceedings of *Dionysius*. *Dion* more touch'd with the Injuries *Plato* had received, and with the Risque he had run, than with all the Acts of Injustice that had been offer'd to himself; swore he would attempt to be reveng'd. *Plato* did all he could to divert him from this Thought, but when he saw all his endeavours were in vain, he predicted to him what Miseries he was going to occasion, and declar'd to him, that he must not expect either Assistance or Advice from him; and since he had had the Honour to eat at the Table of *Dionysius*, to lodge in his Pallace, and to participate of the same Sacrifices

* Maxim. Tyr. ch. 5.

with him; he ſhould always remember the Obligations to which this engag'd him: And that on the other hand, to anſwer the Friendſhip he had for *Dion*, he would ſtand Neuter, always ready to perform the Functions of a good Mediator to reconcile 'em, and always equally oppoſite to their Deſigns, whenever they went about to deſtroy one another.

* *Dion* gather'd ſome Troops together, went into *Sicily*, deſtroy'd the Tyrannical Government, expell'd the Tyrant, and reſtor'd Liberty to his Countrey. 'Tis well known what Miſchiefs were occaſion'd by this Enterprize. It being a difficult thing to preſerve Juſtice and Innocence long, amidſt the diſorders of Arms, above all thoſe of a Civil War; *Dion* had the unhappineſs only by one Action to ſtain the Glory of all the reſt; for he permitted the Murder of *Heraclides*, which did not remain long unpuniſh'd; for *Dion* was aſſaſſinated by *Callippus* the Athenian in the midſt of his Succeſſes and Triumphs.

After the Death of *Dion* his Relations and neareſt Friends wrote to *Plato*, to entreat his Advice in the deplorable Condition to which they were then reduc'd; ſome of 'em having a mind to revive the Tyranny, and others uſing their utmoſt Efforts to reeſtabliſh the Popular Government. *Plato* wrote to 'em, † *That a State would never be happy either under a Tyranny, or too great a Liberty, that the Medium was to yield Obedience to ſuch Kings as were themſelves ſubject to the Laws: that great Liberty and great Servitude were equally dangerous, and produc'd almoſt the ſame Effects; that the Obedience which was given merely to Men, was always exceſſive, and as exorbitant as their Luſts. That there could be no Moderation but only* ‖ *in that Obedience which is render'd to God, who being always the ſame, always requir'd the ſame things at the hands of his Subjects; that it was only this that could make Nations happy,*

* See *Dion*'s Life, in *Plutarch*.

† This is the 8th Letter. Tom. 3.

‖ God's Yoke eaſier than Man's.

and

and that they who would obey God muſt obey the Law, that the Law was the God of Wiſemen, and Licentiouſneſs the God of Fools. That he therefore adviſed 'em to conſtitute three Kings, the Son of *Dion*, the Son of *Dionyſius* who was expelled, and the Son of *Dionyſius* the Elder, to chuſe by their order ſuch a number of Old Men as they ſhould think fit, who ſhould take the care of making Laws, and regulating the Government of the State, as the Kings ſhould have the ſuperintendance of Sacred and Religious Matters, and of all other things fit to be left at the Diſpoſal of Benefactors. That it would after this be needful to create 35 Guardians or Conſervators of the Laws, who ſhould have the diſpoſition of Peace and War, in conjunction with the Senate and People. That Criminal Matters ſhould be judged by theſe 35 Conſervators of the Laws, to whom there might be joined for Commiſſaries, the moſt aged and moſt honeſt of thoſe Senators, that had laid down their Charge: That the Kings ſhould not aſſiſt at theſe Judicial Acts; becauſe being * Prieſts they could not, without defiling themſelves, and derogating from their Character, condemn any one to Death, Exile, or Impriſonment. He alſo particularly enjoyn'd 'em to drive out the Barbarians from all the Places they poſſeſs'd in *Sicily*, and to reeſtabliſh the ancient Inhabitants in their room.

Plato ſurviv'd *Dion* but 5 or 6 years, which time he ſpent in the Academy, not being willing in any manner to intermeddle with the Government, becauſe he ſaw the Manners of the Citizens were very much deprav'd. The Cyrenians ſent Deputies to him, to entreat him to go and give 'em Laws, which he refuſed, telling 'em, *they were too fond of Riches; and that he did not believe it poſſible, that ſo rich a People could be ſubject to the Laws.* The Thebans made the ſame Requeſt to him, and he gave 'em the like Refuſal; *becauſe*, he ſaid, *he perceiv'd they were too great Enemies to Equality.* But He ſent

* The Royalty joined with the Prieſthood.

his Disciples into those places, where the People were in a disposition to conform themselves to his Maxims.

Plato was naturally an Enemy to Pride and Ostentation; and sought for nothing but Truth, Simplicity, and Justice. His Behaviour was courteous and sweet, temper'd with Gravity. He was never seen to laugh immoderately, nor to be extremely angry. One may judge of the Mildness of his Temper by the course he took for the Reformation of his Nephew *Pseusippus*, who was excessively debauch'd. When his Parents had turn'd him out of Doors, he took him to his House, and entertain'd him as if he had never heard a word of his Debauches: His Friends amaz'd and shock'd at a procedure that seem'd to them to carry so much insensibility in it, blam'd him for not labouring to reform his Nephew, and save him from utter ruine. He told 'em he was labouring more effectually than they imagin'd; in letting him see by his manner of Living, what an infinite difference there is between Vice and Vertue, and between honourable and base things. And indeed this Method succeeded so well, that it inspir'd *Pseusippus* with a very great respect for him, and a violent desire to imitate him, and to devote himself to the study of Philosophy, in which he afterwards made a very great progress.

His way of speaking was so agreeable and insinuating, that he never fail'd to make an Impression on those that heard him. One day as he was walking a little way out of the City, with some of his Disciples and Friends, He met *Timothy* the Athenian General returning from the Army in the greatest height of his Fortune, and at a time when the Athenians knew not how sufficiently to honour his merit, while they gave him the greatest Testimonies how much they admired and respected him. The General making a stop, would needs hear his Discourses, in which he insisted, neither on Taxes, nor the equipping of Fleets, nor the subsistance of Troops, but on Vertue, and the Dominion a Man ought to have over

his

his Paſſions; whereby he only aim'd at the Explication of the Nature of the Chief Good. *Timothy* ſtruck with the Truth and Elegancy of his Maxims, cry'd out, *O happy Life! O true Felicity!* by which words he ſignified, he was convinc'd that all the Glory and Honour he enjoy'd were nothing in compariſon of the Happineſs of a Philoſopher, and that without the ſtudy of Wiſdom no ſolid Good was attainable.

As Temperance is accounted the firſt Vertue of a Philoſopher, ſo 'tis ſaid of *Plato*, that he was always very grave and ſober, and always liv'd a ſingle Life; but there is reaſon to doubt whether his Celibacy was the Effect of his Sobriety and Chaſtity; for there are yet in being ſome Verſes which he made on a certain Miſs of *Colophon*, nam'd *Archeanaſſa*, whom he lov'd, tho ſhe was grown old. *I have* (ſays he) *with me* Archeanaſſa *the Miſs*; *Love ſtill lies in ambuſh in her Wrinkles. How unhappy were you that were expos'd to her Glances in her Youth! amidſt what Flames have not you liv'd?* He alſo lov'd another, call'd *Xantippe*. He requeſted her Favours in very preſſing Terms, and with thoſe fine Reaſons which are ſince become *the* * *common places of thoſe laſcivious Morals*, which now reign on one of our Theaters, from whence they inſenſibly glide into our Cities and Houſes, viz. *That Beauty is a Flower which very ſpeedily withers*; *that if Perſons don't make haſte to love, they loſe their Youth to no purpoſe, and that old Age comes ſwiftly towards us, to raviſh our pleaſant Days, and all our Delights from us.*

'Tis true, 'tis ſaid to excuſe *Plato*, that theſe Verſes are not his, but compos'd by *Ariſtippus*, who imputed 'em to him to degrade him, and to revenge himſelf on him for his Railleries. But there is not much got by this Apology, if it be true that he had yet more Criminal Paſſions, and that he lov'd *Dion*, *Phædrus*, *Alexis*, *Agathon*, and *Aſter*. In the Ver-

* M. *Diſpreaux* in his Satyr againſt Women.

ſes he made on 'em he expreſſes himſelf in ſuch Terms as the heat of a poetick Fancy alone could not inſpire. He writes thus to *Dion*, *Thou makeſt my Soul love thee even to Folly.* He ſays to Aſter, *that he could wiſh himſelf to be the Sky, that he might be full of Eyes to look on him*; and expreſſes himſelf after a yet more licentious manner, when he ſpeaks to *Agathon*. 'Tis true, after all, theſe Verſes may be ſuppoſititious; but if they are really his, there is ground to believe they were only the Faults of his Youth, which are the leſs ſurprizing, becauſe committed in an Age, wherein all *Greece* was tainted with horrible Enormities. *Socrates* and his Philoſophy ſoon drew him out of this miſerable State, by making him comprehend the horrid Evil of thoſe brutal Paſſions. He was not content to be cured of 'em himſelf, but alſo labour'd to make others partake of the ſame advantage, and to furniſh 'em with Remedies againſt this mortal Poyſon: for he vehemently oppoſes them in all his Writings, and particularly in his firſt Book of Laws, where he condemns the Government of *Lacedemonia*, and that of *Crete*, becauſe of their publick Exerciſes, * *which produc'd and fomented thoſe abominable Flames in Women towards Women, and in Men towards Men, by a perverſion of their natural uſe.* And he calls this deteſtable and infamous Crime; *one of the moſt audacious and execrable Sins, which Intemperance could cauſe to be committed againſt God.*

In the third Book of his Common-wealth, after he had prov'd that there is no Pleaſure more furious than that which is cauſed by irregular Love, and that it is inſeparable from Inſolence and Intemperance: He adds; † *But true Love conſiſts in loving that which is decent and becoming, and in loving according to all the Laws of Temperance and Muſick.* *Plato* uſes this Word to ſignify the perfect Accord with Reaſon and Harmony, which reſults from all the Vertues. *Nothing that is violent and furious,*

* Tom. 2. † Tom. 2.

or

or that approaches Intemperance and Disorder ought to be tolerated, and consequently no Man ought to propose to himself any Criminal Pleasure. Therefore a Law should be made, permitting Men to love young People, provided they love 'em as a Father loves his Son; and that they have no other end but to incite 'em to every thing that is honourable and comely; and that they never give the least suspicion of any vicious thought, or criminal desire. And that if they make a default herein, they be look'd on as infamous persons, who have renounced all Honour and Virtue.

Plato deserves to be highly commended for having lov'd his Brothers with an extream tenderness; for as 'tis said of *Pollux*, that he would not be a God alone, but chose rather to be a Semi-Deity together with his Brother, and to share with him in a mortal State, that so he might make him partake of his Immortality; *Plato* in like manner was willing to communicate to his Brothers the Glory which himself only was capable of acquiring by his Works. In his Books of a Common-wealth he ascribes some very considerable parts to *Adimantus* and *Glaucon*; and he makes *Antiphon*, the youngest of 'em all, speak in his *Parmenides*, whereby he has render'd 'em all three as immortal as himself.

He never employ'd his Wit to revenge the personal Injuries he receiv'd, but to revenge those that were offer'd his Friends, or the Truth. It can't be shown that he said one Word of *Timon*, who had often attack'd him. And he answer'd *Diogenes* his Witticisms only in a jesting way, without ever speaking of him in his Writings.

Plato one day having made a great Treat for the Friends of *Dionysius*; *Diogenes* came into the Hall where the Feast was kept, and his Feet being very dirty, chose to walk upon the finest Purple Carpets, saying, *I trample* Plato's *pride under my Feet.* Plato smiling made this Reply; *Thou trampleſt my Pride under thy Feet with greater pride of thy own.*

Diogenes once requested some Bottles of Wine of *Plato*, who sent him three dozens. When *Diogenes* met him the next day; says he, *When one asks you how many twice two makes, instead of answering four, you answer twenty.* Thus under the Colour of returning him thanks, he reproach'd him with being too prolix in his Dialogues.

Plato having defin'd Man to be *a Two-leg'd Animal without Wings*; *Diogenes* got a Cock, cut off his Wings, and carried him to *Plato*'s School, telling his Scholars, *that was the Man their Master talk'd of.* This Jest made him change his Definition.

Diogenes being reproach'd of continual Begging; whereas *Plato* never ask'd for any thing, answer'd thus. *The only difference between* Plato *and me, is, that I beg aloud, and he whispers when he begs.*

As *Diogenes* one day continued abroad in a very great Snow mixt with Hail, and abundance of People that saw him were pitying him; says Plato, *If you have any Compassion for him, look on him no longer:* thereby to reproach him, that what he did was not from any vertuous Principle, but out of Ostentation and vain Glory.

It being his perswasion, that Men were not born for themselves, but for their Country, for their Relations and Friends; he was far from authorizing the opinion of those who believ'd that Philosophy had a right of annihilating such essential Obligations; and taught that the Life of a Philosopher is the Life of a Man entirely devoted to the publick; who endeavours to become better, only that he may be the more useful; and that he shuns the hurry of Business then only when his Country refuses his Service, or when he is incapable of serving his Country to good purpose. And his own Practise was sutable to this through the whole Course of his Life. For 'tis reported that he did not so much as excuse himself from bearing of Arms, and that he behav'd himself bravely at the Battel of *Tanagra*, that of *Corinth*, and

and that of *Delium*, where he obtain'd a considerable Victory; but it is not known on what occasion; for this Battel of *Delium* is not to be confounded with that which was fought before in the same place; in which *Socrates* was engag'd, and sav'd the Life of *Alcibiades*, in the first Year of the LXXXIX *Olympiade*, *Plato* being then but five or six years old.

And he serv'd his Friends with as little concern for his own Life; for he not only did all we have said before for *Dion*, but also defended *Chabrias* the Athenian General when impleaded at the Bar; and when his Accuser *Crobylus*, to put him out of countenance, said to him, *Thou comest hither to defend others, little thinking that* Socrates *his Poyson is ready for thee.* He made this return; *When my Country formerly had occasion for my Life, I readily expos'd it; but there's no danger now before me to put me into a Consternation, and to make me desert my Friend.*

He would say there was nothing more unworthy of a Wise Man, and which ought to trouble him more than to have allow'd more time for unnecessary trifling and useless things than they deserv'd. Therefore he omitted no occasion of reproving such as he saw were vainly puff'd up on the account of those Qualities of which they rather ought to have been asham'd. And to this purpose 'tis said the same *Anniceris* of *Cyrene* of whom we have spoken before, who was a considerable Person both for his Birth, and for his Ingenuity; but valued himself above all for being the best Charioteer in the World, having a knack to guide a Chariot above those of the best reputation in that Art, had a mind to shew his Dexterity in his Presence. A Chariot was brought for this purpose into a Close belonging to the Academy, where he made several Turns with that exactness, that the Wheels always ran in the same Track, and constantly describ'd the same Line. All the Spectators were charm'd and extoll'd *Anniceris* to the Skies by their Praises: But *Plato* seriously blam'd him, telling him

it was not poſſible but that he who had ſpent ſo much time in ſo vain and inconſiderable a matter, muſt needs have neglected other things that were very neceſſary and important; and that a Mind entirely taken up with ſuch Trifles could not be capable of applying it ſelf to any thing valuable, and truly worthy of admiration.

He was ſo free from the vice of Flattery, and the baſe and ſervile ſubmiſſions of the Orators of that Age, who made themſelves Maſters of the People only by a mean and cringing Complaiſance, and by conforming themſelves to their Paſſions; that he was compar'd to *Epaminondas*, aud *Ageſilaus*; who tho they travell'd to many Cities, and convers'd with Men whoſe courſe of Life and Manners were very different, yet wherever they were, ſtill retain'd, in their Habit, in their Diſcourſe, and in all their Behaviour, what was worthy of themſelves, and ſutable to their Character. For *Plato* was the ſame Man at *Syracuſe* that he was in the Academy, the ſame with *Dionyſius* as with *Dion*: A certain ſign that the Maxims of his Philoſophy, which were full of Force and Vertue had penetrated his Soul, like a deep Tincture, which nothing can either efface or tarniſh.

During his laſt ſtay in *Sicily*, *Dionyſius* having a mind to Regale all Perſons of chief Note in his Court, and all his Philoſophers, *Plato* and *Ariſtippus* were invited among the reſt. In the midſt of the Feaſt the Tyrant order'd Purple Robes to be brought and given to all the Company, deſiring to ſee 'em dance. *Plato* refus'd the Robe that was preſented him, ſaying, *it would too much daſh him out of Countenance to ſee himſelf apparell'd like a Woman. Ariſtippus* made no ſuch Scruple, but took the Robe and fell a dancing, ſaying, *a very wiſe Woman would never be diſreſpected for her dancing.*

Plato has been accuſed of three things, firſt that his Humour was too Satyrical, which render'd his Writings more piquant than the Strokes of ancient Comedy,, and the more unworthy of a Man of Honour,

nour, in that he did not spare his best Friends; for instance when in his *Phædon* he is speaking of *Cleombrotus* and *Aristippus*, he says, *they* * *were not present at the Death of* Socrates, *because they were at* Ægina.

The second thing with which *Plato* is reproached, is an envious and jealous Disposition, which made him uncapable of enduring an Equal or Partner in any thing whatsoever; and engag'd him tacitely to contradict *Xenophon*, without ever giving one word of Commendation to the Vertue of that Great Man, notwithstanding his extraordinary Merit.

The third thing objected against him, is that many of his Disciples were possessed with a Spirit of Tyranny; *Euphræus* for Instance who was at the Court of *Perdiccas* King of *Macedonia*, had as much Authority as that Prince himself, and would not suffer him to entertain any but Geometricians and Philosophers at his Table; which provok'd *Parmenion* to kill him after the Death of *Perdiccas*; and *Callippus* who kill'd *Dion* to make himself King of *Syracuse*; and *Evagon* of *Lampsacus* who having lent Money to his Countrey, upon the Cittadel, that was given him for his Security, would have employ'd this Fort against it to subject it to himself; and *Tymeus* of *Cyzicus*, who having made a free distribution of Corn among the People, would have abus'd the Favour and Authority which that procur'd him, to make himself their Tyrant: And in fine *Chæron* of *Pellene*, who having cruelly brought his Countrey into subjection, drove away the best Citizens, and gave their Estates and Wives to his Slaves.

Plato *defended against the Reproach of being too Satyrical.*

Let's examine the first of these Reproaches. *Plato* is perhaps the only Person who was ever accused of two Faults directly opposite, and which are destructive of each other. *Atheneus* has accus'd him of being too Satyrical, and others have blam'd him for being too mild, and for having taught a very considerable time without displeasing any one; by which he would insinuate that his Doctrine was not good, or

* See *Plato Phæd.* at the beginning.

that

that his method was bad, since nobody either in hearing or reading him had felt that trouble which naturally arises from the Sense of one's having been vicious. But without troubling my self to confute or reconcile these Contradictions, I shall only say, that *Atheneus* was himself in an ill humour, when he cast this Reproach upon *Plato*: And I shall make use of the same words against him, which this Philosopher us'd against *Anytus* who accus'd him of having been guilty of Calumny. * *He knows not what it is to calumniate, for if he did, he would not accuse me of that Vice.* And indeed *Plato* did no ways slander *Themistocles*, *Pericles*, and *Thucydides*, when he made use of them as Instances to prove, that Vertue could not be attain'd, merely by Instruction; since these Men had not made their Children learn it. As for that word he spoke against *Aristippus* and *Cleombrotus*, besides that the turn of it is very fine, it must be ascribed to that Love and Gratitude *Plato* retain'd towards *Socrates*, which made him highly resent it, that his two Friends had not attended their Master at his Death, because they were at *Ægina*; which by the manner of his Speech one would take to have been at a hundred Leagues distance, tho indeed it was near the Gates of *Athens*. And as occasion offers, we shall hereafter examine all the other Satyrical Touches *Atheneus* charges on him. Not that I pretend to cross *Plato*'s Name out of the number of Satyrical Writers: For on the contrary I am perswaded that never any Man had a finer knack at Raillery; that the most refin'd Satyr is to be learned in his Works, and that none can teach it better than he. He may be compar'd to *Aristophanes* himself. But it will be no difficult matter to make it appear, that as he never threw his Darts against any but Men of profligate Lives, who by abusing their Character, corrupted Youth, and ruined Religion: He is so far from deserving Reproaches on this account, that he deserves to be highly

* In Menon.

prais'd.

prais'd. Wise Men, as a Learned * Father of the Church observes, ought not to give soft and flattering Touches; but on the contrary to give Wounds and Pains to those who are fallen into great Faults, and cannot be otherwise excited to Repentance and the practise of Vertue. Those Discourses which instead of carrying pungency and Reproof in 'em, are only calculated to sooth and please, are not becoming a Wise Man, since *Solomon* himself says, *The Words of the Wise are as Goads.* Besides does not every one know that Laughter is the just Recompence of Ignorance when accompanied with Pride and Vanity.

The second Accusation has no more Justice in it than the first, for 'tis chiefly founded on this, that *Xenophon* and *Plato* wrote on the same Subjects. For each of 'em made an Apology for *Socrates*, each made his Banquet and Treatises of Morality and Policy. If to make Books on the same Subjects on which others have treated were always a sign of an envious and jealous Mind; this Reproach would rather fall on *Xenophon*, who did not write of the Education of *Cyrus*, till after he had seen the two first Books of *Plato*'s Common-wealth.

Plato not justly accused of Jealousy and Envy.

And it would be no very easy matter entirely to justify *Xenophon* from this spirit of Envy, when one reads the Fragment of a Letter which he wrote to *Eschines*, in which he extreamly inveighs against *Plato*, and charges him with having corrupted the Philosophy of *Socrates*, by intermixing that of *Pythagoras*, and makes the end of his going into *Sicily* to be the Enjoyment of the Delicacies of *Dionysius* his Table. To these Invectives of his *Plato* makes no answer, nor speaks one Word of *Xenophon*; in

* St. *Jerome* on that Passage of the XII Chap. of *Eccles.* *The Words of the Wise are as Goads.* Simul & hoc notandum est, quod dicantur verba sapientium pungere, non palpare, nec molli manu attrahere lasciviam, sed errantibus & tardis pœnitentiæ dolores, & vulnus infigere. Si cujus igitur sermo non pungit, sed oblectationem facit audientibus, iste non est sermo sapientis, verba quippe sapientium ut stimuli.

which

which his Modesty can scarce be enough commended; and perhaps this Silence was the chief thing that incensed *Xenophon*. For the greatest Indignity one can offer a Writer is (not to say some ill thing of him, but) to say nothing at all to him. 'Tis true, *Plato* in one place writes, that *Cyrus* was a good General, but that he never had a good Education; by which some pretend he design'd to deny *Xenophon*'s Treatise of the Education of *Cyrus*; but this being made only to give the Idea of a great Prince, and not to pass for a true History, *Xenophon* could not be offended at a thing which he believed as well as *Plato*. In fine, that which yet more discovers with what Spirit *Xenophon* was animated against him, is the frightful Description he makes of *Menon*, in the 11th Book of his Retreat; where he accuses him of having betrayed *Clearcus*, and of having been the Cause of his Death. *Menon*'s Misfortune proceeded from the Intimacy of his Friendship with *Plato*, who had praised him, and inscribed his Name on the Dialogue he compos'd, concerning Vertue; for his pretended Treachery is not at all well proved, and he was sufficiently justified from it by his Death. Not that I pretend to accuse *Xenophon* of Calumny and Imposture: these Vices are not to be found in a Man of Sobriety and Religion; but the Hatred or Jealousy he conceived against *Plato*, dispos'd him insensibly to receive all Reports, that were made against such as were engaged in strict Friendship with him. However if *Menon* had been as bad as *Xenophon* describes him to have been, since his Villany was not known till after his Death, it can't be charg'd on *Plato* as a Crime, that he had spoken in his Praise.

Some moreover support this Accusation, in saying, that *Plato*, who speaks of almost all the Philophers that preceded him, and refutes their Sentiments, speaks not one word of *Democritus*, tho frequent Occasions presented of saying something of him. This is also built on the Testimony of *Aristoxenes*,

toxenes, who in his hiſtorical Commentaries, wrote that *Plato* would have burnt all the Books of *Democritus* which he could heap together, if he had not been prevented by *Amyclas* and *Clynias*, two Pythagorean Philoſophers, who repreſented to him, that it would ſignify nothing to burn 'em, ſince they were in the hands of a great many other Men. And this is counted more than enough to make it believed that *Plato* hated *Democritus*, and was jealous of his great Reputation. For my part I confeſs this Fable of *Ariſtoxenes* ſeems to me to be very ill invented: A Man who has a mind to commit his Rival's Books to the Flames, does not ſeek for Witneſſes to ſuch an Action. Beſides this ſilence of his of which they ſpeak ſo much, ſeems a very doubtful Buſineſs. If the Glory of *Democritus* had touch'd *Plato* ſo ſenſibly, why did he not take the advantage of ſo many occaſions, that were fairly offer'd him to diminiſh it, or to caſt ſome blot on it, by writing againſt him, and deſtroying ſome one or other of his Principles? An Author is ſeldom Maſter of that Reſentment with which the Glory of a Competitor inſpires him. Tis a very difficult matter to come to a certain determination of things that depend on a thouſand Circumſtances, of which we are wholly ignorant; but that which appears to me moſt probable is as follows. 'Tis affirm'd, that *Democritus* never went to *Athens*, or if he went thither that he was always unknown, and never diſcover'd himſelf ſo much as to *Socrates*. 'Tis moreover very well known, that when *Hippocrates*, who was now much advanc'd in years, went to *Abdera* to confer with *Democritus* about the Folly that was imputed to him; this Philoſopher was not yet known in *Greece*, nor had his Works been brought thither. If they had been publiſhed, they would have ſav'd *Hippocrates* the trouble of this Voyage; for they would have diſcover'd the great Wiſdom of their Author, and the Stupidity and Ignorance of the People, who founded this Accuſation of Folly only on thoſe Sentiments,

timents, which this Philoſopher explain'd in his Writings: Now the Death of *Democritus* was not long before that of *Plato*. In a word, I don't think any Paſſage of Antiquity will make it appear, that the Writings of the former were known at *Athens*, during the Life of the latter. Nay I am of opinion, that there are not wanting ſome Proofs among the Ancients, that ſhew they did not begin to make a noiſe in the World, till after the Birth of *Epicurus*. Whence we may conclude, that *Plato* was ſo far from hating *Democritus*, that he never knew him, nor ever ſaw any of his Books.

It would not be ſo eaſy to juſtify *Plato*'s procedure towards *Eſchines*, if that with which he is reproach'd were true. 'Tis ſaid he was ſo jealous of the Reputation and Credit which *Eſchines* had acquired in the Court of *Sicily*; that he made it his buſineſs to ſeek his ruine by his Inſinuations to *Dionyſius*; and that he puſh'd this malicious and envious Humour ſo far, that he attributes thoſe Diſcourſes to *Criton*, which are pretended to have been held by *Eſchines* with *Socrates* in Priſon; but this being ſupported only by the Teſtimony of one *Idomeneus*, one of *Ariſtotle*'s Schollars, 'tis more juſt to guide our Judgment by *Plato*'s Vertue, than to ſuffer our ſelves to be prejudic'd againſt him by mere Calumnies. Would *Xenophon* have forgotten a Circumſtance that might have done ſo much honour to *Eſchines*, and cover'd *Plato* with ſo much ſhame? And have we not in *Plutarch* the Diſcourſe which *Plato* made to *Dionyſius*, to engage him to be kind to *Eſchines*, and to give him ſome Marks of his Eſteem? Nothing is more oppoſite to that Magnanimity, for which *Plato* has been commended, than this Spirit of Envy. Let us ſee how he himſelf ſpeaks of the Envious, in the * 5*th* Book of Laws. *While the Envious Man thinks to exalt himſelf above others by Detraction and Calumny, he wanders out of the Path of true Vertue, and balks the Courage of his Competitors,*

* Tom. 2.

when

when they see themselves treated with so much Injustice; and as he by this means extinguishes all that noble Emulation which the whole City appear'd to have in this glorious Contention of Vertue, he dispirits it, and diminishes its Resolution and Vigour, as much as in him lies, and renders it less ardent in the pursuit of Glory. Can one accuse a Philosopher of Envy, who scarce names himself in his own Works, and who attributes all his own Inventions and Notions to his Master?

* The third Accusation is still worse founded than the two former. The Condition of a Philosopher would be very deplorable; if he were to answer for all the Actions of his Disciples. None of their Faults can be justly charg'd on him, but those which they committed in pursuance of his Opinions. The Instance of *Dion* only may be sufficient to acquit *Plato* of the charge of a Tyrannical Spirit. What could any one have done more than *Dion* did to induce *Dionysius* the Elder and his Son after him to govern justly, that they might firmly establish their Dominion? and when he had taken up a resolution to expel the latter, could any one more vigorously oppose this design than *Plato* did? Besides, 'tis a great piece of Injustice to make *Calippus* pass for one of *Plato*'s Disciples, contrary to what this Philosopher himself says in his 7th Letter, in which he assures us that it was not by the study of Philosophy that *Calippus* acquir'd *Dion*'s friendship; but as it usually happens by civil Conversation, he having gone often in his Company to the Theater, to Sacrifices and other religious Rites; and they being both addicted to the same kinds of Pleasure.

There is not only injustice in this Accusation, but also either a great deal of Ignorance or a great deal of Disingenuity. Could *Atheneus*, who had read and collected so much, be ignorant after what Manner *Xenophon* defends *Socrates* against his Ene-

* The Faults of *Plato*'s Disciples ought not to be thrown upon him.

mies who charg'd him with all the Violences and Injuries of *Critias* and *Alcibiades*, laying the guilt of 'em upon him, on pretence that they had been his Disciples? and if he knew this, ought not he to have made use of the same Maxims to justify *Plato*? As there is some Justice in imputing to Masters the Miscarriages of their Scholars, when they become guilty of 'em by following their Opinions and Principles; so on the other side 'tis just to ascribe to 'em their great and noble Actions, when they are the fruit of their Precepts. *Plutarch* therefore is more just than *Atheneus*, when he places to *Plato*'s Account, all the great things his Disciples had done. His Words are remarkable and entirely overthrow all the Criticism of this Censor. * *Plato* (says he) *had left fine discourses of Laws, and the Government of States; but he had impress still finer on the hearts of his Disciples. These curious discourses engag'd* Dion *to restore* Sicily *its ancient Liberty; and* Python *and his Brother* Heraclides *to deliver* Thrace *from Tyranny by killing* Cotys. Chabrias *and* Phocion, *those two Great Athenian Captains, came out of the same School.* Plato *gave Laws to the Arcadians by his Disciple* Aristonymus, *to the* Elians *by* Phormion, *to those of* Pyrrah *by* Nemedemus, *to the* Cnidians *by* Eudoxus, *and to those of* Stagira *by* Aristotle. *Nay, the Rules of governing well which* Alexander *desir'd of* Xenocrates, *were only* Plato's *Precepts. And he that kindled that Prince's Courage, and perswaded him to make war with the King of* Persia, *was* Delius *the Ephesian, an intimate Friend of this Philosopher.*

Atheneus carried his Malignity and Envy yet farther; for he writes, that *Plato*'s *Timeus*, his *Gorgias*, and his other Dialogues of the like kind, in which he treats of the Mathematicks, and of Natural Philosophy, are not so much to be admir'd, as 'tis commonly said they are: for he says the same things are to be found elsewhere, as well explained, if not better; and he assures the World, that *Theo-*

* In his Treatise against *Colotes* the Epicurean.

pompus

pompus of *Chio* writes, that the greateſt part of his Dialogues were falſe and uſeleſs, becauſe ſome of 'em were taken from *Ariſtippus*, others from *Antiſthenes*, and others from *Bryſon*. He adds, that *when one expects in his Writings the Morals and Wiſdom of a Philoſopher, one finds nothing but Banquets, and Diſcourſes about Love, which have a great deal of Indecency, and very little Chaſtity in 'em, which he compos'd to the great undervaluing of the Judgment of his Readers.*

I will not now ſay the Judgment of *Theopompus* ought to be ſuſpected, becauſe the Ancients have accus'd him of Malice and Calumny; and therefore *Plutarch* ſays of him, 'tis ſafer to believe him when he praiſes, than when he accuſes any one. Let *Plato*'s Dialogues be taken as much as he pleaſes from *Ariſtippus*, *Eryſon* and *Antiſthenes*, ſince their Works are not now extant, the Teſtimony of *Theopompus*, contrary to *Atheneus* his Intention, proves that theſe very Dialogues which he has ſo much condemn'd are now the beſt, and moſt conſiderable Work on thoſe Matters, that is to be found among the Ancients.

And if *Atheneus* paſſes a Judgment on 'em only of his own head; I'll venture to ſay, 'tis not the firſt Fault this Author has committed, who is more to be commended for his vaſt Learning, and great Collections which were the product of a prodigious Reading, than for his Accuracy and Wiſdom in his critical Reflections, and for the Solidity of his Judgment. Is a Man well qualified to judg of *Plato*'s Writings, when he dares to write, that he can't ſee what advantage can be drawn from the Immortality of the Soul, ſince after its ſeperation from the Body, it has no more any Remembrance or Senſation?

As to what he ſays of the indecent Diſcourſes *Plato* has made of Love to the great undervaluing of the Judgment of his Readers; his aim was to decry the Dialogue of the *Banquet*; but by this he diſgraces himſelf more than he does that Dialogue. For

beſides that he diſcovers the Corruption of his Heart; he makes it appear that he was ignorant of the beauty and deſign of that Dialogue; the end of which is only to diſengage us from the Love of Earthly Beauties, and to raiſe us to the Love of the Soveraign Beauty which is God himſelf. No one I believe will heſitate in his choice between the Judgment of *Athenæus*, and that of *Origen*, who in his Excellent Preface on the Song of Songs, ſpeaks of *Plato*'s *Banquet* in theſe Terms. *Divers Learned perſons among the Greeks, who were deſirous to penetrate into Truth, have written Dialogues about Love, to ſhow that 'tis this only that can raiſe our Souls from Earth to Heaven, and that 'tis only by the help of this, that true Felicity is attainable. The Queſtions that are ſtarted at Table on this Subject, are made by perſons not ſo greedy of Dainties, as curious to occaſion fine Diſcourſes. Nay ſome of 'em have taught in Writing, the Ways and Arts of producing or augmenting this Love in the Soul. But Men of carnal Inclinations perverting theſe Arts have employ'd them to ſatisfy their Luſts, and abus'd 'em to promote an infamous Converſation. Therefore it is not to be wonder'd at, if with us among whom there are ſo many more ignorant perſons, as there are more illiterate, a Treatiſe of Love has ſome danger attending it; ſince among the Greeks, who are ſo Learned and Wiſe, there have yet ſome been found, who have miſtaken theſe Dialogues, and interpreted 'em in a ſenſe quite different from that in which they were written, and who, taking occaſion from what is ſaid in 'em of Love, have fallen into a Snare, whether they truly found in theſe Writings any thing that incited 'em to Sin; or whether the Corruption of their Hearts hinder'd 'em from underſtanding 'em.*

This Apology ſtrikes at *Athenæus*, whom *Origen* without doubt had in his Eye; when we publiſh *Plato*'s *Phædrus* we ſhall examine whether that Cenſure paſt on it by *Dicearcus*, *Ariſtotle*'s Diſciple, in affirming (as *Diogenes Laërtius* reports) that the Queſtion

Queſtion handled in this Dialogue is Puerile, and the Character of it Extravagant, ought to be received; and whether *Cicero* had reaſon to embrace the Sentiment of this Critick, and to tax *Plato* with having given too much Authority to Love.

Let us then without ſtopping at what has been written againſt *Plato*, endeavour to know him by his own Works.

Before the Age in which *Pythagoras* liv'd, Morality was treated on only in Sentences and Enigmas: Therefore *Solomon* ſays, a Wiſe Man will * *underſtand the words of the Wiſe, and their dark ſayings. Pherecydes*, and his Diſciple *Pythagoras*, who had brought Treaſures of Knowledg with them when they return'd from their Travels, from *Babylon*, *Egypt* and *Perſia*, were the firſt that open'd a door to good literature among the Greeks. It was from them, and eſpecially from *Pythagoras*, that the firſt Beams of Truth ſhin'd out in *Greece*. Morality was then conſiderably improv'd, yet it conſiſted only of Precepts wrap'd up in Obſcurity. The Method of Reaſoning and Demonſtrating was not yet in uſe. This dry way (if I may ſo term it) of handling Morality, was occaſion'd by the Application of Men's Minds then only to the knowledg of Numbers, Natural Philoſophy, and Aſtronomy. *Socrates* was the firſt, who upon the Reflection he made, that that which happens without us, does not nearly concern us; and that the ſtudy of it is more curious than uſeful, applied himſelf more particularly to the ſtudy of Morality, and handled it more methodically in his Diſcourſes. *Plato* his Diſciple being convinced of how great Importance it was to preſerve to Mankind ſo precious a Treaſure attempted to write of it. And that he might do this to the greater advantage, and might the better retain the Air of him who had revived this Science, prefer'd the way of writing in Dialogues, to all other Methods of treating a Subject: for beſides,

* Prov. 1.6.

that it is the moſt diverting manner of writing, in that it as it were expoſes a Scene, in which all the Actors are ſeen to perform their parts; one may ſay it is beſt fitted to attain the end, which is to perſwade and inſtruct, that it is animated with the moſt Life, and hath all the force of contrary Opinions, wherein the two Parties defend themſelves as much as they will, or can, and conſequently the Victory obtain'd by one over the other can be no longer conteſted, at leaſt when the Dialogue is made by a Man of great ſenſe, and who makes it his only buſineſs to enquire after Truth. Before *Plato*'s time this manner of writing was very little known in the World: None had practiſed it but *Zeno* of *Elea*, and *Alexamenes* of *Teos*; but the Politeneſs, Elegancy and Beauty which *Plato* gave to this way of Diſcourſe, occaſioned the Glory of this Invention to be aſcribed to him, ſo that he has been look'd upon in all Ages as the firſt that ever made Dialogues.

There are two ſorts of Truth, that which is already known, and that which is yet unknown to us, and after which we are ſearching. This difference conſtitutes two principal Characters of *Plato*'s Dialogues. Thoſe of 'em that treat on known Truths, are called, * *Explicatory, or Inſtructive Dialogues*; and thoſe that handle ſuch Truths as are yet unknown, but enquired after, are called † *Inquiſitive Dialogues*. Each of theſe two kinds is divided into divers Species, according to the Subject of which they treat, or the manner of treating of it. For the Inſtructive Dialogues, either have Speculation for their End, and then they are divided into ‡ *Phyſical*, and ‖ *Logical*, or Action, and then they are divided into [a] *Politick* and [b] *Moral*; and the Inquiſitive Dialogues are deſtin'd, either to [c] *Exerciſe* or [d] *Conteſt*. Thoſe that are made for Exerciſe are again of two ſorts; in ſome of 'em *Socrates* exerciſes the Mind after

* ὑφηγματικοί. † ζητητικοί. ‡ φυσικοί. ‖ λογικοί,
[a] πολιτικοί. [b] ἠθικοί [c] γυμναστικοί. [d] ἀγωνιστικοί.

ſuch

ſuch a manner, that he cauſes all ſorts of Truths to be produced in it, which 'tis capable of finding out it ſelf when well aſſiſted. Therefore he calls himſelf the *Midwife of Minds*, jocoſely alluding to the Employment of his Mother, who was a Midwife; and theſe Dialogues are called **Obſtetrical Dialogues*. Or elſe he exerciſes it only in making it ſound, and juſt perceive the Truths in which he is willing to inſtruct it; and theſe are called † *Dialogues of Eſſay*. In fine, thoſe that are deſtin'd to conteſt, are alſo of two ſorts; the one kind are fram'd to accuſe certain Perſons, and to expoſe certain Vices, and are therefore called *Dialogues of* ‡ *Demonſtration, or of Accuſation*. Theſe are properly ſatyrical Dialogues, made for the Reader's Diverſion; exciting in his Mind at the ſame time, a juſt Contempt of thoſe whoſe Vices are diſcover'd to him; and others are calculated to refute and overthrow Errors, and are therefore call'd ‖ *ſubverting* Dialogues. And this is the diviſion that has given a third Title to theſe Dialogues; for they have three. The firſt is the name of the principal Perſon. The ſecond is taken from the Subject, and the third is what I have been juſt mentioning, and expreſſes the Method and Turn of the Dialogue, and of what kind it is. 'Tis only the firſt of theſe at moſt which is *Plato*'s, the laſt of 'em was impos'd by the Platonick Philoſophers, and is very ancient, as we ſee by *Diogenes Laërtius*, who knows only this and the firſt. The ſecond is altogether modern. It was given by ſome that were but little acquainted with the Doctrine of this Philoſopher, and were often miſtaken. For Inſtance, at the head of *Gorgias*, they place this Title, *Gorgias of Rhetorick*; whereas the Ancients cite it only under the name of [a] *Gorgias Subverſive*. And 'tis ſo far from being true, that *Gorgias* was made to teach *Rhetorick*, that on the contrary the deſign of it is to expoſe and overthrow the ill Principle,

* μαιευτικοί. † πειραστικοί. ‡ ἐνδεικτικοί. ‖ ἀνατρεπτικοί.
[a] Γοργίας ἀνατρεπτικός.

by which the Orators were conducted, who then governed all the Cities of *Greece*; and 'tis a Dialogue purely moral; but this Subject shall be treated more at length in the Argument which shall be placed at the head of every Dialogue.

Having explained the Titles of these Dialogues, 'tis needful to say something of the different division which the Ancients have made of 'em: Some have put 'em into Fours, being of opinion that *Plato* had respect to the Tetralogies of the Ancient Tragical Poets, who compos'd four pieces on one and the same Subject for the four great Feasts of the Athenians; but I can't imagine that a great Philosopher should have so frivolous a Reason. Others have divided 'em into Threes; and 'tis certain that in his Works there are three Dialogues found that properly make but one and the same Treatise, as his *Theætetus*, *the Sophist*, and *the Politician*. In the first *Socrates* examines and refutes various Definitions of Science. In the second he establishes divers Definitions of the Sophist, which serve to shew the Art of dividing and defining, and at the same time of making the Sophists ridiculous. And in the third he defines a Politician or Statesman, and there is nothing wanting in this Treatise, because the Statesman can't be well qualified without being tinctur'd with Philosophy. The ten Books of a Common-wealth, which are look'd upon as only one Dialogue, are yet apparently one and the same Treatise with his *Timæus*, *Atlanticus*, or *Critias*. In the first, that is in the long Conversation about a Common-wealth, *Socrates* gives the Idea of a perfect State. In *Timæus* he supports his Rules and Principles by the knowledg of Nature which he communicates; and in *Critias* he confirms this knowledg of Nature, and those Rules of Morality and Policy by the Authority of ancient History, or that I may use *Plato*'s own Words, the Books of his Common-wealth form good Citizens; his *Timæus* discovers to them the Creation of the World, that this Knowledg may fortify in their Minds the Prin-

ciples

ciples he has given 'em; and his *Critias* proves to 'em by ancient History, that such was the Life of their first Ancestors, that is of the first Athenians, who liv'd before the Deluge, whose Example he recommends to their Imitation. And it was after this manner, that the greatest of Legislators compos'd the Lives of the Ancient Hebrews and Patriarchs. Excepting these six Dialogues, the three first of which make a Treatise of Logick, and the three last a very methodical Treatise of Morality; I don't think any others of 'em can be connected together by the Continuance of the same Subject: They are all separate and independant, in respect of the matter of 'em, and have no mutual Correspondence or Resemblance, but by the Method or Manner of treating their Subjects, which has been already sufficiently explained.

Plato affirms that which is certain, refutes that which is false, examines that which is doubtful, and does not pronounce any thing on that which is uncertain, or has but little probability.

The Maxims of Plato

His first Maxim is not to give one's Consent, but only to evident and certain Truths, and to disengage one's Mind from all kinds of Prejudice.

The second is never to attempt to handle Questions which 'tis impossible to decide.

The third is to distinguish well between what we know, and what we are ignorant of; and not to believe we know what indeed we don't understand.

From these Maxims it follows, that *Plato* believed there were certain Truths, and consequently, that there were such Principles as might be term'd *Dogmata*. That is, he affirm'd some things to be absolutely true; but because he entirely follow'd *Socrates* his manner of disputing, and all along avoided the decisive Air of the Sophists and Dogmatists, who affirm'd every thing, almost continually taking simple Probabilities for Truth, he seems positive in nothing in his Writings, in which by his Doubts he endeavours to convince his Adversaries of the

the Errors he designs to refute, and to make 'em of themselves discover the Truths he has a mind to teach; and thus that Passage of *Cicero* ought to be understood, who in the first Book of his Academick Questions, says, *in* Plato's *Books many things are said Pro and Con, but every thing is doubted, and nothing ever affirmed.*

The Ancients inform us, that *Plato* follow'd *Heraclitus*, in things that fall under the Cognizance of the Senses, that is in natural and sensible Objects: *Pythagoras* in intellectual things, which can't be comprehended but by the understanding; and *Socrates* in those which are only dictated by Reason, that is in Morality and Policy; and this deserves to be explained.

Plato followed *Heraclitus* in natural and sensible things, that is, he believed with *Heraclitus*, that there was but one World, that all things were produced of their Contraries; that Motion which he calls War, causes the production of Beings, and Rest their Dissolution; and in fine, that our Senses are very subject to be deceived, and that there is no certain Truth in their Depositions.

He followed *Pythagoras* in intellectual Truths; that is, he taught, as this Philosopher did, that there is only one God, the Creator of all things; that the Soul is immortal; that Men ought continually to labour to purify themselves from their Passions and Vices, that they might be united to God; and that after this Life there is a Reward for good Men, and a Punishment for the Wicked; that between God and Men there are different orders of Spirits, who are the Ministers of that first Being. Seeing he drew his Notions from the same Fountains, namely from the Egyptians and Hebrews, 'tis not to be wonder'd at, if he had the same Doctrine.

But if *Plato* followed *Pythagoras* in his Sentiments, he also imitated him in the manner of explaining them: For he deliver'd 'em only in Enigma's, and under the Vail of Mysteries, Figures

and

and Numbers, that he might not expose such sublime Truths to the Raillery of wicked and profane Men, and might discover 'em only to such as were worthy to learn 'em, and who would give themselves the trouble of unfolding them. * *'Tis not reading of Books*, says he, *that will communicate this great Knowledg; it must be attained by profound Meditation; and every one must for himself draw this Celestial Fire from its true Source. For by this Union with its Object † a divine Flame, (kindled on a sudden, as from a Fire that spreads it self round) illuminates the Mind, and feeds and preserves it self therein. And for this reason, as I have never yet written, so I am resolved never to write on these Matters:* That is, to explain them after a clear and intelligible manner. ‡ *Whoever undertakes it, will never do it to any purpose; and all the Good he'll reap by his Labour will be, that, excepting a small number of Men whom God has endowed with Understanding, capable of unravelling those Celestial Truths of themselves, he'll cause some to despise 'em, and fill others with a vain and rash Confidence, as if they understood wonderful things, when indeed they are unacquainted with 'em.*

This method often causes great obscurity in the writings of this Philosopher, which he has indeed taken care to augment, in chusing to make use of some terms that signify contrary things. And this is the reason why he can't please young People, who have not yet attain'd Judgment enough to discern the Beauty and Solidity of his Dialogues; nor grown men neither who have not had the preparation of those Studies that were necessary, before they attempted to read him, and who are not capable of Reflection and Meditation. For this reason *Antiphanes*, one of *Plato*'s Friends jocosely compar'd his Writings

* Tom. 3. † This is what *David* says in the 35th *Psalm*, *In thy Light we shall see Light*. There is none but God, that can enlighten the Minds of Men. ‡ A Remarkable Passage. *Plato* is not for writing on the Mysteries of Religion, and those of Nature.

to

to a City, in which Mens words freez'd in the Air as ſoon as they were pronounced, and the following Summer when they came to be warm'd and melted by the Beams of the Sun, the Inhabitants underſtood what had been ſaid in the Winter; for *Plato*'s Diſcourſes ought to be warm'd, and as it were melted by the rays of an underſtanding well exercis'd, if one would know the true ſenſe of 'em.

In fine, he imitated *Socrates* in what relates to Morals and Politicks, that is, he reduc'd every thing to Morality, and made it his whole buſineſs to engage men to fill up the Duties they ow'd to the State in which Providence had caſt their Lot.

'Tis pretended that *Plato* to his Natural Philoſophy and Morality added Dialectick; but this ought only to be underſtood of his bringing it to perfection: For *Socrates* had the uſe of Dialectick before *Plato*; as appears by his proving and refuting ſo ſolidly in Converſation what ever he had a mind to eſtabliſh or overthrow. How can it be imagin'd that Truths were diſcover'd and prov'd before *Plato* and *Socrates* without the help of Dialectick? 'Tis impoſſible.

Theſe are then the three parts of the Philoſophy of the Academicks, Morality, Natural Philoſophy and Dialectick; and theſe three parts make Philoſophy compleat, in which one can't ſo much as imagine a fourth. Natural Philoſophy reſpects Speculation, Morality Action, and Dialectick is uſeful both for one and t'other. For 'tis by means of this that we diſtinguiſh Truth from that which has only the Appearance of it, both in Morality and Natural Philoſophy. And many Ages before *Plato*, the Philoſophy of the Hebrews was likewiſe divided into three parts, Reaſoning, the Knowledg of Nature, and Morality.

The Morality of the Platonicks.

The Platonicks make the Perfection of Morality to conſiſt in living in conformity to Nature, that is to the Will of God the only Author of Soveraign Happineſs; and they teach that the Scope of all our Deſires ſhould be to obtain of Him thoſe good things that

that are neceſſary for Soul and Body, and for our State of Life, Thus they divide Good, into that which is divine and that which is humane,

Humane Goods are diſtinguiſhed into Goods of the Body, and Goods of Life. The Goods of the Body are Health, Beauty, good Humour, Strength, *&c.* The Goods of Life are Friends, Riches, in fine, every thing that ſerves to advance Vertue, and ſet it on work. For they teach that a man is not born for himſelf alone; but is united to all other men by Society, which renders him a member of one and the ſame body, to the Advantage of which he ought to refer all his Actions, and Thoughts.

Divine Goods are the Goods of the Soul, that is, every thing which renders the Soul capable of knowing, loving and embracing that which is good and lovely, *&c.* And they divide theſe Goods, into thoſe of Nature, aud thoſe of Morality. The Goods of Nature are the Imagination and the Memory, which properly depend on the Mind? and the Goods of Morality are thoſe that are procured by ſtudy and the habit which is form'd by Exerciſe and Reaſon. That which has made but a ſlight Impreſſion they call a certain motion toward Vertue; and that which is finiſhed is what they term Vertue, which is the perfection of Nature, and the moſt excellent of all Goods.

Humane Goods are ſobordinate to Divine; and when once a man has theſe he has all the other; the firſt of 'em all is Prudence, the ſecond is Temperance: from theſe two mix'd with Courage ſprings Juſtice, which is the third, and Valour is the fourth. They teach that Divine Goods can't be given by men, and that they are not to be acquired by our Labour; that they are given only by the favour of God, and that they ought to be ſought at his hand alone.

So that they do not equally eſteem theſe three ſorts of Goods, but prefer thoſe of the Soul before the two others, as infinitely more conſiderable, and which alone ought to be ſought for themſelves.

Hence

Hence it comes, that they make the Happineſs of Life to conſiſt only in Vertue, tho at the ſame time they maintain, that it cannot be very happy without the Goods of the Body, and the other that are neceſſary for the uſe of Vertue; and from thence ariſes an indiſpenſible Obligation to Labour, and to fill up the Duties which Nature impoſes: An Obligation which engages us to avoid Idleneſs, and to contemn criminal Pleaſures; and which neceſſarily diſpoſes us to ſuffer all ſorts of Labour and Pain too, for that which is juſt and honeſt. From whence Friendſhip, Juſtice, and Equity reſult, which they perfer to all the Pleaſures and Advantages of Life.

There is nothing more ſolid and ſublime than theſe Morals, which make the chief Good to conſiſt in being united to God, in obeying his Commands, and in receiving with Submiſſion whatever comes from his hand; becauſe all God's Acts towards Men are uſeful to 'em, if they know how to make an Improvement of 'em.

Plato every where inſinuates a diſintereſſed frame of Mind, and the Contempt of Riches; and teaches to poſtpone all the Gold in the World to the leaſt Vertue. He is for a Man's expoſing himſelf to Death in the defence of Juſtice, and in maintaining Laws, Order, and the Publick Good; and would have us avoid, not only all criminal Pleaſures, but Delicacy, Idleneſs, and too much Sleep. We find his Writings full of Precepts of Truth, Chaſtity, Temperance, Modeſty, Patience, Meekneſs and Humility; but theſe Precepts are accompanied with Proofs. For he utterly overthrows the Principles of ill Morals, after he has propos'd 'em in their full Strength; and this is the way of Perſwaſion that becomes a Philoſopher.

Almoſt every thing in his Doctrine is worthy of Chriſtianity. * That which he ſays of the Duty of honouring Parents, deſerves to be recited. *The fear*

* Precepts of the Honour due to Parents 11th Book of Laws.

of God is the Foundation of that Duty which Children owe their Parents; and if the Gods are pleas'd with the Respect which is render'd to their Images, which are only dead Representations of the Deity, how much more do they rejoice in those Honours which are given to Parents, who are the living Images of God; and the older they are, the more Force and Efficacy have these living Images of the Deity (who are kept in the House like the most precious Jewels) to make all sorts of Blessings descend on their Children, who give 'em the Reverence which is due to 'em; and to bring upon their heads the most dreadful Curses, when they refuse it. For God hears the Prayers which Parents address to him either for or against their Children. So that there is no surer way to please God than to honour our Parents, and whenever they are respected 'tis very grateful and acceptable to God himself. The way of honouring them duly, is to love them more than our own Children, or our selves. And they who fail in this Duty shall be brought to the Magistrates constituted for this purpose, who shall take care to punish 'em.

Revenge forbidden.

He every where maintains, and particularly in his *Gorgias* and *Criton*, that no injury is to be offer'd to any man, no not to such as deal injuriously with us, and makes it appear, that to introduce this Maxim into civil Conversation, that 'tis lawful for a Man to revenge himself and render Evil for Evil, is to pretend to lay a foundation for Justice in innumerable Acts of Injustice, and to open an inexhaustible Source of Crimes, and Acts of Violence. What Bank would be strong enough to stop such an Inundation of Wickedness, and what end would there be of Injury and Revenge? He carries his Proofs of this Matter so far, that his Disciples assure us, that he that revenges an Injury, is more criminal than he that offers it.

The Necessity of Prayer.

He teaches that if a man have any degree of Wisdom, he will never undertake the least thing without the Invocation of God; and that if Prayer is necessary before every ordinary Action, 'tis much more so when we

we are about to ſpeak of God, becauſe 'tis God that illuminates our Minds, 'tis he that aſſiſts us, and without him we can do nothing. He well underſtood the Neceſſity and Beauty of that Precept of *Pythagoras*. * *Begin all thy Actions with Prayer, that thou mayſt be able to accompliſh 'em.* Prayer and Action ought to be inſeparable; want of Prayer renders Action uſeleſs, and want of Action renders Prayer ineffectual. We ought to ask what we do, and to do what we ask. But he at the ſame time affirms, that Men are ſo blinded by their Paſſions, that they know not how to pray well, unleſs God inſtructs 'em; and therefore the trueſt Prayer, and that which alone can be agreable to him, is to requeſt of him to perform his own Will in us, and not ours.

The moſt conſiderable thing in Morality is the political part of it, the true uſe of which *Plato* endeavours to ſhew, and to reeſtabliſh it in that Perfection from whence it fell by the Corruption of Men. In the time of this Philoſopher, Injuſtice had overturn'd all the States of *Greece*; ſo that there was not one Government left that deſerv'd to be approv'd. *Plato* in oppoſition to this diſorder gave a perfect Model of a moſt juſt form of Government, that all States might correct the Vices of their way of Government by this Pattern. To this purpoſe he employs his Books of a Common-wealth, and thoſe of Laws; in which he after a wonderful manner reconciles Policy to Religion, which is the very Baſis of it.

Princes can't govern well, but as they imitate God.

He ſhews that Princes and Governors of States, can never conduct the People well, but by imitating the King of Kings, the Soveraign Lord of the World, the only and perfect Model of all Wiſdom and Juſtice. For as a Sheep is not capable of guiding the whole Flock, which ought to be under the Conduct of a Shepherd; ſo one man is not capable alone of conducting others, who all together

* *Pythagoras* his Precept.

ought

ought to be subject to God. One would think he had read that Complaint made by the People of God by the Mouth of * *Isaiah*, as the greatest of all Miseries, *O Lord our God, other Lords besides thee have had Dominion over us.*

† He renders this Truth sensible by a Fable in which the Vestiges of the Truth of ancient History are easily discern'd. *The Memory of the happy Course of Life the first Men led is preserved to our Time. They were abundantly provided for without any Labour; the Earth spontaneously furnished them with all Necessaries: And the Cause of their Happiness was this;* Saturn *well knowing that there was no Man that could have an Absolute Empire over others, without abandoning himself to all sorts of Violence and Injustice, subjected the Nations not to men, but to more noble and excellent Beings, as their Lords and Kings; namely to intelligent Spirits (or Angels) after the same manner as we deal with our Cattle; for as we don't set a Bull over a whole Herd of his own kind, nor a Goat to govern a Flock of Goats; but put those of one kind and another under the Conduct of a Man; so God who loves Mankind plac'd us at first under the Conduct of Angels, who with marvellous Facility, and without any trouble to them, took a great deal of care of their Affairs, and by making, Peace, Chastity, Liberty and Justice reign among them, kept all sorts of Troubles and Seditions at a distance from them, and render'd their Lives very happy.* This Fable which is founded on ‡ Truth, clearly shews us, that *those Societies which yield Obedience to Men and not to God can never be happy, and will never find the end of their Miseries: and farther intimates, that if we will be happy, we must with all our might imitate that manner of Life Men led under the reign of* Saturn; *and that according to that Immortal Principle which is in us, we*

The Cause of the happy Life of the first Men.

What the Reign of Saturn *is.*

* Isa. 26. † In the 4th Book of Laws, Tom. 2.
‡ For the Nation and Kingdom that will not serve thee shall perish, *Isa.* 60. 12.

should govern our Families and Cities according to its Dictates; taking this wise Dispensation of the Understanding for our first and chief Law. For if a King, if Nobles who govern in an Oligarchy, or if the People who are supreme in Republicks, think of nothing but how to satiate their Passions, and drown themselves in Sensuality, and run like mad men after such Pleasures as only irritate their insatiable Intemperance: 'Tis impossible they should forbear to trample on the Laws, and there can be no safety to such as obey 'em.

The choice of Priests and Magistrates.

He gives admirable Precepts for the Establishment of Priests and Magistrates; he would not have such chosen, who have nothing to recommend 'em but their Birth, their Riches, Credit, or Power, but would have the choice of 'em regulated only by their Merit and Piety. * *Those are the best (says he) who yield the greatest Obedience to the Laws, and excel all the rest of their Fellow-Citizens in that respect. The first places ought to be given to those of the first Rank, the second to those of the second Degree, and so of the rest in proportion, as every one distinguishes himself, and is disposed to look on himself, not as Master of the Laws, but as their Servant. For wherever the Law is Mistress, and the Magistrates its Servants, there States are observ'd to prosper, and abound with all the Blessings one can expect from the hand of God: Whereas in all places where the Magistrate is Master, and the Law his Servant and Slave, there nothing is to be expected but Ruin and Desolation.*

† He would have none made Priests till they are sixty years of Age. He says, *they should be lawfully begotten, and without any bodily Imperfection; that they should be such as have been educated in chast Families, and have their hands free from the stain of Blood, that they should not be tainted with any of those Pollutions that are offensive to God; and are incompatible with the Sanctity of their Cha-*

* Tom. 2. † IV Book, Tom. 2.

racter;

ſtacter; *and that their Parents ſhould be ſuch as have liv'd with the ſame Purity of Converſation.*

He proves, that thoſe Laws which are made ſolely for the Profit of the Legiſlator, and not for the Publick Good, are not properly Laws, but the Product of Self-Love and Injuſtice.

He ſhews, that of all Governments the Monarchical is the moſt perfect, becauſe it approaches neareſt to the firſt Model; but that the Power of it ought to be mitigated by the Law which is to govern as the Supream Reaſon. *Monarchy the moſt perfect of all Governments.*

After having ſhown the Good and Evil of all known Governments, he maintains, that all political Schemes which tend to render the Ruler powerful to the detriment of the Subject, and which make all the Vettue of the Sovereign to conſiſt in confirming and augmenting his Power, leaving Juſtice, Patience, Goodneſs, Fidelity, and Humanity to private Perſons, as Vertues only becoming Slaves, are no better than open Tyranny; and that the end of true Policy is to make all the Members of the Community live together in Society as ſo many Brothers, after the moſt happy manner that can be, without either Poverty, or very great Riches, according to the Rules of Juſtice and Holineſs. To engage Princes to employ Men according to the different Talents they diſcern in them, he * relates this Fable, which he calls a *Phœnician Lie*, becauſe 'tis † taken out of the Books of the Hebrews. *Hear* (ſays he) *this Fable, you who are the Inhabitants of this City; you are all Brethren, but God who created you mingled Gold in thoſe who are worthy to command; therefore they are the moſt excellent and honourable. He mingled Silver in thoſe who are capable of aſſiſting them in their Functions; and Iron and Braſs in thoſe who are fit for nothing but to be* *The end of his true Policy.* *To employ Men according to their Talents.*

* 3d Book of Laws. *Tom.* 2. † *Euſebius* ſhows that *Plato* deriv'd this Fable from what God ſays in the Prophecy of *Ezekiel*, *ch.* 22. *v.* 18. *Son of Man the Houſe of* Iſrael *is to me become Droſs; all they are Braſs and Tin, and Iron and Lead.*

Husband-men and Artificers : And as we are all Parents, we have ordinarily Children that reſemble us ; but it alſo ſometimes happens, that he who is mix'd with Gold, has Children who are only mix'd with Silver ; and he who is mix'd with Silver, hath Children mix'd with Gold, and ſo of the reſt. That therefore which God in a ſpecial manner recommends to Princes, is to take ſtricter notice of their Children than of any thing elſe, that they may well diſcover what was mix'd with 'em in their firſt formation ; that if they perceive Iron or Braſs in it, they may not ſhew 'em any pity, but place 'em in the Rank to which they were deſtin'd by Nature, and make 'em Husband-men, or Artificers ; and as for ſuch as are found to be temper'd with Gold or Silver, that they ſhould deſtine ſome of 'em to govern, and the reſt to aſſiſt and eaſe them by their Miniſtry ; there being an Oracle which predicts, that the City ſhall periſh when under the Government of Iron or Braſs.

This Treatiſe is full of admirable Maxims, and ſuch as are worthy to be ingraven on the Hearts of all Mankind. 'Tis true, there is one very conſider-
A defect in Plato's Politicks. able defect in it, in that *Plato* to take away *Meum* and *Tuum* from the Government which he forms, inſtitutes a Community, not only of Eſtates, but alſo of Women and Children. This Notion was not entirely Chimerical, ſince it had already been put in practice in part among the *Lacedemonians*, and ſome other Nations ; but that does not excuſe it from being a moſt vitious Uſage ; for the Authority of Cuſtom can't render that Good which is in its own Nature Evil. This Community of Things and Perſons can't conduct this Law-giver to the end he propoſes, but on the contrary ſets him at a greater diſtance from it, and makes him loſe the advantage of all he has before eſtabliſhed ; for inſtead of uniting his Citizens this divides 'em, by breaking aſunder all Relations, and all the moſt ſacred Ties of Nature, and trampling on Laws, and Religion, Honour and Decency. Before the Chriſtians ſhew'd their

their Indignation againſt a Maxim ſo full of Wickedneſs and Error, the Pagans diſcerned the falſhood of it; for *Ariſtotle* attacks it in the II Book of his Politicks. Nay *Plato* himſelf abandons it in his *6th* Book of Laws, where he reſtores all that honour to Marriage of which he had before diveſted it.

Beſides this Fault, there is another taken notice of, and that is the Education of Women, to whom he aſſigns the ſame Employments as Men committing to 'em the Command of Armies, and the Government of States. He founded this Notion on a Maxim of *Socrates*, who held, that Women were capable of the ſame Vertues as Men, tho they can't carry them to the laſt Perfection. Excepting theſe two things, which yet occaſion very ſolid, and very uſeful Reflections, there is nothing among the Writings of the Pagans, which better deſerves to be read, and retained, than *Plato*'s Book of a *Republick*, and thoſe of *Laws*: They have a Beauty on 'em that may be called Divine; and indeed they appear to be a Copy of a truly divine Original. For this * Republick of which *Plato* gives an Idea, is the true Draught of the Common-wealth of the Hebrews under the Conduct of *Moſes*. We ſee in both the ſame Simplicity of Manners, the ſame way of living, and the ſame end propos'd. The Miſeries of both proceed from the ſame Cauſes; that is only from the Diſobedience of the People; and their forgetfulneſs of their principal Duties; and their Proſperity always ſprings from their diligent Attendance on the ſame Duties, and their readineſs to obey. But here is one thing that ſeems to be very remarkable. *Plato* will have his wiſe Man to be of a wonderful Genius, and Temper; he muſt have had a miraculous and divine Education; he muſt from his Youth have given Marks of his great Zeal for the Publick Good; he muſt be fit, both for a Contemplative and Active Life; he muſt be an E-

Moſes the Model on which Plato forms his wiſe Man.

* *Plato*'s Republick, the Draught of that of the Hebrews.

nemy of Grandeur, and attain it only by Obedience; this Obedience must be the occasion of his taking the Conduct of a People; he must govern them according to the Institutions of God to whom he is only a Vicegerent; Religion must be the principle and end of all his Enterprizes; he must have both Severity and Meekness; he must be arm'd with Courage and Temperance, with Justice and Wisdom; and must make it his business to render those whom he governs the Friends of God. And these are the principal Strokes in *Moses* his Picture; so that if the Idea of our Philosopher does honour to this Legislator, and his People whose Grandeur he represents; one may say the Truth accomplished in one and t'other does yet more honour to the Philosopher, by shewing his great Wisdom, and the extent of his Mind. If *Plato* had had this Idea without any knowledg of the History of *Moses* (which yet I do not believe) nothing can be imagined greater; he would be more than a Man. And if he form'd it only on this History, which he had read, or learn'd by Tradition in *Egypt*; it was a very great Demonstration of his Wisdom, that he discern'd the Beauty of it, and follow'd it as a Pattern.

Religion founded on Revelation.

As *Moses* regulated the People of God, so *Plato*'s Wise-man regulates those under his Conduct. First he instructs them in Religion, about which he establishes nothing without having consulted God; that is nothing but what is conformable to true Traditions, and ancient Oracles. He fortifies them against the Poyson of the Theology of the Poets who intermix Lies with the Truth, and against the Religion of credulous and superstitious People. He teaches 'em to believe there is one only true God, who being infinitely Good loves Mankind, and is willing to render 'em happy, and who as he is also infinitely Just makes none happy but those who resemble him, and punishes such as dishonour the sacred Character he had imprinted on 'em. He tells 'em that *God as*

4th Book of Laws, Tom. 2.

we

we are taught by ancient Tradition * *having in himself the beginning, the middle and the end of all things, always goes on his way according to his Nature without ever ſtepping aſide: He is followed by Juſtice which never fails to puniſh the Tranſgreſſions committed againſt his Law. Thoſe who would be Happy, conform to this Divine Juſtice with* † *Humility; whereas he that becomes proud becauſe of his Riches, Honours, or Beauty (for Beauty often betrays young people into Extravagancy and Folly) and who has preſumption enough to think he has no need of a Guide, but is capable of conducting both himſelf and others, is entirely abandon'd of God for his Pride. A Man in this condition joins himſelf to others who are tainted with the ſame Vice; and* ‡ *turning all things upſide down with extreme boldneſs, and moſt horrible preſumption, he comes to be look'd upon by the people as ſome great perſon: But ſoon after by the juſt judgment of God, he is ſeen to deſtroy himſelf, to ſubvert his own Houſe, and to involve the whole State in his Ruine.* He explains to 'em the Puniſhments that are reſerved for the Wicked. *They are not limited* (ſays he) *to the Miſeries of this Life, nor to Death it ſelf, from which even Good Men are not exempted; for theſe are Penalties too light, and ſhort; but they are horrible Torments which ſhall never have an end.* He encourages them by the hope of Rewards, and an everlaſting ſtate of Felicity. He takes ſo great care of 'em that he obviates every thing that might occaſion 'em to call in queſtion the Divine Providence, and throw 'em into Impiety. One would think he had copied out of *David's*

The Recompence of Humility.

The Puniſhment of Pride.

* This is what God ſays in Iſa. 41. 4. *I the Lord the firſt, and with the laſt I am he.* † *Plato* here employs the ſame term, which the ſacred Writers uſe, to expreſs one who is of a humble Spirit, ταπεινὸς; ſo that the Pagans, not only knew the name of the Vertue, but the Vertue it ſelf. ‡ *Plato* here admirably well repreſents the Miſery and Littleneſs of ſome Men, who think themſelves great, and appear ſo in the Eyes of the People: And ſhows, that there are no Men truly great but ſuch as humbly ſubmit to the Divine Law.

Psalms; for thus he speaks to a Young Man not well instructed in the Divine Conduct. *You have in you a Nature which having something Divine in it, leads you to believe the Gods, but the prosperity of the Wicked, whose happiness is so much boasted of, tho they are indeed very miserable, is ready to lead you into Impiety: You can't see profligate Persons arrive at extreme Old Age without meeting with any remakable Calamity, and leave their Children's Children after 'em, Heirs to their Estates and Fortune; you can't see all this (I say) without being shaken by it. You have often heard say, and have often seen with your own Eyes, that the meanest Persons have ascended Thrones by their Crimes; and upon this you dare not down-right deny the Gods, nor accuse them of being the cause of this; for there is something in you, that restrains you from this, and opposes it: But you are so far seduced and deceived by your Folly and Ignorance, that while you confess there are Gods, you reduce your self to say they are regardless of humane Affairs. A Remedy ought to be speedily applied to remove this Distemper, before it has time to grow upon you, and so to precipitate you into the Abyss of Impiety. Perhaps it will be no difficult matter to prove, that the Gods extend their Care and Regard to the smallest things as well as the greatest. And that the divine Nature being Vertue it self, extends its Providence over all.*

IId *Book of Laws*, Tom. 2.

Proofs of Providence.

And indeed he proves this with wonderful Solidity. I'll only give an Abridgment of these Proofs, which have yet more force in the Original. *If God* (says he) *should take no care of Men, it would be either through Malice, or Ignorance, Weakness, Negligence or Laziness: But none of these Vices, which are in us, can be found in God, who is infinitely perfect; who is Goodness, Knowledg, Wisdom, Power, Providence, and Activity it self. He takes care of all things, for he created them, and they are his. How then can he neglect Men, who belong to him in a more particular manner? Has God less Capacity,*

Tom. 2.

or

or is he less diligent than Artificers? By how much the more knowing these are; by so much the more perfect are their Works, whether small or great, they forgetting nothing that may conduce to the Improvement of 'em. And shall God, who is most wise, most knowing, and has a Power proportionate to his Will, regard only the greatest things; and neglect others which may be still more easily mended; as if he was idle, and afraid of giving himself trouble? This is followed with other admirable Proofs, which it would be too long to relate. In fine, he * shows, that *sooner or later God renders to every Man according to his Works. The Righteous, who have been expos'd to Troubles in this Life are recompenced in the other, and the Wicked who have always enjoy'd the Pleasures of the World, are punished in Hell. This is necessarily infer'd from the Justice of God: 'Tis impossible to avoid this Judgment which the Gods have fix'd by that Providence which you oppose, and of which you shall one day be fatally convinced; don't suppose that it will negligently pass you by. † Tho you should seek a shelter by hiding your self in the deepest Caverns of the Earth; tho you should have Wings, and could fly into the Heavens to hide your self there; the Divine Providence would seize you every where; and you shall never avoid the Punishments you deserve; whether in this World, or in Hell, or in some other place yet more terrible.*

God at the last Judgment renders to every Man according to his Works.

He afterwards shews, that not only they shall be punished who deny the Divine Being, dispute against Providence, or blaspheme God, by saying he suffers himself to be bribed by the Offerings of the Wicked, but also such as have heard these Blasphemies; and yet neglect to bring the Authors of 'em before the Judges who are set to punish 'em. He also institutes Penalties for those who by their own private

The Punishment of impious Persons stated.

The Punishment of such as hear Blasphemy without discovering it.

* Tom. 2. † This is what *David* says in almost the same Terms, Psal. 139. 7, 8. *Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? whither shall I flee from thy Presence? if I ascend up into Heaven thou art there, if I make my Bed in Hell, behold thou art there.*

Autho-

Particular Forms of Worſhip condemned. Authority teach or practice in their Houſes particular Forms of Worſhip, and to prevent this Inconveniency, he applies himſelf to diſcover the Cauſe of it. He ſays this commonly proceeds from Women, and weak Minds, when they find themſelves in any danger, or under any adverſe Circumſtances; or when on the contrary they meet with unexpected Proſperity, or are in ſome tranſport of Joy; or in fine, when their Imagination is diſturb'd by ſome fright, ſo that they fancy they have ſeen Spectres, either waking or ſleeping. For ſuch People as theſe when in this Condition, are wont to vow to offer the firſt thing that comes into their Heads: they promiſe Sacrifices and Images; and fill their Houſes with Chappels and Altars; or ſet up particular forms of Devotion, which by degrees degenerate into dreadful Superſtitions, or impious Novelties, which entirely ruin both Religion and good Manners; for what is it that can't enter into the head of a Man or Woman, that is weak or perverted? and 'tis for this reaſon *Plato* forbids Innovations in Worſhip, and makes this Law, *That no private perſon ſhould have either a Chappel or Altar in his Houſe, but when he has a mind to offer Sacrifices he muſt go into the publick Temples; he is to put his Victims and Offerings into the Hands of the Prieſts and Prieſteſſes, to whoſe Care the ſacred Altars are committed, there he muſt make his Prayers where thoſe that come to worſhip may join with him. For it does not belong to every Man to conſecrate Altars; but 'tis the work of a very enlighten'd Mind.*

In the 10th Book of Laws. Tom. 2.

The Origin of Superſtitions.

They are mad, when they are merry. Wiſd. 14. 27.

Domeſtick Chappels and Altars forbidden.

To cure Men of Superſtition and Idolatry which then reigned ſo much in the World, *Plato* forgets nothing that might induce 'em to render God a rational Worſhip. For this purpoſe he endeavours to raiſe their Minds in giving them an Idea of God, which might in ſome ſort agree with his Eſſence, which mortal Eyes can't ſee but very imperfectly. The ſtrokes with which he forms this Idea are ſcatter'd up and down in all his Works. The principal

of

of 'em which I have collected are these that follow.

God is one, eternal, immutable, incomprehensible Being. He created and dispos'd all things by his Wisdom; he maintains and preserves all things by his Providence; he is in all places, and no place can contain him. He is all things, and yet he is none of those things which are by him, and have received their being from him. For he is greater than Essence it self: he sees all things, knows all things, and penetrates the most secret thoughts; he fills the Capacity of the Deeps, and the Immensity of the Heavens; all Knowledg, Good, Vertue, Light, Life are only in him, and are Himself. He is at the same time infinitely Good and infinitely Just. He loves men with a singular Affection; and created 'em only to render 'em happy: But as he is Holiness and Justice it self he makes none happy but those who resemble him in Righteousness and Holiness: And punishes those who have corrupted the sacred Character he had impress'd on 'em by creating 'em after his own Image. *What God is.*

He says, none but God can cure all the Infirmities of Men.

He teaches that God nor only hates Liars, and perjur'd persons, but also such as swear vainly and unnecessarily, and who debase and profane the Majesty of his Name, by using it rashly on all occasions, whereas it ought to be mentioned with all possible Sanctity and Purity of Mind. *Lies, Perjury and profane Swearing abhor'd of God.*

The generality of Philosophers were divided about the Nature of the Chief Good: Some made it consist in the knowledg of Arts and Sciences, others in Pleasures, and others in Authority and Power. *Plato* opposes all these Errors; and shews that the Supreme Good is not to be found in the Sciences; seing these and Vices often appear together in the same Persons, and 'tis very common for Men to abuse 'em: He proves that Power can't render a Man happy without Justice; and shews that which Men call Pleasures, namely sensual Delights, are by no *What Pleasures are.*

means

means of the nature of that Pleasure which can give us the Supreme Happiness: For they are the Consequence of Humane Weakness and Infirmity; and may be called the Daughters of Sorrow: they are always hatching but never exist. 'Tis therefore a ridiculous thing to make the chief Good consist in that which has no Essence of it self, but only springs from our Miseries and Necessities. He moreover proves it by other Reasons no less solid, which may be seen in their proper place.

In his Phileb. *which is entirely employ'd on this Subject. And in the* VI *Book of his Republick.*

He does not content himself to shew wherein the chief Good is not to be found; he also teaches where it is; and the force of his reasoning is precisely this: The Chief Good must be perfect, self-existent, self-sufficient, the first and last end of all things; and the only scope of all Mankind in general. Knowledg or Pleasure are the only things in which one can with any shadow of Reason make the Chief Good consist; but it can neither be found in Knowledg without Pleasure, nor in Pleasure without Knowledg: It must therefore of necessity consist in that which unites these two things together, and possesses 'em in the highest degree, and that is God.

In the VI *Book of the Republick.* Tom. 2.

Nay, says he, That Knowledg and Truth of which God is the Cause can't be the Chief Good, *for they are infinitely less beautiful and less perfect than God, whose Image they do but very imperfectly represent; as Light is but a very imperfect representation of the Sun. So that the Supreme Good, being greater, more august and more perfect than Truth and Knowledg, can be no other than God himself.* Therefore it is not to be found but in God who is the sole Treasure and perfection of Light; and the Author of true and solid Pleasures. Whence he infers that while we are on Earth, we can't acquire this Chief Good but after an imperfect manner; and shall not enjoy it fully till after Death; because we can't till then know clearly what we knew only obscurely during this Life: And this is one of his proofs for

In his Phedon.

the

the Immortality of the Soul; namely becauſe it is capable of Action and Knowledg after Death.

But 'tis not enough for a Philoſopher to point out the Supreme Good, unleſs he alſo ſhew the way of obtaining it; and this is what *Plato* does with marvellous Solidity. For he proves that, to be Happy, we muſt be united to God; that in order to be united to him, we muſt reſemble him in Holineſs and Righteouſneſs; that to obtain theſe Gifts at his hand we muſt ask 'em in Prayer, and that our Prayers ought to be animated with Love; which he calls the Sureſt and moſt Effectual Courſe Men can take to lead 'em to Happineſs: for a bleſſed Immortality is the fruit of Love. Therefore a Learned Interpreter of *Plato* highly commends *Socrates* for having known, that to raiſe our Souls to the Enjoyment of God, we muſt take Reaſon and Love for our Guides. Reaſon teaches us the right way, and hinders us from wandering out of it, and Love by its ſweet Perſwaſions and inſinuating Graces, makes us find all things eaſy, and ſoftens the Labour and Toil, which is inſeperable from the Conflicts we muſt go through.

In his Banquet.

Maximus Tyrius.

He ſhews, there is nothing more natural to Mankind than Love. They naturally love every thing that is fair and beautiful, becauſe their Souls are deriv'd from the very Source of Beauty. But every thing that in ſome ſort reſembles this Primitive Beauty moves 'em more or leſs, according as their Souls are more or leſs ſtrictly united to their Bodies. So that thoſe whoſe Souls are moſt diſingaged in every Beauty adore that Sovereign Beauty whoſe compleat Idea they have, and for which indeed they were born. And this Adoration produces in 'em Temperance, Fortitude, Wiſdom, and all other Vertues. But thoſe who ſink down and wallow in Matter; and no longer preſerve any Idea of the Sovereign Beauty, run furiouſly after imperfect and tranſitory Beauties; and without Fear or Wit plunge themſelves into all ſorts of Filthineſs and Impurity.

In his Phedr.

I can't here ſtand to remark on each Subject the great Truths which are taught by this Philoſopher, and deſerve our Attention: What I propos'd to my ſelf was only to relate a few of 'em; to give ſome Idea of 'em, and hereby to excite the Curioſity of the Reader: The reſt will be more advantageouſly ſeen in their Source.

Plato regulates all the Civil Actions of Life.

After he has with wonderful Accuracy eſtabliſhed all that relates to Religious Worſhip; he in like manner provides for what concerns civil Matters. He creates Magiſtrates, propoſes Laws, and forgets nothing that may augment, and ſecure the welfare of the Common-wealth; for he is not content only to regulate Marriages, Divorces, the Education of Children, Wills, Guardian-ſhips, War, Peace, and other principal Matters; but deſcends into a ſurprizing Particularity. And as we may obſerve that God has not left ſo much as one part of the Univerſe without imprinting on it the Characters of his God-head, that Men might by no means be ignorant of it; ſo *Plato* has not left any part of humane Life, whether private or publick, without a Regulation by ſome Precept or Law, to prevent the Commiſſion of Faults and Injuries in it.

XIth *Book of Laws.* Tom. 2. *The Duty of ſuch as find a Treaſure.*

He determines what ought to be done with any thing one finds, which another has loſt. He ſays, *if he ſhould find a Treaſure he would not touch it, till he had conſulted the Diviners, and they had aſſured him he might appropriate it to himſelf. This Treaſure* (ſays he) *has ſome Owner; we muſt therefore wait till this Owner, or his Heirs come to demand it; for we ought to obey the Law which ſays, Thou ſhalt not take away that which thou haſt not laid down, and that other Law which is not leſs ancient. Thou ſhalt not take another Man's Goods. This Treaſure in our Coffers is not ſo valuable as the Progreſs we make in Vertue and Juſtice; when we have the Courage to deſpiſe it. Beſides, if we appropriate it to our own uſe, 'tis a Spring of Curſes to our Families.*

Becauſe

Becauſe Injuſtice reigns chiefly in Trade; he is unmindful of nothing that may prevent it; and goes ſo far as to forbid the Seller * *to make two Words, and falſly to commend what he is about to ſell.* *Trade.*

To prevent the Manners of Foreigners from corrupting thoſe of his Citizens, and that when theſe are corrupted the Laws may not be render'd uſeleſs by 'em, he does not permit every one to travel indifferently; but is for having the State make choice of thoſe to whom this Liberty ſhall be granted. They muſt be above 40 Years of Age; they muſt be Men of Sobriety and Wiſdom, and capable of remarking what is good in other Commonwealths; and they muſt make a faithful report of Things at their return; that the Laws that are received may be augmented or corrected by their Memoirs, and the Government by this means be brought to greater perfection. *Travelling.*

Men rejoice when they are happy, and think themſelves happy when they rejoice. Hence it is that they have ſuch a propenſion to Pleaſure. God compaſſionately accommodates himſelf to this ſo natural Inclination, and extracting Good out of Evil makes uſe of it as a very proper means to confirm Men in what is Good; and that they might never loſe ſight of the Religion which he eſtabliſhed. So that to hinder 'em from throwing themſelves into thoſe Exceſſes to which Nature when abandon'd to it ſelf carries them, he was pleaſed to inſtitute Feaſts for his People by *Moſes*, and order'd him to regulate every thing to be obſerv'd in 'em. Tradition had preſerv'd ſome remembrance of theſe Inſtitutions, for ſome Veſtiges of 'em are found in *Plato*, who attributes 'em to the Egyptians in his IId Book of *Laws*, where he complains of the too great Liberty that was allow'd the Poets in all the Cities of *The Origin of Feaſts, Shows, and Muſick, &c.*

* *Solomon* condemn'd the ſame abuſe in the Buyer who ſlights what he is buying, and after he has got it, boaſts as if he had outwitted the Seller. *It is naught, it is naught (ſaith the Buyer) but when he is gone his way then he boaſts.* Prov. 20. 14.

"*Greece*,

Greece, to keep young People under the Conduct of very pernicious Maxims by their Verſes. He affirms that it was otherwiſe in *Egypt*, where there were very wiſe Laws to hinder this Corruption. " The " ancient Egyptians (ſays he) knew that Children " ought to be early accuſtom'd to ſuch Geſtures, " Looks and Motions, as are honeſt and decent; " and that they ſhould not be ſuffer'd, either to hear " or learn any other Verſes, or Songs, but ſuch as " were fit to inſpire 'em with Vertue. Therefore " they took care to regulate the Dances and Songs " that belong'd to their Feaſts and Sacrifices. Nay, " they puſh'd this Matter yet farther; for they " never ſuffer'd any Painters or Statuaries to inno- " vate any thing in their Art, to invent any new " Subjects, or any new Habits. And hence it is " (ſays he) that in reſpect of what concerns theſe " Arts and Muſick, you ſhall find no Work through- " out all *Egypt* that has been made for ten thouſand " Years paſt, which is form'd any otherwiſe than " thoſe pieces which are made at preſent. They " are all alike, they are neither fairer, nor more de- " form'd. The Art remains ſtill the ſame, the Rules " of it the ſame. And there is nothing more ad- " mirable, or more worthy of a good Law-giver, " and of a wiſe Adminiſtrator of Governments than " to have regulated and fixed all theſe Matters that " have a regard to Pleaſure, and particularly that " which reſpects Muſick: And to do this is the " Work, either of God himſelf, or of ſome divine " Man. So that all their Dances, all their Poeſy, " all their Songs were ſanctified; and not the leaſt " thing was ſuffer'd which did not anſwer the de- " ſign of the eſtabliſh'd Religion, and which was " not worthy of the Feaſts that were celebrated by " 'em. This indeed is a very remarkable Tradition; and *Plato* does not fail to make a very good Improvement of it; for he purſues the ſame deſign; and inſtitutes Feaſts for his People, that during the time of their Relaxation from Labour, they might render

Tom. 2. *The care which the ancient Egyptians took to prevent all ſorts of Novelties.*

render homage to God, and testify their Gratitude to him for all the benefits they received from his Divine Hand. He suffers nothing to be acted at these Feasts, but what was Sacred or Innocent. He forbids all such Poetry and Musick as might be injurious to the Honour of God, or dangerous to the Manners of Men; and only receives such as might tend to rectify and instruct the Minds of the People. The Ancient Hebrews used only Lyrick Poesie, which in singing the Praises of God, and those of Vertuous Men, raises the Courage, and excites Devotion. And this was also the only kind of Poesie in use among the first Greeks, as appears by a Passage of *Plutarch* in his Treatise of Musick. *The Ancient Greeks* (says he) *were unacquainted with the Musick of the Theatre, they employ'd this Art only in honouring the Gods, and in instructing of Youth; for there were then no Theatres in their Cities, Musick was reserv'd for the Temples where the Gods were honour'd in Songs, and where the Praises of vertuous Men were sung.* While *Plato* authorizes this Lyrick Poesie, he also receives other Poems which were already established, and which it was impossible to extirpate and destroy: But we shall see what precautious he takes to purge and to discharge 'em of that Poyson which render'd 'em so dangerous.

The Poesie of the Ancient Hebrews.

The Poesie of the First Greeks.

The Greeks being extreamly addicted to the pleasure of Musick, this inordinate Passion had made 'em receive all the Works of Poets and Musicians, which had at last so alter'd and transform'd the Ancient Poesie and Musick, that instead of that Wisdom, Gravity and Sanctity that reign'd in the Pleasures of their Ancestors, nothing was found in theirs but Folly, Effeminacy, and Impiety. *Plato* therefore seeks to re-establish this Ancient Purity, and is for a perpetual prohibition of any alteration in Musick. *It is not to be imagin'd* (says he) *what a weight and force there is in Plays and other Pleasures, either for the Support or Ruin of Discipline and*

VII *Book of Laws*, Tom. 2. *Of what importance it is to regulate Plays, and the Pleasures of the people.*

H *Laws.*

Laws. If Alterations be suffer'd continally to be made in 'em; and young people be continually accustom'd to new Pleasures, every day to have new Pieces, new Ornaments, and Dances; and to esteem none but those who can furnish this unlimited Variety, there can be nothing more pernicious to a State, for this insensibly changes the Manners of young people; so that they can no longer endure any thing that is Ancient; and only value Novelties; and this opens a Door to all the most dangerous Errors both in respect of Politicks, and Religion.

The pernicious consequences of the Gust Men have for Novelties.

These Alterations are dangerous in every thing; but especially in Musick, because all Musick being an Imitation, that only ought to be suffer'd, which imitates what is good and useful; the other being rather a Plague than a Play, which he explains after a sensible manner by this Example, which appears to me to deserve our attention.

Tom. 2. *The way* Plato *takes to illustrate the horror of pernicious Plays.*

If we should see (says he) *at our Sacrifices, after the Victims were consumed in the Fire, a Man approach the Altars, and extravagantly utter Blasphemies and Impieties; should we not think all his Family would look upon this as a great Misfortune, and a very fatal Omen? That which is done in our Time in the publick Shows and Plays, is not much different from this. For after the Magistrates have Sacrificed, we see divers Choirs of Musick come, and in the view of our Temples and Altars they utter most execrable things against these very Altars, contradict the Principles of Religion by their Impious Maxims, and affect the Souls of their Auditors by their indecent Expressions, lascivious Dances, and their effeminate and voluptuous Tunes. Ought not this then to be abolished, and the Poets oblig'd to submit to other Rules? And since all Poets are not capable of knowing what is truly excellent and good; ought we not to make choice of such who in their Imitations can follow the Idea of Beauty and Decency? That young people may receive improvement by every thing, as being in a very advantageous place, and that all*

This passage is taken out of the III Book of his Repub.

which

which strikes their Eyes and Ears arising from a good fund, that is from a Subject which is excellent in it self, may be like a good Air which having pass'd through wholsome Places, carries health along with it, and may insensibly accustom them to love and imitate those Discourses, and conform all the Actions of their Lives to them.

To this purpose he makes the following Law. *Let none be so insolent as to sing any thing besides our Sacred Hymns, or to alter and vary the received Dances any more than our other Laws, And if any one disobey this Statute, let the Conservators of the Laws, together with the Priests and Priestesses take cognizance of it.* *The* VII *Book of Laws about Songs and Dances.*

To this Law he added another: *Let no Poet in his Imitations, depart from any of the Maxims which the City has received as good and just; nor let him presume to shew his Compositions to any private Man * till they have been seen, and approv'd by Judges establish'd for that purpose, and by the Conservators of the Laws.* Tom. 2. *A Law about Poetry, and Poetical Imitations. Judges established to judge of 'em.*

In the II Book of the Republick, he had made the same Law for those Poets who compos'd the Fables that were taught to Children: He was for having Judges to approve the Good and reject the Evil. *Judges appointed to judge of Fables.*

He uses the same Precautions about Comedies and Tragedies, as he does about Songs, Dances, and all other Imitations. He thinks Comedies necessary to make Men know what is ridiculous, and to expose Vices that are represented in 'em. *For* (says he) *one can't know what is comely and serious, unless one knows what is indecent and ridiculous. And to acquire Prudence and Wisdom, we must know their* *Comedies judged necessary, and why,* VII *Book of Laws.*

* *Plato* took this too from the Tradition of the Ancient Hebrews, for they had Judges appointed to try all new Pieces which were made either in Prose or Verse, and these received only such as were conformable to Religion, and rejected the rest. They also prohibited the singing of Hymns and Songs by any other than the common and received Tunes. *Euseb. preparat. Evangel.* XII 22. & 23.

contraries. Not that any Man who has any tincture of Vertue can equally do what is good and evil, decent and indecent, but it's needful he should know these things for fear he should through ignorance fall into what is ridiculous, and should do or say any thing unbecoming him. But we'll make use only of Slaves or Mercenary Strangers to make these Imitations, and all free Men and Women shall be forbidden to be concern'd in 'em, or to learn 'em.

Tragedies how receiv'd.

As for Tragical Poets (says he) *who boast of imitating great and serious Actions; when any of 'em come into our City, and ask if we are willing to receive 'em among us, and see their Tragedies, what answer shall we make these Divine Men? Methinks we ought to make 'em this return. Friends, we are employ'd in Tragedies as well as you, and we make the best and finest we can, for our Policy is only an imitation of the most refin'd and excellent way of living; this is the true sort of Tragedy with which we are acquainted. So if you are Poets, we pretend to the same thing, and declare our selves your Rivals in that Noble Imitation which can be perfected only by the Law. Therefore do not hope to be so easily permitted to build Theatres in our publick Places, and to introduce Skilful Actors that shall extend their Voices beyond ours, and tell our Wives and Children, and all the people on the same Subjects, things directly opposite to our Instructions. We must be quite destitute of common Sense, before we can give you permission to Act, till the established Judges have determined whether what you say is good and useful, and whether it ought to be made publick or not. Therefore, You tender Darlings of the soft Muses, put your Compositions into the hands of the Judges, who will compare them with ours; and if what you say is better than what we say, we'll give you leave to Act; otherwise it can't possibly be done, and therefore 'tis in vain to expect it.*

Those Poets who in their writings contradicted receiv'd Maxims condemned.

Plato has treated this business of Plays and Shows thoroughly, because 'tis a very important matter in relation

relation to States; all he says of it is admirable, and deserves to be carefully recollected. What I have recited is sufficient to give a just Idea of it: Wise Men may make on it what Reflections they think fit: My scope has been only to show that *Plato* after the Example of *Moses*, would permit only such Divertisements as were decent, and tended to support Religion, or at least were not contrary to it. They who are for advancing farther, and for particularly examining the conformity the Laws of *Plato* have in many things, with those that were given the People of God, will still better discover this Resemblance; which made *Clemens Alexandrinus* say, that *Moses* assisted *Plato* in making his Laws, and that *Plato* was only *Moses* speaking the Attick Language. Not but that some Laws are to be found in *Plato* very remote from the Spirit of *Moses*, and very contrary to Equity: but the number of 'em is but small.

The Emperour *Marcus Aurelius* had reason to say, That *such a Commonwealth as* Plato's *is not to be expected in this World.* Not but that there had already been one which was still better, and more wisely constituted; and when *Antoninus* said this there was one infinitely more perfect, of which the former was but a shadow; but it was the work of God; and none but God can put this Idea into Act, because 'tis only he that can change the Hearts of Men: of which we have a very evident Proof. A great Emperour had a mind to establish *Plato*'s Republick in his Territories, to which purpose he employ'd divers Philosophers whose Knowledg was very extensive, and their Eloquence very perswasive: but all his Efforts were in vain, he could never gain his end so much as to establish it in one single Village; whereas the Christian Religion was established by the Ministry of illiterate Men, and that in spite of the Emperours themselves.

As for Physicks in which also Metaphysicks are comprehended; *Plato* in the first place acknowledges that since we are but Men, we must not hope per- *Physicks.*

fectly to gain the knowledg of Nature, and that all a Philoſopher can do is to find out Probabilities; pure and ſimple Truths being only known to God, who alone can diſcover 'em to Men. After this acknowledgment he divides Nature into two parts, *Spirit* which acts, and *Matter* upon which it acts.

He calls the Spirit which acts, a Being eternal, infinite, very good, immutable, which hath neither beginning nor end, but is always the ſame, and he calls Matter, a Maſs without form and void, which is always ready to be produc'd, and never exiſts. His Words are remarkable. *Firſt* (ſays he) *all theſe things ought to be well diſtinguiſhed, and we muſt well eſtabliſh what it is that always exiſts and is never produc'd; and what it is that never exiſts, and is always producing. The firſt is not conceived but by the Underſtanding aſſiſted by Reaſon. This we diſcern to be always one and the ſame. And the other is only opinable, that is known by Opinion aſſiſted by the Sentiment diveſted of Reaſon; which we ſee to be always producing, and dying without ever exiſting.* Therefore he gives Matter the Name of *Other*, becauſe of the continual Changes it undergoes: He alſo gives it the Name of *Neceſſity*, becauſe it only follows the order and determination of the Spirit which governs it.

In Timeus, Tom. 3.

Matter how known.

Why called Other and Neceſſity.

He alſo ſometimes calls Matter *Eternal*, which has given occaſion to ſome to accuſe him of believing it to have been with God from all Eternity. But a Philoſopher who in ſo many places maintains the unity of God could not fall into ſo groſs an Error: If Matter were Eternal, it muſt then be God, and ſo there would be two Gods, contrary to what he had laid down. When therefore *Plato* calls Matter *Eternal* he would not be underſtood as if it viſibly ſubſiſted from all Eternity, but that it ſubſiſted intelligibly in the eternal Idea of God; and in this reſpect the World is ſometimes ſaid to be *Eternal*. Let us ſee the very Terms *Plato* uſes, which will leave us no room to doubt what his Thoughts were. *The*

How ſaid to be Eternal.

Pattern

Pattern of the World (says he) *is from all Eternity; and the World, this visible World is from the beginning of Time, and will always thus subsist alone.* *Plato* could not think Matter to be Eternal: seeing he affirms the Soul to be older than the Body; for if the Soul is older than the Body, the Body must needs have been created, and consequently can't be Eternal. And for this reason he calls God the Father or Creator, and Former of the World. By the Quality of Creator he signifies that he made the World out of Nothing, and by that of Former he signifies, that God after he had created it, gave it its Form and orderly Disposition. *Plato* derived this Idea from the Tradition of the Hebrews, of which the Greeks had some knowledg long before him; as appears from *Hesiod*'s speaking of the Birth of the Chaos. Perhaps also he had read these Words in in the Prophesy of *Isaiah*, *God himself that formed the Earth and made it, he hath established it.* *In his* Timeus, *Tom.* 3. *The World made out of Nothing.* *Chap.* 45. 18.

Of this created Matter God formed the World, by separating and disposing the Elements, which having simple qualities of themselves, form by their different Union, and various Figures an infinite number of compounded Qualities: for Matter is divisible to Infinity.

The Universe must necessarily comprehend all sensible things; from whence *Plato* draws three Consequences: The first is that it can be but one: For there can be nothing beyond All. The second is that it is of a Spherical Figure; because besides that that is the most perfect of all Figures, 'tis the only one that can agree to a Being that comprehends any thing. And the third is that it can have no end but only by the Will of him who form'd it; for since the Change of all Beings can never proceed but from that which is without 'em, and since there is nothing out of the World, there is by consequence nothing that can destroy it but God in whom alone the World is contained.

Seeing the two first Qualities of the World are to be visible and palpable; and since there is nothing

visible without Fire, nor solid without Earth, *Plato* says God at first created Earth and Fire. In which one may discern some Vestiges of those words in *Genesis*, *In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth.* For by the Heavens here most Interpreters understand the Empyrean Heaven, and not the Firmament.

It was very difficult, or rather impossible that two things so contrary should be long united. Therefore God contriv'd a way to hold them together by a *Medium*, which partaking of the Nature of them both, should make one *Whole* of them together with it self. But if one *Medium* is sufficient to join plain Points and Numbers, two are necessary to join solid Numbers. For Example; the Numbers Six and Twenty four, which are alike plain Numbers, may be united by one sole *Medium*, which is Twelve; that is to say Twelve is the proportional Number or *Mean* between Six and Twenty four; in like manner between Nine and Sixteen, the proportional Number is Twelve.

In Timæus, Tom. 3.

The Numbers Eighteen and Fifty four are alike solid Numbers, which cannot be united by one *Medium*; that is, one cannot find one sole proportional Number or Mean to 'em: So that there's need of two; as Twenty four and Thirty six; for Fifty four is to Thirty six as Thirty six is to Twenty four, and as Twenty four is to Eighteen.

'Tis the same with plain and solid Dimensions. If the World could have been plain, one *Medium* would have been sufficient for it; but being round, it has need of two to unite it. And 'tis for this reason that *Plato* says God put Air and Water between Fire and Earth; for the same proportion that is between Water and Earth is between Air and Fire; this Proportional Bond, is the Divine Bond that renders the World so solid, that it can never have an end but only by the Will of him who is the Author of it; on the contrary, the Alteration and Age of its Parts, serve to support and renew it.

But

But though the World in this State was solid, yet it still wanted perfection, for no Body is perfect without Intelligence. Therefore God, who design'd the Universe should be as perfect as it could be, gave it a Spirit, which *Plato* calls the Soul of the World, which governs in it, and preserves Harmony in it, maugre the discord of the Elements. He says this Soul was created before the World; and perhaps he imagin'd this from a misconstruction of those words in *Genesis*. *And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.* 'Tis true, he also calls this Soul, proportion, and Symmetry; which might induce one to suppose that he means nothing else by it, but the just Temperament of the Elements themselves: But the definition he gives of the Soul, will not suffer his words to be taken in this sense; for he says 'tis a Substance that participates of the indivisible Substance, a Composition of *the same* and *the other*; that is, of the first Matter, and the Universal Spirit; and hereby he would shew that Matter was a *Medium* that contained an Immortal, Immaterial, and consequently Indivisible Spirit; and an Animal and Corporeal Spirit; just like our Bodies which are compos'd of three things, of *the same*, of *the other*, and of *Substance*, which he explains by very obscure Examples taken from Numbers, and Musick. And herein *Plato*'s Error consisted, namely in giving the World a Soul like ours, and still more perfect. Therefore he calls the World God, but a *God that is created and dissoluble*. So that he was so far however from confounding Nature with God himself, that he has thoroughly distinguished them, for he calls God alone *the efficient Cause, or Power*; and he calls Nature *the Consequent, which obeys the first Cause for the creation of Beings*; And subjects it entirely to the Government of that first Cause. *Plato* did not content himself in giving the World a Soul, he also gives one to the Heavens and to the Stars. And perhaps this false Idea of his, was occasion'd by his mis-

In his Phileb. Tom. 2.

under-

understanding of some Passages of the Prophets, for instance, that which God says in *Isaiah*. *I have commanded all the Host of the Heavens.* Or it may be, this Language of *Plato*'s is only Poetical; and being *Homer*'s Scholar and Rival, he was willing to animate every thing like his Master, who inspires Life into the most insensible Beings, insomuch that he gives a Soul to a Spear. And the Holy Prophets sometimes speak after the same manner.

Chap. 45. 12.

Thus Time and Motion had a beginning.

All the Pagan Philosophers before *Plato*, had taught that Motion, and consequently that Time was Eternal; and it was on this Principle that *Democritus* founded his Arguments when he maintain'd that all could not be created, and thence infer'd the Eternity of the World, *Plato* was the first who by a Beam of Truth, discover'd through this thick Darkness, that Time and Motion had a beginning as well as the Universe. For it being impossible that Matter should be of it self, as one must be forc'd to acknowledge, neither is it any more possible for Motion either to exist of it self, or to be a Quality affix'd to Matter, which then would never rest. Motion therefore must proceed from without, and was imprinted on Matter by the same Spirit that created it. *Plato* was so deeply sensible of this Truth, that he made use of it to dissipate the Errors of that senseless Philosophy which had reign'd to his Time: Now he says, when God had created the World, and communicated to it the Motion that was most suitable; *He was extremely pleased to see his Work move, live, and almost resemble the Immortal Gods themselves.* (And for this reason *Plato* calls it God.) *And he would have render'd it more conformable to his eternal Idea, but that it was impossible to communicate Eternity to a created Being, therefore he took this expedient to create as it were a moving Image of Eternity, And in disposing the Heavens he made this Image of Eternity, which is permanent in Being only; This Image which goes on by Numbers, that is to say, Time, which did not subsist*

In his Timeus, Tom. 3.

sist before the Creation of the World. Time not being capable of subsisting but with Motion, whereas Eternity subsists alone by it self, without being either Old or Young; and 'tis only of this that one can properly say *it is*; the Terms of past, present, and future, cannot agree to it, because they are fluid parts of Time, whose property it is to be always just producing, but never existing.

The improper Language Men use about the eternal Being.

We don't perceive (continues he) *that we very unfitly attribute to the Eternal Being these parts of Time, and the Terms* IT WAS *and* IT SHALL BE, *for we say of this true Being,* It was, is, and is to come. *But we ought always to say,* It is; *for this only agrees to it according to true Reason.* It was, and it shall be *ought never to be said but of that which is produced in Time: These are but Motions, that which always is, and is always the same, without any Change, can't be called either Old or Young at any time, nor receive any of the Modes which Birth or Production affixes to things that are moveable, and the Objects of Sense; these are the parts of Time which imitates Eternity, and proceeds by Number and Measure,* &c. *So that Time was created with the Heavens, that as they were produc'd together, so they might end together, if ever they come to be dissolved.*

This Truth is confirm'd by the Writings of the Saints, who teach that Time and Motion had a beginning, and must have an end. The Beauty of this Discovery, and the Strength of this proof, which may be called a Demonstration, did not hinder *Aristotle* from contradicting his Master in this point, and from maintaining his Error by the following Argument, which has nothing of Solidity in it. *If it be altogether impossible* (says he) *that there is, or can be imagin'd a Time without a present Instant; and if it be true, as it cannot be denied, that the present Instant is a sort of* Medium *which has a beginning and end, a beginning of the Future, and an end of the Past, Time must necessarily be from all Eternity,*

Aristotle's very subtile and false way of arguing, in the 1st Chap. of his Physicks.

Eternity, because the most remote Time one can take, is in some present Instant; for in Time one can only take the present Instant: so that seeing the present Instant is a beginning and end, Time must needs have been from all Eternity; no person being able to assign a Time which has not been preceded by Time, and so ad infinitum. *And if Time is eternal, Motion must be so too, since Time is only a Passion of Motion.*

Eternity admits of neither Time nor Motion.

This is the Language of a Philosopher, so blind that he could not conceive that the World was created, and that before the Creation there was neither Time nor Motion, but Eternity, in which nothing ran from the present to the past, but all was present and stable: God alone being before Time, in whom there is no successive Course either of Time or Motion.

What Plato's Ideas were.

Before we pursue this Matter we must explain what *Plato* means, when he says God created the World according to that Eternal Pattern which he had conceived in himself. As an able Workman has in his Head the whole disposition and form of his Work before he begins it; so that he works according to his Idea after such a manner that what he performs is (if I may so say) only the Copy of that Original which he has imagined; the whole Work that subsists being a mere Imitation: After the like manner, God in creating the World only executed that eternal Idea he had conceived of it; for the World and all that it contains existed intelligibly in God, before it existed really in Nature. This is the meaning of *Plato*'s Ideas which the Pythagoreans and he had taken out of the History of the Hebrews; where we see God gives *Moses* the Models of all those Works he would have him make: But it ought to be remember'd that these Ideas are universal and not particular; that is they comprehend the Species, as *Man*, and not the Individuals, as *Alexander:* And it must farther be minded that they are not a Being separate from God, but are in God. This is the Im-

The Origin of those Ideas.

Immaterial and Eternal Original upon which every thing was made, and indeed is nothing but the Divine Knowledg, the first Cause of all created Beings; for those Ideas are in God his Notions, which are eternal and perfect of themselves, and as *Alcinous* says, *Idea with reference to God is the Eternal Intelligence, and with respect to us, it is the first Intelligible; in reference to Matter it is Measure, in reference to the Universe 'tis the Exemplar, and in respect to it self it is Essence.* If *Aristotle* had rightly understood this Doctrine, he would not have oppos'd it, nor have given so rash a decision as he has done, affirming that to establish these Ideas as the Exemplars of sensible things, is *to speak to no purpose, and to amuse ones self in imagining Poetick Metaphors.* *Eusebius* was better acquainted with the excellency of it, for he says in expres Terms, that this Doctrine which teaches that there is an Intelligence which has taken all things from Incorporeal Ideas, which are their Patterns, was conceived by *Plato* with a great deal of Reason, and by very just and necessary Consequences.

Aristotle conceived those Ideas as Essences separate from God.

In Prepar. Evang. *lib.* 3. *cap.* 6.

When God was pleas'd to create Time, he created the Sun and Moon, whose Course is the measure of Days, Nights, Months, Years and Seasons, and gave motion to the other Celestial Spheres. He afterward proceeded to the creation of Animals, without which the World could not be perfect; and of these he was pleas'd to make as many Species as the World had parts; that is, Celestial, Aerial, Aquatile, and Terrestial.

And God created the Demons (or Angels) those Inferiour Intelligences, to whom he gave order to create three other sorts of Animals, because if he had created 'em himself they would have been Immortal; for all that proceeds immediately from God, must necessarily be Immortal in its Nature: So that these Intelligences created Man, that is they form'd the Humane Body, God having reserved to himself the right of giving it a Soul, which he made

The Creation of Angels.

of

of the same Nature with that of the World, only he made it less perfect. For (says he) it was not just that Man who was but a part of the Universe should be more perfect than the Universe it self, or so perfect. These were *Plato*'s Thoughts on the creation of Man, and 'tis not difficult to know the Source of this Opinion, in which there is such a Mixture of Truth and Error; for it springs from a misinterpretation of the Words of *Moses*. After God had created the Heavens, the Earth, the Stars, and the Celestial Intelligences, that is, the Angels, he says, *Let us make Man after our own Image.* Upon this the Egyptians, and Pythagoreans not understanding the Mystery hid under the Plural Number, thought God spoke to the Intelligences he had created, and said to them, *Let us now make Man after our Image; you in forming that part of him which must be mortal, and I in creating that which shall be of an immortal Nature.*

The Air fill'd with good and evil Angels. In his 10th *Book of Laws,* Tom. 2.

He maintains as a most certain Truth, that as there is an infinite number of Good Angels in the Heavens (that is in the Air) so there is also a multitude of Evil Ones, that seek nothing else but how to do mischief to Mankind. *Seeing we are agreed* (says he) *that the* * *Air is fill'd with good and bad Genii, which are entirely opposite to each other,* † *this occasions an Immortal Combate, and requires a continual Attention on our part: The Gods and the Good Angels are ready to help us, for we are their Possession.*

Plato adds that God at once created the Souls of all Mankind, who were to live in all Ages of the

* *Eusebius* amaz'd and surpriz'd at the Beauty of this Passage, shews that *Plato* could not have it but out of the Book of *Job*, who many Ages before him relates that the Devil appear'd before God with the Good Angels. † A very surprizing Truth to be found in the Writings of a Pagan, and the same which is admirably explain'd by St. *Paul*, when he says, Eph. 6. 12. *For we wrestle not against Flesh and Blood, but against Principalities, against Powers, against the Rulers of the Darkness of this World, against Spiritual Wickedness in high Places.*

World,

World, and that he distributed them into all the Celestial Spheres, teaching them the Nature of all things, and giving them his Eternal Laws which he calls *Destiny*, and to which he also gives the name of *Necessity*, and sometimes that of *Fortune*; not that any thing is fortuitous, but only to denote, that this Destiny brings to pass an infinite Number of things, which are unforeseen by us, and which are commonly imputed to Chance, altho their Cause is designed and fixed. The Poets understood this, when they call'd Destiny, *that which has been once said*. In which they seem to have had some knowledg of what *David* says in the 65th *Psalm*. *God hath spoken once*, that is to say, he has spoken with an immutable Word; for Destiny is nothing but that Law which flows from the Will of God.

Destiny why call'd Necessity and Fortune.

Quod semel dictum est. Horat.

What Destiny is.

From this Creation of Souls before their Bodies, *Plato* draws his Opinion of *Reminiscence*. For if the Soul existed before the Body, it must have had in it all Notions, and by consequence all that we learn through the Course of our Life, is only the remembrance of what we had forgotten. For *to learn* is nothing else but to recover the knowledg we had before we came into the World, and which the Passions of the Body made us forget.

Reminiscence.

However *Plato* in his *Menon* seems not to be entirely convinc'd of the truth of this Opinion of *Reminiscence*; but to perceive that it might be reasonably objected, that God actually illuminates the Soul, and that by the Light he communicates to it he renders it capable of Seeing and Learning that which it never saw, or knew before. And this in all Appearance is the reason, that he does not establish it as an absolute Certainty, but only makes use of it to shew that we ought not to despair of Learning that of which we are ignorant.

From the Union of the Body and Soul result the Passions and Sensations. When the Soul is Mistress, she leads a Life of Temperance and Justice, and when she leaves the Body, she returns to the Star to which

The Passions and Sensations.

which she was formerly assigned; but when she becomes a Slave, and plunges her self into all sorts of Corruption; she suffers a Punishment tenfold more than all her Pollutions and Impurities, and after a thousand years has the Liberty to chuse what kind of Life she likes best: if she still chuses to live irregularly, she goes to animate Beasts, that is, she becomes from day to day more and more vile and vitious, which continues till at last she comes to acknowledg the Empire of Reason; and follows this Guide which is given to her; and so by purging her self from all the Filth of the Elements, returns to her first State.

The Origin of false Opinions, Errors, Knowledg and Wisdom.

Moreover from the same Source *Plato* draws the Origin of the false Opinions, Errors, and all the Follies of Men, as also of their Knowledg and Wisdom. When the Soul is as it were delug'd by the Torrent of Matter, it can no longer distinguish Truth; and is like a Man going with his head down, and his heels up, to whom all Objects are inverted.

When she moderates the Course of this Torrent, so that what is *the same* is neither surmounted nor obscur'd by the Mists of what he calls *the other*: then she sees all things as they are; and being fortified by Study and Experience penetrates their Causes, and by those means arrives at true Knowledg, and perfect Health, as much as 'tis possible in this Life.

Plato afterwards descends to the Consideration of all the parts of a humane Body, to shew with what exactness they answer the design of Providence. And the Description he makes of it is so fine, that *Longinus* calls it divine.

Plato not much skill'd in Anatomy.

The Excellency of this Description does not consist in the truth of his *Anatomick Discoveries*: for on the contrary *Plato* seems to have been less skill'd in *Anatomy* than his Predecessors; but it consists in the Elegancy of his Expressions, in the just Relation he finds between all the parts of the Body of Man, and in the Reasons he gives of their different use.

One

One of the great Faults of which he has been reproach'd, was, for having ſaid, that Drink paſſes through the Lungs. *Plutarch* has made an expreſs Treatiſe to juſtify him in this by the Authority of the Poets and that of Phyſicians. That of the Poets is too weak: for when a Poet ſpeaks of *watering the Lungs* for *drinking*, he conforms himſelf to the vulgar Opinion and Language: And that of Phyſicians is not ſtrong enough to make an Error paſs for Truth. But indeed *Plutarch* is miſtaken when he affirms this to have been the Sentiment of *Plato*, and of *Hippocrates* too; for neither one nor t'other ever fell into this Error. On the contrary *Hippocrates* ſays, that Drink does not paſs through the Lungs, but goes into the Stomach, and thence runs into the Bowels; He only aſſerts that a ſmall inſenſible part of it ſlides into the *Aſpera Arteria*, only to help to cool the Air which goes into the Lungs; and this likewiſe is what *Plato* means; nor could he have any other Thought, ſeeing he often in the ſame Treatiſe teaches, that the Stomach is made to receive all that we eat and drink; and that the natural Heat after it has mix'd, diſſolv'd and divided the Meat and Drink, ſends the Liquor into the Veins, which carry it to the Heart, and from thence into all the Body by the Pipes that proceed from that part. And the diſtribution of this Liquor of the Chyle which paſſes from the Stomach into the Veins he calls *Irrigation*. So that 'tis but a ſmall inſenſible part of what we drink that goes into the Lungs; as *Hippocrates* and after him *Galen* have juſtified by Experience. *Plato juſtified.*

Plato afterwards treats of the wonderful things to be obſerv'd in the Sight and Hearing, which are the moſt perfect Senſes. And in explaining the admirable Conſtruction of the Eyes, he diſcovers the Cauſes of Waking and Sleep, and deſcends even to that of Dreams which may be ſaid to be Material. For he ſays they that are in a deep Sleep have either no Dreams, or very ſhort ones; becauſe all their *The wonderful things that belong to the Sight and Hearing, and the uſe of both.*

Senſes are at reſt: but they who are but half aſleep, if one may ſo ſpeak, do not fail of having Dreams; becauſe their Senſes being ſtill in motion, preſerve the Veſtiges of thoſe things that have mov'd 'em, and imprint 'em on the Imagination.

The true uſe of the Eyes. He ſays that the Eyes firſt taught us Philoſophy, which is the greateſt favour Men can receive from the hand of God: and he is ſo well perſwaded that they are given us only for this end; that he makes no difficulty of affirming, that if a Man, who does not uſe 'em to this purpoſe, becomes blind, he has no reaſon to complain, becauſe his Eyes having been always uſeleſs to him, he has no loſs in loſing 'em.

Tom. 3. *In truth* (ſays he) *God has form'd our Eyes, only to contemplate the Works of his Providence, and to ſee the regular Motion of the Heavens which ſo conſtantly obey the Spirit that guides 'em, that ſo we might accuſtom our ſelves to love that which is Comely and Regular: and that we might learn to regulate all the Motions of our Souls, which are of the ſame Nature with that Divine Intelligence, but are diſorder'd by our Paſſions.*

The true uſe of the Voice and of the Hearing. He ſays the ſame of the Voice and of the Hearing; that the Tongue and the Ears are given us particularly that we might declare and hear the Wonders to be remark'd in the Works of God; and that Muſick was invented only to furniſh us, if we may ſo ſay, with Rule and Harmony. For becauſe is has a wonderful relation to all the Motions of our Souls, he ſays, *Wiſe Men make uſe of it, not as 'tis now us'd*

Tom. 3. *for fooliſh nay pernicious Mirth; but to calm and moderate the Paſſions, and to correct the horrible Diſcord's which they occaſion.*

The formation of the Heart and its uſe. Tom. 3. He ſays the Heart is the Source of the Veins, and the Fountain of the Blood which runs from thence with a rapid Courſe into all the other parts; and that it is as it were in a Fort guarded on all Sides; that ſo when the Choler comes to be inflam'd, when Reaſon gives it notice that it is threaten'd with ſome Miſchief from without by external Cauſes, or from within

within by the Disorder or Tumult of the Passions; it may speedily warn the whole Body of what passes, and dispose it to obey its Orders, to prevent the Danger impending. *And because God knew that the unexpected sight of any terrible thing, and the motion of the Choler would make the Heart beat violently, he contriv'd a very useful Remedy for this sort of Inflamation; and put the Lungs under it, the substance of which being soft and not furnish'd with much Blood, and having little holes within it like a Spunge, serves as a Pillow to the Heart, incessantly refreshes it with the Air and Moisture which it attracts, and moderates that violent Heat which would otherwise consume it.*

The Functions of the Spleen and Liver. Tom. 3.

In the lower Ventricle where the Nourishment is made, are the Spleen and Liver; the Spleen is a hollow and soft Substance, and consequently very proper to perform those Functions which it has pleas'd God to assign it. For he thought fit, that it should be (not the *Kitchen*, as 'tis express'd in a corrupt Copy, but) *the Spunge to wipe and cleanse the Intestines; and to take off all the Filth which gathers about the Liver in time of Sickness; and this swells and puffs it up; as it on the contrary flags, and returns to its former state when the Body is cleans'd.*

Some have falsly read μαγειρεῖον *a Kitchen for* ἐκμαγεῖον, *a Spunge.*

As for the Liver he says it was destined to a use which deserves to be related for its singularity: He tells us that because God knew that when the Spirit was busy in distributing the Aliment in this lower part of the Belly, it would be but little concern'd in what passed in the upper Region, and in the Seat of Reason, whose Orders it would never hear; he to provide against this Inconvenience, made the Liver of a hard Substance, having a mixture of Sweetness and Bitterness; and of a smooth and even Superficies like a Looking-Glass. When the Soul would advertise this Animal Spirit of what passes, she by means of the Thoughts, imprints on this Superficies the Image of all things of which she would give it Information; and by these Images gives it either Tom. 3.

Joy or Sorrow. When the Soul does not act upon this part, but leaves it at rest, as during the time of Sleep, those Gods who form'd the Body, or the great God himself imprints on this smooth Superficies the Images of such things as must come to pass, and these Images being carried to the Imagination produce Divination or Prophesy, the Seat of which the Ancients for this reason plac'd in the Liver; but *This* (says he) *never happens unless it be when that part of the Soul is not in a condition to obey the Spirit, which ought to guide it; for God has joined Prophesy with Madness; and 'tis easy to convince any one of this Truth, who considers that no person prophesies truly but when he is out of his Senses, that is when God, or Sleep, or some Disease deprive him of the use of Reason; and because 'tis only by Reason that Men can judge of things, therefore Prophets never * understand what they see; and we are therefore obliged to have recourse to Interpreters, who not being transported with Passion are capable of explaining what the Prophets have seen, by Reasonings founded on Experience.* But all this Construction of the Liver looks more like one of *Pythagoras* his Enigmas, than a Physical Explication; and seems much less proper to prove that prophesy comes from God, than to discover that it is the effect of some Vapours of the lower Ventricle which darken and stain the Imagination.

In his Timæus. Tom. 3.

He endeavours to shew that God knowing Man would be intemperate in Eating and Drinking, and that nothing would be more capable of destroying him before he advanc'd to ripeness of Age, he made as it were a Labyrinth of Bowels in the lower Ventricle, that by their turnings and windings the Food might be hinder'd from passing off too soon; for if

Why the Bowels wind about. Tom. 3.

* This is one of *Plato*'s Errors, who absurdly confounds Prophets divinely inspir'd with false Prophets, and thereby gave occasion to the Error of the *Montanists*. True Prophets did not speak by Extasy, but saw and understood what they declar'd, and were therefore call'd *Seers*.

the

the Bowels were all ſtreight, the Food would be continually paſſing; and Men by this means render'd inſatiable would think of nothing elſe but eating, which would make 'em uncapable of applying themſelves to Learning and Philoſophy, and would ſpeedily occaſion their Death; the natural Heat not being ſufficient to digeſt ſo much Food, beſides that it would want time to do it.

After this he explains the nature, and production of the Fleſh, Blood, Bones, Muſcles, Sinews, Brain, Marrow, and all the other parts of which our Bodies are compos'd; he calls the Blood *the Food of the Fleſh*, and ſays the whole Body is encompaſs'd with Fleſh, like ſo much ſoft Wool, laid cloſe together, which ſerves to fortify it againſt the Injuries of the Air, and all other Accidents, as falls, *&c.*

The Conſtruction of the Head. Tom. 3.

In ſpeaking of the Conſtruction of the Head, he ſays 'tis both the moſt beautiful, and weakeſt of all the parts of the Body. That God indeed could have given Man a Head much better fortified with Bones, Sinews and Fleſh, which would have extremely prolong'd his Life, as well as made him lead it more commodiouſly; but becauſe it was not poſſible that a part cover'd over with a very hard Bone, a great many Sinews, and very thick Fleſh, ſhould have a very quick Senſe; and the Head was to be the Seat of Senſe, Reaſon and Prudence; God having well weigh'd the advantages of a very ſtrong and robuſt but ill-contriv'd Body, that is heavy and uncapable of Senſe and Prudence, againſt thoſe of a Body more feeble but more elegant, that is to ſay, lively and lightſome, he prefer'd this to the other, and choſe to give us a ſhort rather than a long Life; for the Spirit was not created for the Body, but the Body for the Spirit.

He goes on to ſpeak of Sanguification, Nutrition, Reſpiration, Tranſpiration, natural Heat, the diminution, and augmentation of the Body, which leads him to ſpeak of Old Age, Diſeaſes and Death, which happens, *when the Machine is worn out, and the*

Strings that hold it together grow ſlack, and give the Soul liberty to fly out of her Priſon with extreme Pleaſure.

As for Diſeaſes he explains the Cauſes of them by the ſame Principles which *Hippocrates* had eſtabliſh'd before him. For he ſays Man being a Compound of the four Elements, Fire, Air, Earth, and Water, or which is the ſame thing, Cold, Hot, Moiſt, and Dry; the juſt Proportion and even Temperament of theſe 4 Qualities preſerve Union and Peace, from whence Health reſults; and on the contrary their unequal mixture which proceeds from Exceſs, Defect, or the Change of the Situation of ſome or other of 'em, produces Diſorder and Diviſion, the only ſource of Diſeaſes. For then that which was Cold becomes Hot, that which was Dry, Moiſt; and that which was Heavy Light, and the Blood being corrupted by this Alteration, as well as the Spirits, and overcharg'd with Acid, or Salt Particles, inſtead of producing New to nouriſh the Fleſh, breeds nothing but Choler Flegm, and Water, which generate divers ſorts of Fevers and other Diſtempers. Tom. 3.

The Diſeaſes of the Soul. From theſe Diſeaſes of the Body ſpring thoſe of the Soul which *Plato* divides into two ſorts, that of Folly, and that of Ignorance or Stupidity. Ignorance is properly the Soul's forgetfulneſs: and when great Pleaſure or exceſſive Sorrows take away Knowledg from the Soul, ſo that ſhe is not in a condition to underſtand any thing, this is Folly. For example, a Man whoſe Temper inclines him to Love, is always mad while the rage of this Paſſion laſts; he is therefore call'd a profligate Perſon, or a Debauchee, as if he willingly plung'd himſelf into this Diſorder; But he ought to be call'd a Fool, and look'd upon as a Diſeas'd Perſon; for according to *Socrates* no Man is vitious but againſt his will. This Man is carried away by his Conſtitution, and the ill Education he has had. And the ſame may be ſaid of all other ſorts of Senſuality.

Sorrow

Sorrow likewise proceeds from the Intemperature of the Body, for it is caus'd by an acrimonious Flegm, and Bilious Humors which disperse themselves through the Body, and not finding vent obscure the Soul with their Vapours, disturb her motion, and bring grievous Distempers upon her, but different according to the Parts on which they fix. *The Cause of Sorrow.*

To this Intemperature of the Body he joins the Intemperature of whole Cities, which by the pernicious Example of their corrupt Manners, and the wicked Discourse which they suffer both in publick and in private, and in fine by the little Care they take to have young People well educated, frequently precipitate us into all these Mischiefs. Thus our Corruption comes properly from two Causes that are absolutly involuntary; which render us wicked against our Wills; And instead of accusing us, there is reason only to accuse our Parents and Teachers. *The Moral Intemperature of Cities.*

What *Plato* says of the ill Education of Youth, and the fatal Examples which whole Cities give them, is but too True, but what he adds, that our Corruption is involuntary on our own part ought not to be taken in a strict Literal Sense. For as *Aristotle* has very well observ'd, 'tis a great Error to say we are only vitious against our Wills. Sound Philosophy and Religion teach us, that God has given Men a Liberty of chosing between Good and Evil, and that all vertuous or vicious Actions are purely voluntary. If it were not so it would be unreasonable to blame Vice or commend Vertue, nor could any reason be assigned for the Establishment of Rewards and Punishments, for none can be justly praised or dispraised only for what he did whether he would or no. How then did *Plato* understand this Notion of *Socrates*, to embrace it as he did? without doubt he understood (and 'tis what *Aristotle* did not comprehend) that God has given men all that Light that is necessary to direct 'em to obey the Law of Nature which he has engrav'd in their hearts; and to inform 'em of certain fundamental Truths, which enlighten the Universe like so many *How this Opinion of* Plato, *that we are wicked against our Wills, ought to be understood.*

Torches; but Men have despised these Helps; and by this voluntary Contempt, are justly fallen into Blindness which hinders 'em from distinguishing Truth from Error, or at least from obeying it; and thus all the vitious Actions of Men are at the same time voluntary and involuntary; voluntary in their Origin and Source; for 'tis their own Choice that they have thrown off the Yoke of Vertue and Righteousness; and involuntary often in the execution; for in spite of the Remorse of their Consciences, they are led away by the miserable propension of their Hearts, which induces 'em to commit the Evil which they would not do. They are the Slaves of Sin which rules over 'em, and to the Service of which they have engag'd their Liberty.

Remedies for the Diseases of the Soul.

Plato comes next to shew the Remedies that are to be applied against these two sorts of Diseases of the Soul and Body; and first establishes this Incontestable Maxime; that whatsoever is Good is Beautiful; that Goodness consists in proportion and measure; and that if this be true in all sensible things, 'tis much more so in the Union of the Soul and Body: For from their just proportion spring Health and Vertue; as Diseases and Vices are produc'd by the contrary: If the Soul be too strong for the Body, she weakens it, wears it out, and very often causes such Maladies as baffle the Art of Physicians.

On the other side if the Body is stronger than the Soul; because it takes care only of it self, it grows, and fortifies it self daily, and leaves the Soul in an Oblivion, and as it were in a Lethargy, which brings on her a Stupidity and Ignorance which she cannot dissipate. Therefore to preserve the health of both parts, they both of 'em ought to be equally exercised. He that applies himself to Study ought not to despise the Exercises of the Body; and he who makes Bodily Exercises his principal business, ought not to neglect Meditation and Study. But in these two States we must take great care not to go from one Extreme to another; not to pass suddenly, for instance,

ſtance, from great Reſt to great Labour. We ſhould imitate Nature whoſe Motions are always equal, without Catches, and Shocks. Now of all Motions the moſt Salutary is that which is made of ones ſelf in ones ſelf; becauſe 'tis Natural. That which comes from another Body is Detrimental; and the moſt miſchievous of all is that which by means of External Bodies, removes by parts a Body which was at Reſt.

Hence it follows, that the beſt Remedy, and moſt wholeſome Purgative is Exerciſe, that is to ſay that which they call * *Gymnaſtick*: After this comes the Exerciſe of the Horſe, or that of being carried any other way, as in a Litter or Boat, which the Ancients called *Vectatio*; For this Exerciſe is compos'd of Motion and Reſt; the third ſort is not good, but in preſſing Neceſſity, and no Man of Senſe will ever uſe it but in an Extremity; Such are Medicinal Purges: for we ſhould never irritate thoſe Diſeaſes that are not dangerous, by ſuch kind of Medicines. The formation of Diſeaſes is like that of Animals, they require a certain ſpace of time to bring 'em to perfection; they have their Periods; and if we attempt to oppoſe 'em by violent Remedies before the time of their declenſion, we often make many Diſtempers of one, or of a ſlight Diſeaſe an incurable one. We ought to prevent or attack them by a good Regiment, as much as opportunity will permit.

Plato divides the Soul into 3 parts; the Reaſonable part, the Iraſcible part, and the Concupiſcible part. He places the firſt in the Brain, the ſecond in the Heart, and the third in the Liver; he alſo compares it to a Flying Chariot having two Horſes and a Charioteer; one of the Horſes is head-ſtrong and unruly, and the other gentle and governable: The Charioteer is Reaſon, which is to Command and Guide; the Unruly Horſe is the Concupiſcible part; for the Appetites know no Bridle or Reſtraint of

The Soul divided into 3 parts.

* Such as Wreſtling, Leaping, Running, &c.

Rea-

Reaſon: and the gentle Horſe is rhe Iraſcible part, becauſe it obeys the Reaſon, and is ſerviceable to it on urgent Occaſions. When a Man does not moderate theſe two latter parts, and purge their Paſſions to reduce 'em to a uſeful Mediocrity, and ſubmit them to the former, he can have no other than Earthly and Mortal Opinions; and he renders himſelf Mortal, becauſe he fortifies in himſelf thoſe parts that are Mortal; whereas he that makes the firſt part reign over the two other; becauſe he has in a ſpecial manner adorn'd and cultivated that God which was given to him, that is his Underſtanding or Mind; and becauſe the Mind comes immediatly from the only true God, he is hereby united to the Source of Life, and already taſtes the firſt fruits of Immortality.

An Explication of this Diviſion.

This Diviſion of the Soul deſerves to be explain'd for ſome have been mightily miſtaken to think that *Plato* made the Soul diviſible, or that he imagin'd there were divers Souls; as if he put as many Souls in the Body of Man, as there were Grecian Officers (if I may ſo ſpeak) in the famous Trojan Horſe. This Philoſopher did not fall into ſuch an Error as this; but on the contrary attacks it and expoſes all the Abſurdity of it, and with marvellous ſtrength of Argument eſtabliſhes the Simplicity and Indiviſibility of the Soul; but his deſign was to ſhow (as he explaines himſelf in his *Theætitus* and the 4th Book of his *Republick*) that there are ſome things that depend only on the Soul, ſuch are all the Acts of the Will; and that there are others which depend on the Corporeal Faculties; and theſe Corporeal Faculties or Powers compoſe thoſe two parts, that may be call'd the two Corporeal and Mortal parts of the Soul, *viz.* the *Concupiſcible* and *Iraſcible*, which cauſe all our Paſſions, and the ſeat of which he places in the Heart and Liver, which he looks upon as the two Sources of the Blood and Spirits, on which alone the Corporeal Faculties depend, and which alone excite all the Motions and Paſſions of the Body.

Thus

Thus according to *Plato* there is but one ſimple Soul without any diverſity of parts, the ſeat of which is in the Brain, whence it irradiates the whole Body by means of the Nerves, Bloud and Spirits; but its Motions, that is the Acts of the Will, may be oppoſed by the Motions, and Impulſions of the Body; and 'tis this which makes theſe Combates between the Superior and Inferior Soul, (that is betwixt the Soul and the Body) mention'd in the 4th Book of the *Republick*. This I ſay is *Plato's* Doctrin, by which 'tis eaſy to explain all the Faculties of the Soul, and to give the Reaſons of its Vices and Vertues, and to diſcover the Remedies that ought to be uſed to fortifie the one and weaken the other, and to correct all the Paſſions in reducing them to a uſeful Mediocrity; for there are none of 'em but what are good by Nature, and may be uſed to good advantage, when the Soul is Miſtreſs of 'em, and ſo regulates and conducts 'em.

The Creation of the firſt woman and of all Animals.

He next explains the Production of the firſt Woman, and that of Animals. Having underſtood by the Hiſtory of *Moſes*, that the firſt Man being caſt into a deep ſleep, God extracted the Woman from him; this gave riſe to all thoſe Imaginations, which he expoſes in his *Timeus*; where he teaches, that the firſt Woman, and all Animals ſprang from Man, but through that thick Darkneſs he has ſpread upon this Work of God, in explaining it after a Myſterious and Poetical manner, the Foot-ſteps of Ancient Truth are to be diſcovered; and one may perceive, that he thus obſcur'd and conceal'd 'em, only that he might thence draw a Doctrine uſeful to regulate the Manners of Men. His deſign is to engage Man always to render his Creator that Worſhip which is due to him; and to do nothing that may render him unworthy of that great Advantage of having been form'd by the Hands of God himſelf; therefore he repreſents to him, not only that he degenerates into a Woman, when he is unjuſt, timorous and voluptuous, but moreover that he ſinks into the Condition

of

of Animals. For when he is Inconſtant, Raſh and Unſteady, and amuſes himſelf about penetrating the Heavens by a vain Curioſity, imagining that only by the Organ of his Sight he is able to judg of all that appears there, he becomes a Bird: If he has no reliſh of true Philoſophy; but inſtead of contemplating the Heavens, that by the marvellous Workmanſhip of 'em, he might ſeek the knowledg of him that made them, he only thinks on Earthly Things, and how to gratify his ſenſual Deſires, he degenerates into a brute Beaſt, and is always fix'd to the Earth; if he be yet more corrupted, he becomes a Reptile, and always touches the Earth with all the parts of his Body; and in fine, if he puſh his Folly and Ignorance to the laſt Extremity, he becomes a Fiſh, unworthy to breath in the Air; and conſequently plung'd in the moſt filthy and troubled Element of all. This was the Metempſychoſis of which *Plato* ſpeaks, and I make no doubt, but this was the Sentiment of *Pythagoras*, and of the Egyptians, which has been made ridiculous in taking it very unjuſtly in a literal Senſe. For what Probability is there that Philoſophers, who never ſpoke without Enigmas ſhould with ſo much Simplicity explain ſo wonderful a Secret as that of the Paſſage of Souls into various Bodies of a different Species? And perhaps it would be no ill-founded Opinion that this Idea came into the head of *Pythagoras*, upon what happen'd in his time to King *Nebuchadnezzar*, who for his Sins was turn'd out among the Beaſts, and for ſeven Years grazed like an Ox.

What gave occaſion to the Opinion of a Metempſychoſis.

A Philoſopher who explain'd his Doctrine only by Enigmatick Expreſſions could not but be taken with this Idea, which naturally informs us, that Vice degrades us from our Dignity, and transforms us into Beaſts, more or leſs Savage, according as we are more or leſs vitious; and a certain ſign, that this was the ſenſe of this Metempſychoſis, is, that the Pythagorean Philoſophers conceiv'd it juſt after this manner; and prov'd that Man in his Eſſence is

inferior

inferior to God, and Angels, and ſuperior to Animals, Plants, and other Terreſtrial and Mortal Natures: and that as that Man who ſhould flatter himſelf that he ſhould become a God, or an Angel, would be infinitely miſtaken, not underſtanding the Limits of Nature; he that ſhould think he ſhould become a Beaſt for his Wickedneſs, or a Plant becauſe of his heavy and ſluggiſh Temper, would likewiſe be deceived, *being ignorant of the eſſential Form of the Soul, which can never alter; but being and continuing always Man, is ſaid to become a God or a Brute by Vertue or Vice, although by Nature it cannot be either the one or the other, and therefore is ſo only by reſemblance.* Hierocles *on the Verſes of* Pythagoras.

Moreover *Pythagoras* might take this Idea from the Ancient Hebrews, who gave Men ſuch Names as were deſcriptive of their Nature, calling them Wolves, Dogs, Swine, Serpents, Fiſhes, &c. as they remark'd in 'em ſuch Vices as render'd 'em very like thoſe Animals. Therefore the firſt Man that was celebrated for Piety, and began to call on the Name of the Lord was call'd *Enos*, that is to ſay, *a True Man*; as if there had been no true Man before him, * becauſe there was no pious Man. This is all, the Myſtery of *Pythagoras* his Metempſychoſis; which has been turn'd into a Monſter by a low literal Explication of it. *Plato* underſtood it in part, but he alter'd it in connecting it with an Error into which he fell, about the Return of Souls into this Life after a certain ſpace of time. As I take it, he conceiv'd that a Soul came divers times to animate the ſame Body, thus it was rather a Reſurrection ſeveral times, repeated, then a Metempſychoſis. But of this Matter we ſhall treat more largely in its place.

Some of *Plato*'s Interpreters have ſaid that in the Creation of Man, God order'd the Inferior Deities to make the Body, that ſo, becauſe all Evil was to proceed from Matter, he might not be charg'd with *Whence Evil comes, and whether it ſubſiſts of it ſelf.*

* *I ſuppoſe the Author means in that Generation; for otherwiſe 'tis evident, that* Abel *was a pious man.*

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it, and that it might not be ſaid, that Evil came from God himſelf. But this expedient would have been very uſeleſs, for if Evil were a quality adherent to Matter, God having created this, the other muſt needs have come from him; though the Body had been created by inferior Deities; which is impious and very remote from *Plato*'s Thoughts. When this Philoſopher ſays Evils could not be baniſh'd from Nature, and that they aroſe from Neceſſity, that is from Matter; he had no deſign to ſignifiy that Matter was Evil of it ſelf; but he meant to ſhew, that as it is always oppoſite to the Nature of God, it cauſes all the Paſſions and all the Miſeries of Men; who by how much the more they approach it by ſo much the more diſtant they remove from God. For Matter does not only corrupt thoſe who immerſe themſelves in it, but alſo ſuch as look on it; becauſe every thing that inclines or turns it ſelf towards it, neceſſarily turns away from God, aud leaves Light for Darkneſs, which is a Principle confirm'd equally by Religion and Experience, ſo that 'tis unneceſſary to bring Proofs to ſupport it. It will be ſufficient to cite here *Plato*'s own words. *It is impoſſible my Dear* Theodore, *that Evils ſhould be entirely expel'd humane Society. For 'tis neceſſary there ſhould be always ſomething oppoſite to Good. Yet it muſt not be thought that Evil can ever approach the Deity, 'tis only annex'd to mortal Natures; and is always about the Earth which we inhabit, becauſe it ſprings only from Neceſſity. Therefore we ſhould endeavour to fly from hence as ſwiftly as we can. Now to fly away is to labour to unite our ſelves to God, as much as poſſible; and we can't be united to him, but by Wiſdom, Righteouſneſs and Holineſs.*

In his Theætetus. *Tom.* 1.

Evil does not ſpring from Matter.

In this Book of a *Republick*, he ſhews that Evil does not ſpring from Matter, but from Motion, which brings it to its firſt Confuſion and Diſorder. *The World* (ſays he) *had all good things from its Maker, but from the External Habitude, which it had before it had all that is Evil, wicked and vitious in Nature,*

and

and communicates it to Animals. So that by his Account, Evil is properly only a Return to the first Disorder, an Irregularity, a Dislocation, and Disobedience, and consequently subsists not by it self; whereas Good subsists independantly of the things that possess it; for it subsists in God, who is the Author of all Good, and is Goodness it self. But whence comes this Motion that leads to Disorder? It proceeds not from Matter, seeing that is without quality. It comes according to *Plato* from the rash and disorder'd Spirit which heated and animated the first Matter, before God by framing the World, had render'd it capable of Order and Harmony by an Understanding.

By this we are to understand, that Evil is a privation of Order and Harmony, which proves true in all sorts of Evil, and above all in those of the Soul, that is in Vices which are the only proper Evils. When a man disobeys the Law, one can't say his Disobedience is a Being which exists and springs from the Law, but 'tis an Alienation from what the Law commands. The Law is Holy and the Commandment is Just and Good, but Concupiscence has produc'd Sin. When a Son loves not his Father who has done him nothing but Good, one can't say this Aversion proceeds from the Father; on the contrary, 'tis only a Refusal of Love and Submission which he owes him, and which the Law of Nature teaches him. Just so the Evils of the Soul, are not a fault of Nature; but a fault of the Will, which being free uses its liberty to reject that which is Good. So that Vices are only voluntary Aversions which alienate us from right Reason, in which alone Order, and Harmony consist; and consequently, as the Pythagoreans and Platonists knew very well there is no necessity of establishing a Principle of Evil, whether we make it spring from Matter, or derive it from without; we need only one principle of Good which truely exists, and this is God. By his Essence he is separated from Rational Substances but he com-

Evil does not exist of it self.

communicates and unites himself to them by Reason: to obey this Reason is Vertue and to disobey it, Vice. Thus our Bodies are neither the Cause of our Vices, nor that of our Vertues; * But our Souls are the Cause of both, as *Plato* very solidly proves in his Xth Book of *Laws*.

What Good, and Evil, Vertue and Vice are.

In what sense Plato *calls Creatures Gods.*

It has been charg'd on *Plato* as a Crime, that he gives the Name of God to Creatures: But besides that he has done nothing in this but what we find done in the Holy Scripture, where Men and Angels are called *Gods*; Never did any one better observe the infinite Sovereignty of the true God over mortal Creatures to whom he has given this Name, than *Plato* has done. Thus he feigns God speaking to 'em as their Supreme Lord. *Children of the Gods, all the Works that have gone out of my Hands are indissoluble as much as I please, and as long as I shall sustain 'em. Not but that whatsoever has been join'd together is of a nature capable of being disunited, but it becomes not an infinitely good Creator to destroy his Work, when this Work has nothing of evil in it. You have been created, and consequently you can't be entirely Immortal, and Indissoluble; however you shall never be destroy'd, and Death shall have no dominion over you; my Will being a stronger Bond to ascertain your Immortality, than all that wherewith you have been bound at your Birth. We have yet three sorts of Animals to form of mortal Matter, without which the World would not be perfect, for to make it perfect it ought to contain Animals of every Species; but if I should create them my self, they would be equal to the Gods. Therefore that they may be mortal, and that the World may be compleated, do you form them your selves according to your Nature, by imitating the Power I display'd in forming you: and seeing the most excellent of 'em ought to have something Divine to render 'em worthy to rule the rest, and to engage*

In his Timæus, *Tom.* 3.

* Therefore the Holy Scripture commonly speaks of the Soul with reference to Vices and Vertues. *The Soul that sinneth, if a Soul touch*, &c.

them

them to obey Laws and Justice; I will provide that Divine Seed which is the Soul. Do you finish this Composition, by adding that which is to be mortal; and by furnishing it with necessary Aliments, raise them up and make 'em grow, and when they are destroyed receive them again into your Bosom.

Plato here after a very Magnificent and Poetical manner describes how God created Man and the other Animals by means of second Causes, which he calls Gods; and it is no difficult Matter to find in his Words the Beams of those Eternal Truths which *Moses* teaches us. *Plato* (after *Moses*) brings God in as if speaking to other Gods when he is about to create Man; though he did not comprehend the Mystery hidden under those divine Words. In *Plato* as well as in the Writings of *Moses* we see Man was form'd after the Image of God; not as to his Body, but as to his Mind; that he was to rule over other Animals; and that he only is capable of rendering God true Worship. *Plato* teaches us after *Moses* that these very Animals serve to perfectionate the Universe; contrary to the opinion of certain Heretiques, who accused God for having made many Animals that were either dangerous or useless. In fine we see in *Plato* as well as in the Holy Scriptures that Important Truth * that the Immortality of the Angels is not an effect of their Nature, but a Privilege of mere Grace, which depends only on the Divine Will.

Whether God can make himself visible to Men.

'Tis surprizing that such a Man as *Plato*, who understood these Great Truths, and spoke of God after so admirable a manner, as we shall see in divers places of this Treatise, should notwithstanding maintain, as he has done in the 11th Book of his *Republick*, *Tom.* 2. that God being perfection it self, cannot shew himself to Men under any visible Figure, and he reasons

* This is what St. *Ambrose* says in express Terms in his 3d Book *De Fide*. *Nec & Angelus immortalis est naturaliter, cujus immortalitas est in voluntate Creatoris.* Angels themselves are not Immortal by Nature, but their Immortality depends on the Will of their Creator.

Plato's *false Reasoning.*

thus; *If God should metamorphose himself he would assume a Form more perfect than his own, or a Form less perfect. Now 'tis ridiculous to say he changes for the better, for then there would be something more perfect than he, which is absurd; and 'tis Impious to admit that he changes himself into something less perfect, for God can't degrade himself; besides if he should appear under any other Form than his own, he would lye, because he would appear to be what he is not. Hence therefore it must be concluded that he continues in his Simple Form, which alone is Beauty and Perfection it self.* And upon this he condemns *Homer* for having attributed to God those Visible Forms.

If *Plato* had only employ'd this Argument of his to beat down the ridiculous Metamorphoses which the Poets attributed to the Gods, he would have had Reason; but to make use of it to oppose the manner by which God has often render'd himself visible, *viz.* Under the Form of an Angel or Man, whom he created after his Image, and whose Figure he might take, without deceiving Men, or laying aside his Perfections, is an Error. And this did not escape the knowledg of his Disciple *Aristotle*, who though otherwise less illuminated in what belongs to the Divine Nature, understood better than *Plato* the Beauty and Truth of that Sentiment of *Homer*, who in the XIVth Book of his *Odysses* says *that the Gods, who can easily clothe themselves with all sorts of Forms, sometimes take the Figure of Travellers and go into Cities to be Witnesses both of the Sins of Men and of their Good Actions.* Instructed by this great Poet he understood that it is not unworthy of God to assume Humane Nature, to deliver Men from their Errors. Upon which his too Zealous Admirers have advanc'd that he had some presage of the Incarnation of the Messiah. But what an Honour is it to *Homer*, that his Notions agree better with the Truths contain'd in the Holy Scriptures, than those of the Greatest Philosophers. When God appear'd to Men under a visible Form he had both what was visible and what was invisible. But

But to return to *Plato*'s Phyſicks. One may very well diſſent both from thoſe who will have 'em very perfect; and from the Sentiment of thoſe that Account 'em very defective. The former have too good an Opinion of 'em; ſeduc'd perhaps by the great pleaſure they have found in penetrating the great Obſcurities of his *Timæus*; and others ſpeak too meanly of 'em, becauſe they have not given themſelves time to ſound thoſe Deeps, having been diſcourag'd by the dryneſs of his Principles, which he does not give himſelf the trouble of unfolding; but leaves others the labour of explaining and finding out the meaning of 'em. But in this there is a Medium to be obſerv'd. 'Tis certain *Plato* knew the chief Principles of true Natural Philoſophy. This ſufficiently appears by what has been already ſaid on this Subject. We find in his *Timæus* an explication of the Nature of the Elements, only by the Diſpoſition and Configuration of the parts of Matter, which alſo cauſe the different Senſations and Affections of the Body. There we find the Explication of Colours, which are only the Reflexion of Light. By the different Mixture, by the diverſified Figure and Motion of the Elements, each of which has many different Qualities or Forms, he explains the Production and Nature of Minerals, Metals, Oils, Salt, Liquors, Meteors, *&c.* For Example, ſpeaking of the Loadſtone, and Amber, he ſays, *Their Vertue comes from the Motion of the Matter which goes out of their Pores.* But all this together can't make a well methodiz'd Syſtem of Phyſicks: Nor is it his deſign to give the World a Treatiſe of Phyſicks: He ſwiftly runs through that which is tranſitory, to find that which is permanent, and to dwell upon it; he forgets nothing that is neceſſary, but rejects whatſoever is uſeleſs or ſuperfluous; he ſo little deſigns to enter into a deep reſearch of this Matter, that he lets us know, that if any one has a mind to break off his Meditation from things that truly exiſt and abide, to apply himſelf

What Judgment may be made of Plato's Phyſicks.

Natural Philosophy consider'd by Plato *as a Divertisement.*

to a more particular knowledg of such as are only transitory and momentany, and finds pleasure in so doing, it will not be difficult for him to satisfy himself in following his Principles; *and to give himself a Divertisement of Life*, which he calls *Wise and Moderate.*

By these Words *Plato* gives us to understand that he look'd upon this part of Natural Philosophy rather as a Play, than an Employment; and this oblig'd him, to give only a superficial Account of it; that he might more usefully employ his Time in searching for more important and Solid Truths. And one may say, that in this again he imitates *Moses*, who in the History of the Creation has wisely suppress'd whatsoever might flatter the Vanity and Curiosity of Men, to insist only on that which was proper to augment their Humility and Piety. Therefore we should be so far from wondering that Natural Philosophy was not rais'd to its perfection in those Ancient Times when it was look'd upon at best but as an Amusement more curious than useful, and when the greatest Men applied themselves only to Morality which is concern'd only about our true Happiness and Misery; that I know not whether we should not have more reason to be surpriz'd that it should be so much esteem'd in Ages wherein we ought even to make less account of it than *Plato* does. *Solomon* does not advise Men to *acquire Natural Philosophy* but *to get Wisdom.* For 'tis Wisdom only that teaches us to know God; and this is *Plato*'s Language, who to promote his Design always reasons morally in his Physical Discourses: and instead of insisting on the Consideration of Mechanique Reasons taken from the Motion, and Succession of Bodies, applies himself, as *Socrates* did before him, to discover the first Cause, and to penetrate the Designs of the Soveraign Spirit which governs the World; and endeavours to explain whole Nature by Harmony aud Proportion; Seeking not so much to teach Men Physicks, as to give 'em great Prospects, and to elevate

elevate their Minds. Nay *Socrates* formally says in *Phædon* that the manner of teaching Physicks by the Succession and Motion of Bodies is very defective, and causes more Errors than it cures; because by detaining the Mind too much upon Matter, and that which is but a Second Cause, it hinders it from raising it self up to God, who is the only true and first Cause of all things; and he blames *Anaxagoras*, who tho he knew this Truth, dissembles it in his practise, and deceives the expectation of his Readers. 'Tis such a Research as this that *Solomon* represents as *a very Evil and Dangerous Employment* and the Truth of this has been but too much confirm'd by Experience.

The Order of the Celestial Spheres.

Before we quit this Subject, let us see how he ranges the Celestial Spheres, and what Vertues he supposes them to display by their Influences, First he places the Earth as the Center of the World. 'Tis true *Theophrastus* writes, that in his Old Age he repented that he had given it that place, which is not suitable to it, He says it is the Boundary of the Rising and Setting of the Sun, and consequently the Instrument of Time, as the Planets are, and Guardian or Mother of the Day and Night. After the *Earth* he places the Sphere of the *Moon*, then that of the *Sun*, that of *Venus* and that of *Mercury*; after *Mercury* he places *Mars*, *Jupiter* and *Saturn*.

The Influences of the Stars.

He says that in the beginning after God had created the Souls of Men, he distributed them into all the Planets; by which he would signifie, that the Bodies which those Souls animated in the time mark'd out by Providence, should be subject to the Influences of those Stars. Which he explains more sensibly when he feigns that there are Three *Parcæ* the Daughters of Necessity, which turn a great Spindle, that is the Axle-tree of the World, with its Eight Spheres, whose Motions and Revolutions produce all things. Necessity is Destiny, which is nothing but the Order and Concatenation of Causes, which ought to produce such or such Effects. This Necessity has 3 Daugh-

An Explication of the three Parcæ.

ters which denote the three differences of Time which is either Paſt, Preſent or Future. The firſt which is the Eldeſt is nam'd *Lacheſis* that is, *a Lot*, becauſe the Lots of all things have been regulated from all Eternity, that is before Time. The ſecond is *Clothon*, This is ſhe that executes, and adds the preſent to the paſt. And the third is *Atropos* which ſignifies that the future is no leſs certain or invariable than the two others; but is the Conſequence of one and and the ſame Law which never alters. Theſe *Parcæ* are cloth'd in white, and ſeated on Thrones with Crowns on their Heads, to ſignify on one hand their Purity and Innocence, and on the other the Dominion they exerciſe over all that is ſubjected to 'em; they are plac'd at equal diſtances over theſe Eight Spheres, upon each of which there is a *Siren* which Sings with all her might, and the *Parcæ* anſwer this Singing after ſuch a manner, that all theſe different Voices make but one Harmony. *Plato* would hereby ſignify that all things obey the Divine Law and concur to produce thoſe Effects, which are Conſequences of the Cauſes God has eſtabliſhed.

The Soul is not ſubject to Deſtiny.

But if our Bodies depend on theſe Planets and obey the Laws of this fatal Neceſſity, our Souls may preſerve themſelves independant, and only obey God, who is Maſter of Neceſſity it ſelf. The Planets may by their Influence produce in us ſuch or ſuch Manners, and by theſe ſuch or ſuch Actions or Paſſions; but if our Souls will, they have power to moderate and regulate 'em. And when the Soul does the conrrary, and ſuffers her ſelf to be carried down the Stream; ſhe deprives her ſelf of her own Liberty, and loſes all her Privileges. For this is that in which that Free will, that God has left her to denote her Origin, conſiſts: She can either ſubmit her ſelf to that Fatal Neceſſity which *Zoroaſter* calls an *Augmenting the power of Deſtiny*; or ſubject that to her ſelf, by uniting her ſelf to him, to whom all things are ſubject, and in whom alone ſhe can enjoy her Liberty; And this is what *Plato* means, when

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he says a Prophet having taken the Lots out of the Lap of the first *Parcæ*, ascended a Throne, and addressing himself to all the Souls that had been created, spoke to 'em in these Terms. *Hear what* Lachesis *the Daughter of Necessity says. O Mortal Souls, here is the beginning of a New Period, or Life, You are going to animate Bodies that are destin'd to Death; Your Demon (or Angel) shall not make choice of you, but you shall choose your Demon (or Angel) your selves. Let that Soul therefore that has the first Lot, first choose the kind of Life which she will lead by the Laws of Necessity, and so of the rest. There is nothing but only Vertue that does not acknowledg her Laws: she is free, and gives not her self to any but such as know how to honour her: Thus the fault is in the Soul which chooses, and God is not to be blamed.* After this Proclamation, all imaginable ways of living are propos'd, and the Soul chooses.

In the X *Book of his* Repub. *Tom.* 2.

We cannot finish this Matter without speaking somewhat of these Demons, assign'd as Guides to each Soul; and this Article would indeed require a long Chapter of it self, or rather an entire Volume, if we would sound the bottom of this Doctrine; but 'tis sufficient for us here to know in general, that when *Plato* says the Soul immediately after her animating the Body, chooses her Demon or Genius; his design is only to signify the Liberty of the Soul, and that she is able to choose between Good and Evil. That is, that as we are compos'd of 2 different Natures, by one of which we partake of this gross and Terrestrial World, and by the other of the Intelligible World; by which we are raised to that which is most Sublime and Spiritual; If the Soul immerses her self in Matter, she has a material Demon, that hinders her from raising her self up to Celestial Things; and if on the contrary she keeps her self pure, and lives only by the Understanding, she has a good Demon, or perfect Genius, which supports and hinders her from descending to that which is

How the choice of a Demon or Genius ought to be understood.

material and corruptible; if she changes her Life, she also changes her Demon; and after Death, the Demon that she chose, leads her either to her Reward or Punishment. This was *Plato*'s Doctrine, which he frequently delivers in Allegories very difficult to be understood, but by which he seems to have known, or at least had some Glances of very great Truths concerning the Nature and Difference of those Spirits, which are between God and Men, Truths which the Christian Religion has consecrated without divesting them of their Obscurity. For who is it that understands those different Orders of Spirits which St. *Paul* describes by those different Names, of Powers, Thrones, Principalities, and Mights? St. *Augustine* confesses he does not understand 'em, and St. *Irenæus* assures us that they cannot be understood. It is probable *Plato* had received almost the same Ideas from the Theology of the Hebrews, which we shall speak of in the Argument of *Socrates* his Apology; and it was without doubt out of respect to their Books, that he advanc'd that excellent Maxim, that in those matters we ought to receive nothing for Truth, but what is found conformable to the Word of God, and the Divine Oracles.

None ever prov'd the Immortality of the Soul better than *Plato*. His Proofs of it are to be seen in his *Phædrus*, in the X Book of his *Republick* and in his *Phædon*. In the mean time I can't choose but speak here of a seeming Contradiction which is found in his Writings. In *Phædrus* he says in express Terms, *That the Soul is eternal, and that it can't perish, because it was not begotten:* And on the contrary he says in *Timæus*, *That the Soul was created before the Body, and that it was begotten by the best of intellectual and eternal Causes, as it is also the best of all things that are generated and temporal.*

Asserming Contradiction in Plato.

Plutarch to reconcile this Contradiction, into which he is sure *Plato* never fell, assures us that by this unbegotten and eternal Soul he understands that

Plutarch endeavours to reconcile his Contradiction.

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void and disorderly Spirit which mov'd all things irregularly before the Constitution of the World; and on the contrary that he calls that the begotten Soul which God compos'd of that first Spirit and of the permanent and eternal Substance; of which he made a wise and regular Soul, because he put something of his own into it, and added Understanding to Sense, and Order and Harmony to Motion.

The Errors of Plutarch.

But at this rate the Soul would be a Compound of a foolish thing and a wise, which is the grossest of all Errors. It would likewise be a Composition of two things equally Eternal, which by their Union would constitute one entire begotten Substance, which is a Contradiction. In fine this void and precipitant Spirit which animated the first Matter is not Eternal in *Plato*'s Opinion, for he makes it a Creature, and calls it Eternal only in reference to Time, the Birth of which it preceded. Therefore to reconcile these two different Ideas which he gives of the Soul, I suppose when he calls it begotten he has regard simply to the Essence of it, which began to exist by the Will of God; and when he calls it Eternal, 'tis with respect to the Principle of it which is God, who communicates to it all its Qualities, and in whom it is properly Eternal.

The way of reconciling these two Ideas.

Plato not only proves the Immortality of the Soul, but also knew all the Consequences of it, as the Resurrection, and Final Judgment, when all Good Men shall be rewarded and the Wicked punished. Nay he penetrated so far into these Divine Truths, that his Expressions are entirely conformable to those of the Holy Prophets, and even to those of the Evangelists and Apostles. For he expressly observes that at the time of this Judgment *good Men shall be at the right hand of God, and the Wicked at the left, from whence they shall be thrown down into the Abyss and into outward Darkness, bound hand and foot*, where they shall be tormented, and torn by Spirits, which he calls Fire, and where nothing shall be heard but horrible Groaning and Howling.

The Consequences of Immortality known to Plato.

In the X *Book of his Republick.* Tom. 2.

He

That the dead know what passes here in this World.

He taught as a certain Truth that the dead know what passes in this Life; For he says in express terms, *that Souls after they are separated from their Bodies have still some power by which they take care of humane Affairs. This Truth is prov'd by a long train of Reasons. We ought therefore to believe these so certain and Ancient Traditions: and to credit the Testimony of those Legislators who have transmitted them to us. Unless we will reproach them as so many Fools.* And in another place he says, *Hence I conclude, that the Dead retain some knowledge of what passes here below. Good Men have some sentiment before hand of this Matter; and the Wicked deny it: But the Presages of divine Men are more certain than those of such Miserable Wretches as are always immers'd in Vice.*

In the XI *Book of* Laws Tom. 2.

Tom. 3.

The Source of these Traditions.

Plato received all these Ideas from the Traditions of the Egyptians, who had 'em from the People of God, and the Ancient Patriarchs. But in process of Time, these Traditions were so corrupted by those Idolaters, and mix'd with so many Errors, that 'tis not to be wonder'd at that *Plato* has explain'd one and the same Truth by Descriptions so different and fabulous as those of his *Phædon*, his *Gorgias*, and the last Book of his *Republick*.

The Divinity of the Son of God known to Plato. Tom. 2.

Those who have carefully read the writings of this Philosopher, discover yet more surprising Truths in 'em; for they find that he believ'd the Divinity of the Son of God, which he has explain'd by Enigmas, that those Sublime Truths might not be expos'd to the Raillery of the Profane.

In his *Epinomis*, after he had spoken of the Honour due to the Sun and other Planets, as they were the wonderful Works of God on which he had printed the Character of his Omnipotence, and which in performing their Revolutions in the Time prescrib'd to 'em, contribute to the perfection of the Universe by this Obedience of theirs: He adds, *The most Divine WORD fram'd this Universe and render'd it visible. And that Man that is truly happy, first admires*

mires this WORD, *and is afterward inflam'd with a desire of learning all that can be known by a mortal Nature, being convinc'd that this is the only way, to lead a happy Life here below, and after Death to arrive at those places that are prepar'd for Vertue; where he shall be truly initiated and united with Wisdom; and always enjoy the most wonderful Discoveries.* Here *Plato* very exquisitly maintains that the knowledg of the WORD leads to all sublime Discoveries. *For none knows the Father but by the Son.* And 'tis only by him that we can attain a Life of Bliss.

In the Letter he wrote to *Hermias*, *Erastus*, and *Coriscus* to exhort 'em to live in Peace, he says. *You must read my Letter all three together; and that you may profit by it, you ought to implore the Assistance of God the Soveraign Lord of all things that either are or shall be; and the Father of this Soveraign, who is the Cause of Beings. If we are truly Philosophers we shall know this God as clearly as Blessed Men are capable of knowing him.* *Letter* VI. *Tom.* 3.

Does not *Plato* in this manifestly follow the Opinion of the Hebrews? For whence could he receive this knowledg of God, the Father, and the Lord; of God the cause of Beings; but from their Writings, who taught him to give the Son the name of *Lord*, of which none of the Greeks before him had ever heard, or had the least Idea? *Euseb. præpar. Evang.* XI. 16.

Nor is it only pretended, that he had some knowledg of the *Word*, the Eternal Son of God, but some farther maintain, that he had some discovery of the Holy Spirit; and so had a certain Idea of the most Holy Trinity: For thus he writes to young *Dionysius*, *I must declare to* Archedemus, *that which is much more precious and divine; and which you have a very ardent desire to know; since you sent expressly to me on that Account. For as far as I understand by him you don't believe I have sufficiently explain'd what I think of the Nature of the first Principle; I must write of this to you in Enigmas, that if my Letter* Plato *had some Idea of the Holy Trinity.* *Letter* II. *Tom.* 3.

ter ſhould be intercepted by Sea or Land, he that reads it may not be able to comprehend any thing. All things are round about their King; they exiſt by him, and he alone is the cauſe of good things: Second for ſecond things, and third for third.

In his *Epinomis*, and elſewhere, he eſtabliſhes for Principles, the firſt Good, the Word, or Underſtanding or Soul. The firſt Good is God; and when he calls God, Goodneſs, or the firſt Good, he had an Idea of this Truth, that Good is nothing but the Nature of God, and his Infinite Goodneſs. This Good he explains in Terms very well worth the reading. *As the Sun* (ſays he) *gives to viſible things, not only the faculty of being ſeen, but alſo, their Birth, Nouriſhment and Growth, juſt ſo this* Good, *not only makes intelligible things knowable, but alſo gives 'em being, although that is not Eſſence, but ſome other thing that infinitely ſurpaſſes Eſſence by its Power and Majeſty.*

Book VI *of his Repub.* Tom. 2.

The Word or Underſtanding is the Son of the firſt Good, who hath begotten him like himſelf. And the Soul which is the Term between the Father and the Son, is the Holy Spirit.

I don't know whether without having recourſe to theſe great Truths, we could by *Plato*'s Philoſophy explain theſe Paſſages which ſeem ſo ſtrange, ſo as to give 'em another ſenſe that ſhould be natural, and agreeable to his Principles. I muſt ſay, I very much doubt it. Nay, I am perſwaded it would be very great Temerity, or rather Impiety, to interpret 'em after any other manner after the Deciſion of ſo many Fathers of the Church and Eccleſiaſtick Writers. For they tell us in expreſs Terms, that *Plato* had this knowledg of the Father and the Son, and of him that proceeds from them both, namely the Holy Spirit.

St. Juſtin, *St.* Auguſtin, *St.* Jerom, *St.* Cyril, Euſebius, Theodoret, *St.* Clement, *&c.*

Origen is not content to aſſure us of the ſame thing, but accuſes *Celſus* for having purpoſely overlook'd the Paſſage of the 6th Letter, becauſe Jeſus Chriſt is plainly ſpoken of in it. Which proves, that the Chriſtians were not the only Perſons who found

found these great Mysteries in *Plato*'s Writings; but that the Enemies of Christianity found 'em there as well as they, and were uneasy at the sight of 'em.

Let us not by our Darkness cast a shade over those Rays of Light which proceed from the Fountain of Light it self; but let us acknowledge that *Plato* not only knew all that Natural Reason could discover concerning God to a Philosopher; but was illuminated by supernatural Reason too. Having been instructed in the Books of the Hebrews, in those of the Prophets, and in the Traditions of the Egyptians, he became favourably dispos'd to receive the Seeds of these Eternal Truths; and was assisted by Grace, for St. *Augustin* asserts, that Jesus Christ revealed 'em to him. That which is deplorable is that he has corrupted 'em by his Reasonings. For he speaks of the Three Persons of the Deity as of Three Gods, and Three different Principles. Thus while the supreme Reason enlighten'd him on one side, Philosophy seduc'd him on the other: The common unhappiness of those who merely by Humane Reason go about to explain the Mysteries of God, which are not to be known but from himself, and from those he has truly inspir'd.

How Plato *has corrupted the Truths with which he was illuminated by God.*

That *Plato* had a particular knowledg of the Sacred Writings appears by many Passages in his Works, and by his Errors themselves; for the greatest part of his most erroneous Opinions proceed in some sort from that Source of Light which dazzled him, and on which he has spread so much Darkness. This several have observed before now. That of the Creation of Souls before Bodies seems to have had no other Foundation than that Passage of *Jeremiah*, where God says to this Holy Prophet. *Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee*, This Philosopher not understanding that God calls things that are not as if they were; and that he knows not only all that is, but also all that shall ever be, built on this Text that Error of his, that Souls existed before Bodies. Jer. 1. 5.

From the same Divine Writings he extracted all the

the great Truths which he teaches, as when he says the *Name* of God is *he that is* for there's none but God that truly is. This Name of God, as St. *Augustin* observes, is not found in any profane Book more ancient than *Plato*; and this Philosopher could not have it from any other Books than those of *Moses*.

Who is it that does not discern the stile of the Prophets in that place of *Phædon*; where he describes a pure Earth which is above this of ours in Heaven, and in comparison of which this we inhabit is no better than Dirt? In this every thing is corrupt, and we are encompass'd with Darkness; or if we see any Light, 'tis through great Clouds, and very thick Mists: whereas in the other, the true Light is to be seen; and every thing in it is admirable. All things there shine with the glittering Lustre of Gold, Jaspers, Saphirs, and Emeralds; and those that inhabit it enjoy a long Life which is not cross'd with any incommodious Accident. The Ancients who discover'd the Truth hid under these Images, show that they were extracted out of the Books of the holy Prophets, who call Heaven the City of God, and the Land of the Righteous; and prove, that the Names of these precious Stones are taken from the 54th Chapter of *Isaiah*, where God promises to lay the Foundation of his Church with Saphirs, and Jaspers.

So the LXXII *render it.*

I should be too prolix if I should here relate all that *Plato* has drawn from this Fountain. 'Tis sufficient to know, that what we find in him of this kind, is so considerable, that it ought to render his Writings very precious to us; and that of all the Works of the Pagans, there is none more useful, or that can be more serviceable to establish eternal Truths, to raise the Soul to the solid Contemplation of the divine Essence, and to manifest the Beauties of the sacred Scriptures. And 'tis on these Accounts that he merited that great Encomium, given him by *Proclus*. *Truth* (says he) *is spread through all*

Book I. *Chap.* 5.

all Plato's *Dialogues, more obscurely in some, and more clearly in others. We find in 'em every where grave, sensible, supernatural thoughts of the first Philosophy, which carry those up to the pure immaterial Essence of God, who are in some sort in a condition, to participate of it. And as he who has created every thing in the World by his power, has in every part of this Universe plac'd Images of the Gods, which are so many Proofs of their Existence, that all things in the World might turn towards the Deity, because of the Union, and if I may so say, natural Relation that is between them; so the Mind of* Plato *being fill'd with the Deity, has dispersed his Thoughts of God through all his Works. He would not suffer any single Tract to be destitute of this Character, and without any thing spoken of God; that such as are truly enflam'd with the Love of Divine things might receive some knowledg of the supreme Being from all his Writings, and so might have a Just Idea of every thing which cannot be known but in God who is Truth it self.*

Having spoken of Natural Philosophy and Morality let us pass to the third part which is *Dialectick*. The Ancients write, that *Plato* perfected Philosophy, by adding this part to Physicks and Ethicks: But by this they only mean he brought *Dialectick*, which is true Logick to its perfection. Indeed *Plato*'s Logick is more natural, more exact, and more solid than that which was in use before him, and than that the Rules of which have been publish'd after him. For he teaches more by examples, than Precepts: He always chooses Subjects that are familiar and useful to Morality; and treates 'em not as a Doctor, and as they do in the Schools, by Methodical Discourses and studied Syllogisms, but like a Man of Conversation by free Discourses, which properly make the Character of Dialectick. Therefore *Plato* preserv'd *Socrates* his method of Dialogue being fully convinc'd that Sciences ought to be taught by Word of Mouth, and not by Writing, because Men *Dialectick.*

are

are better perſuaded by the Tongue than the Pen; becauſe the Anſwers, and Objections of the Learner, not only ſhew what progreſs Truth makes in his Mind; but beſides give an occaſion of clearing up many Difficulties that lie in his way, and which can't all be foreſeen in Writing. *Plato* teaches better than any Man how to ſpeak with juſtneſs, to anſwer preciſely to what is asked, to lay down the State of a Queſtion exactly, and lead on the Argument directly. He ſhews perfectly well how to make accurate Diviſions, to define well, and to examine Definitions aright, that none may be ſuffer'd to eſcape that are not true.

He not only brought this Science to perfection but alſo regulated the ſtudy of it; for to avoid the unhappy Inconveniences that befal thoſe who apply themſelves to it too Young, and who commonly make uſe of it rather to contradict than ro inveſtigate Truth, he would have none apply themſelves to it, till they were above thirty Years of Age, and then would have 'em employ five Years in it, being perſwaded that on this alone depends all the Progreſs a Man is capable of making in the Sciences, and in the perfect knowledg of true and ſolid Good. And indeed, *Dialectick* being the Art of Reaſoning, 'tis not only the Foundation of all the Sciences, but the only Guide that can conduct Men to true Happineſs, by making 'em diſtinguiſh Truth from Error. And for this ſame Reaſon, near ſix hundred Years before *Plato*, the Holy Spirit exhorted Men to learn *Dialectick*, when he ſignifies by the Mouth of *Solomon*, *that all Science without Examination and Proof ſerves only to deceive Men.* And alſo *that the knowledg of a Fool, is but a Diſcourſe in the Air without Examination and Proof.* And for the ſame Reaſon St. *Paul* ſays, a Biſhop ought to *hold faſt the faithfull Word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by ſound doctrine, both to exhort, and to convince Gainſayers, who* by their falſe Principles *ſubvert whole Houſes, teaching things which they ought not.* And

At what Age Plato *would have Men ſtudy Dialectick.*

Tit. 1. 9. and 11.

this

this is the work of Dialectick. For 'tis properly a Habitude, a Science which teaches to define what every thing is, in what it differs from another thing, or in what it resembles it; to search it out where it is, to know what makes the Essence of it, how many true Beings there are; what those things are which are not; and in what they differ from those that are: It treats of the true Good, and of that which is not so, it shews us how many things enter into the first Good, and how many are rank'd under its contrary; and leads us to distinguish that which is Eternal, from that which is but Temporal and Transitory; and this not by Reasonings founded on Opinion, but by Proofs drawn from Science. For it hinders the Mind from wandering after sensible things, and thereby fixes it on that which is intelligible, and by dissipating all sorts of Errors by its Light, feeds it as it were in the field of Truth. *Plotinus* says very well, that this is the most estimable part of Philosophy; and is not to be considered as the Instrument of a Philosopher, but as that which is essential to him. For it does not stop at simple Propositions and Rules, but passes on to things, and has all Beings for its Matter and Object; and by the Truth that is in it discerns Error which is always a Stranger to it.

The Definition of Dialectick.

If the Writings of the Ancient Hebrews assisted *Plato* in laying the Foundations of good Ethicks and Physicks, they have not been less serviceable to him in establishing the Principles of good Logick. These Principles consist in a right Imposition of Names, which ought to denote the Nature of things. For when the Nature of any thing is known 'tis easy to reason justly, and to establish the Truth. No Nation ever follow'd better Rules in this than the Hebrews, as appears by the Books of *Moses*, and the Writings of the Prophets. And therefore *Plato* confesses that the Greeks borrow'd the greatest part of the Names of things from the Barbarians (that is from the Hebrews) and acknowledges that this right

Plato took the Principles of true Dialectick from the Hebrews.

Impoſition of Names proceeds from a more Divine Nature than that of Man.

The Character of a good Dialectician

Plato ſays, that Man will never be a good Dialectician, who is not in a condition (they are his own Words) *to Give and Receive Reaſon.* He means that to be a Dialectician a Man ought to be able, not only to know the Truth, but to make it known to others, and perſwade 'em to embrace it. And for this Reaſon there are indeed two parts of Dialectick, namely Logick and Rhetorick. By the firſt we know, and by the ſecond we perſwade.

The true uſe of Logick and Rhetorick.

Since Logick and Rhetorick are the 2 parts of Dialectick, 'tis eaſy to ſee they ought only to be employ'd for Juſtice and Truth. If us'd to ſupport Error 'tis no longer Rhetorick nor Logick; as a Rule is no longer a Rule when it is bent to make an ill uſe of it. For a crooked Rule can no longer judge, either of it ſelf, or that which is ſtraight. Logick and Rhetorick teach us truly to reaſon and diſcourſe for and againſt. Not that two Contraries can be equally true; But this is to put us in a condition of anſwering thoſe who would abuſe 'em in favour of Injuſtice. None doubts that the ſole Object of Logick is Truth: And this is no leſs true of Rhetorick: And *Plato* very well ſays that *a Wiſe Man will never labour to render himſelf Dextrous to pleaſe Man, but to pleaſe the Gods.* For (he adds) *Prudence requires that we ſhould rather ſeek the favour of our Maſters, than of thoſe who are only our Companions in the ſervice we owe them.*

In his Phedrus, Tom. 3

Never did any one exceed *Plato* in ſhewing the uſe of true Rhetorick, of which he gives admirable Precepts: To ſhew the difference between this and its Counterfeit, he compares the firſt to the Medicinal Art, and the other to skill in Cookery. The Phyſician ſeeks only ſuch things as may conduce to the Health of the Body, Health being the thing he deſigns to procure: but the Cook is concern'd only for what may pleaſe the Taſte, without troubling his Head, whether 'tis healthful or hurtful. In like manner

ner the true Orator, he says, seeks only to make those to whom he speaks better, and the counterfeit Orator has no other design than that of persuading 'em, whatever damage they suffer by it. *The difference between the true and counterfeit Orator.*

'Tis objected to him that a Man ought to make use of his Eloquence at any rate to acquire Reputation and Authority in his Country; and to bring it into subjection to him, if possible; to advance his Friends, to bring down his Enemies; and in fine (when great Calamities happen) to secure himself or others from danger; *Plato* answers all these Objections after an admirable manner, and by Principles that cannot be contested.

First he makes it appear that those who have the greatest Authority in their Countrey are the most unhappy, if they have not acquir'd it by just Means, and do not employ it to just Purposes.

He shews that Tyrants are so far from being Happy, and from having dominion over others, that they are very Miserable, and so many vile Slaves; who never do what they desire, even then when they do what they please.

He proves that 'tis much better to suffer Wrong than to do it; and that when a Man has once done it, 'tis much happier for him to be punish'd for it, than to escape the Penalty he has deserv'd.

As for what respects a Man's saving himself or securing others from great Danger; he shews 'tis not so considerable a thing as to deserve so much of our Esteem; for there are a great many things which often conduce to save Life, which yet are very inconsiderable in themselves. For Example (he says) the Art of Swimming is a thing very little esteem'd, and yet on many Occasions it preserves a Man from certain Death. The Art of a Pilot saves whole Families, and the whole Estates of divers Persons; yet a Pilot is not ordinarily much puff'd up on the account of this advantage; he does not think himself a very Considerable Man in a State, but contents himself with a moderate *In Gorgias, Tom. 1.*

Salary, as 'tis reasonable he should, because he does not know whether he has done those whom he has preserv'd any great service, for besides that he returns 'em just such as he found em; It often happens that it might have been better for some of 'em to have perish'd in their Voyage.

The like may be said of the Art of Engineers, that of Carpenters, Brick-layers, Coachmen and many others; who often preserve the Lives of abundance of People; and yet there is no Goverment wherein the Laws allot, any very great Honors, or establish any very considerable Rewards for those that exercise 'em: So true is it that notwithstanding the love Men naturally bear to Life, it must be confess'd that the Art of preserving our selves or others is no such wonderful thing, as to be prefer'd to every thing besides. The only Art which merits our Esteem, and which alone can make a Man considered as a God, is that of saving Souls; and to save 'em, they must be purg'd from their Vices: for 'tis the greatest unhappiness in the World for a Man to pass into the other Life with his Soul loaded with Sins. Therefore a Good Man ought to employ all his Logick and Eloquence both to make himself better, and to render others so; and to put both himself and others in a Condition to appear before that Judg from whom nothing can be hid, who viewing Souls quite naked discovers the least scars that are left on 'em by Perjury, Injustice, Vanity, Lying, Cruelty, Debauchery, and all other Sins; and who, as he renders to every Man according to his Works, punishes those for a time, who have committed only such Sins as are cureable, that is which may be expiated, and condemns those to Eternal Torments who have been guilty of Mortal Sins; and by pushing their Wickedness to extremity have render'd themselves incurable, and have no sound part in 'em. This is the Danger from which 'tis so noble a thing to secure Men. This is the best Combate in the World, and the only

What that Art is which alone merits our Esteem.

only one that deſerves to be undertaken even with the peril of one's Life: for is it fit we ſhould fear Men who can do no more than kill the Body?

Thoſe Legiſlators, Orators and Miniſters of State who have not employ'd their Eloquence to meliorate the People that were ſubject to 'em, were not true Orators, and conſequently were not truly righteous. This *Plato* proves by the Examples of *Pericles*, *Simon*, *Milciades* and *Themiſtocles*; who were ſo far from making the Athenians good Men that they render'd them yet more brutiſh and ſavage; and in fine, bore the Puniſhment of that little care they took of 'em. For all that befel 'em from the hands of the People, came on 'em through their own fault; like that which happens to an ill Groom, who ſuffers his Horſes to become more unlucky than when they were firſt committed to his keeping, and ſo at laſt is kick'd by 'em, and can no longer rule 'em. This is the Idea *Plato* had of Rhetorick, of which he gives excellent Precepts in his *Phedrus*, and *Gorgias*, Dialogues which can never be ſufficiently commended, and which furniſh us with the Maxims of which we have been diſcourſing.

When I ſay Rhetorick is one part of Dialectick, I don't forget that this is ſometimes oppos'd to the other; as we find in *Plato*'s own Writings in the beginning of *Gorgias*, where *Socrates* ſays to *Polus*, that he exercis'd himſelf more in that which is call'd Rhetorick, than in Dialectick. But 'tis eaſy to ſee that *Socrates* there, by Rhetorick, means that Art which has no regard to Truth, but aims only at a plauſible Appearance of Truth; and the Scope of which is only to adorn and embelliſh any Subject. When *Iſocrates* makes a Panegyrick on *Helena*, he only employs the figures of Rhetorick; and never troubles himſelf about the Proofs and Arguments of Dialectick. In a Word, an Orator is one who labours to excite or appeaſe the Paſſions, and to obtain his end ſeeks magnificent Words, and ſpe-

cious Figures, and employs falſe Arguments as if they were true; and the Dialectician applies himſelf to Art, only to prove the Truth; as the Sophiſt has recourſe to Art only to put off Falſhood.

We now come to the manner in which *Plato* handles the Subjects of which he treats; and ſhall endeavour to diſcover the Beauties and Defects of his Stile.

After what manner Plato handles the Subjects of which he treats.

He is accus'd of never propoſing his Queſtions ſimply and clearly, and of caſting by this means a great deal of obſcurity on his Dialogues. But to judge whether this Reproach is well or ill founded 'tis neceſſary to examine what belongs to Method. There are two ſorts of Method; The firſt may be call'd ſimple and dry; ſuch is that of Geometricians who endeavour only to propoſe the naked Truths, and to draw juſt Concluſions from their Propoſitions. This Method is very good, and extremely uſeful, when we have to do with Minds that are rational and free from all ſorts of Prejudice: But is worth nothing when we deal with People prepoſſeſſed or unattentive, impatient or obſtinate.

The Second Method which may be call'd *compounded* or *florid* is that of Orators; 'tis properly the firſt Method extended and diſguiſed by all the Ornaments that can render Arguments agreeable, and takes away that rudeneſs and dryneſs from Precepts, which commonly hinder the reception of 'em. If we examine *Plato*'s works with reference to the firſt of theſe: 'Tis certain he does not at firſt daſh diſtinctly propoſe the Queſtion on which he treats. But inſtead of being reproached he ought to be commended for this: For he purpoſely rejected this Method to follow the other which is infinitely more uſeful, and has more of Art in it. By this means he cures a great many Paſſions, and deſtroys an infinite number of Prejudices, before they to whom he ſpeaks, know what he aims at; and 'tis by this Courſe he convinces them with ſo much

ſtrength

ſtrength of all the Truths he has a mind to teach.

But ſay ſome, to what purpoſe ſerve thoſe great Preambles which he ſets at the head of his Dialogues? Theſe are neceſſary to accompany his Deſign; and as *Plutarch* ſays when he ſpeaks of the Dialogue which *Plato* made of the Atlantick Iſland on *Solons* Memoirs; *Theſe are Superb gates and magnificent Courts with which he purpoſely embelliſhes his great Edifices; that nothing may be wanting to their Beauty, and that all may be equally ſplendid.* He acts like a great Prince who when he builds a fine Pallace, *adorns the Porch with Golden Pillars* to uſe the words of *Pindar*. For 'tis proper that what is firſt ſeen ſhould be ſplendid and magnificent; and ſhould promiſe all that greatneſs which is to be ſeen afterwards. *Plato's Preambles.*

If *Plato's* Preambles ſhould be excus'd for the ſake of their great Beauty, and for the genuine and admirable deſcriptions with which they abound; yet how can any one excuſe the frequent Digreſſions in which he engages himſelf? This is what is ſaid by thoſe who never had the Patience to read *Plato*; or elſe have read him very careleſsly. 'Tis true there are frequent Digreſſions in his Dialogues; but theſe Digreſſions never carry him entirely from his Subject; for he always employs them either to eſtabliſh ſome great Truth which he ſhall have occaſion for in the ſequel of his diſcourſe; or to prevent the Readers mind with Authorities and Examples, or in fine to divert, and refreſh him after a painful and ſerious reſearch; and in this *Plato* may be ſaid to be the Greateſt Inchanter that ever was in the World, for when he is giving you the proofs of the moſt neceſſary and ſolid Truths; he takes care at the ſame time to lead you into the ſweet Meadows, Groves and Vallies which the Muſes frequent. *His frequent Digreſſions.*

Beſides 'tis an inconteſtable Maxime that the Operations of the Mind are not like the Motions of an Arrow. An Arrow does not go well, unleſs it flee ſtraight forward; but the Mind makes no leſs pro-

greſs when it turns aſide, or ſtops at a Subject, to conſider it well on every ſide, and by the different relations it has to other things, than when it goes on directly to its end. 'Tis for an Arrow to go, without turning, to the Mark we aim at; and it always miſſes its ſtroke, how little ſoever it diverts from it. But the Mind of Man is not oblig'd to proceed ſo directly; but is often engag'd to conſider ſuch Objects as are nearly allied to that it deſires to know; and to take a turn about them to examine 'em on all ſides. This Circular Motion is no leſs ſtreight than that of an Arrow; and theſe turnings and windings inſtead of leading us from the end, conduct us to it. This is ſo true that when we have been thinking *Plato* was wandering from his deſign by frequent Digreſſions; we are ſtrangely ſurprized to ſee, that that which ſeem'd to carry him from it does indeed after a wonderful manner lead him to it; and that the Truths he has explain'd in different places being laid together, form and compleat his Demonſtrations, which would have been neither certain nor right, if he had approach'd 'em by a direct Line.

He muſt never have read *Plato*, who accuſes him of being ignorant of the Method of Geometricians. He knew it perfectly well, and deſignedly forbears the uſe of it. A Learned Man, who is very well acquainted with *Plato*, has obſerv'd before me, that no Man can more accurately propoſe the State of a Queſtion, more exactly divide a Subject, and examine Definitions more nicely than he. He never forgets any of the things on which he has propos'd to treat; He always returns to his Subject, the ſight of which he has never loſt, what Digreſſion ſoever he makes. He often marks out the beginning and end of each part, and of every Digreſſion by Propoſitions and Concluſions; he often uſes Recapitulations; and when he keeps his proof at a diſtance, he always takes care to make you remember the State of the Queſtion: So that his Diſcourſe has at once the liberty

(The Abbot Fleury in his Treatiſe of Studies.

berty of Converſation, and the accuracy of the moſt Methodical Treatiſe. An Ancient Philoſopher has given this Commendation to *Plato*; that *of all the Philoſophers he is the moſt excellent and admirable for dividing and defining: which qualities denote him to be a very expert Logician.* Alcin. *Ch.* VI.

As for his Stile 'tis ſublime without being Impetuous and Rapid. 'Tis a great River the depth of which makes it ſmooth. The principal Cauſe of that Elevation which reigns in it, is that he imitates *Homer*, more than any other Writers; and has drawn from his Poeſy as from a living Spring that which has furniſh'd an infinite Number of Rivulets which he has made to run from it: Nay he is *Homer*'s Rival; and indeed ſeems to have heap'd up ſo many magnificent things in his Treatiſes of Philoſophy, and to have fallen ſo often upon Poetical Matters, and Expreſſions, only to diſpute the Prize with this great Poet with all his might, like a new Wreſtler who enters the Liſts againſt one that has already receiv'd all the Acclamations, and is the Admiration of all Mankind. This is the Judgment which *Longinus* makes of him; but ſince he goes not deep enough into the true Character of *Plato*, and underſtood but a part of it; That it may be better known, I hope I ſhall be permitted to explain it a little more throughly, by adhering to what our Ancient Maſters have ſaid of it. Plato's *Stile.*

There are ſo many different manners of compoſing, that indeed they are innumerable. For one may ſay, the Countenances of Men are not more different than their ways of Writing. 'Tis with this Art as 'tis with that of Painting, the Profeſſors of which make very different Mixtures with the ſame Colours, and Paint the ſame Subjects after a very different Manner. But though thoſe differences are ſo very numerous, when they are examined nicely and by detail, yet they may be reduc'd to three principal ones; which go under borrow'd Names, for want of proper ones. The Firſt is auſtere or rude Compoſition. Dionyſius Halicarn. *in his Treatiſe of Compoſition.*

The

The Second is florid, or ſmooth. And the Third intermediate, which is compos'd of the other Two.

Auſtere or rude Compoſition, Dionyſ. *pag.* 22, &c.

Auſtere or rough Compoſition reſembles thoſe Ancient Buildings, the Stones of which are neither poliſh'd, nor artificially plac'd; but yet are well fix'd; and have more Solidity than Beauty, it has more of Nature than Art in it; and depends more on the Paſſion than Manners and Civility: It has nothing florid, 'tis great and rigid, if I may be permitted to uſe ſuch a Term; 'tis without Ornament; and all the Graces of it ſavour much of Antiquity. This is the true Character of *Pindar*, *Eſchylus* and *Thucydides*.

Smooth or florid Compoſition, p. 25. *and* 26.

The Second, which is ſmooth and florid, is almoſt entirely oppoſite to the other, It ſeeks the ſweeteſt and ſmootheſt Words; and avoids ſuch as are harſh and rough with all imaginable care. This ſavours more of Art than Nature, and depends more on polite Manners than on the Paſſion. This is the Character of *Heſiod*, *Sapho*, *Anacreon*, *Simonides*, and *Euripides* among the Poets, and of *Iſocrates* among the Orators. For of all that have written in Proſe none ever ſucceeded better than this Laſt.

Mix'd Compoſition made up of the 2 former, pag. 27.

The Third is made up of both together 'tis compounded of what is beſt in the two former; and therefore excels them both; for the perfection of Arts always conſiſts in a Medium, as well as that of Manners and Actions, and the whole Courſe of Life.

The Writers of this kind differ more among themſelves than thoſe that have follow'd the two former methods, becauſe of the different mixture they have made of thoſe two Characters; for ſome have fallen more on the rough way, and others more on the florid,

Homer, *Sophocles*, *Herodotus*, *Demoſthenes*, *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* wrote in this laſt kind; but without contradiction *Homer* is the moſt to be admired. There is no part of his Poems but is wonderfully diverſified by theſe 2 ſorts of Compoſition. They who have follow'd

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him are more or less excellent; according as they more or less approach this great Model. And as *Plato* comes nearer to him than others, 'tis this that gives him his greatest Beauty.

The Foundation of these Three ways, as well as of all others is First the choice of Words; Secondly the regular placing of 'em, from which there results a different Harmony, and in fine the use of Figures, and all the other Ornaments of Discourse. *The Foundation of these 3 ways.*

The choice of Words is first in Order, but the regular Disposition of 'em is first in Beauty. This is so true, that the best chosen and noblest Words if thrown at a venture, without Method and Art, will quite spoil the Elegancy of the Thought; whereas the worst chosen and most vulgar Words will make an indifferent Thought pass, when Art has taken care to put them in good Order; To be throughly convinc'd of this Truth, a Man need only pick out some of the finest Passages to be found in the Orators and Poets, and alter the Order and Harmony of 'em without making any Alteration in the Words: and he'll destroy the Beauty and Force of 'em; for by this means the Figures, Colours, Passions and polite Manners that appear in 'em will be lost. Hence it is that the Beauties which shine in the Writings of these great Men can't be discern'd but by those that know all these differences. *Dionysius Halicarnasseus* with a great deal of reason compares the disposition of Words to *Homer*'s *Minerva*; for as this Goddess by touching *Ulysses* with her Ring made him appear one while little, deform'd, and like a Beggar depress'd with Misery and Age; and another while very great and marvellously beautiful; so the different placing of the same Words make the Thoughts appear one while poor and low, and another while rich and sublime. *The Choice of Words and the regular placing of 'em.* Dionys. Halicarn. *gives Examples of it in his Treatise of Composition,* P. 4. *and* 5.

Plato may be call'd Divine for this part, and if he were as happy in the choice of Words, as in the Disposition of 'em he would equal *Homer*, and exceed all other Writers; but he sometimes fails in his choice, Plato *term'd* Divine *for the disposition of words, and less happy in the choice of 'em.*

choice, when he quits his ordinary Stile, to fall upon extraordinary and sublime Expressions. While he keeps in a simple and natural way, nothing has more gracefulness, purity and smoothness than his Diction. 'Tis like the Chrystal Stream of a clear River. He then uses the most common Terms, he only studies Accuracy and Perspicuity, and contemns all foreign Ornaments; he only preserves a little Air of Antiquity, which is almost insensible, and serves to set off his Elegancy, and by Numbers varied with wonderful Art; he every where spreads a charming Harmony. But when he would exceed himself, and affects to be great, the quite contrary sometimes befalls him; for besides that his Diction is less agreeable, less pure, and more embarrass'd; he falls into Circumlocutions, which being scatter'd up and down without choice and without measure, have no Elegancy or Beauty; and only make a vain show of a luxuriant richness of Language: Instead of words that are proper, and of common use, he seeks only for such as are novel, foreign and antique; and instead of employing only such Figures as are wise and grave, and easily understood; he is excessive in his Epithets, hard in his Metaphors, and extravagant in his Allegories. When I say this I don't pretend that this always happens to him; one must be either blind or stupid, not to be touch'd with an infinite number of Passages, in which he is as great and sublime as possible, and his Stile rises up to the Character of Wonderful. But I speak this to shew that when he falls, 'tis only in that kind of Stile, in which 'tis impossible for a Man always to support himself equally. For the great and magnificent way is slippery and dangerous; and he that will attain it must expose himself to Falls. And indeed none but a great Genius is capable of this noble Effort; and the Falls Men have had signify that they were led by a kind of Divine Ardour, which they could not govern. Therefore the sublime Method though it has very little Foundation al-

ways

ways carries the Prize from the middle way, though it be never so happy and perfect.

It must moreover be said to the praise of *Plato*, that the places wherein he may be said to fall are very few in comparison of those in which he has succeeded to a wonder; and if we take notice of 'em, 'tis not so much to censure them, as to admire that a Man rais'd so high above the ordinary pitch of humane Nature; should not be able to preserve himself from Faults in those places where he might so easily have avoided them; and where he seems to have known 'em. For he sometimes confesses that what he says is not so much like a wise and orderly Discourse, as a Dithyrambick Poem; and that he speaks like a Man possess'd. This extravagant Enthusiasm is vicious; especially in Matters of Philosophy; and he ought to have corrected it, seeing he discern'd it; and was so careful and jealous of his Stile, that at fourscore Years of Age, he did not cease to give new touches once and again to his Dialogues, and took so much pains with 'em, that after his Death, the beginning of his Books of a *Republick* was found on his Writing-Tables, alter'd twenty several ways.

But it may be said this Fault pleas'd him, or that, because he fear'd the Simplicity of *Socrates* would not be always reliſh'd, he had a mind to raise it by the Sublimity of *Thucydides* and *Gorgias*, however in imitating their Vertues, he did not take sufficient precaution against their Vices. This is the Judgment which *Dionysius Halicarnasseus* makes of him in his Treatise of the Ancient Orators; and he supports it in the Answer which he makes to the great *Pompey* who took *Plato*'s part. In this Answer he proves to him the Truth of this Censure, and makes it appear, that he is of the same mind himself; and farther shows, that the Ancients, as *Demetrius Phalereus*, and some others, had passed the same Judgment before him.

Longinus, who is so fine, so sure, and so exact a Critick

Critick was of the ſame Opinion ſome Ages before *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus*. He acknowledges as well as this Latter that *Plato* writes after a divine manner in abundance of places, and at the ſame time, proves, like him too, by palpable Inſtances, that he is ſometimes too figurative in his expreſſions; and that by a certain fury of diſcourſe he ſuffers himſelf to be tranſported to harſh and extravagant Metaphors, and to a vain allegorical Pomp, which can't chooſe but frequently languiſh. This is a defect which he might have avoided, as *Demetrius* ſays, if he had uſed proper Terms more frequently than Metaphors.

But to finiſh this Character in few words, by reſuming what has been already ſaid. In General there is nothing more harmonious and touching than *Plato*'s Diction; he joins the force of the greateſt Orators, with the Graces of the greateſt Poets; he is very fruitful and luxuriant: he ſo perfectly deſcribes Manners and Paſſions, and forms Characters ſo well, that all the Perſons he brings in every where appear what they ſeem'd to be at firſt view. There is nothing more perfect when he keeps himſelf within the Bounds of ordinary Language; but he ſometimes falls when he ſtrives to ſoar very high, tho his Falls are not common, and yet the places wherein he ſhows himſelf pompous and magnificient are very frequent; ſo that even in this kind of writing there are a thouſand things to be admir'd in his Books where there is one to condemn'd.

Having ſpoken of *Plato*'s Stile, we come to ſpeak a word or two of his Commentators, and Interpreters.

We have but two Latin Tranſlations of this Philoſopher's Works, that of *Marſilius Ficinus*, and that of *John de Serres*, who compos'd the Hiſtory of *France* under the Title of an Inventory (or Regiſter.) Neither of 'em will ever make *Plato* to be well underſtood. However the former ſeems to me the beſt for the literal Senſe, and 'tis certain, that it has fewer faults.

faults. *Marsilius Ficinus* was a Learned and Laborious Man; but being too speculative and abstracted, he loses all the advantage of his Translation by his Explication, in which he strains Allegories and Mysteries to an exorbitant degree. It would have been a great uneasiness to him to understand any thing simply, tho *Plato* often speaks with great Simplicity; and by this means he endeavours to justify a great many Errors into which *Plato* fell; for he every where finds a sense, not only commodious and excusable, but orthodox; he always looks on him with a profound respect as a Man inspir'd of God; and is perswaded there is no Mystery in the Christian Religion, but he knew it: I don't say in the Writings of the Prophets only, but in those of the Evangelists and Apostles.

John de Serres was a Man of less Ability than *Marsilius Ficinus*, nor did he understand Greek near so well as he, so that his Translation abounds with Faults, and essential Faults too, which corrupt the Sense: but he is yet more to blame for entirely changing the order of the Dialogues, and disposing 'em into different Classes; not according to the Subjects, but the Titles of 'em, which are commonly false; which makes the Reader, when he seeks for that in the Dialogue which is promised in the Title, and does not find it, accuse *Plato* of being very defective in his Proofs, and of wandering from his Subject; so that he has not the Patience to hear him. The only thing in his Work, that seems to me worthy of any great Commendation, is his small Marginal Notes; in which he gives a naked discovery of *Plato*'s Method; for tho *Plato* was willing to conceal it, to render his Dialogues the more diverting; it was fit some Person should give himself the trouble of unfolding this Art thoroughly, which the Readers would not always unravel of themselves: This is a very great help, and indeed is very useful to make the Beauties of the Method *Plato* follow'd appear to good advantage.

See the Abbot Fleury's *Treatise of Studies*, pag. 297.

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In fine, if *Marsilius Ficinus* errs in running every where too far into Mysteries; *John de Serres* runs into the contrary Fault, in taking things too simply: for 'tis by this means he charges a great many very innocent things, and which may receive a good sense to *Plato*'s Account, as so many Crimes.

The Commentators of Plato.

Plato explains his Thoughts so clearly himself; that a Man needs nothing but Attention, not to lose the train of his Reasoning. The Obscurities we find in 'em result either from the Customs of his Time, or the Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers; into which Commentators give very little Light. The knowledg of 'em ought to be sought in the reading of Ancient Authors, which are more useful to make a Man understand *Plato*, than all that have labour'd to explain his Doctrine. These Commentators however are not to be slighted, but deserve to be read for their own sake, without any regard to *Plato*'s Philosophy. At least there are five of 'em, of which I may make this Account: *Maximus Tyrius* under the Emperour *Marcus Aurelius*, in the second Century: *Plotinus* in the third, *Porphyrius* the Scholar of *Plotinus*, and *Iamblichus* the Scholar of *Porphyrius* in the fourth; and *Proclus* in the sixth.

The last was a very great Philosopher, and so skillful in the Mechanicks, that he equal'd, and even surpassed *Archimedes* himself in divers things: But his Vanity was yet more remarkable than his Ingenuity; when to encourage the Emperour *Anastasius*, to whom it had been predicted, that he should be kill'd with a Clap of Thunder, he built a Tower for him that was to be Proof against the Artillery of Heaven: for this Tower prov'd useless; and the Emperour was kill'd with Thunder which he was so desirous to escape. We have moreover six Books of this *Proclus* on *Plato*'s Theology, and Theological Institutions. His Words are very difficult to be understood, because he is very abstracted. But when a Man can penetrate 'em, he'll find 'em very profound, and full of admirable things. As when he

he explains what *Plato* says, that that which unites us to God is Love, Truth, and Faith; and shows Faith to be the only cause of Initiation. *For* (says he) *this Initiation is made neither by knowledg nor discerning, but by a Medium which is single, and stronger than all Knowledges, that is, by the silence which Faith inspires in raising up our Souls to God, and plunging them into that Sea, which can never be comprehended.* But he must be read with a great deal of Judgment and precaution; for these things that are so admirable are mix'd with a great many Errors, into which he was thrown by that hatred with which he was always animated against the Christians.

Iamblichus is considerable in that he perfectly well explains the Opinions of the Egyptians, and Chaldeans about divine things. Besides in explaining these Mysteries he often gives great Discoveries that may be usefully employ'd to elucidate abundance of Difficulties in the holy Scriptures; and is full of Maxims that may be of great use. The greatest fault of *Iamblichus* is, that in treating of these very sublime Subjects he often shows himself credulous and superstitious.

Porphyrius was of *Tyre*, he was call'd *Malcho*. And therefore *Longinus*, in his Letters, calls him *the King of Tyre*, because *Malcho*, in the Phenician Language, signifies *a King*, for the same reason he is nam'd *Porphyrius*, which signifies *one cloath'd with purple*; that is to say, a King. The Ancients have preserved to us many things which he wrote on the Philosophy of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*: but he was a Man of a wicked Mind, and very satyrical; and was moreover so inclin'd to Magick, that this sacrilegious Curiosity of his obscur'd the greatest Discoveries of Truth which he had received from *Plato*. His Treatise or Abstinence is the best, and most useful thing he compos'd.

Plotinus in my Opinion excels all the rest. Not but that he is often very abstracted and hard to be

underſtood; but in general he is more intelligible than *Proclus*; and for Morality much Advantage may be reap'd from his Writings. And 'tis happy that his fineſt Treatiſes are the moſt plain and intelligible. *Longinus* ſays of him, that he has more clearly explain'd the Principles of *Plato* and *Pythagoras* than any Philoſopher before him. He ſays his Writings are worthy of the Eſteem, and Veneration of all Men; and adds, that though the greateſt part of the Matters on which he treats ſeem to him incomprehenſible; and do not affect him; he can never be weary in admiring his Stile, the Solidity of his Thoughts and Conceptions, the depth of his reſearches, and the truly Philoſophical manner in which he handles his ſubjects.

When *Longinus* ſays, he is not always affected with the Subjects which *Plotinus* handles, he principally reſpects what he wrote on Ideas. For *Longinus* had labour'd to refute *Porphyrius*, who was brought over to the Sentiment of *Plotinus* after having written againſt him; That is *Longinus* could not conceive the Doctrine of Ideas, and was of *Ariſtotle*'s ſentiment, who took what *Diogenes* had ſaid to ridicule this Opinion, too literally: For *Diogenes* being one day at Table with *Plato*; and being fallen in Converſation upon immaterial and eternal Exemplars, ſays he to *Plato*, *I ſee very well there is a Goblet and a Table, but I ſee neither Gobleity nor Tableity.* To which *Plato* anſwer'd, *'Tis becauſe thou haſt bodily Eyes which can ſee a Goblet and a Table, but not thoſe of the Mind, which alone ſee Gobleity and Tableity.*

Never did any Diſciple do more honour to his Maſter than *Plotinus* did to *Plato* both by his Manners and Doctrine.

It was he that firſt ſaid, *God was mov'd merely by his Mercy to give our Souls only Mortal Chains.* By which he ſignifies that it was an Effect of his Compaſſions that he gave us Bodies ſubject to Death; that ſo we might not always be expos'd to the Miſeries of this Life. He

He was convinc'd that our Souls draw all their Light and Sagacity only from that intelligible Light which created 'em; that the Soul has no Nature ſuperior to it but that of God alone; and that the Angels and other Celeſtial Spirits derive their Happineſs and Knowledg from no other Source than that which enlightens us, and renders us happy. His Manners were yet more admirable than his Doctrine. He all his Life deſpis'd Vain-Glory, Riches and Pleaſures; and his Probity was ſo generally known; that the moſt conſiderable perſons of both Sexes, when they dyed, entruſted him with their Eſtates and Children; as not being able to find a more faithful Depoſitary, or more ſacred Aſylum.

Maximus Tyrius wrote on *Homer*'s Doctrine, and on the Matters of Philoſophy; almoſt all the Diſcourſes which we have of his do either directly or indirectly reſpect *Plato*'s Philoſophy. The Reading of 'em is very agreable and very uſeful: But they ſupply us with no more Aid for the underſtanding of the Difficulties of *Plato*, than all the reſt. And in this reſpect one may ſay the uſeleſsneſs of theſe Commentaries proves the truth of one of *Plato*'s Sentements, who held, that it ſerves to very little purpoſe to write on thoſe ſublime Sciences, and that the true manner of teaching 'em is by Converſation, which is the only way to perſwade a Man after ſuch a manner, that he ſhall not have the leaſt difficulty remain upon his Mind, and that he ſhall be capable of convincing another of the ſame thing: For we never well underſtand a Truth; if we are not in a condition on all Occaſions to make it known to ſuch as have all neceſſary Diſpoſitions to receive it. And this was likewiſe the reaſon that *Plato* was more known, and better underſtood at *Rome* in *Cicero*'s time than he is now. Becauſe he was read in the Company of Philoſophers, and nothing ſhortens Difficulties ſo much as Living Commentaries. Unhappily for us theſe living Commentaries are now very rare, or to ſpeak more plainly are

not to be found. For of all our Philoſophers there is not one who has cloſely applied himſelf to the reading of *Plato*, a Negligence not to be excus'd. If the reading of *Plato* ſhould not render us more Learned, 'tis certain however that it might make us better, leſs proud, and more wiſe, not only with that Humane Wiſdom which qualifies us externally to fill up all the Duties of our civil Life; but alſo with that ſoveraign Wiſdom which diſpoſes us to obey God, and to ſubject our ſelves to the Truths of Religion, and which alone makes up the true Character of a Philoſopher.

Being therefore deſtitute of all help from living Commentaries, for the underſtanding of *Plato*; I apply my ſelf to *Plato* himſelf, and ſhall endeavour to give a faithful Tranſlation accompanied with ſome Remarks, in thoſe places which are moſt difficult and of greateſt Importance. It may be the Facility of reading him in this dreſs will attract ſome Readers. But however the ſucceſs be, I ſhall never repent of having employ'd my time in tranſlating ſome Treatiſes of a truly divine Philoſopher ſince he had the glorious priviledg of being in the hand of God an Inſtrument of Light and Grace for the Converſion of St. *Auguſtin*; and perhaps may be ſo to ſome of us.

The

The ARGUMENT OF THE First *ALCIBIADES.*

IN this Dialogue which is Intituled OF HUMANE NATURE, Plato *attempts to cure our Pride and Self-love, by ſetting the Infirmities and Defects of Humane Nature in the cleareſt Light; and by preſcribing the means which ought to be us'd to reform it, with the care we ought to take of our ſelves. The matter in queſtion therefore is to know what* We our Selves *are; and above all that part of the Dialogue which treats of this appears to be Divine. For here* Plato *teaches, that* Man is the reaſonable Soul, which participates of Underſtanding, and makes uſe of the Body. *The Soul as reaſonable makes uſe of her* Reaſon *to reflect on her ſelf; and to know her own Neceſſities; as ſhe participates of Underſtanding, ſhe makes uſe of this to raiſe her up toward God, and to know her ſelf in that reſplendent Light, in which only we can be able perfectly to view our ſelves; and to know what is good, profitable, lovely, juſt, in a word the true Good, of which that is the Fountain: And 'tis this knowledg alone that ſets us right, and which by directing our Actions renders them uſeful both to our ſelves and others. But that it may not be thought that it abſolutely depends on us to acquire this Perfection, he aſſures us that all our Efforts will be uſeleſs without the aſſiſtance of God. We ſhall find here beſides this other Truths as ſurprizing in a Pagan; for inſtance, that which he ſays of the two ſorts of Ignorance, one of which is good and t'other evil; and what he teaches us concerning particular things, that the knowledg of theſe is not ſuf-*

ficient to produce the Peace and Union of States and Families; and that we have need of the knowledg of universal things, which alone produces Charity the Mother of Union. 'Tis not necessary here to set off all the Beauties of this Dialogue, I shall only remark in general, that all these Dialogues are as so many pieces of the Theatre; Comedy reigns in some of 'em, and Tragedy in others. This is of the latter kind; and in some sort resembles Sophocles *his* Oedipus. *For as in that Piece we see a Prince who from the highest Pinacle of Grandeur, and after he had been look'd upon as a God falls into a most deplorable state of Misery: We here in like manner see* Alcibiades, *after having been counted worthy of the greatest Honours, obliged to acknowledg that he deserves only to be a Slave. They that are shock'd at the passionate manner in which* Socrates *speaks to* Alcibiades *at the beginning of this Dialogue, will cease to be offended when they have read it out; for they'll then see 'tis a very innocent Passion; design'd only for the advancement of Vertue. Young People would be very happy, if they always found Friends that lov'd 'em as truly and piously as* Socrates *loved* Alcibiades; *for as* Plutarch *says,* He did not seek with him an Efferminate Pleasure unworthy of a Man, but cured the Corruption of his Soul, fill'd the Void of his Mind; and repress'd his extravagant Vanity. *He endeavour'd to lead him out of Darkness and conduct him to the true Light. 'Tis not difficult to fix the Time in which* Plato *supposes this Dialogue to have been made, since he tell us* Alcibiades *was then in the 20th Year of his Age; it must have been therefore in the 3d Year of the* LXXXVII *Olympiade, one Year before the death of* Pericles.

This Dialogue is μαιευτικὸς, *that is* Socrates *so manages the matter, as to make* Alcibiades *of himself find out the Truths which he has a mind to teach him.*

THE

THE

First *ALCIBIADES*,

OR

Of the Nature of Man.

Socrates, Alcibiades.

Socrates. O Son of *Clinias*, you are without doubt surpriz'd, that since I was the first that lov'd you, I should likewise be the last; and that whereas others have pursued you with their importunate Visits, I have been so many Years without speaking to you. 'Tis no Humane Consideration that has retained me; But a regard altogether * Divine; which I'll explain to you hereafter. At present while that God who conducts me lays me under no restraint; I make use of the permission he gives me to accost you; and I hope our Conversation for the time to come will not be disagreeable to him. I have hitherto observ'd with Joy how you have conducted your self towards my Rivals; among that great number of proud and haughty Men who have adher'd to you, there is not one whom you have not shock'd by your lofty Carriage. And I am now willing to tell you the cause of the Contempt you have had for 'em. You think you have no need of any Man;

* *A Regard altogether divine*) he means he was not willing to speak to him without the Permission of God, under whose Conduct he is, and that God would not suffer him to speak, during the great Tenderness of *Alcibiades* his Youth, which would have render'd all his Instructions useless. See the Argument of the Apology about the Genius that conducted *Socrates*.

so liberally has Nature, as you suppose, indulged you with all the Goods both of Body and Mind. For first of all * you think your self to be one of the finest and best made Men in the World; and 'tis very certain in this you are not mistaken. In the second place you are sensible of the Advantage of † your birth; for you are of the most Illustrious House of *Athens*; which is the most considerable of all the Cities of *Greece*. On your Fathers side you have a great many very powerful Relations and Friends to support you on all Occasions: You have no less Number, nor less considerable in Quality on your Mother's Side; and that which you think yet more augments your Reputation, is that your Father left you *Pericles* for your Guardian; whose Authority is so great, that he does what he pleases not only in this City, but likewise in all *Greece*, and among the most powerful of the Barbarous Nations. I might also speak of your Riches, if I did not know that these are the least occasion of your Vanity. ‡ All these great Advantages have inspired you with so much Pride, that you have despis'd all your Admirers as so many Inferiours not worthy of loving you. Accordingly they have all left you, and you have very well observ'd it; therefore I am very sure you can't sufficiently wonder what reasons I can have to continue in my former passion; and are considering what hope I can yet have to follow you after all my Rivals have retired.

The Pride of Alcibiades, *and the reason of it.*

* *Plutarch* reports, that the Beauty of *Alcibiades*, kept in a florid state, through all the Ages of his Life; and that the saying of *Euripides*, *That the Autumn of handsom Men is gay*, was verified in him.

† On the side of his Father *Clinias*, he descended from *Eurysaces*, the Son of *Ajax*; and on the side of his Mother *Dinomache*, he was *Alcmæonides*, and descended from *Megacles*.

‡ The most noted and strongest Passions *Alcibiades* had, were a boundless Vanity which made him endeavour to carry all before him with an Air of Haughtiness, and an unlimited Ambition, which made either a superior, or equal, always seem intolerable to him; this made *Archestratus* say, *Greece could not bear two* Alcibiades, *Plutar.*

Alcibiades. But one thing which without doubt you don't know, *Socrates*, is that you have prevented me but a Moment, and that I designed to speak to you first to ask the Reason of your Obstinacy. What do you mean, or what is it you hope for, that you trouble me after this manner, using your utmost diligence continually to attend me in every place whither I go? for in fine I can't enough wonder at your Deportment; and you'll do me a pleasure to tell me once for all to what you pretend.

Socrat. That is you'll freely hear me, seing you have a mind to know my Thoughts; I shall therefore now speak to you, as to one who will have patience to hear me, and will not take Occasion to get away from me.

Alcib. Yes, you may so.

Socrat. Consider well to what you engage your self; that you may not be surpriz'd, if I find it as hard for me to make an end, as it has been to begin.

Alcib. Speak, *Socrates*, I'll give you as much time as you please.

Socrat. Well then I'll obey you; and though it be a very difficult thing for a Man to speak to a Person he loves, who yet does not love him; I must take the Courage to tell you my thoughts. For my part, *Alcibiades*, if I had always seen you devoted to your Vanity and Grandeur, and in the design of living, as you have hitherto done, in your Luxury and Softness; I should also have long ago renounc'd my Passion for you; at least I flatter my self that I should have done so. But now I am going to discover to You your own Thoughts, which are very different from those you have had formerly; and by this you'll know that the reason of my obstinate persisting in following you up and down, was, to study You. I am ready to think, that if some God should all on a sudden say to you, *Alcibiades*; would you rather choose to live with all the Advantages you have at present, than to die, if you were withal forbidden to aspire to the Possession of yet greater

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for the future. I am ready to think, I say, that you would choose to die: So that this appears to be the hope with which you flatter your self, and which makes you in love with Life: You are perswaded, that you shall have no sooner harangued the Athenians, and that will be within a very little time, but you'll make 'em sensible you deserve to be honour'd more than *Pericles*, or any of our greatest Citizens; that you shall soon be Master of this City; and that your Power shall extend over all the Cities of *Greece*, and over the Barbarous Nations that inhabit our Continent. And if this God should farther say, *Alcibiades*, you shall be King of all *Europe*; but you shall not extend your Dominion over the Provinces of *Asia*; I believe you would not be willing to live for so small a Empire; unless you could fill the whole World with the noise of your Name. You esteem none but *Cyrus* and *Xerxes*; and as you are charm'd with their Glory, you propose them as Patterns for your imitation. These are the Views you have. I know it, and 'tis not mere conjecture. You very well know I say nothing but the Truth, and therefore perhaps you'll ask me; what respect, *Socrates*, has this Preamble of yours to that you had a mind to say to explain to me the reasons you have to follow me every where? I'll immediatly satisfy you of that, O Son of *Clinias*. 'Tis because the * great Projects you form in your head can never be put in Execution without my Assistance; so much Power have I over all your Affairs, and over your self too. And hence it is without doubt, that the God who governs me, has never suffer'd me to speak to you till now, and I have been long waiting for his Permission. Now therefore as you hope that, when you have convinc'd your Fellow-Citizens that you are worthy of the greatest Honours, they will make you Master of their Fortunes; I also hope you will make

* The Designs of the Ambitious can't succeed but by the Counsels of the Wise.

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me Master of your Conduct, when I have convinc'd you, that I am more worthy of this Honour than any other Person, and that you have neither Guardian, Friend nor Brother that can give you that great Power to which you aspire; there is none but I that can do it with the help of God. While you were Younger, and had not this great Ambition, God was not pleas'd to suffer me to speak to you, that my Words might not be thrown away. Now he gives me leave to break Silence; and you are indeed in a better Disposition to hear me.

Alcib. I confess, *Socrates*, * you seem to me a more strange Person since you have begun to speak than while you were silent; tho indeed I have always taken you for an odd sort of a Man. It seems then you know my thoughts perfectly well, so let it be; if I should tell you the contrary, I should have enough to do to convince you. But I pray tell me how you will be able to prove, that with your Assistance, I shall effect the great things I am projecting, and that I can do nothing without you?

Socrat. Do you ask me if I am capable of making a long Discourse † as they do whom you are wont to hear? You know that is not my manner. But if you would (tho never so little) comply with my way, I'll do all I can to convince you that I have advanced nothing but what is true.

Alcib. I am willing to comply with it, provided 'tis not very difficult.

Socrat. Is it so difficult a Matter to answer a few Questions?

Alcib. No, if that be all, I am willing to do it.

Socrat. Answer me then.

Alcib. Well interrogate me as soon as you please.

*The Wisdom of *Socrates* could not but seem mere Folly to *Alcibiades*, especially while *Socrates* promises him such great things, which he could not tell how to comprehend.

† He reproaches him for amusing himself too much in hearing the long Discourses of the Sophists. For *Alcibiades* pretended much to Eloquence, which made him so much relish those studied Discourses.

Socrat.

Socrat. May we not suppose that you have always those great Thoughts which I have attributed to you?

Alcib. I agree to it; I shall at least have the satisfaction of hearing what you have to say to me.

Socrat. I believe I am not mistaken, you are preparing to go in a few days to the Assembly of the Athenians to make them participate of the Knowledge and Skill you have acquired. And if I should meet you at that instant and ask you, *Alcibiades*, what are the Matters about which you are going to advise the Athenians? Are they not such things as you know better than they? What would you answer me?

Alcib. Without doubt I should answer, 'tis about such things as I know better than they.

Socrat. For you would not know how to give good Counsel but in Matters that you know?

Alcib. How should any one give it in other things?

Socrat. And is it not certain, that you know nothing but what you have either learn'd of others, or what you have found out your self?

Alcib. What can one know otherwise?

Socrat. But have you learnt any thing of others, or found out any thing your self; when you have neither been willing to learn nor search into any thing?

Alcib. That cannot be.

Socrat. Have you ever thought it worth your while to endeavour to find out, or learn, what you believ'd you already understood?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. There was a time then, in which you thought your self ignorant of what you now know?

Alcib. That is very true.

Socrat. But I pretty well know what are the things you have learn'd. If I forget any one of 'em mention it to me. You have learnt, (if my Memory don't deceive me) to read and write, to play on the

the Harp; and to wreſtle: * but as for the Flute you did not value it. This is all you underſtand, unleſs you have learn'd ſome other thing that I never knew of. And yet † I don't think you have gone abroad either Day or Night, but I have been a Witneſs to the Steps you have taken.

Alcib. 'Tis very true, theſe are the only things I have learn'd.

Socrat. Will you then when the Athenians enter into a Deliberation about Writing, to know how that Art ought to be practis'd, riſe up to give 'em your advice?

Alcib. No ſurely.

Socrat. Shall it be when they conſult about the Different Tunes in Muſick?

Alcib. A fine Conſultation indeed!

Socrat. Nor are the Athenians us'd to deliberate on the various Turns us'd in Wreſtling:

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. What is it then you expect they will conſider, wherein you may give 'em advice? It muſt not be about the manner of building a Houſe neither; the meaneſt Brick-layer would be able to adviſe 'em how to do that better than you.

Alcib. He would ſo.

Socrat. Nor muſt it be about any point of Divination, you are not ſo well acquainted with that Buſineſs as every Diviner is, let him be ſmall or great, handſome or ugly, of high or low Birth.

Alcib. What does all that ſignify?

Socrat. Nor is it any matter whether he be rich or poor, for good Counſel proceeds from knowledg, and not from Riches. *Alcib.*

* He look'd upon it as an ignoble Inſtrument, and unworthy of the Application of a Free-man. But the principal Cauſe of this Averſion was, becauſe it ſpoil'd the graceful Air of his Countenance.

† *Alcibiades* was Night and Day beſieg'd by a corrupt ſort of Men, who made it their conſtant endeavour to ſeduce him. But *Socrates*, like a good Father, kept him always in his ſight, to ſecure him from all thoſe dangers, well knowing that none but himſelf was capable of preſerving him from ſo great Perils.

Alcib. That's easily granted.

Socrat. And if the Athenians should take into consideration the ways and means of recovering their Health; do you think they would not send for a Physician to consult him without giving themselves any farther trouble?

Alcib. No doubt of it.

Socrat. When is it then, d'ye think, that you'll rise up with any Colour of Reason to give 'em good Advice?

Alcib. When they deliberate on their Affairs.

Socrat. What, when they consult about the building of Ships; to know what sort of Vessels they should make?

Alcib. No, not that neither.

Socrat. For you never learnt to build Ships; That's the reason I suppose you will not speak of that Matter; is it not?

Alcib. To be sure, I'll say nothing on that Subject.

Socrat. When is it then that their Affairs will be so deliberated, that you'll put in with a Speech?

Alcib. When they have before 'em the business of Peace and War, or any other thing belonging to Goverment.

Socrat. You mean, when they consider with what Nations 'tis proper for 'em to make War or Peace; and when and how it ought to be made?

Alcib. You hit it.

Socrat. Peace or War ought to be made with those Nations with whom 'tis best to make either the one or the other; and when the best Occasion offers, and also after the best Manner; and as long as it continues to be best.

Alcib. True.

Socrat. If the Athenians should consult with what Wrestlers 'tis best to take the Lock, and what others 'tis best to deal with * at Armes-end without clo-

* Tis a kind of Wrestling *Hippocrates* speaks of in his 11th Book of Diet, Chap. XI. *To wrestle only with the Arms, without taking hold of the body, makes one lean, and draws the Flesh upward.*

sing

ſing in to 'em, and when and how theſe different Exerciſes ought to be perform'd, ſhould you give better advice in theſe Matters than the Maſter of the Wreſtling-ground?

Alcib. No Queſtion but he would give the beſt Counſel in this caſe.

Socrat. Can you tell me what this Wreſtling-Maſter would principally regard in giving his Inſtructions, with whom, when and how theſe different Exerciſes ought to be perform'd? Would he not have reſpect only to what is beſt?

Alcib. Without doubt he would.

Socrat. Then he would order 'em to be perform'd as often as it ſhould be beſt ſo to do; and on ſuch Occaſions as ſhould be moſt proper.

Alcib. Very true.

Socrat. He that Sings ought ſometimes to joine his Voice with the Harp; and ſometimes to dance as he Plays and Sings, and in all this he ſhould conduct himſelf by what is beſt.

Alcib. That is moſt certain.

Socrat. Seeing then there is a Beſt in ſinging, and in playing on Inſtruments as well as in Wreſtling, how will you call this Beſt? For as for that of Wreſtling, all the World calls it the moſt *Gymnaſtick*.

Alcib. I don't underſtand you.

Socrat. Endeavour to follow me; for my part I ſhould anſwer that this Beſt, is that which is always the Beſt, and is not that which is always the beſt, that which is moſt according to the Rules of the Art it ſelf?

Alcib. You have reaſon.

Socrat. What is this Art or Wreſtling? is it not the *Gymnaſtick* Art?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. What I have been ſaying, is that that which is beſt in the Art of Wreſtling, is call'd the moſt *Gymnaſtick*.

Alcib. This is what you have already ſaid.

Socrat. And this is Right.

Alcib.

Alcib. Very Right.

Socrat. Come then, do you also endeavour to give me a right answer. How do you call that Art, which teaches to Sing, to play on the Harp, and to dance well? Can't you tell me that?

Alcib. No indeed *Socrates.*

Socrat. Try if you can't hit on't in this way: How do you call the Goddesses, that preside over this Art?

Alcib. You mean the Muses.

Socrat. Very well. Let us see then what name this Art has derived from them.

Alcib. O, 'tis Musick you speak of.

Socrat. Very right; and as I told you that which was perform'd according to the Rules of the Art of Wrestling or of the *Gymnasium* is call'd *Gymnastick*: tell me also how you call that which is according to the Rules of this other Art.

Alcib. I call it *Musical*, and say such a thing is done *Musically.*

Socrat. Very good. And in the Art of making War and in that of making Peace, what is that which is best, and how do you call it? Seing as to those two other Arts you say that which is best in the one is that which is most Gymnastick, and that which is best in the other is that which is most Musical; try now in like manner to tell me the name of that which is best in the Arts we are now upon.

Alcib. Indeed *Socrates*, I can't tell.

Socrat. But if any one should hear you discoursing, and giving Advice about several sorts of Food, and saying that is better than this, both for the Season and Quality of it? and should ask you, *Alcibiades*, what is it that you call better? would it not be a shame, if you could not answer, that you mean by better, that which is more wholesome. Yet 'tis not your profession to be a Physician. And is it not a yet greater shame that you know not how to give an answer in things you profess to know, and about which you pretend to give Advice, as understanding them better than others? Does not this cover you with Confusion? *Alcib.*

Alcib. I confeſs it does.

Socrat. Apply your Mind to it then; and endeavour to give me an Account what is the deſign of that better thing, which we ſeek in the Art of making Peace or War with thoſe with whom we ought to be either in War or Peace.

Alcib. I know not how to find it out, what Effort ſoever I make.

Socrat. What don't you know that when we make War we complain of ſomething that has been done to us by thoſe againſt whom we take up Arms? And are you ignorant of the Name we give to the thing of which we complain?

Alcib. I know on ſuch Occaſions we ſay, they have deceived us, they have inſulted us; they have taken away our property.

Socrat. Very well, when one of theſe things befalls us, I pray explain to me the different manner in which they may happen.

Alcib. You mean, *Socrates* that they may befal us juſtly or unjuſtly.

Socrat. I do ſo.

Alcib. And that makes an infinite difference.

Socrat. Againſt what People then ſhall the Athenians declare War by your Advice? ſhall it be againſt ſuch as follow the Rules of Juſtice, or ſuch as act unjuſtly?

Alcib. A Pretty Queſtion, *Socrates*; if any one ſhould be capable of thinking it needful to make War with thoſe that follow the Rules of Juſtice; do you think he would dare to own it?

Socrat. Becauſe, you'll ſay, that is not conformable to the Laws.

Alcib. No, doubtleſs; 'tis neither juſt, nor honorable.

Socrat. You'll always then have Juſtice in view in all you Counſels?

Alcib. That is very neceſſary.

Socrat. But is not that better thing about which I was juſt now enquiring of you on the Subject of

Peace or War, *viz.* to know with whom, when and how War and Peace should be made, * always the most just?

Alcib. I am of that mind.

Socrat. How comes this to pass then, my dear *Alcibiades*, is it that you perceive not that you are ignorant of what is just, or is it that I perceive not that you have learn'd it, and that you have secretly attended some Master who has taught you to distinguish well between what is most just, and what is most unjust? Who is this Master; I pray tell me, that you may put me under his Care, and recommend me to him?

Alcib. These are your common Ironies, *Socrates*.

Socrat. No, I swear it by that God who presides over our Friendship, and whom I would least offend by Perjury. I very seriously entreat you, if you have a Master, tell me who he is?

Alcib. And what if I have none, do you think I could not otherwise know what is just and unjust?

Socrat. You know it if you have found it out your self.

Alcib. Do you think I have not found it out?

Socrat. I am perswaded you have found it if you have sought for it.

Alcib. D'ye think I have not sought for it?

Socrat. You have sought for it, if you have believed your self ignorant of it.

Alcib. Do you then imagine there was not a time when I was ignorant of it?

Socrat. You speak better than you think, but can you then precisely assign me the Time, when you believed you did not know what was just and unjust? Let us see, was it the last year that you sought for the knowledge of this being throughly convinced of your Ignorance in this Matter? Or did you then think you knew it? Tell the truth, that our Con-

* It is not sufficient to know what is just, we should know what is most just, and this point is very difficult to be found: this is not within the reach of little Politicians. *M. Le Fevre.*

versation

verſation may not appear vain and trifling.

Alcib. The laſt year I believed I knew it.

Socrat. And did you not think the ſame, three, four or five years ago?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And before that time you were no more than a Child, were you?

Alcib. Very true.

Socrat. And at that time when you were but a Child, I am very ſure you thought you knew it.

Alcib. How are you ſo ſure of that?

Socrat. Becauſe during your Child-hood, when you were with your Maſters and elſewhere; and * when you play'd at Dice, or any other play; I have very often obſerved you did not heſitate to determine what was juſt, or unjuſt, and to tell the firſt of your Play-fellows that offended you, with a great deal of plainneſs and aſſurance, that he was baſe and unfair, and did you a great deal † of Injuſtice. Is not this True?

Alcib. What ſhould I have done then do you think when any Injuſtice was done me?

Socrat. If you were ignorant that what was offer'd you was unjuſt, you might then have ask'd what you ſhould have done.

Alcib. But I was not at all ignorant of that, for I very well knew the Injuſtice that was done me.

Socrat. By this you ſee then, that when you were but a Child you thought you knew what was Juſt and Unjuſt.

Alcib. I thought I knew it; and ſo I really did.

Socrat. At what time did you find this out? for it was not when you thought you knew it.

Alcib. No. Doubtleſs.

Socrat. At what time then do you think you were

* See what *Alcibiades* did one day as he was playing at Dice, as 'tis reported by *Plutarch* in the beginning of his Life.

† When Children trick'd one another in their play, the ordinary Term they us'd at *Athens* was ἀδικεῖς you do me Injuſtice, or as we ſay *You do me wrong*. There is a very expreſs Inſtance of it, in *Ariſtophanes* his Clouds. *M. Le Fevre.*

ignorant of it? Consider, reckon. I am much afraid you'll not be able to find that time.

Alcib. Indeed *Socrates* I can't give you an Account of it.

Socrat. Then you have not found out of your self the knowledge of what is Just and Unjust?

Alcib. So it seems, *Socrates*.

Socrat. You just now acknowledged that you had not learned it of others neither: and if you have neither found it out your self, nor learn'd it of others, how came you to know it? whence had it you?

Alcib. But perhaps I mistook my self, and did not answer you well, when I told you I had found it out my self.

Socrat. How did you learn it then?

Alcib. I learn'd it as others did.

For it must be inquir'd how, and of whom others learn'd it, and that goes ad Infinitum.

Socrat. Then we are to begin again, tell me of whom you learn'd it.

Alcib. I learn'd it of the People.

Socrat. Now you quote a bad Master.

Alcib. What is not the People capable of teaching it?

Socrat. So far from that, that they are not capable of teaching one to judge right * of a Game at Tables; and that is much less important and less difficult, than to understand Justice; don't you think so as well as I?

Alcib. Yes without doubt.

Socrat. And if they know not how to teach you things of little or no consequence, how should they teach you things of this Importance and Solidity?

Alcib. I am of your mind; yet the people are capable of teaching a great many things much more solid, than any thing that belongs to this Play.

Socrat. What are those?

Alcib. Our Language for Instance; I learn'd that

* This play was neither our Draughts nor Chess; but a more Philosophical Game, for it taught the motions of the Heavens, the course of the Sun, that of the Moon, the Eclipses, &c. *Plato* says in his *Phædrus*, it was invented by the Egyptians.

only

only of the People; I can't name you any one single Master I had for it; I am altogether oblig'd to the people for it, whom yet you account so bad a Master.

Socrat. This is a very different case. * In this the people is a very Excellent Master; and we have always Reason to apply our selves to 'em on this Account.

Alcib. Why?

Socrat. Because they have every thing that the best Masters ought to have.

Alcib. Why, what have they?

Socrat. Ought not they that would teach others any thing, first to know it well themselves?

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. Ought not they who know any thing well to agree about what they know, and never dispute about it; for if they should dispute about it, would you believe 'em to be well instructed in it? and could they be able to teach it to others?

Alcib. By no means.

Socrat. Do you see the people disagree about what a Stone and a Stick is? Ask all our Citizens that question, they'll answer you alike, and when they go about to take up a Stone or a Stick, they'll all run to the same thing, and so of the rest. For I understand this is what you mean by knowing the Language; all our Citizens constantly agree about this both with one another, and with themselves. Of all our Greek Cities there is not one that disputes about the Signification and use of Words. So that the People are very good to teach us the Tongue; and we can't do better than to learn of 'em, but if instead of desiring to learn what a Horse is, we would know what a good Horse is; would the People, do you think, be capable of informing us?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. For one certain sign that they don't know

* This was true at *Athens* especially, where all the Citizens speaking perfectly well, and there being no different use of Words, as now adays among us, the people was an Excellent Master for the ground of the Language. Therefore *Aristophanes* says, the *first Comer was a Child's Master.*

it, and that they know not how to teach it, is that they can't agree about it among themselves. In like manner if we desire to know, not what a Man is, but what a sound or unsound Man is; would the People be in a Condition to teach us this?

Alcib. Still less than the other.

Socrat. And when you should see 'em agree so little among themselves; would you not judge 'em to be very bad Instructors?

Alcib. Without any difficulty.

Socrat. And do you think the People agree better with themselves or others about what is just and unjust?

Alcib. No indeed *Socrates.*

Socrat. You believe then they agree least of all about that?

Alcib. I am thoroughly convinc'd of it.

Socrat. Have you ever seen or read that to maintain that a thing is sound or unsound, Men have taken up Arms against each other, and knock'd one another o'th' head?

Alcib. What a folly must that be!

Socrat. Well, if you have not seen it, at least you have read that this has happen'd to maintain that a thing is Just or Unjust. For you have read *Homer's Odysée* and *Iliade.* *Alcib.* Yes Certainly.

The cause of the Trojan War, and of all other Wars is Ignorance and Injustice.

Socrat. Is not the difference Men have always had about Justice and Injustice, the foundation of those Poems? Was it not this difference that caused so many Battles and Slaughters between the Greeks and Trojans? was it not this that made *Ulysses* undergo so many Dangers and so much Toil, and that ruin'd *Penelope*'s Lovers?

Alcib. You say right.

Socrat. Was it not this same difference that destroy'd so many Athenians, Lacedemonians, and Beotians at the famous † Battel of *Tanagra*, and after

* This great Battle was fought the last year of the LXXX *Olympiade.* The Athenian Captain, who gain'd it, was nam'd *Myronides. Socrates* was then 12 years of Age, or therabout. *M. Le Fevre.*

that

that again at the * Battle of *Coronea* where your Father was kill'd?

Alcib. Who can deny this?

Socrat. Shall we then dare to say the people knows a thing well, about which they dispute with so much Animosity, that they are carried to the most fatal Extremities?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Very good! And yet are not these the Masters you cite, when at the same time you acknowledge their Ignorance?

Alcib. I confess it.

Socrat. What Probability then is there that you should know what is Just and Unjust, about which you appear so uncertain and fluctuating; and which you confess you have neither learn'd of others, nor found out your self?

Alcib. According to what you say there is no Probability of it at all.

Socrat. How! according to what I say? You speak not right, *Alcibiades*, say rather 'tis according to what you say your self.

Alcib. How! is it not you that say, I know nothing at all of what belongs to Justice and Injustice?

Socrat. No, indeed, 'tis not I.

Alcib. Who then? Is it I?

Socrat. Yes, 'tis your self.

Alcib. How so?

Socrat. I'll tell you how so; and you will agree with me. If I should ask you which is the greatest Number, one, or two; you would immediatly answer two; and if I should again ask you how much greater this Number is than the other; you would likewise answer, that 'tis greater by one.

Alcib. Very true.

* This Battle of *Coronea* was fought the second year of the LXXXIII Olymp. Here the brave *Tolmides* was kill'd; after which the Athenians were driven out of *Beotia*. *Socrates* was then 22 years of Age. This Battle of *Coronea* has often through mistake, been confounded with that of *Cheronea*. *M. Le Fevre.*

Socrat. Which of us two would it be then that would say two is more than one; would it be I?

Alcib. No, 'twould be I.

Socrat. For it was I that ask'd, and you that answer'd. Is it not the same thing in the present Question? *Alcib.* That's certain.

Socrat If I should ask you what Letters compose *Socrates* his Name, and you should tell 'em me one after another, which of us two would tell them?

Alcib. I should do it without doubt.

Socrat. For in a Discourse which is spent in Questions and Answers; he that asks never affirms, but always he that answers. 'Tis I that have ask'd you, and 'tis you that have answer'd, 'tis you therefore that have affirm'd the things you have said.

This proves the Usefulness of this Method.

Alcib. This must be granted.

Socrat. 'Tis your self that have said that the fine *Alcibiades* the Son of *Clinias*, not knowing what is Just and Unjust, and yet thinking he knows it very well, is going to the Assembly of the Athenians to give them his Advice about such things as he knows nothing of; Is it not so?

Alcib. 'Tis even so.

Socrat. One may then apply to you, *Alcibiades*, that saying of *Euripides*. *'Tis thy self that has named it.* For it is not I that have spoken it, but your self; and you are to blame to charge it on me.

'Tis in the Tragedy of Hippolytus.

Alcib. You have Reason.

Socrat. Believe me, *Alcibiades*, 'tis a wild Enterprize to have a mind to go teach the Athenians that which you do not know your self, and about which you have neglected to inform your self.

Alcib. I fancy, *Socrates*, the Athenians, and all the rest of the Greeks very rarely examine in their Counsel, what is most Just or Unjust; for they are satisfied that is very evident. And therefore without amusing themselves with this vain Enquiry they only consider what is most advantageous and useful; and Utility and Justice are very different things; since there have always been people in the World

World that have found themſelves very proſperous in the Commiſſion of great Injuſtice; and others who have ſucceeded very ill, in the exerciſe of Juſtice.

Socrat. What do you * think then that, if what is Uſeful and what is Juſt are very different, as you ſay they are, you know what is uſeful to Men, and why it is ſo?

Alcib. What ſhould hinder me, *Socrates*; Unleſs you would ask me of whom I learn'd this too; or how I found it out my ſelf?

Socrat. Is your proceeding juſt, *Alcibiades*, ſuppoſing what you ſay is not right, as that may very well be; and that 'tis very eaſy to refute you by the ſame Reaſons which I have already employ'd? You would have new Proofs, and freſh Demonſtrations, and treat the former as old Clothes, which you are not willing to wear any longer. You are ſtill for having ſomething entirely new; but for my part, without following you in your Stragglings and Eſcapes, I ſhall ask you, as I have already done, whence you came to know what Utility is; and who was your Inſtructor: In a word I ask you all I have ask'd you before. 'Tis very certain you'll anſwer me too after the ſame manner you have done, and that you'll not be able to ſhew me either that you have learn'd of others, to know what is uſeful, or that you have found it out your ſelf. But becauſe you are very nice, and don't love to hear the ſame thing twice, I am willing to drop this Queſtion whether you know what is uſeful to the Athenians or no. But if what is juſt and what is uſeful are one and the ſame thing; or if they are very different as you ſay, why have you not prov'd it to me? Prove it me, either by interrogating me as I have dealt with you; or in making me a fine Diſcourſe which may ſet the Matter in a clear Light.

* If what is uſeful, and what is juſt, were different things, yet if one knew what is Uſeful, one might alſo know what is Juſt: For we know Contraries by their Contraries. But they are not different, and *Socrates* is going to prove it. *Alcibiades* knows no more what is uſeful than what is juſt.

Alcib.

Alcib. But, *Socrates* I know not whether I am capable of speaking before you.

Socrat. My dear *Alcibiades*, imagine me to be the Assembly, suppose me to be the People: When you are among them, must you not endeavour to perswade every one of 'em?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And when a Man knows a thing well, is it not equal to him to demonstrate to this and that Person one after another; or to prove it to divers Persons all at once; as one that teaches Reading or Arithmetick can equally instruct one or more Scholars together?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. And consequently of whatsoever you are capable of persuading many you may very easily persuade one single Person. But of what can a Man perisuade others, is it not of that which he knows himself?

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. What other difference is there between an Orator that speaks to a multitude of People, and a Man that discourses with his Friend in familiar Conversation, but that the former persuades a great Number of People at once, and the latter persuades but one?

Alcib. 'Tis likely there may be no other difference.

Socrat. Come then; Since he who is capable of proving what he knows to many, is by a much stronger Reason capable of proving it to one single person; display here all your Eloquence to me, and endeavour to shew me that what is just is not always useful.

Alcib. You are very urgent, *Socrates.*

Socrat. I am so urgent, that I'll presently prove to you the contrary of that which you refuse to prove to me.

Alcib. Do so.

Socrat. Only answer me.

Alcib. Ha! Nothing but Questions; let me intreat you to speak your self alone. *Socrat.*

Socrat. What are you not willing to be convinc'd ?

Alcib. Yes with all my heart.

Socrat. When you your self shall grant, and affirm to me that what I advance is true, will you not be convinc'd ?

Alcib. I think I shall.

Socrat. Answer me then : And if you your self don't say that what is just is always useful, never believe any Man living that shall tell you so.

Alcib. Agreed, I am ready to answer you, for I shall receive no damage by it.

Socrat. You are a Prophet, *Alcibiades*; but tell me ; do you think there are some just things which are useful, and others which are not so ?

Alcib. Yes certainly.

Socrat. Do you think too that some of them are comely and honorable, and others the quite contrary ?

Alcib. How do you say ?

Socrat. I ask you for instance, if a Man who does an Action that is shameful, does an Action that is just ?

Alcib. I am very far from such a thought.

Socrat. You believe then that whatsoever is just is comely.

Alcib. I am entirely convinc'd of that.

Socrat. But is every thing that is comely and honorable good ? or do you think there are some comely and honorable things that are Good, and others that are Evil ?

Alcib. For my part, *Socrates* I think there are some honorable things that are Evil.

Socrat. And by consequence that there are some shameful things that are Good ?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. See if I understand you well. It has often happen'd in Battles, that one Man in attempting to succour his Friend, or Relation, has receiv'd a great many Wounds, or has been kill'd ; and another, by abandoning his Relation, or Friend, has sav'd his Life : Is not this your meaning ?

Alcib. 'Tis the very thing I would say.

Socrat.

Alcibiades is afraid of Socrates his Questions, which shews this to be the best method to convince and refute.

Socrat. The succour a Man gives to his Friend is a comely and honourable thing, in that he endeavours to save one whom he is oblig'd to save; and is not this what we call Valour.

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And this very Succour is an evil thing, in that it is the cause of a Man's receiving Wounds, or of being kill'd?

Alcib. Yes, without doubt.

Socrat. * But is not Valour one thing, and Death another?

Alcib. Yes certainly.

Socrat. This Succour then which a Man gives to his Friend, is not at the same time an honourable and an evil thing in the same respect.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. But observe, if that which renders this Action comely, is not that which also renders it good: for you have your self acknowledg'd that in respect of Valour this Action was comely. Let us now examine whether Valour is a Good or an Evil. And I'll shew you the way to make this Examen aright. Do you desire for your self Goods or Evils?

Alcib. Goods without doubt.

Socrat. And the greatest?

Alcib. Yes, you may be sure on't.

Socrat. And would you not suffer any one to deprive you of 'em?

Alcib. Why should I suffer that?

Socrat. What do you think of Valour? at what rate do you value it? is there any good in the World for which you would be depriv'd of it?

Alcib. No, not Life it self. What to be a Coward? I would a thousand times rather choose to dye.

* *Socrates* means, that Valour and Death being two very different things, 'tis ridiculous to judg of one by the other: But each of 'em ought to be examin'd by it self. The former of these is the thing under debate, and not the latter. This is extreamly ingenious; and *Alcibiades* did not expect such a very quick Repartee.

Socrat.

Socrat. Then Cowardise seems to you the greatest of all Evils?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And more to be fear'd than Death it self?

Alcib. Most certainly.

Socrat. Are not Life and Valour the Contraries to Death and Cowardise?

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Socrat. You desire the former, and by no means wish for the latter; is it not because you find those very good, and these very evil?

Alcib. Yes doubtless.

Socrat. You have your self acknowledg'd, that the Succour a Man gives to his Friend in Battle is a comely and honourable Action; if it be consider'd with respect to the good that is in it, which is Valour.

Alcib. I have acknowledg'd it.

Socrat. And that 'tis an evil Action, when consider'd with respect to the Evil that attends it, that is Wounds and Death.

Alcib. I confess it.

Socrat. * Then it hence follows, that we ought to call each Action according to what it produces; we ought to call it Good, if Good springs from it; and Evil, if Evil arise out of it?

Alcib. So it seems to me.

Socrat. Is not an Action comely in that it is Good, and shameful in that it is Evil?

Alcib. That's beyond Contradiction.

Socrat. When you say then that the Succour a Man gives his Friend in a Battle is a comely Action, and at the same time an evil Action, 'tis as if you should say, 'tis Evil tho it be Good.

Alcib. Indeed I think what you say is true.

Socrat. Then there is nothing comely and honour-

* This Maxim is false in *Alcibiades* his sense, but very true in that of *Socrates:* for nothing can ever spring from a good Action but Good, as nothing but Evil can spring from an evil one.

able

able which is Evil so far as it is comely and honourable; nor is any thing which is shameful good, so far as it is shameful.

Alcib. So I think.

Happiness is always the fruit of good Actions.

Socrat. Let us seek for another Proof of this Truth. Are not all that do good Actions happy? Can they be happy, unless it be by the Possession of Good? Is not this Possession of Good the fruit of a good Life? And consequently is not Happiness necessarily for them that do good Actions?

Alcib. Who can deny it?

Socrat. * Then Happiness is a comely and honorable thing. Hence it follows that what is comely and what is good are never two different things, as we just now agreed, and that whatsoever we take to be comely, we shall also take to be good; if we look narrowly into it.

Alcib. This is absolutely necessary.

Socrat. What do you say then, is that which is good useful, or not?

Alcib. Yes, it is useful.

Socrat. Do you remember what we said when we spoke of Justice, and about what we agreed?

Alcib. I think we agreed that all Men that do just Actions, must needs do what is comely and honorable.

Socrat. Then that which is comely is good?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. Then that which is good is useful?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. And consequently whatsoever 'is just is useful? *Alcib.* So it seems.

Socrat. Take good Notice that 'tis your self who affirm these Truths; for I for my part, only ask Questions. *Alcib.* I acknowledge it.

Socrat. If any one then thinking he well understood the Nature of Justice should go into the Assembly of the Athenians, or Parthians if you please, (to lay the Scene more remote) and should tell 'em he

* And consequently Happiness can't be the fruit of an ill Life and of ill Actions.

cer-

certainly knows that juſt Actions are ſometimes Evil; would not you laugh at him, who have juſt now granted and acknowledg'd that Juſtice and Utility are one and the ſame thing?

Alcib. I ſolemnly proteſt to you *Socrates*, that I know not what I ſay, nor where I am; for theſe things appear to me ſometimes one way and ſometimes another, according as you interrogate me.

Socrat. Don't you know the Cauſe of this diſorder?

Alcib. No, I know nothing at all of it.

Socrat. And if any one ſhould ask you if you have three Eyes or four Hands, do you think you ſhould anſwer ſometimes after one manner and ſometimes after another? or would you not anſwer him always after the ſame manner?

Alcib. Tho I begin to be diffident of my ſelf, yet I think I ſhould always anſwer the ſame thing.

Socrat. And is not this becauſe you know very well you have but two Eyes and two Hands?

Alcib. I think ſo.

Socrat. Since then you anſwer ſo differently whether you will or no about the ſame thing, 'tis a certain ſign that you are ignorant of it.

Alcib. So one would think.

Socrat. You confeſs then that your thoughts are uncertain and fluctuating about what is juſt and unjuſt; honorable or diſhonorable, good or evil, uſeful or the contrary. And is it not evident from hence that this uncertainty ſprings only from your ignorance? *Uncertainty always comes from Ignorance.*

Alcib. 'Tis evident.

Socrat. Then 'tis a certain Maxim that the Mind is always fluctuating and uncertain about every thing it does not know?

Alcib. It cannot be otherwiſe.

Socrat * But do you know how to mount up to Heaven?

* After he had ſhown *Alcibiades*, that Ignorance is the cauſe of all the Errors of Mankind; he goes about to prove to him, that Men ought not to be accus'd of Ignorance in general, for if one kind of it is Evil, there is another kind Good, and this he maintains very ſolidly.

Alcib.

Alcib. No, I protest.

Socrat. Are you in any doubt, or does your Mind fluctuate about this?

Alcib. Not in the least.

Socrat. Do you know the reason of this, or would you have me tell it you?

Alcib. Tell it me.

Socrat. 'Tis because as you don't know how to mount up to Heaven; so you don't think you know it neither.

Alcib. How is that?

Socrat. Let You and I examine this. When you are ignorant of a thing, and you know you are ignorant of it, are you uncertain and fluctuating about this? For Example, about the Art of Cookery? Don't you know you are ignorant of it? Do you then amuse your self in reasoning about the manner of dressing Meat, and speak sometimes one way, and sometimes another, don't you rather suffer the Cook to take his own way?

Alcib. Yes certainly.

Socrat. And if you were on board a Ship, would you concern your self to give advice to turn the Helm to the right, or left; and when you don't understand the *Art of Navigation*, would you speak about it sometimes after one fashion, and sometimes after another? Would you not rather be quiet, and leave the Pilot to steer?

Alcib. To be sure I should leave that to him.

Socrat. Then you are never fluctuating and uncertain about things you don't know, provided you know that you don't know 'em?

Alcib. So it seems.

Socrat. By this then you very well discern that all the faults we commit proceed only from this sort of ignorance, which makes us think we know that of which we are indeed ignorant.

Alcib. How do you say?

Socrat. I say that which induces us to attempt a thing is the thought we have that we know how to

do

do it; for when we are convinc'd that we don't know it, we leave it to others. *Alcib.* That is certain.

Socrat. Thus they who are under this laſt ſort of ignorance never commit any fault, becauſe they leave to others the care of ſuch things as they know not how to do themſelves.

Alcib. That's true.

Socrat. Who are they then that commit faults? 'Tis not they that know things?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Seing 'tis neither they that know things, nor they who while they are ignorant of 'em, know that they are ignorant; it neceſſarily follows that 'tis they who while they are ignorant of 'em, yet think they know 'em: can it be any others?

Alcib. No 'tis only they.

Socrat. Well then this muſt be the ignorance which is ſhameful and the Cauſe of all Evils.

Alcib. True.

Socrat. And when this Ignorance happens to be about things of very great conſequence, is it not very pernicious, and very ſhameful?

Alcib. It cannot be denied.

Socrat. But can you name me any thing that is of greater conſequence, than what is juſt, what is honorable, what is good, and what is uſeful?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Is it not about theſe things that you your ſelf ſay you are fluctuating and uncertain? Is not this Uncertainty a ſure ſign, as we have ſaid already, not only that you are ignorant of theſe things that are ſo great and important; but alſo that while you are ignorant of 'em, you think you know 'em?

Alcib. I am affraid this is but too true.

Socrat. Oh *Alcibiades*! In what a deplorable condition then are you! * I dare not mention it, yet

* He does not mention it immediately. *Alcibiades* is not yet in a condition to bear the horrour of it: But he'll mention it at length, when he has diſpos'd and prepar'd the young Man to receive this Thunder-clap.

seeing we are alone 'tis necessary I should tell it you. My dear *Alcibiades* you are under a very shameful kind of Ignorance, as appears by your Words, and your own Testimony against your self. And this is the Reason you throw your self with so much precipitancy into the Government; before you are instructed in what belongs to it. But you are not the only Person who has fallen under this Unhappiness; 'tis common to you with the greatest part of those who have intermedled with the Affairs of the Commonwealth. I can except but a small Number. Nay it may be your Tutor *Pericles* is the only Person that is to be exempted.

Alcib. And, *Socrates*, 'tis likewise said, he did not become so accomplished of himself; but that he had a great deal of Conversation with many great Men, such as *Pythoclides*, and *Anaxagoras*; and to this very day, as old as he is, he spends whole days with * *Damon*, to inform himself still more and more.

Socrat. † Did you ever see any one, who perfectly knew a thing, and yet could not teach it another? Your Reading-Master taught you what he knew; and taught it whom he pleas'd. And you that have learn'd it of him might teach it another. The same may be said of a Musick-Master, and of a Master of Exercises.

Alcib. This is certain.

Socrat. For the best sign that one knows a thing well is to be in a condition to teach it others.

Alcib. So I think.

* This is he of whom *Plutarch* speaks in the Life of *Pericles*; under the specious Veil of Musick he hid his Profession, which was to teach Politicks. The People perceived this, and banish'd him with the Sentence of the Ostracism.

† Upon what *Alcibiades* had just said, that *Pericles* had render'd himself accomplished by the Conversation of Philosophers and Sophists, *Socrates* would intimate to him, that this Conversation was very useless for the acquiring of Vertue, in which true Accomplishment consists. And this he ingeniously proves by the Example of *Pericles* himself, who had not been able to teach his own Children any thing; a sure sign that he had learn'd no great Matter of his Sophists.

Socrat.

Socrat. But can you name me any one whom *Pericles* has accomplished? Let's begin with his own Children.

Alcib. What does this prove, *Socrates*, if *Pericles* his Children were Block-heads?

Socrat. And your Brother *Clinias*?

Alcib. A fine Proof indeed! you talk to me of a Fool.

Socrat. If *Clinias* is a Fool, and the Children of *Pericles* were Block-heads; how came it to pass that *Pericles* neglected such good natural Parts as yours, and taught you nothing?

Alcib. I am the only cause of it my self, in not attending at all to what he said to me.

Socrat. But among all the Athenians and Strangers, whether Freemen or Slaves, can you name me one whom the Conversation of *Pericles* has render'd more accomplish'd, as I'll name you a *Pythodorus*, the Son of *Isolochus*, and a *Callias*, the Son of *Calliades*, who became very great Men in *Zeno*'s School, at the Expence of *a hundred Minas*. *About 200 l. Sterling.*

Alcib. I can't name you one.

Socrat. * That's very well; but what will you do with your self, *Alcibiades*? will you continue as you are, or will you at last take some care of your self.

Alcib. 'Tis a general Affair, *Socrates*, and concerns me no more than others. For I understand all you say, and agree with you. Yes, all that concern themselves with the Affairs of the Republick, are a Company of ignorant People, excepting a very small number.

Socrat. And what then?

Alcib. If they were Men of great Accomplishments, it would be necessary for one that should pretend to equal, or surpass 'em, to learn, and exercise

This Sentiment of Alcibiades is that which still to this day ruins most young Men.

* *Socrates* is not willing now to push on this Question which he has started, whether Vertue may be taught. The Question is too general, and he'll treat of it elsewhere; here he keeps close to his Subject, which is to confound the Pride of *Alcibiades*.

erciſe himſelf, and after that to enter the Liſts as Wreſtlers do; but ſeeing they don't fail to intermeddle with Government, tho endu'd with very indifferent and common Qualities; what need is there for a Man to give himſelf ſo much trouble in Learning and Exerciſe? I am well aſſur'd that with the Aſſiſtance of Nature alone, I ſhall excel 'em all.

Socrat. Ah my dear *Alcibiades*, what have you now ſaid? what Sentiment is this ſo unworthy of that noble Air, and all the other Advantages, which you poſſeſs!

Alcib. What do you mean, *Socrates*, when you ſpeak thus?

Socrat. Alas! I am inconſolable, both on your Account, and my own, I have ſo great an Affection for you, if———

Alcib. If what?

Socrat. If you think you have only ſuch kind of People to conteſt with, and to ſurpaſs.

Alcib. Whom then would you have me ſtrive to ſurpaſs?

Socrat. Again! Is this a Queſtion becoming a Man of a great Spirit?

Alcib. What do you mean? Are not thoſe the only Perſons I have to deal with?

An admirable Leſſon, which Socrates gives Alcibiades

Socrat. If you were to guide a Man of War, which was to fight in a little time; would you be content if you were more expert in *Navigation*, than all the Sailers you had on board you? Would you not rather propoſe to your ſelf to acquire all neceſſary Qualities, and to ſurpaſs all the greateſt Pilots on the Enemy's ſide, without meaſuring your ſelf as you do now with thoſe of your own Party, above whom you ſhould endeavour to raiſe your ſelf to that Degree, that they ſhould not have ſo much as a thought of diſputing any advantage with you, but finding themſelves abſolutely inferior to you, ſhould only think of fighting under your Command? Theſe are the Sentiments that ſhould animate you, if you

deſign'd

design'd to do any thing great, and worthy, both of your self, and your Country.

Alcib. Why this is all I design.

Socrat. This must needs be a glorious thing indeed *Alcibiades*, to be a braver Man than our Soldiers! Ought you not rather constantly to set the Generals of our Enemies before your Eyes, that you may excel them in Capacity, and greatness of Courage? and should you not study and labour to this End; always endeavouring to equal the greatest Persons?

Alc. Who then are these great Generals, *Socrates?*

Socrat. Don't you know our City is almost continually in War, either with the Lacedemonians, or with the Great King? *The King of Persia.*

Alcib. I know it.

Socrat. If then you think to put your self at the head of the Athenians, you must also prepare your self to receive the Attacks of the † Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and of the King of *Persia.* † *For there were two at a time.*

Alcib. You may be in the right.

Socrat. No, Alas! No my dear *Alcibiades.* * You have only to think of excelling a *Midias*, who is so accomplish'd a Man for feeding of Quailes; and others of the same Rank, that seek to intrude themselves into the Government, who by their Stupidity and Ignorance shew (as our good Women would say) that they have not yet quitted the Slave, but retain him still under their long Hair; and who with their barbarous Language are come rather to corrupt the City by their servile Flatteries, than to govern it. These are the People you must set before you without thinking of your self; that when you are

* *Plutarch* is of use to make us understand the bitter Satyr, that is hid under these Words, for he informs us that *Alcibiades* applied himself to feed Quailes, like this *Midias*, witness that which he let fly out of his Bosom in an open place, and which was caught again by a Master of a Ship, nam'd *Antiochus*, who had the favour of *Alcibiades* ever after, in so much, that he left him the Command of a Fleet in his Absence, which had like to have ruin'd the Affairs of the Athenians.

to engage in such great Battles, you may go, without having ever learn'd any thing of what you ought to know, without being exercis'd at all, without making any preparation, in a word, that without having ever given your self the least trouble, you may go in this Condition to put your self at the head of the Athenians.

Alcib. Socrates, I believe all you say is true. Yet I fancy the Generals of *Lacedemonia*, and of the King of *Persia*, are like other Generals.

What Socrates is now going to say is one of the finest things Antiquity has left us.

Socrat. Ah my dear *Alcibiades*, pray observe what an Opinion that of yours is?

Alcib. Why so?

Socrat. In the first place, which of these two Opinions do you think will be most advantagous to you, and will engage you to conduct your self with the greatest Care; whether to form to your self a great Idea of those Men, which may render 'em formidable, or to take 'em, as you do, for ordinary Men, that have no advantage above you?

Alcib. Doubtless that of forming to my self a great Idea of 'em.

Socrat. Do you think then 'tis an Evil for you to conduct your self with care?

Alcib. On the contrary I am persuaded it will be a very great Good.

Socrat. Then this Opinion which you have conceived already appears to be a very great Evil.

Alcib. I confess it.

Socrat. But besides this 'tis false, and I'll presently demonstrate this to you.

Alcib. How so?

Socrat. Whom do you account the best Men; those who are of high Birth, or such as are of mean Extraction?

Alc. Without doubt, those who are of high Birth.

Socrat. And don't you think, they that have had a good Education join'd to their high Birth have every thing that is necessary for the Perfection of Vertue?

Alcib.

Alcib. That is certain.

Socrat. By comparing therefore our Condition with theirs, let us see first of all if the Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and the King of *Persia* are of meaner Birth than we: Don't we know that the former descend from *Hercules*, and the latter from *Achemenes*, and that *Hercules* and *Achemenes* descend from *Jupiter*?

Achemenes, *the Son of* Perseus.

Alcib. And does not our Family, *Socrates*, descend from *Euryfaces*, and does not *Euryfaces* carry his Line up as far as *Jupiter*?

Socrat. * And does not ours, my dear *Alcibiades*, if you take it that way, descend from *Dedalus*? and does not *Dedalus* likewise carry us back as far as *Vulcan Jupiter*'s Son? But the difference between them and us is, that they reascend as far as *Jupiter* by a continual Gradation of Kings without any Interruption: The former have been the Kings of *Argos* and *Lacedemonia*, and the latter have always reign'd in *Persia*, and have often possess'd the Throne of *Asia*, as they do now, whereas our Ancestors were only private Persons like us. And if to do Honor to your Ancestors, you were oblig'd to shew *Artaxerxes* the Country of *Euryfaces*, or that of *Eacus*, which is still more remote, what occasion of laughter would you not give him in pointing out to him two little Islands not much bigger than one's hand? Since then we are oblig'd to give place in point of birth; let us see if we are not likewise inferior to 'em in respect of Education. Have you never been told what great Advantages the *Lacedemonian* Kings have in this, whose Wives are kept publickly by the *Ephori*, that they may be certain, as much as 'tis possible, that they produce no Princes but of the Race of *Hercules*? And the King of *Persia* is so far beyond the Kings of *Lacedemonia* in this respect, that it has never yet been so much as suspected, that the Queen could have a Child that might not be

Egina *and* Salamina.

* This is a piece of Rallery of *Socrates*, as we shall see when we come to his *Eutyphron*.

the King's Son. Therefore she is not guarded; all the Guards she has are Terror and Majesty. When she is deliver'd of her first Son, who is to succeed to the Crown; all the Nations that are spread over that great Emprice celebrate his Birth; after which that day is annually one of their greatest Festivals; in all the Provinces of *Asia* there are then nothing but Sacrifices and Feasts; whereas when we are born, my dear *Alcibiades*; that Expression of the Comick Poet may be applied to us.

The News scarce to our nearest Neighbours comes.

When the young Prince is wean'd he is not left in the hands of Women, but is committed to the Care of the most Vertuous Eunuchs of the Court whose business it is to form and fashion his Body, that he may be brought to the best shape that can be; and this employ brings them abundance of Honor. When the Prince is seven years old he is put into the hands of the Gentlemen of the Horse who begin to carry him a Hunting: at fourteen years of Age, he comes under the Charge of those who are called the King's Preceptors; These are the four greatest Lords, and the most accomplish'd Men of all *Persia*; they are taken in the Vigour of their Age; one passes for the most Learned, another for the most Just, the third for the Wisest, and the fourth for the most Valiant. The first teaches him the Magick of *Zoroaster* the Son of *Oromazus*, in which is comprehended all the worship of the Gods, he teaches him likewise the Laws of the Kingdom and all the Duties of a good King. The second teaches him always to speak the Truth, tho against himself. The third instructs him, not to suffer himself at any time to be overcome by his Passions; that he may always maintain his Freedom, and his Royalty, in having constantly an absolute Dominion over himself, as well as over his People: And the fourth teaches him not to fear either Dangers, or Death; because if he should become timorous, from a King he would degenerate into a Slave. Whereas, *Alcibiades*, for your

Zoroaster was a Magus, and King of Bactriana; he wrote divers Volumes on Magick, which contained Religion, Physick and Astrology, he liv'd in the time of Ninus, and of Noah.

your part what Preceptor have you had? *Pericles* left you in the hands of *Zopyrus* a vile Thracian Slave, who was indeed unfit for every thing besides, because of his old Age. I would here recount to you all the consequent Matters relating to the Education of your Antagonists, but that I should be too long; and the Specimen I have given you is sufficient to make you easily judg of the rest. * No Person took care of you at your Birth more than of any other Athenian; no Body takes any pains about your Education; unless you have some one who concerns himself with it, because he sincerely loves you. And if you consider the Riches of the Persians, the Magnificence of their Habits, the prodigious Expence they make in Perfumes and Essences, the multitude of Slaves that surround 'em, all their Luxury, Finery and Politeness, you'll see your self so little, that you'll be quite asham'd of your self. Will you but cast your Eyes on the Temperance of the Lacedemonians, on their Modesty, Easiness, Sweetness, Magnanimity, their good disposition of Mind under all the Accidents of Life, their Valour, Firmness and Constancy in Labours, their Noble Emulation, and love of Glory? In all these great Qualities you'll find your self a Child in comparison of them. Again, if you would have us take notice of their Riches, and think your self something under this head; I am willing to speak to it, to make you remember who you are, and whence you came. There is no Comparison between us and the Lacedemonians, they are abundantly more wealthy. Shall any of us dare to compare our Lands with those of *Sparta*, and *Messene*; which are much larger and better, and maintain an infinite number of Slaves, without counting the *Ilotes*? Who can number that excellent Race of Horses, and those other sorts of Cattle which feed in

Socrates *means himself.*

The Qualities of the Lacedemonians.

* 'Tis certain, the Athenians gave their Children no Governers, but Slaves, or such as were enfranchis'd; this appears by the Greek Comedies, which are left us, and by the Comedies of *Plautus* and *Terence*. *M. Le Fevre.*

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the Pastures of *Messene?* whereas we inhabit a dry and barren Countrey: But I pass by all these things. Would you speak of Gold and Silver? I tell you all *Greece* together has not near so much as *Lacedemonia* alone; for the Money of all *Greece*, and very often that of the Barbarians too has for several Ages gone into *Lacedemonia*, and never come out again. So that one might very well say, in allusion to what is said by the Fox to the Lion in *Esop*'s Fables. *I see the Track of all the Money that is gone into* Lacedemonia, *but I see no Track that signifies there's any gone out from thence.* 'Tis certain the Commons of *Lacedemonia* are richer than any other Commons in *Greece:* And the Kings are richer than all the rest of the Lacedemonians put together; for these pay their Kings immense Taxes, which extremely augment their Revenues. But if the Wealth of the Lacedemonians appears so great in comparison of that of the other Greeks, 'tis nothing when compar'd with that of the King of *Persia.* I heard a Man worthy of Credit, who had been one of the Ambassadors that was sent to that Prince, say, he had travell'd a great way in a very fine and fruitful Countrey, which the Inhabitants call'd *the Queen's Girdle*, that he made another large Journey in another Countrey as pleasant, which they call'd *the Queen's Veil*, and that he pass'd through a great many other fine Provinces, that were destin'd only to furnish that Princess with Clothes, and had their several Names from the things they were to provide. So that if any should go, and say to *Amastris*, the Wife of *Xerxes*, the King's Mother; *There is at* Athens *a Citizen whose whole Estate is not above* 200 *Acres of Land which he possesses in the Town of* Erquies, *and who is the Son of* Dinomache; *whose Clothes and Jewels altogether, are scarce worth fifty Minæ; this Citizen is preparing to make War with your Son.* What do you think she would say? *This Man founds the Success of his Designs on his Application, Experience, and great Wisdom; for these are the only things*

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things that make the Greeks eſteem'd in the World. But if one ſhould ſay to her, *This* Alcibiades *is a young Man, not yet twenty years of Age, who is very ignorant, has no manner of Experience, and who, when a certain Friend of his whom he paſſionately loves, repreſents to him, that he ought above all things to cultivate himſelf, to labour, meditate, to exerciſe himſelf; and after having acquir'd the Capacity that is neceſſary, might engage in War with the great King; will not believe a word of the Matter, and ſays he's fit enough for this as he is already.* How great would be the wonder of this Princeſs? Would ſhe not ask; *on what then does this young Giddy-brains depend?* and if we ſhould tell her, *he depends on his Beauty; his fine Shape, his Nobility, and fortunate Birth*; would ſhe not take us for Fools, conſidering the great Advantages the Kings of *Perſia* have in all this above us? But without going any higher, do you think *Lampyto*, the Daughter of *Leotychidas*, the Wife of *Archidamus*, and Mother of *Agis*, who were all born Kings of *Lacedemonia*, would be leſs aſtoniſhed, if one ſhould tell her, that as ill educated as you have been, you don't ſcruple to trouble your head with a deſign of making War with her Son? Alas! Is it not a horrible ſhame, that the very Women among our Enemies know better than we what we ought to be to undertake to make War with them with any likelihood of Succeſs? Follow my Advice then, my dear *Alcibiades*, and obey the Precept which is written on the Gate of the Temple of *Delphos*. *Know thy ſelf.* For the Enemies you have to deal with are ſuch as I repreſent 'em to you, and not ſuch as you imagine 'em to be. The only means of conquering 'em are Application, and Skill: If you renounce theſe ſo neceſſary Qualities, renounce the Glory too, of which you are ſo paſſionately ambitious.

Alcib. Can you then explain to me, *Socrates*, how I ought to cultivate my ſelf? for no Man whatever ſpeaks more truly to me than you.

Socrat. I can without doubt, but this does not re-

reſpect

ſpect you alone; this concerns us all how many ſoever we are. We ought to ſeek the means of making our ſelves better; and I ſpeak no more on your Account than on my own, who have no leſs need of Inſtruction than you, and have only one advantage above you.

Alcib. What is that?

Socrat. 'Tis this, my Tutor is wiſer and better than *Pericles*, who is yours.

God the beſt Tutor of Men.

Alcib. Who is this Tutor of yours?

Socrat. 'Tis God who never permitted me to ſpeak to you before this Day, and 'tis in purſuance of his Inſpirations that I now tell you, that you'll never arrive at the Reputation you deſire, but by me.

Alcib. You jeſt, *Socrates*.

Socrat. It may be ſo. But in fine 'tis ſtill a great Truth, that we have great need to take care of our ſelves. All Men need this, and we yet more than others.

Alcib. You ſpeak no Untruth, ſo far as it concerns me, *Socrates*.

Socrat. Nor in what concerns me neither.

Alcib. What ſhall we do then?

Socrat. Now is the time to throw off Lazineſs and Softneſs.

Alcib. 'Tis very true, *Socrates*.

Socrat. Come then, let us examine what it is we would become. Tell me, Would we not render our ſelves * very good?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. In what ſort of Vertue?

Alcib. In that Vertue that renders a Man good and fit?

Socrat. For what?

Alcib. For Buſineſs.

Socrat. What Buſineſs? The managing of a Horſe?

* But there are many different ſorts of Goodneſs, and upon this *Socrates* is going to enlarge. For the word *Good* in Greek ſignifies, Accompliſh'd, Excellent, improv'd in any Art or Science, or Vertuous. And the word *Evil*, by the Rule of Contraries, has as many Significations. This Remark is neceſſary for the underſtanding of what follows. *M. Le Fevre.*

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It can't be that, for that belongs to Querries. Is it Navigation? not that neither, for that belongs to Pilots. What Buſineſs is it then?

Alcib. The Buſineſs in which our beſt Athenians are employ'd.

Socrat. What do you mean by our beſt Athenians? Are they the Prudent or Imprudent?

Alcib. The Prudent.

Soc. So that according to you when a Man is Prudent in any thing, he is good and fit for that thing; and the Imprudent are very bad for it.

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. A Shoe-maker has all the prudence neceſſary for making of Shoes. And therefore he is good for that.

Alcib. 'Tis right.

Socrat. But he is very Imprudent for making of Clothes, and conſequently is a bad Taylor.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. This ſame Man then is both Good and Bad?

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. It follows from this principle that your Athenians whom you call Good and Honeſt Men are bad too.

Alcib. That is not what I mean.

Socrat. What do you mean then by the good Athenians?

Alcib. They that know how to govern.

Socrat. To govern what? Horſes?

Alcib. No.

Socrat. Men?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. What ſick Men, Pilots, or Mowers?

Alcib. No, none of theſe.

Socrat. Whom then? Thoſe that do ſomething, or thoſe who do nothing?

Alcib. Thoſe that do ſomething.

Socrat. Thoſe that do what? Endeavour to explain your ſelf and make me underſtand your meaning.

Alcib. Thoſe that live together, and make uſe one of another; as we live in Cities.

Socrat.

For the Politicians command the Magistrates and these the rest of the Citizens.

Socrat. According to you then the Good Athenians are such as know how to command such Men as make use of Men.

Alcib. I mean so.

Socrat. Is it those that know how to command the Masters of Gallies who make use of Rowers?

Alcib. No.

Soc. Because this belongs to Pilots. Is it then those that know how to command the Players on the Flute who make use of Musicians and Dancers? No doubtless, for this belongs to the Masters of the Choirs.

The Masters of the Choirs regulated the Musicians, and in their place it was the Players on the Flute.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. What do you mean then by knowing how to command such Men as make use of other Men?

Alcib. I mean 'tis to command Men that live together under the same Laws, and Polity.

Socrat. What is this Art then that teaches to command 'em? If I should ask you what is the Art which teaches to command all the Rowers of the same Vessel, what answer would you give me?

Alcib. That 'tis the Pilot's Art.

Socrat. And if I should ask you what is the Art that teaches to command Musicians and Dancers?

Alcib. I would answer you, 'tis the Art of the Masters of the Choirs.

Soc. How then do you call this Art, which teaches to command those who make the same Politick Body, and live together under the same Government?

Alcib. 'Tis the Art of giving good Counsel.

Socrat. How? What then is the Art of Pilots the Art of giving bad Counsel? Is it not their design to give good?

Alc. Yes certainly to save those that are in the ship.

Soc. You say very well; of what good Counsel then do you speak; and to what does it tend?

Alcib. It tends to preserve the City, and to make it better policied.

Socrat. But what is it that preserves Cities, and makes 'em better policied? What is it that ought or ought not to be in 'em? As if you should ask me what

what it is that ought or ought not to be in a Body to make it ſound and in good health; I would immediately anſwer you, that that which ought to be in it is Health; and that which ought not to be in it is Sickneſs: Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Alcib. I think the very ſame.

Socrat. And if you ſhould ask me the ſame thing of the Eye, I ſhould anſwer you after the ſame manner that the Eye is in a good condition, when it has all that is neceſſary for Sight, and when nothing hinders it from ſeeing. And the very ſame of the Ears, that they are very well, when they have every thing they need to hear well, and no diſpoſition to Deafneſs.

Alcib. True.

Socrat. And now for a City, what is it which by its Preſence or Abſence makes it to be in a better condition, better policied and better govern'd?

Alcib. I think, *Socrates*, 'tis when Amity is well eſtabliſh'd among the Citizens, and Hatred and Diviſion are baniſhed out of the City.

Socrat. What do you call Amity, is it Concord or Diſcord?

Alcib. 'Tis Concord certainly.

Socrat. What Art is that which makes Cities accord, for example about Numbers?

Alcib. 'Tis Arithmetick.

Socrat. And is it this that makes particular perſons accord one with another, and each one with himſelf?

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. And how do you call that Art which makes each one agree with himſelf about the length of a Span or Cubit, is it not the Art of Meaſuring?

Alcib. Yes doubtleſs.

Socrat. Then Cities and particular perſons accord by means of this Art. And is it not the ſame thing about Weight?

Alcib. The very ſame.

Socrat. And what is that Concord of which you ſpeak, in what does it conſiſt, and what is the Art that

that produces it? Is the Concord of a City the same that makes a particular person accord with himself and others?

Alcib. I think so.

Socrat. What is it? Don't be weary in answering me, but charitably instruct me.

Alcib. I think it is this Amity and Concord, that makes Parents agree with their Children, one Brother with another, and the Wife with her Husband.

Socrat. But do you think a Husband can agree well with his Wife, and that they will accord perfectly about the Tapistry which she works, and he knows not how to make?

Alcib. No, certainly.

Socrat. Nor is there any need of it; for 'tis Women's work. No more is it possible that a Woman should agree with her Husband about the use of Arms; for she knows not what belongs to it: This being a Science which appertains only to Men.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. You agree then that there are some Sciences which are destin'd only for Women, and others which are reserv'd for Men.

Alcib. Who can deny it?

Socrat. It is not possible that Women should accord with their Husbands about all these Sciences.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. And consequently there will be no Amity, seeing Amity is nothing but Concord.

Alcib. I am of your mind.

Socrat. So that when a Woman does what she ought to do, she will not be loved by her husband; and when a husband does what he ought to do, he will not be loved by his Wife?

Alcib. This is a certain consequence.

Soc. Then that which make Cities well policied, is not, for every one to follow his own employment in 'em.

Alcib. However *Socrates*, methinks ——

Socrat.

Socrat. How do you say? Can a City be well policied without having Amity in it, are we not agreed that it is by Amity that a City is well regulated, and that otherwise there is nothing but Disorder and Confusion?

Alcib But yet methinks, 'tis this very thing that produces Amity, namely that every one mind his own Business.

Socrat You said the contrary but just now. But I must endeavour to understand you, what do you say? That Concord well established produces Amity? What can there be Concord about things which some know, and others don't understand?

Alcib That's impossible.

Socrat. When every one does what he ought to do, does every one do what is just or what is unjust?

Alcib. A pretty Question! every one then does what is Just.

Socrat Hence it follows that when all the Citizens do what is Just, yet they can't love one another.

Alcib. * The consequence is necessary.

Socrat. What then is this Amity or Concord, that can accomplish and make us capable of giving good Counsel; so that we may be of the Number of those whom you call your best Citizens? for I can't comprehend what it is, or in whom 'tis to be found. Sometimes 'tis to be found in certain persons, and

* This consequence is very certain: *Alcibiades* acknowledges it, but he does not yet understand the Reason of it. I have given a hint of it in the Argument; but 'tis fit to explain *Socrates* his thought here at length; his design is to shew that when Men precisely do only their own business, they only take care of what belongs to themselves; and so limit themselves to the knowledge of particular things and do not rise up to that of the essence of universal things; which is the only knowledge that produces Union and Concord, whereas the Knowledge merely of particular things produces Disorder and Division. Therefore to make Concord reign in a state 'tis not enough for every one to take care of what he has; he must take care of himself too. This care will teach him to love his Neighbour as himself; and 'tis only this Love, which has God for its Principle, that can produce Concord and Union.

ſometimes 'tis not to be found in 'em, as it ſeems by your Words.

Alcib. Socrates, I ſolemnly proteſt to you, I know not what I ſay my ſelf: And have run a great riſque in being a long time in an ill Condition, without perceiving it.

Soc. Don't be diſcourag'd, *Alcibiades*, if you ſhould not perceive in what Condition you are till you are 50 years of Age, it would be a difficult matter for you to recover your ſelf out of it, and to take care of your ſelf; but now at your years 'tis the fitteſt time for you to feel your Diſtemper after the manner you do.

Alcib. But when a Man feels his Diſtemper what muſt he do?

Without the help of God Men can't reform.

Socrat. You need only anſwer to ſome Queſtions, *Alcibiades*, which if you do, I hope by the help of God, both you and I ſhall become better than we are, at leaſt if my Propheſie is to be believ'd.

Alc. If there needs nothing but to anſwer you to bring it about, I'll promiſe you your Propheſie ſhall prove true.

Soc. Come then. What is it to take care of one's ſelf ſo that when we think we take care of our ſelves the moſt, it may not often happen to us without our knowledg to take care of quite another thing? What muſt a Man do to take care of himſelf? does he take care of himſelf, when he takes care of the things that belong to him? *Alcib.* * I think ſo.

Soc. How? does a Man take care of his feet, when he takes care of the things that belongs to his feet?

Alcib. I don't underſtand you.

Socrat. Do you know nothing that properly belongs to the hand? To what part of the Body do the Rings appertain, is it not to the Fingers?

Socrat. Yes doubtleſs.

Soc. And in like manner the Shoes belong to the Feet. *Alcib.* Very true.

* *Alcibiades* anſwers according to the principles that are almoſt generally receiv'd. Men think they take care of themſelves, when they take care of the things that belong to 'em; but they are groſly miſtaken: And *Socrates* is going to confound this Error with great Solidity. That which is *mine* is not *my ſelf*.

Soc.

Socrat. Do we then take care of our Feet, when we take care of our Shoes?

Alcib. Indeed *Socrates* I don't yet understand you.

Soc. What do you mean then by taking care of a thing? Is it not to make it better than it was? What Art is it then that makes our Shoes better?

Alcib. 'Tis the Shoemaker's Art.

In Greece the Shoemakers mended Shoes as well as made 'em.

Socrat. 'Tis by the Shoemaker's Art then that we take care of our Shoes: Is it it by the same Art too that we take care of our Feet; or is it by some other Art that we make our Feet better?

Alcib. Without doubt that's done by another Art.

Socrat. Don't we make our Feet better by another Art, which meliorates the whole Body? And is not this the Gymnastick Art?

For Exercise strengthens all the parts of the Body.

Alcib. Yes certainly.

Socrat. 'Tis then by the Gymnastick Art that we take care of our Feet; and by the Shoemaker's Art, that we take care of the things that belong to our Feet? 'Tis by the Gymnastick Art we take care of our Hands; and by the Gold-smith's Art that we take care of the things that belong to our Hands. 'Tis by the Gymnastick Art that we take care of our Bodies; and by the Weaver's Art, and many other Arts that we take care of the things that appertain to our Bodies.

Alcib. This is beyond all doubt.

Soc. And consequently the Art by which we take care of our selves is not the same with that whereby we take care of the things that belongs to us.

Alcib. So it seems.

Soc. Hence it follows that when you take care of the things that belong to you, you do not take care of your self.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. For 'tis not by the same Art that we take care of our selves, and of the things that belongs to us.

Alcib. I ackowledge it.

Socrat. By what Art is it then that we take care of our selves;

Alcib. I cannot tell.

Socrat. We are already agreed that it is not that by which we can make any of those things that belong to us better: But that by which we can meliorate our selves. *Alcib.* 'Tis true.

Socrat. Can we know the Art of making Shoes better, if we don't first know what a Shoe is; or the Art of taking care of Rings, if we don't know first what a Ring is?

Alcib. No that can't be.

S. Can we then know what Art it is that makes us better; if we don't first know what we our selves are?

Alcib. Tis absolutely impossible.

Socrat. But is it a very easy thing to know ones self; and was it some ignorant Person that wrote that Trivial Precept on the Gate of *Apollo*'s Temple at *Delphos*? Or is it on the contrary a thing of great difficulty, and which is not given to every Man?

Alcib. For my part, *Socrates*; I have often thonght it was given to all Men: and yet it has often seem'd to me to be a thing of very great difficulty.

Soc. But, *Alcibiades*; Let it be easy or difficult; 'tis still certain that when once we know it; we imediately and easily know what care we ought to take of our selves. Whereas while we are ignorant of it; we shall never come to the knowledg of the Nature of this Care.

Alcib. That is beyond all doubt.

Socrat. Come on then; by what means shall we find out the * Essence of things to speak universally? By

* This universal Essence of things, αὐτοτοαυτὸ, is the Divine Intelligence, the Eternal Idea, the only cause of Beings, and the singular Essence, αὐτοέκαστον, is the thing form'd on this Idea. So that there are two ways of knowing one's self: The first is to know the Divine Intelligence; and to descend from that to the Soul, by following the designs which the All-wise Creator had in creating it: and the other is simply to know the Soul as a Being different from the Body, and to be convinc'd that that alone is the Man. The first is the most perfect: However *Socrates* leaves this at present; and applies himself only to the second, which is more easy: but he afterwards resumes it, and from the knowledg of the Soul raises *Alcibiades* to the Consideration of the Eternal Idea, in which alone, as in the true Light a Man may perfectly see his Soul, and all that belongs to it. The whole Argument of *Socrates* is worthy the most solid Theology.

this

this we shall soon find what we are our selves; and if we are ignorant of this Essence we shall always be ignorant of our selves.

Alcib. You say right.

Socrat. Follow me close then I conjure you in the Name of God: With whom are you now discoursing, is it with some other person or with me?

Alcib. No 'tis with you.

Soc. And I in like manner discourse with none but You, 'Tis *Socrates* that now speaks, and *Alcibiades* that hears. *Alcib.* True.

Soc. 'Tis by using Words that *Socrates* speaks; for to speak, and to use words is one and the same thing.

Alcib. 'Tis so without doubt.

Socrat. Are not He who uses a thing, and the Thing which he uses, different?

Alcib. How do you say?

Socrat. For Example, a Shoemaker, who uses Knives, Lasts and other Tools, cuts with his Knife and is different from the Knife with which he cuts. A Man that plays on the Harp is not the same thing with the Harp on which he plays.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. This is what I ask'd you just now, whether he that uses a thing, and the thing he uses, always seem to you two different things?

Alcib. So they seem to me.

Socrat. * But the Shoemaker does not only use his Tools, but his Hands too.

Alcib. That's beyond all doubt.

Socrat. He also uses his Eyes.

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. We are agreed that he who uses a thing, is always different from the thing he uses.

Alcib. That is agreed between us.

Soc. So that the Shoemaker and the Harper are some other thing than the Hands and Eyes which they both use.

Alcib. That's plain.

* He designs to prove, that the Body is no less an Instrument of the Soul, than all the other remoter Instruments which it uses.

Socrat. Man uſes his Body.

Alcib. Who doubts it?

Soc. That which uſes a thing is different from the thing which is uſed.

Alcib. Yes.

Soc. Man then is a different thing from his Body?

Alcib. I believe it.

Socrat. What is Man then?

Alcib. Indeed, *Socrates*, I can't tell.

Soc. You can at leaſt tell me that Man is that which uſes the Body.

Alcib. That's true.

Socrat. Is there any thing that uſes the Body beſides the Soul?

Alcib. No nothing elſe.

Socrat. 'Tis that that governs.

Alcib. Moſt certainly.

Soc. I believe there's no Man but is forc'd to confeſs--

Alcib. What?

Soc. That Man is one of theſe three things, either the Soul or the Body, or the Compound of 'em both. Now we are agreed that Man is that which commands the Body.

Alcib. That we are.

Soc. What is Man then? Does the Body command it ſelf? No. For we have ſaid 'tis the Man that commands that. So that the Body is not the Man.

Alcib. So it ſeems.

Socrat. Is it then the Compound that commands the Body? and ſhall this Compound be the Man?

Alcib. That may be.

Socrat. Nothing leſs. For ſince one of 'em does not command as we have already ſaid, * 'tis impoſſible they both ſhould command together.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. Seing then neither the Body, nor the Com-

* For beſides that this is a Contradiction; ſeeing that which does not command would then command; there is no a third thing for theſe two to command together. If the Soul and the Body both command, what is it that is under their Command?

pound

pound of Soul and Body are the Man; 'tis absolutely necessary either that Man is Nothing at all, or that the Soul alone is the Man.

Alcib. Most certainly.

Socrat. Shall I demonstrate to you yet more clearly that the Soul alone is the Man?

Alcib. No, I protest, this is sufficiently prov'd.

Socrat. We have not yet founded this Truth with all the accuracy it deserves; but 'tis sufficiently prov'd, and that may serve. We shall sound it farther, and penetrate it better; when we have found out what we just now quitted, because it requir'd a longer Investigation.

Alcib. What is that?

Socrat. 'Tis what we said but now; that 'tis necessary we would first seek to know the very essence of things to speak universally; instead of which we have stop'd to examine and know the Essence of a particular thing; and perhaps that is sufficient. For we can find nothing that is more properly, and precisely our selves than our Souls.

Alcib. That's very certain.

Socrat. So then this is a principle very well establish'd that when you and I converse together, by making use of Discourse; 'tis my Soul that converses with yours. And this is what we said just now, that *Socrates* speaks to *Alcibiades*, by addressing Words not to the Body which is expos'd to my Eyes, but to *Alcibiades* himself, whom I do not see, that is, to his Soul.

Alcib. This is evident.

Socrat. He then who requires us to know our selves, requires us to know our Souls.

Alcib. I believe it.

Socrat. He who knows his Body only, knows that which belongs to him, but does not know himself. Thus a Physician as a Physician, does not know himself, nor a Wrestling-Master as a Wrestling-Master, nor a Husband-Man as a Husband-Man. All persons of these Professions, and those of the like Nature,

are so far from knowing themselves, * that they do not know particularly what belongs to 'em; and their Art makes 'em adhere to what is yet more foreign to 'em than that which properly belongs to 'em. For they know only those things that appertain to the Body, and by which they cure, and preserve it in health.

Alcib. All this is very true.

Socrat. If therefore it be a piece of Wisdom to know one's self, There is no Man of any of these Professions who is wise by his Art.

Alcib. I am of the same Mind.

Soc. † And 'tis for this reason all these Arts appear vile and sordid, and consequently unworthy of a good Man.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. Well then to return to our Principle, every Man that takes care of his Body, takes care of that which belongs to him, and not of himself.

Alcib. I grant it.

Socrat. Every Man that loves Riches, loves neither himself, nor that which belongs to him, but loves a thing which is yet more foreign to him, *And which only respects that which belongs to him.*

Alcib. I think so.

To labour only to heap up Treasures is to manage one's Affairs ill.

Socrat. Then according to this principle one may affirm, that he who employs his Care to heap up Riches, does not manage his Affairs well.

Alcib. 'Tis most certainly so.

Socrat. If any one has been in love with the Body of *Alcibiades*, that Person has not been in love with

* Physicians and Masters of Exercise indeed apply themselves to know the Body; but they know it only to a certain degree: For as *Hippocrates* says in his Treatise of the Ancient Art of Medicine, they content themselves with knowing what Man is, with respect to what he eats and drinks, and to the Exercises he performs: and what may occur to him from any of these things. So that they only know some certain Qualities of Matter, but not the Essence of it. 'Tis more easy to know the Essence of the Soul, than that of the Body.

† The only Art truly worthy of a good Man, is that of knowing, and labouring to perfectionate himself.

Alci-

Alcibiades, but with one of those things that appertain to him.

Alcib. I am convinc'd of it.

Socrat. That Person who is in love with *Alcibiades*, must be one that is in love with his Soul.

Alcib. That's a necessary Consequence of your Principle.

Socrat. And this is the Reason that that Person who only loves your Body, retires when the beauty of this Body begins to decay.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. But one that loves your Soul never retires * while you make any progress in Vertue; and every day make your self still a better Man.

Alcib. That is very likely.

Socrat. And this likewise is the reason that I am the only Person that does not leave you, but continue constant after the flower of your Beauty is faded, and all your Admirers are retir'd.

Alcib. You very much oblige me, *Socrates*; and I entreat you not to abandon me.

Socrat. Labour then with all your Might to become every day more and more beautiful. *By beautiful he means vertuous.*

Alcib. I'll labour to become so.

Socrat. As Matters stand with you, 'tis easy to judg that *Alcibiades*, the Son of *Clinias*, never had nor has yet more than only one true Lover; and this faithful Lover is the † lovely *Socrates*, the Son of *Sophroniscus* and *Phenareta*.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. But did you not tell me when I met you; that I prevented you but one moment, and that you had a design to speak to me, to know why I was the only Person that had not left you.

Alcib. I told you so, and 'tis true.

Socrat. You now know the reason of it; 'tis be-

* So this Passage ought to be translated. The Latin Interpreters have made a mistake here, not remembring ἕως has often the Signification of the present time. *M. Le Fevre.*

† He jokes on his own deformity and low Birth, which he opposes to the Beauty, fine Air, and Nobility of his Rivals.

cause

cause I always lov'd you, and others only lov'd what belongs to you. The Beauty of that which belongs to you begins to decay, whereas your own Beauty begins to flourish. And if you don't suffer your self to be corrupted by the People, and become more deform'd: I'll not forsake you as long as I live. But I very much fear, since you are so much * in love with the applause of the People, that you'll destroy your self by this unhappy Disposition, as it has been the Lot of a great many of our best Athenians. For the People of the Magranimous *Erectheus* have a fair outside. But we ought to look into 'em, and remove that fair covering which hides 'em from us. Believe me then, *Alcibiades*, and take the Precautions I give you.

More deformed, that is more vicious.

Erectheus was one of the first Kings of Athens.

Alcib. What Precautions?

Socrat. To exercise your self, and be instructed in what is necessary to be known before you intermeddle with the Affairs of the Common-wealth; that you may be always fortified with an Antidote; and that you may not perish in so contagious, and fatal a Conversation.

Alcib. All you say is very well, *Socrates*; But endeavour to explain to me, by what means we may be able to take care of our selves.

Socrat. That's done already, for first of all we have prov'd what Man is, and that with good reason; because we fear'd, if that were not well known, we should take care of something quite different from our selves, without perceiving it. We afterwards agreed that we ought to take care of our Souls; that this is the only end we should propose to our selves; and that the care of the Body, and of that which appertains to it, as Riches, should be left to others.

Alcib. Can any one deny this?

* He was so in love with the People, that he did not cease to bestow Gifts on 'em, and to present 'em with Shows and Plays. *Plutarch* speaks of a Distribution of Money, which he made when he was very young, and carried Quailes in his Bosom.

Socrat.

Socrat. How can we understand this Truth * more clearly, and evidently? For when we have set it in its true Light, 'tis very certain, that we shall know our selves perfectly well: Let us then in the Name of the Gods endeavour to understand well the Precept of *Delphos*, of which we have already spoken. For we don't yet well comprehend all its Force. *Know thy self.*

Alcib. What Force? What do you mean?

Socrat. I'm going to communicate to you what I take to be the meaning of that Inscription, and the Precept it includes. 'Tis hardly possible to make you understand it by any other comparison than this, which is taken from the sight. *Alc.* How do you say?

Socrat. Observe well what I say. If this Inscription spoke to the Eye, as it speaks to the Man, and should say to it, *Know thy self*: what should we think it required of it? Should we not think it required it to look upon it self in something in which the Eye might see it self?

Alcib. That's evident.

Soc. Let us then seek for this thing, in which, as we behold our selves in it, we may see both it and our selves.

Alcib. We may see our selves in a Looking-glass, and in other Bodies of the like kind.

Socrat. You say very well. Is not there likewise some little part of the Eye, which has the same Effect as a Looking-glass?

Alcib. Yes certainly there is.

Socrat. You have observed then, that as often as you look into an Eye, you see your own Image, as in a Glass, in that little part which is call'd by a Name which signifies a † Baby, be-

* *M. Le Fevre* had reason to say, that ἐναργέστερα ought to be read for ἐναργέστατα, and that it should be translated *more clearly*. *Socrates* is now going to resume the Proposition he had quitted, which was to know the universal Essence of things; and all he is going to say on this Subject is incomparably fine.

† There is a fault in the Greek, which I wonder to find left there: for what sense has κόρην here, which signifies *the apple of a thing?* It ought to be read κόρον that is the Apple of the Eye. κόρη, *pupilla*, a Poppet or Baby.

cause

cause 'tis the Image of him that looks on it.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. Then an Eye, that it may see into another Eye, ought to look into this part of it, which is the most beautiful, and which alone has the faculty of seeing.

Alcib. Who doubts it ?

Socrat. For if he should fix his Looks on any other part of the Body of Man, or on any other Object, unless it were like this part of the Eye which sees, it would see nothing of it self.

Alcib. You are in the right.

Socrat. Therefore an Eye that would see it self, ought to look into another Eye, and into that part of the Eye, in which all the Vertue of it resides, that is, the Sight.

Alcib. That's certain.

In what we should look upon our selves to know our selves well.

Socrat. My dear *Alcibiades*, is it not just so with the Soul ? Ought it not to look into the Soul to see it self, and into that * part of the Soul, in which all its Vertues, that is to say Wisdom, is ingenerated ? or else ought it not to behold it self in some other thing yet more noble, which this part of the Soul in some sort resembles ?

Alcib. So methinks, *Socrates*.

Socrat. But can we find any part of the Soul which is more divine than that in which Knowledg and Wisdom reside.

Alcib. No certainly.

* That is into our Intellect or Understanding. We ought strictly to remark with what Wisdom *Socrates* here expresses himself. In speaking of the Soul of Man, he acknowledges, that Wisdom is ingenerated in it, that is, that it comes to it from without ; for it is not its own Light ; this is deriv'd into it from God. And a few Lines lower, as he speaks of the Divine Intelligence, he does not choose to say, in which Knowledg and Wisdom are ingenerated ; but says he, *in which they reside*, because it is Wisdom it self, and the Source of Wisdom. The Latin Interpreters, who did not pry into this Accuracy of *Socrates* have spoiled all the beauty of these Passages by their Translations. More Attention and Fidelity ought to have been used in handling Theological Truths.

Socrat.

Socrat. 'Tis then in this Soul, of which ours is but the Image, 'tis in this divine Soul we ought to behold our ſelves, and to contemplate the whole Deity in it, that is to ſay God, and Wiſdom; if we would know our ſelves perfectly. *We muſt behold our ſelves in God to know our ſelves well.*

Alcib. This ſeems very probable.

Socrat. To know one's ſelf is Wiſdom, as we have both agreed.

Alcib. 'Tis true.

Socrat. While we don't know our ſelves, nor are wiſe with this Wiſdom; we can't know either our Goods or our Evils; for it is not poſſible that he who knows not *Alcibiades*, ſhould know that what belongs to *Alcibiades*, does indeed appertain to him.

Alcib. 'Tis impoſſible.

Socrat. 'Tis only by knowing our ſelves that we come to know that that which belongs to us does indeed appertain to us. And if we know not what belongs to us; neither ſhall we know what has reference to the things that belong to us.

Alcib. I confeſs it.

Socrat. We therefore juſt now did ill to agree, that there are ſome Perſons, who tho' they don't know themſelves, yet know that which belongs to them, without knowing the things that appertain to that which belongs to them. For theſe three Knowledges; to know one's ſelf, to know that which belongs to one; and to know the things that appertain to that which belongs to one, are link'd together, they are the Action of the ſame Man, and the Effect of one and the ſame Art.

Alcib. 'Tis very likely.

Socrat. Now that Man that knows not the things that belong to himſelf neither will know thoſe that belong to others.

Alcib. That's evident.

Socrat. And if he knows not what belongs to others, neither will he know what belongs to the City.

Alcib. That's a certain Conſequence.

Socrat. Therefore ſuch a Man can never be a good States

States Man; nay he can't be so much as a Good Master to govern a Family; what do I say? He can't so much as govern himself; for he knows not what he does; and if he knows not what he does, 'tis impossible he should be free from Faults.

Alcib. That is impossible indeed.

Socrat. And if he commits Faults, does he not do ill both in private and in publick? If he does ill, is he not Miserable? and as he is Miserable, does he not involve those that obey him in his Misfortunes?

The Wicked can't be happy.

Alcib. Who can deny it?

Socrat. Then 'tis not possible that he who is neither Good nor Wise, should be Happy.

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Then all vicious Persons are Miserable.

Alcib. I acknowledge it.

Socrat. Then a Man can't deliver himself from his Misery by Riches, but by Wisdom.

Alcib. That's certain.

The Happiness of Cities and States consists in Vertue.

Socrat. So that, My Dear *Alcibiades*, Cities have no need either of Walls, or Ships, or Arsenals, or Troops or Grandeur to make 'em happy; the only thing they need is Vertue. And if you would manage the affairs of the Commonwealth well, you must give your Citizens Vertue.

Alcib. This is an evident Truth.

Socrat. But can a Man give that which he has not?

Alcib. How should he?

Socrat. Then you ought first of all to consider how to acquire Vertue; and so must every Man who desires to take care not only of himself, and the things that belong to him; but also of the City, and the things that belong to that.

Alcib. This is beyond all doubt.

Socrat. Therefore you ought not to consider how to acquire for your self or your City a large extent of Empire and the absolute power of doing what you please; but only how to acquire Wisdom and Justice.

Alcib. I believe what you say.

Socrat.

Socrat. For if you and your City govern your selves wisely and justly, you will please God.

We can't please God but by Wisdom and Justice.

Alc. I am well convinc'd of that.

Socrat. And you'll govern your selves wisely and justly, if, as I just now told you, you behold your selves always in the Deity; in that splendid Light, which alone is capable of giving you the knowledge of the Truth.

If we would conduct our selves wisely and justly we must behold our selves in God

Alcib. This seems very reasonable.

Socrat. For while you behold your selves in this Light; you will see your selves; and will see and know your True Goods.

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. And so you will always do what is Good.

Alcib. Most certainly.

Soc. If you always do what is good, I dare answer for it, and warrant you, you shall be always happy.

Happiness is the certain recompence of good Actions.

Alcib. Your warrant is very good in this case, *Socrates.*

Socrat. But if you govern your selves unjustly, and instead of beholding the Deity, and True Light you look into that which is without God and full of Darkness, you will do nothing but the Works of Darkness, and such as are full of Impiety; and it can't be otherwise, because you will not know your self.

Those that look on Darkness do nothing but the works of Darkness.

Alcib. I am of the same mind.

Socrat. My dear *Alcibiades*, represent to your self a Person that has * a Power to do any thing he pleases, and yet has no Judgment; what is to be expected from him? and what Mischief is there that will not befal him? For example, suppose a sick Man has power to do whatever comes into his Head, has no understanding in Physick; is in a rage against every Body, so that no Person dares speak to him or restrain him; what will be the event of this? He will without doubt destroy his Body, and render himself incurable.

The terrible effects of absolute Power, when not attended with Wisdom.

* When Wisdom is wanting, absolute Power always transports Men beyond the Limits of their Duty, and induces 'em to trample Religion and Justice under their Feet.

Alcib.

Alcib. 'Tis very true.

Socrat. Suppose some Person in a Ship, who has not the Judgment and Skill of a Pilot, should yet have the liberty to do what he thinks fit: You your self see what must certainly befal him and those that abandon themselves to his Conduct.

Alcib. They must all necessarily perish.

The ruine of Cities and States is certain when Vertue does not reign in 'em.

Socrat. The case is the same with Cities, Republicks, and all States; if destitute of Vertue their Ruine is certain.

Alcib. 'Tis impossible it should be otherwise.

Socrat. Consequently, my dear *Alcibiades*, if you would be happy; your business is not to acquire a large extent of Empire for your self or your Republick; but to acquire Vertue.

Alcib. Very true.

'Tis more advantageous for vicious Persons to obey than command.

Socrat. * And before this Vertue is acquir'd, 'tis better and more advantageous, I don't say for a Child, but for a Man to obey him, who is the most Vertuous, than to command.

Alcib. I am of the same mind.

Soc. And what is best is also most beautiful.

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. That which is most beautiful is likewise most becoming, and suitable.

Alcib. That's beyond dispute.

A vicious Person ought to be a Slave.

Soc. 'Tis then becoming and suitable to a vicious Person to be a Slave, for that is best for him.

Alcib. Most certainly.

The baseness of Vice.

Socrat. Then Vice is a vile thing, and suitable to a Slave.

Alcib. So it seems.

The Nobility of Vertue.

Socrat. And Vertue is a noble thing, and suits only with a free Man.

* After *Socrates* has confounded the Pride of *Alcibiades*, he gives a finishing stroke to lay him low, in reducing him to pronounce this terrible Sentence against himself, that he's only worthy to be a Slave, because he has no Vertue, since 'tis Vertue alone that makes Men free.

Alcib. That can't be conteſted.

Socrat. Then this Vileneſs ought to be avoided, which only ſuites with Slaves.

Alcib. Moſt certainly, *Socrates*.

Socrat. Well then, my dear *Alcibiades*; do you now perceive in what condition you are? Are you in this noble Diſpoſition of Mind ſo becoming a Man of your Birth; or———

Alcib. * Ah, *Socrates*, I perceive very well, I am in the Condition, you ſpeak of.

Socrat. But do you know how to deliver your ſelf out of this Condition, which I dare not name, when I ſpeak of a Man of your make?

Alcib. Yes I do

Soc. Well, how can you deliver your ſelf?

Alcib. I ſhall deliver my ſelf, if *Socrates* pleaſes.

Socrat. You don't ſay well, *Alcibiades*.

Alcib. What ſhould I ſay then?

Socrat. You ſhould ſay, if God pleaſes. *We can do nothing without the help of God.*

Alcib. Well then, I ſay if God pleaſes; and I add, let us for the future change Perſons; you ſhall perſonate me, and I you; that is to ſay, I'll now † make my Court to you, as you have hitherto made yours to me.

Socrat. If ſo my dear *Alcibiades*, what is reported of the Stork may be ſaid of the love I have for

* Tis upon this, without doubt, that *Plutarch* ſays, *Alcibiades* ſtruck with the victorious Reaſons of *Socrates*, was like a Cock, that after a long fight, hangs the Wing and yields himſelf conquer'd, and that *Socrates* by his ingenious Diſcourſes touch'd him to the quick, and made him pour out a flood of Tears.

† This Paſſage is corrupted in the Text. It ſhould be read, ὡς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐπαιδαγωγήθην, or ὡς σὺ ἐμὲ ἐπαιδαγώγησας. *I'll be your Pedagogue* or Schoolmaſter, *as you have been mine*. We ſee *Socrates* has been conſtantly following *Alcibiades* as his Schoolmaſter; for the future *Alcibiades* deſigns to follow *Socrates* in his Turn: but it will be to learn of him and not to teach him. In *Greece* they had Schoolmaſters for their Children, becauſe they went to publick Schools, and there were no private Maſters but for Perſons of the firſt Quality; and they made uſe of 'em but rarely. M. *le Fevre*. In the Tranſlation 'twas requiſite to put an equivalent Term, becauſe the Word *Pedagogue* or *Schoolmaſter* would not have ſounded well.

you; for after it has hatch'd and nouriſhed a little *Winged Love* in your Boſom; This little Love ſhall take his turn to cheriſh and nouriſh that in his old Age.

Alcib. It ſhall ſo; and from this day I'll apply my ſelf to Righteouſneſs.

Socrat. I deſire you may through the whole courſe of your Life, perſevere in this deſign * but I confeſs I fear it very much. Not that I diſtruſt your Good Temper; but the force of the Examples that reign in this Ciry occaſion theſe apprehenſions. I tremble for fear they ſhould be too ſtrong for you and me too.

* The Event prov'd that this fear of *Socrates* was but too well founded. *Alcibiades* with all his good Temper, and with his great Qualities, entirely ruin'd himſelf, and did a World of miſchief to the Athenians. He aband'on'd himſelf to Pleaſures; immers'd himſelf in Luxu'y; and made Spoil on all hands, without any reſpect to Honour or Decency: and if he did ill in ſeizing, he did ſtill worſe in ſpending, to furniſh matter for his Intemperance and Debauches. Inſtead of following the Rules of Juſtice, he govern'd after a licentious manner, full of Diſſolution, and mix'd with Treachery and Deceit; and gave himſelf up to extravagant Fits of Anger, which occaſioned great Miſchiefs. All which proceeded from his forſaking *Lyceus*, and forgetting the wiſe Leſſons of *Socrates*. *Alcibiades* his Diſeaſe became incureable when he had left this Phyſician. It ſeiz'd him like a violent Fever, overturn'd his Underſtanding, and made him as it were run mad. From *Lyceus* it drove him to the Aſſembly of the Athenians; from that Aſſembly it forc'd him to Sea, from the Sea to *Sicily*, from thence to *Lacedemonia*, from *Lacedemonia* to the *Perſians*, from the *Perſians* to *Samos*, from *Samos* to *Athens*, from *Athens* again into the *Helleſpont*; and from thence in fine it brought him to be confin'd in a Town of *Phrygia* where he liv'd obſcurely in the Embraces of a debauch'd Woman, and was at laſt miſerably kill'd.

THE

The ARGUMENT OF THE Second *ALCIBIADES*.

Piety is the only Spring of our Happiness, and 'tis Prayer alone that nourishes Piety: By this we keep up a continual Correspondence with God, represent our Necessities to him, and draw down his Favours upon us. So that the Essence of Religion consists in Prayer. For Prayers are properly the Sallies of a Soul penetrated with Piety, discovering its Misery to God, in order to request a Remedy. But our Passions fill our Minds with so much Darkness, that we know neither our Goods, nor our Evils, but following our own Desires every day offer such Petitions to God, as would be fatal to us, and would become real Curses if God should harken to us. Therefore there is nothing of so great Importance as Prayer; nothing that requires so much Prudence and Attention, and yet we go about nothing with so much Temerity and Negligence. Plato *here vigorously opposes this Abuse; and teaches, that if we would pray well we must learn to know our Goods and Evils; that the Knowledg of this is only taught by God; and consequently that 'tis God alone that can dissipate the Darkness of our Souls, and teach us to pray. Till then we can't safely make any Prayers of our selves, without being expos'd to great Dangers. But are we in the mean time to continue without Prayer, tho we are in continual need of the Divine Assistance? There would be Stupidity or Pride in this kind of Inaction. Certainly it would be more eligible for the Soul to continue in silence, than to ask Evils of God, when she desires to ask Good; but God has given her some help under this Ignorance, in inspiring even during the*

time of Darkneſs, a Prayer which teaches us to abandon our ſelves to him, and to requeſt of him, that he would do his own Will in us, and not ours. Of all the Prayers Men are capable of making, this is the moſt agreeable to God, and this Socrates *would have men continually make. When God has once enlighten'd and inſtructed us, we ſhall then ask of him what we think neceſſary; for ſeeing we ſhall ſpeak only by his Spirit we ſhall requeſt of him that which is truly Good; which he is always willing to grant; and will never fail to give it, becauſe he truly loves us. This is what* Socrates *deſigns to teach in this Dialogue, which may be term'd Sacred; ſince it is full of Maxims, very worthy of Chriſtianity it ſelf; and very uſeful both for Politicks and Religion. As when* Socrates *ſays, all the Sciences in the World without the Knowledg of that which is very good, are pernicious, inſtead of being uſeful; when he teaches us, that God is not to be corrupted by Bribes, and that he does not regard the Sacrifices, and Offerings of the wicked; but the Righteouſneſs and Holineſs of thoſe that invoke him: And when he aſſures us, that God is free and has a ſoveraign Power to hear, or reject our Supplications; whence it follows, that when he hears them, he ſhews us an Act of Grace, and not of ſtrict Juſtice. Here are many other Beauties which may be eaſily remark'd, becauſe they very ſenſibly and obviouſly offer themſelves. This Dialogue is a kind of Continuation of the precedent. As in the former,* Alcibiades *ſeem'd to underſtand but little with reſpect to humane Affairs; in this he appears to be very ignorant in divine things; for there is ſo great a Connexion between 'em; that thoſe that are ignorant of the one, are neceſſarily ignorant of the other, as* Socrates *demonſtrates, when he ſhews, that to know God, to know one's ſelf, and to know what appertains to our ſelves, and what to others, is the Effect of one and the ſame Art. We may obſerve by the way, as we have done before; that this Dialogue is ſuſtain'd as all the reſt are, by Action. And this Dramatrick*

Air

Air, is that which animates it, and is one of its greatest Beauties.

All that is farther necessary to be known, is at what time Plato *supposes it to be made. If we follow his Interpreters, they make him fall into a very ridiculous Inconveniency. For after he had said* Archelaus, *King of* Macedonia *was kill'd, he speaks of* Pericles *as of a Person yet alive, contrary to what is certainly known, namely, that* Archelaus *survived* Pericles, *and was not assassinated till Twenty years after his Death; and contrary to what* Plato *himself says, in his* Gorgias *and* Theages. *We shall see in the Notes what led* Plato's *Interpreters into this Mistake. In the mean time it may be maintain'd, that* Socrates *held these Discourses with* Alcibiades, *the first year of the 93 Olympiade; for* Perdiccas *reign'd 13 years after the death of* Pericles, *who died the last year of the 87 Olympiade.* Archelaus, *who kill'd* Perdiccas, *reign'd seven years, and then was kill'd the last year of the 92 Olympiade. This naturally leads us to the time of this Dialogue. They that make* Archelaus *to have reign'd 16 Years, or* Perdiccas 23, *make* Archelaus *survive* Alcibiades *and* Socrates.

This Dialogue is of the same Character with the precedent, μαιευτικὸς, *that is,* Socrates *here makes* Alcibiades *find out the Truths which he designs to teach him. 'Tis also a Moral Dialogue, as well as the former.*

THE

Second *ALCIBIADES*,

OR

Of Prayer.

Socrates, Alcibiades.

Socrates. *Alcibiades*, are you going into this Temple to say your Prayers?

Alcib. Yes *Socrates*, that is my design.

Socrat. Indeed you seem very thoughtful, I see your Eyes are fix'd on the Ground like a Man that's thinking on some very serious Matter.

Alcib. What should I think on, *Socrates*?

Socrat. What should you think on? on some very important thing, I suppose; for I beseech you in the Name of God, tell me, whether when we address our Prayers to the Gods, either in publick or private, do they not grant us some things, and refuse us others? do they not hear some Persons, and reject others?

Alc. That's very true.

Prayer requires a great deal of Wisdom and Prudence.

Socrat. Don't you think then, that Prayer requires a great deal of Precaution and Prudence, lest before we are aware we ask the Gods great Evils, while we think we are requesting what is good; and lest they should be dispos'd to grant what is requested of 'em; as they granted *Oedipus*, his Petition, who pray'd that his Children might decide their Rights by the Sword. This unhappy Father, who might have pray'd to the Gods to remove from him the Mischiefs that oppress'd him, drew new Miseries on him-

himself by his horrible Imprecations; for his Petitions were heard, and this prov'd a source of terrible Calamities to his Family, the particulars of which I need not relate to you.

Alcib. But *Socrates*, you tell me of a Mad Man, can you believe any Man in his Senses would have made such kind of Prayers?

Soc. Then to be mad you think is oppos'd to being wise.

Alcib. Most certainly.

Socrat. Don't you think, that some Men are Fools, and others Wise?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. Come then, let us endeavour to know and distinguish 'em well; for you agree that there are some that are foolish, others that are wise, and others that are mad.

Alcib. I do so.

Soc. Are not some People in health, and others sick?

Alcib. That's certain.

Socrat. These are not the same Persons.

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Is there a third sort, who are neither sick nor in health?

Alcib. * No. That can't be.

Socrat. For a Man must necessarily be in health or sick, there is no Medium.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. But is it the same thing with respect to Wisdom and Folly in your opinion?

Alcib. How do you say?

Socrat. I ask you if a Man must necessarily be either foolish or wise; or is there a certain Medium which makes one become neither a wise Man nor a Fool?

* If one were dispos'd to Criticize, one might say, there is a third state which is that of Convalescence, in which Men have not yet recover'd Health, neither are properly sick. But at bottom, this is not true, for one who is recovering is no longer under the Power of Sickness, but is in the way of Health.

Alcib. * No. There's no Medium.

Socrat. Then One must necessarily be one or t'other.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. Did you not just now grant that Madness is opposite to Wisdom?

Alcib. Yes.

Socrat. And that there is no Medium, to put a Man into such a Condition as to be neither wise nor foolish?

Alcib. I did grant it.

Socrat. But is it possible for the same thing to have two Contraries oppos'd to it?

Alcib. By no means.

Socrat. Then Folly and Madness will appear to be one and the same thing.

Alcib. So methinks.

Socrat. Then if we say all Fools are mad, we shall say right.

Alcib. Certainly.

Socrat. Without going any farther; Among all the Men of your Age, if there are any Fools, as without doubt there are, and some of a longer standing, (for, I pray, don't you find wise Men are very rare in this City and Fools very numerous) would you call these Fools mad?

Alcib. Without any Scruple.

The Difficulty which Socrates *opposes to what* Alcibiades *has just granted.*

Socrat. But do you think we should be very safe among so many mad Men; and that we should not before now have born the punishment of such Conversation; in suffering from 'em whatever might be expected from mad Men? Have a care what you say,

* To this 'tis objected, that there is a certain *Medium* between Vertue and Vice, which is the State of such as are, neither vicious, nor vertuous, as *Tacitus* says of *Galba*, *magis extra Vitia quàm cum Virtutibus*. But 'tis easy to see, that this Expression of *Tacitus* is not true, but only in the common Language of the World, which makes only a superficial Judgment, without penetrating deeply into things, and so calls none vicious but those who practise gross Vices; and is false, when we speak with a Philosophick Accuracy. Wherever Vertue is not, there Vice must necessarily be. The same may be said of Wisdom and Folly. Every Man who is not Wise, can be no other than a Fool.

there-

therefore, my dear *Alcibiades*; leſt this matter be otherwiſe than you pretend.

Alcib. Well then how is it? for I perceive it may be otherwiſe than I ſay.

Socrat. I think ſo too; and we muſt examine the Matter after this Manner. *Alc.* After what Manner?

Socrat. I'm going to tell you; Some Perſons are ſick, are they not? *Alcib.* Who doubts it?

Socrat. Is it abſolutely neceſſary, that every one that is ſick, ſhould have the Gout or Fever, or ſore Eyes? and don't you think he may be free from all theſe Diſtempers and yet be ſick of another Diſeaſe? For there are divers kinds of Diſeaſes, beſides theſe. *A Solution of this difficulty.*

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. You believe every Diſtemper of the Eyes is a Diſeaſe, but you don't think every Diſeaſe is a Diſtemper of the Eyes.

Alc. No certainly, but yet I don't ſee what that proves.

Socrat. But if you'll follow me, I am perſwaded, we ſhall find that preſently. *You know that ſaying of the Poet* * Two Men that go together.

Alcib. I follow you with all my might, *Socrates.*

Socrat. Are we not agreed that every Diſtemper of the Eyes is a Diſeaſe, and that every Diſeaſe is not a Diſtemper of the Eyes?

* *Plato* often intermixes Sentences of the Poets in his Diſcourſes without giving any notice when he does it. To underſtand this Paſſage well, and to know all its Elegancy; 'tis neceſſary to remember the Words *Homer* puts into *Diomedes* his Mouth, when *Neſtor* propoſes to ſend Spies into the *Trojan Camp*. For he ſpeaks thus, *My Courage prompts me to go into the Enemies Army, but if any one would accompany me, I ſhould go with greater Boldneſs and Confidence; for two Men that go together, take a better view of things, one ſees what the other does not obſerve: One Man alone, tho he want not Prudence, yet has always leſs Vigour and Activity in his Mind.* Iliad. K. ver. 224. So that here is a manifeſt Alluſion to this Paſſage. *Homer* ſays σύντε δ' ἐρχομένω, *Two Men that go together.* And *Plato* ſays σύντε δύο σκοπουμένω, *Two Men that examine together.* But becauſe *Homer* is not now ſo well known as he was in *Plato*'s time, I have elucidated the Paſſage in the Tranſlation, by adding, *you know that Saying of the Poet.* Without which the Alluſion would not have been perceiveable. The Latin Tranſlators have ſlip'd over it without perceiving it.

Alcib.

Alcib. In that we are agreed.

Soc. And that with good Reaſon; for all that have a Fever are ſick; but all that are ſick, have not a Fever, or the Gout, or ſore Eyes. All theſe Afflictions are Diſeaſes, but Phyſicians aſſure us that they are ſo many different Diſeaſes by their Effects; for they are not allalike; and they don't deal with them all after the ſame manner; but according to the Nature and Violence of 'em. Are there not a great many ſorts of Artificers? There are Shoemakers, Bricklayers, Architects, Carvers, Painters, and a multitude of others, whom I need not name; work is divided among 'em. They are all Artificers, but they are not all Carvers or Architects. *Alcib.* 'Tis true.

Folly is divided among Men, as Labour and Induſtry is ſhar'd among 'em.

Socrat. In like manner Folly is divided among Men, thoſe that have the greateſt ſhare of it we call mad, or diſtracted. Thoſe that have a degree leſs we call Fools, and Stupid; but while Men ſeek to hide theſe Vices under honourable and ſpecious Names; they call the former Men of Magnanimity, and Courage; and they call the others Men of Simplicity; or elſe they ſay they have no harm in 'em; but have little Experience, and much Youth. You'll find a great many other Names beſides theſe with which they palliate their weak ſide. But theſe are ſo many ſorts of Folly, which differ only as one Art does from another, and one Diſeaſe from another. Don't you think ſo as well as I?

Alcib. I am of the ſame mind with you.

Socrat. To return then to our Subject; Our firſt deſign was exactly to know and diſtinguiſh the Fooliſh from the Wiſe; for we agreed that ſome Men are Wiſe and others Fooliſh, did we not?

Alcib. Yes, in that we agreed.

Socrat. Don't you call him wiſe who knows what he ought to ſay or do, and him fooliſh who knows neither one nor t'other? *Alc.* Yes certainly.

The definition of a Wiſe Man and a Fool.

Socrat. Are they, who know not what they ought to ſay or do, ignorant that they ſay and do what they ought not?

Alcib.

Alcib. I think ſo.

Socrat. I told you *Oedipus* was of that number: But you'll yet find in our time a multitude of People, who without being tranſported with an Emotion of Anger like him will requeſt of God real Evils while they think they are asking real Goods. For as for *Oedipus*; if he did not ask for what was Good neither did he think he ask'd it; whereas others every day do the quite contrary; and without going any farther, *Alcibiades*, if the God to whom you are going to pray, ſhould appear ſuddenly to you, and before you have open'd your Lips ſhould ask you, if you would be content to be the Tyrant of *Athens*, or (if that ſeem too little for you) of all *Greece*; or if you were not yet ſatisfied, ſhould promiſe you all *Europe* together; and fully to gratifie your Ambition, ſhould add, that that very day all the World ſhould know that *Alcibiades* the Son of *Clinias* is King; I am perſwaded you would go out of the Temple with abundance of Joy, as one that has juſt received the greateſt of all Goods.

Alcib. And, *Socrates*, I verily believe, there's no Man but he would be tranſported with Joy, if the ſame thing ſhould happen to him.

Socrat. But you would not give your Life for the Empire of the *Greeks*, nor for that of the *Barbarians*.

Alcib. No certainly; to what purpoſe? for then I could not enjoy that Empire.

Socrat. But ſuppoſe you could enjoy it, would you do it, if this Enjoyment were to be fatal to you?

Alcib. No, neither would I do it, on that Condition.

Socrat. Then by this you ſee very well, that it is not ſafe to accept, or deſire what one does not know; if it be true, that it may bring great Miſchiefs upon us, or even make us loſe our Lives: For I could name to you a great many of thoſe Ambitious Men, who having paſſionately deſir'd the Tyranny, and ſpar'd nothing to obtain it, as the greateſt

There is a great deal of danger in asking and receiving what we know not.

greateſt of all Goods; yet have deriv'd no other Advantage from this great Elevation, than to be expos'd to the Stratagems of their Enemies, who have aſſaſſinated them on the Throne. 'Tis impoſſible but you muſt have heard of that Tragical Story that has lately happen'd. * *Archelaus*, the King of *Macedonia* had a Favorite whom he lov'd with an unbounded Paſſion; this Favorite, who was yet more in love with the Throne of *Archelaus*, than this Prince was with him, kill'd him to fill up his place, flattering himſelf that he ſhould be the happieſt Man in the World: But he had ſcarce enjoy'd the Tyranny 3 or 4 days, when he was cut off by others that were poſſeſs'd with the ſame Ambition. And among our Athenians (for theſe are Examples which come not to us by hear-ſay; but ſuch as we have ſeen with our Eyes) how many have there been, who, after they had ardently aſpir'd to be Generals of the Army, and had obtain'd what they deſir'd, have been put to death, or baniſhed? How many others who have ſeem'd more happy, have paſs'd through innumerable Dangers, and been expos'd to continual Fears, not only during the time of their being Generals, but alſo after their return into their Country, where they have all their Life-time had a more cruel Siege to maintain againſt envious Detractors, than all thoſe they ſuſtain'd in War againſt the Enemies of the State? So that the greateſt part of 'em wiſh'd they had never been any more than private Men, rather than to have had the Command of Armies at ſo dear a rate. If all theſe Dangers and Fatigues would produce a Man any advantage in the end; there would be ſome reaſon for him to to expoſe himſelf to 'em, but 'tis the quite contrary. What I ſay of Honours, I ſay alſo of Children. How many People have we ſeen, who after they

* *Archelaus* was the natural Son of *Perdiccas*. He kill'd his Father, his Uncle *Alcetas* and his Son. He afterwards kill'd the Legitimate Son of *Perdiccas*; and after he had poſſeſs'd the Throne 7 years, was aſſaſſinated by his Favorite *Craterus*.

have

have importunately desir'd of God, that he would give them Children, and have accordingly obtain'd 'em, have by this means precipitated themselves into terrible Miseries and Troubles: For some of 'em have spent their whole Life in Sorrow and Bitterness; because their Children have prov'd wicked; and others who have had such as have prov'd good have been no more happy than the former, because they have lost them for the most part in the Flower of their Age: So that they had much rather never have had 'em. Now tho all these Miseries, and many others, are very obvious, and common; yet there's scarce a Man to be found, who would refuse these false Goods, if God should give 'em him; or who would cease to importune him for 'em, if he were assur'd he should obtain 'em by his Prayers. The generality of Men would not refuse, either the Tyranny, or the Command of Armies, or any other great Honours, which yet are certainly much more pernicious than useful; but would request 'em of God, if they did not spontaneously offer themselves to 'em. But wait a moment, and you'll hear 'em sing a *Palinodia*, and offer Petitions quite contrary to the former. For my part, I confess, I can't choose but think, that Men are really to blame, *in complaining of the Gods, and accusing 'em of being the Cause of the Miseries they suffer; for 'tis themselves, who by their Faults, or rather by their Follies,*

In spite of Fate *draw Mischiefs on themselves.*

And therefore, *Alcibiades*, that Ancient Poet seems to me to have had a great deal of Sense and Reason, who having (as I think) very imprudent Friends, whom he saw every day going on in a Course of asking of God such things as seem'd good to them, and yet were very bad for 'em, compos'd for 'em this Prayer, and gave it 'em. *Great God, give us the Good Things that are necessary for us, whether we ask 'em or not; and keep evil things from us, even when we ask 'em of thee.* This seems to be a most Excellent and very safe Prayer. If you have any thing

A Recantation.

This is a Passage of Homer, *in the 1st Book of his* Odyss. *at the beginning.*

An admirable Prayer of an unknown Author.

thing to object against it, do not hide it from me.

Alcib. 'Tis hard to contradict what is well spoken. The only reflection I make on it, *Socrates*, is how many Evils are brought upon Mankind by Ignorance. For we don't so much as perceive that 'tis this that not only makes us every day do such things as are fatal to us; but (which is most deplorable) engages us to ask our own unhappiness of God; and this is what no Man can tell how to imagine. There's no Person but thinks himself capable of asking such things of God, as are very useful for him, and very uncapable of desiring such as are pernicious to him; for this would not be a Prayer, but a real Imprecation.

Socrat. Hold a little, my dear *Alcibiades*, 'tis possible there may be found some Person wiser than you and I, who might with good Reason reprehend us, and tell us we are very much in the wrong thus to blame Ignorance, without adding what sort of Ignorance it is that we condemn, and in what it consists. For if Ignorance is bad in some things, 'tis good in others.

Ignorance is sometimes good.

Alcib. How do you say, *Socrates*, is there any thing of what kind soever of which 'tis more useful to be ignorant, than to know it?

Socrat. So I think, and you think otherwise.

Alcib. That I do I protest.

Socrat. Yet I shall never believe you capable of being irritated against your Mother with the fury either of an *Orestes*, or an *Alcmæon*, or any the like *Parricides*; if there have been any others who have committed the same Crimes.

Alcib. Ah! *Socrates*, I intreat you in the Name of God alter your discourse.

Socrat. *Alcibiades*, you are to blame to desire that of me, of me, I say, who tell you, I don't think you capable of committing those Crimes. You could do no more if I accus'd you of 'em. But since these Actions appear so abominable to you, that one must not name 'em unless there be an absolute necessity of it; with all my heart, so let it be. I only

ly ask you, do you think, if *Oreſtes* had been in his Senſes, and had known what was good, and uſeful for him, he would have dar'd to do what he did?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Neither he nor any body elſe would have done it.

Alcib. That's moſt certain.

Socrat. Then in my Opinion this Ignorance of what is good and uſeful is a great Evil.

Alcib. I am of the ſame Mind.

Socrat. And that either in *Oreſtes*, or any other Perſon.

Alcib. I am fully perſuaded of that.

Socrat. Let us examine this matter yet a little farther. Suppoſe then * it had formerly come into your Head on a ſudden, that it was a very good and laudable Action for you to go and kill *Pericles* your Tutor and Friend; and that you had taken a Dagger, and gone directly to his Door, to ask if he were at Home, as having a deſign againſt him alone, and not any other; and that you had been told he was within. I don't mean by this that you could ever have been capable of committing ſo horrible an Action;

* The Latin Interpreters have tranſlated this Paſſage, as if *Plato* had ſaid, *if it ſhould come into your head of a ſudden, to go and kill* Pericles *your Tutor and Friend*, not conſidering that they make *Plato* fall into a very ridiculous Fault. For to ſpeak thus, *Pericles* muſt have been ſtill living. And *Plato* had been ſaying, that *Archelaus*, King of *Macedonia*, had been aſſaſſinated, and we know *Pericles* died ſo years before. How then ſhall this Contradiction be reconcil'd? How ſhall we ſecure *Plato* from this Fault of which he is not guilty: ſeeing he ſpeaks the contrary in *Gorgias* and *Theages*? There's no great difficulty in the Matter, 'tis only to tranſlate as the Greek Terms will bear; *if it had formerly come into your head on a ſudden*, that is, *if while* Pericles *was living*, &c. By this means we not only prevent a great miſtake, in regard of the time, but alſo eſcape a great Fault againſt the Rules of Decency. For that *Pericles* ſhould be yet alive when *Socrates* ſpeaks thus to *Alcibiades*, is a hard and odious Suppoſition; but ſuppoſing *Pericles* to be dead, it has not the ſame harſhneſs in it. *Atheneus* would not have forgot to improve this Paſſage to ſtrengthen his Chicanerie againſt *Plato*'s *Gorgias*, if he had not very well underſtood that it would bear another Interpretation beſides that given it by his Tranſlators.

but

but I make this Supposition to shew you that there's nothing hinders, but a Man who knows not what is comely and honourable may be in a disposition of taking that for very Good, which is in it self very Evil; Don't you think so as well as I?

Alcib. I am perfectly of the same Mind.

Socrat. To go on then; supposing you had been told *Pericles* was at Home, and you had gone in, and seen him, but not known him, and imagined that you saw some body else; would you have had the Boldness to kill him? No certainly, for your design would have been only against him; and every time you had been at his House on the same Design, and had mistaken him for another, you would not have done him the least Injury.

Alcib. That's very certain.

Socrat. What then? Do you think *Orestes* would have laid his Parricidial Hands on his Mother, if he had mistaken her for another?

Alcib. No doubtless.

Socrat. For he did not design to kill the first Woman he met, nor the Mother of this or that Person; but had a mind to kill his own Mother.

Alcib. You say right.

Socrat. Then this sort of Ignorance is very good for those that are in such a disposition of mind as his, and have such kind of Fancies in their Heads.

Alcib. So I think.

Socrat. By this then you plainly see, that on some Occasions, and in some Persons whose Minds are dispos'd after a certain manner, Ignorance is a Good and not an Evil, as you just now suppos'd.

Alcib. I perceive it very well.

Socrat. If you will take the pains to examine what I am now going to say, how strange soever it may at first seem to you, it may be you'll be of the same mind with me.

* *All the Sciences are useless without the knowledge of that which is very good.*

Alcib. Well, *Socrates*, What is it?

Socrat. 'Tis true, that possibly all the *Sciences without the knowledg of that which is very good, are

are seldom of use to those that possess 'em, nay most commonly are pernicious to 'em. Follow me a little in your Thoughts, I entreat you. When we are about to say or do any thing; Is it not altogether necessary, either that we really know what we are going to do or say, or at least that we think we know it?

Alcib. Without doubt.

Socrat. According to this Principle the Orators who every Day advise the People, give them advice about what they know, or at least think they know. Some give 'em counsel about Peace and War, others about the Walls that ought to be built, about the Fortifications, Gates, and Arsenals. In a word, all, that the City does for it self, or against another City, is not done but by the advice of Orators.

Alcib 'Tis true.

Socrat. Observe well what follows; and see if I can finish my proof: Don't you divide the People into wise Men and Fools? *Alcib.* Yes.

Socrat. Don't you call the greatest number Fools, and the least wise Men? *Alcib.* Yes

Socrat. Is it not with reference to something that you call 'em so?

Alcib. Most certainly.

Socrat. Do you then call him a wise Man who can give this Counsel without knowing what is best, or in what time it is best?

Alcib. No certainly.

Socrat. Nor do you call him wise, who can make War, but knows not when nor how, nor how long 'tis best so to do.

Alcib. No, not I.

Socrat. Neither do you call those Magistrates wise, who know how to put to death, to fine, and to banish; and yet know not when or on what Occasions these punishments are best and most just.

Alcib. No indeed.

Socrat. Well then, when any one knows well how to do all these things, and these Sciences are accompanied with the knowledge of that which is very

good (and this is the same with the knowledge of that which is very useful, as you have granted) we call this Man wise, and say he is very capable to advise and conduct himself, and govern the Commonwealth. And we say directly the contrary of him who does not add the knowledge of that which is good to these Sciences.

He is going to prove that to be skilful in the Art a Man professes is not sufficient to merit the name of a wise Man.

Alcib. This must be granted.

Socr. When a Man knows how to mount a Horse, to draw a Bow, to Wrestle, in a word to perform any of the like Exercises; or is well instructed in any other Art, how do you call him, when he knows perfectly well what is most conformable to the Art he professes? Don't you call him a Querry that employs himself in managing of Horses, him Wrestler that makes it his business to Wrestle, and him a Musician who understands Musick, and so of the rest? Don't you give 'em all such Names as are deriv'd from their Art, and are suitable to it? or do you give them other Appellations?

Alcib. We give 'em only such Names as are taken from their Art.

Socrat. Do you think 'tis of absolute necessity that he who well understands the Art of which he makes Profession, should also be a wise Man; or shall we say he may be far from that Character?

Alcib. He may be very far from it *Socrates.*

Socrat. * What will you say of a *Republick* compos'd of Wrestlers, Pipers, Archers, and other such kind of People mingled with such Persons as we have been speaking of, some of whom know how to make War, others to condemn to Death; and with those States-Men, who are bloated with pride on the Account of their pretended Capacity in Politicks? Supposing all these People to have knowledge of what is very good, and that there is but one single

* This is a subtile Satyr against the Republick of the *Athenians*, in which all Arts and Sciences were seen to flourish, but the knowledg of what is very good was not to be found there; and therefore nothing but Confusion and Disorder was to be seen among 'em.

Man

Man among 'em all who knows either on what Occasion or with whom each of these different Arts ought to be used?

Alcib. I should say, *Socrates*, that would be a very ill-compos'd Commonwealth.

Socrat. Much more would you say so, when you saw every one full of Ambition, and striving to engross the greatest part of Affairs to himself; that he might still exceed himself, and become every Day more powerful in that part of the Government which is the most Noble; and if you should at the same time see every one making horrible Mistakes against the knowledge of what is very good, both on his own account and that of the Commonwealth; because he conducts himself by Opinion without Understanding. This being the State of the case, should we not have great Reason to say that such a *Republick* can't choose but be full of Disorder and Injustice?

Alcib. This is manifestly true.

Socrat. Have we not agreed that it is absolutely necessary for us either to believe we know, or else really to know what we are about to do or say without any farther Deliberation?

Alcib. That has been agreed between us.

Socrat. * Have we not likewise acknowledged, that when any Man does that which he knows, or thinks he knows; provided he possesses the knowledge of that which is very good, great advantage hence accrues both to himself and to the State.

Alcib. Who can doubt that?

Socrat. And that when 'tis otherwise, the contrary ensues.

Alcib. That's evident.

Soc. Do you still persist in the same Sentiments?

Alcib. I do.

Socrat. Have you not said, that the greatest number is that of Fools, and that of wise Men the least?

Alcib. Yes, and I say the same still.

* The knowledg of that which is very good conducts and directs us not only in the things we know, but also in those we know not.

Socrat. Did we not upon this say, that the greatest number keep at a distance from that which is good, because they usually abandon themselves to Opinion without Understanding.

Alcib. Yes, so we said.

Socrat. Then 'tis useful for this great number to know nothing, and to believe they know nothing, because what they know, or believe they know they will be willing to put in Execution, and in so doing, instead of gaining any advantage, they will receive great prejudice. *Alcib.* You say true.

Soc. By this then you see very well, that I had reason when I told you just now, that possibly all Sciences, without the knowledge of what is very good, were seldom useful to those that possess'd 'em, but were most commonly very pernicious to 'em. Were you not then sensible of this Truth ?

Alcib. I was not then sensible of it, *Socrates*, but now I am.

Socrat. Then a City which would be well govern'd and a Soul that would live well applies it self only to this Science ; as a Sick Man commits himself to his Physician ; and as a Sailer, that would arrive safe at his Port, obeys his Pilot. * Without this the greater Fortune, Men or States enjoy, the

* This is one of the most difficult places in *Plato* ; *Marsilius Ficinus*, and *De Serres* have translated it very ill, and have rather obscur'd than interpreted it. However *Ficinus* suspected that it was corrupted, tho he could not correct it. I am of opinion that we should read μέν for μὴ, and γε for γὰρ. But that is not all, the principal Fault in the Text consists in the Word ψυχῆς which makes a very ill Sense, we must therefore necessarily read πνεύμασι, and take away the Point. *Plato*'s Sense is, that without the knowledg of what is very good, the greater Fortune a Soul or a City enjoys, the greater Crimes will they commit to satiate their Passions. The Corruption came from the Word ψυχὴν which is 3 or 4 Lines higher. But *Plato* speaks no more of the Soul than he does of the City, and consequently could not repeat ψυχῆς. He certainly wrote πνεύμασι, and this mode of Speech ἐπιῤῥέον τὸ τῆς πνεύμασι is very elegant, *quo magis fortuna afflaverit*, properly, *the more Fortune blows on their Poop.* The Beauty of this Principle, and the Truth which it contains, prove the necessity of restoring the Sense after this manner; The greater Fortune wicked Men have, the greater Sins do they commit.

great-

greater Crimes will they commit, either to acquire Riches, or to augment their Power, or satiate their Passions. He that possesses all the Arts and Sciences, and is destitute of this, will be driven about and toss'd by each of them, and be really batter'd with a furious Tempest; and having neither Helm nor Pilot, 'tis impossible he should go very far, and his ruine must needs be near. Methinks what the Poet speaks of one whom he would dispraise may be applied to him. * *He knew* (says he) *many things, but knew 'em all amiss.*

The more prosperous Men are the greater Crimes they commit, if they have not the knowledg of what is very good.

Alcib. How can one make such an application as this, *Socrates*? for my part, I don't think there is any Justness in it.

Socrat. On the contrary I say there is a great deal of Justness in it. For my dear *Alcibiades*, 'tis a sort of Enigma. *Homer* and the other Poets are full of 'em. For all Poesie is naturally enigmatick, and 'tis not given to every Man to penetrate those Obscurities; and if besides its being Enigmatick, it be handled by envious Poets, who instead of discovering their Wisdom to us, only seek to hide it from us; 'tis then almost impossible to sound their Thoughts. But you'll never accuse *Homer* that most Wise, and Divine Poet of being ignorant that 'tis impossible to know amiss what one knows; 'tis he that says of *Margites*, that † *he knew many things but knew 'em all amiss*, and he speaks enigmatically, for he puts [*he knew*] for *his Learning* and [*amiss*] for *unhappy*; which terms could not well enter into the Composition of his Verse; but what he certainly meant by

All Poesie is Enigmatick.

* Or thus, To a great Sum his Knowledg did amount,
But all he knew turn'd to an ill Account.

† *Homer* made a Poem against one *Margites*, who knew much, and yet spent his Life in Idleness and Debauchery, a certain sign that he did not possess the knowledg of what is very good. This Poem which was made up of a mixture of Heroick and Iambick Verses is lost: In which *Homer* turn'd the pungent Railleries of those Satyrical Pieces which were in vogue before him into pleasant Stories and Jests; and by this means was the first that gave us any strokes of Comedy: See the 4th Chapter of *Aristotle* of the Art of Poetry.

All the Sciences are unhappy without the knowledge of what is good.

it, is that *Margites* had a great deal of Learning and Knowledge, and that this was an unhappy or unfortunate knowledge to him. If this knowledge was unfortunate to him he must needs have been a poor Man, if we will adhere to what has been said.

Alcib. So I think, *Socrates*, I should scarce yield to the most evident Truths, if I should not grant that.

Socrat. You have reason. But, *Alcibiades*, I entreat you, let us assure our selves of the Truth. You see how many Doubts and Uncertainties present themselves. You have your share of 'em, for you go sometimes to the right and sometimes to the left. That which seems true to you this Minute you receive as such; and the very next Moment 'tis quite another thing in your Opinion. Let us endeavour to know where to fix. And as I have already said, if the God to whom you are going to pray, should suddenly appear to you, and should ask you before you have begun your Prayers, if you would be satisfied that he should grant you some one of those things we first spoke of; or rather supposing he should permit you to make your request; which would you think most safe and most advantageous to you, whether to receive what he should give you, or to obtain what you should ask of him?

Alcib. I solemnly protest, *Socrates*, I know not how to answer you: For nothing seems to me to be more foolish, and more to be avoided with the greatest Care, than to run the risque of asking real Evils of God, while one thinks one is asking true Goods of him, and thereby to expose one's self, as you have very well said, to retract the next moment, and make new Requests quite contrary to the former.

Socrat. Is it not for this Reason that that Ancient Poet I was speaking of in the beginning of our Discourse; and who understood these things better than we, would have us end our Prayers with these Words, *And keep evil things from us, even when we ask 'em of thee?*

Alcib. So I suppose.

Socrat.

Socrat. In like manner the Lacedemonians, whether they imitate this Poet, or have of themſelves found out this Truth, make both in publick and private a Prayer much like it. For they deſire the Gods *to give 'em that which is Comely with that which is Good.* They were never heard to make any other Prayer; and yet they are as happy as any People in the World; and if they have ſometimes ſeen an Interruption in the Courſe of their Succeſſes; however none can juſtly blame their Prayer. For the Gods are free, and it depends on their Will, whether they will grant what is deſir'd of 'em, or give what is contrary to it. And on this occaſion I'll tell you another Story, which I have often heard related by ſome antient People. The Athenians being engag'd formerly in a War with the Lacedemonians, it happen'd that they were always beat in every Battle that was fought: Being deeply concern'd at this Misfortune, and ſeeking Means to divert theſe Miſeries that impended, at laſt after divers Conſultations they thought it the beſt Expedient to ſend to the Oracle of *Ammon*, to enquire of him the Reaſon of their Misfortunes, and to pray him to tell 'em why the Gods granted Victory rather to the Lacedemonians, than to the Athenians, who every day offer'd 'em a great Number of choicer Sacrifices, who enriched their Temples with nobler Offerings, who annually made more magnificent, and more devout Proceſſions in their Honour, and in a word who themſelves alone were at greater Expence in their Worſhip than all the reſt of the Greeks together. Whereas (ſaid they) the Lacedemonians have no regard to theſe Ceremonies, they are ſo covetous in reference to the Gods, that they offer them mutilated Victims, and are at much leſs charge in every thing that concerns Religion than the Athenians, tho they infinitely exceed 'em in Riches. After they had thus preſented their Reaſons, they ask'd how thoſe Miſeries that preſs'd their City might be diverted. The Prophet gave 'em no immediate anſwer,

The Prayer of the Lacedemonians.

God is free and can either hear or reject our prayers without being unjuſt.

swer, for doubtless the God would not permit him to give any. But after some time, recalling the Ambassador, he told him. *This is the Answer* Ammon *gives the Athenians; he loves the Benedictions of the Lacedemonians much more than all the Sacrifices of the Greeks.* This was all he said. By the *Benedictions* of the Lacedemonians, I suppose, he only meant their Prayers, which indeed are more perfect than those of any other People. For as for the rest of the Greeks, some of 'em indeed offer'd Bulls with gilded Horns, and others consecrated rich Oblations to the Gods; but at the same time requested in their Prayers whatever their Passions suggested, without informing themselves, whether what they ask'd was Good or Evil. But the Gods, who hear their Blasphemies, are not pleas'd with those magnificent Processions, nor do they accept their costly Sacrifices. Therefore nothing requires so much Precaution and Attention as Prayer; to know what we ought to say, and what not. You'll find many other things in *Homer*, which amount to the same thing with the Story I have been telling you. For he says, the *Trojans*, when they built a Fort, *offer'd whole Hecatombes to the Immortal Gods, that the Winds carried a pleasant Odour from Earth to Heaven, and yet that the Gods refus'd to accept all this, but rejected it, because they had an Aversion for the sacred City of* Troy, *for* Priamus, *and all his People.* So that it was to no purpose for 'em to offer Sacrifices, and make Presents to the Gods that hated 'em; for the Deity is not to be corrupted by Bribes, like a covetous Usurer. And we should be Fools, if we should pretend by this means to render our selves more agreable to the Gods than the Lacedemonians. For it would be a very horrible and most unworthy thing for the Gods to have more regard to our Gifts and Sacrifices, than to our Souls, in distinguishing those that are truly holy and righteous. But they have regard only to our Souls, and not at all to our Processions, or Sacrifices, upon which the most profligate Per-

Prayers, called Benedictions.

God is not to be corrupted by Bribes.

Perſons, and thoſe Cities whoſe Sins both againſt God and Man, ariſe to the greateſt height, commonly value themſelves more than good Men. Nor do the Gods ever ſuffer themſelves to be biaſs'd by Preſents, but deſpiſe all thoſe things as *the God* himſelf, and his Prophet have aſſur'd us. *God only regards the Souls of them that offer Sacrifices to him.*

So that it ſeems plain that nothing is ſo precious as Wiſdom and Juſtice both in the ſight of Gods and Men. And none are truly juſt and truly wiſe but thoſe who both in their Words and Actions know how to acquit themſelves of their Duty both to the Gods and to Men. Therefore I would now willingly know what your Sentiments are about what I have been ſaying. *In what true Juſtice, and true Wiſdom conſiſt.*

Alcib. For my part, *Socrates* I can't chooſe but conform my Sentiments in this matter to yours, and thoſe of that God of whom we have been ſpeaking. Would it be reaſonable for me to go about to oppoſe my weak Underſtanding to that of a God, and to contradict his Oracles?

Socrat. Don't you remember you told me you were in great perplexity; for fear you ſhould at unawares pray for Evil things while you deſign'd only to ask for Good?

Alcib. I remember it very well, *Socrates.*

Socrat. You ſee 'tis not at all ſafe for you to go and pray in the Temple, in the Condition you are in, leſt the God hearing your Blaſphemies ſhould reject your Sacrifices, and to puniſh you, ſhould give you what you would not have: I am therefore of the mind that 'tis much better for you to be ſilent, for I know you very well. Your Pride, for that's the ſofteſt Name I can give your Imprudence, your Pride I ſay, probably will not permit you to uſe the Prayer of the Lacedemonians. Therefore 'tis altogether neceſſary you ſhould wait for ſome Perſon to teach you how you ought to behave your ſelf both towards the Gods and Men.

Alcib. And when will that time come, *Socrates*? and who is he that will inſtruct me? with what pleaſure ſhould I look upon him! *Socrat.*

That is God.

Socrat. He will do it, who takes a true Care of you. But methinks, as we read in *Homer*, that *Minerva* diſſipated the Miſt that cover'd *Diomedes* his Eyes, and hinder'd him from diſtinguiſhing God from Man, ſo 'tis neceſſary he ſhould in the firſt place ſcatter the Darkneſs that covers your Soul, and afterwards give you thoſe remedies that are neceſſary to put you in a condition of diſcerning Good and Evil; for at preſent you know not how to make a difference between 'em.

'Tis God alone can diſſipate the Darkneſs of the Mind.

Alcib. Let him ſcatter then, let him deſtroy this Darkneſs of mine, and whatever elſe he pleaſes; I abandon my ſelf to his conduct; and am very ready to obey all his Commands, provided I may but be made better by 'em.

Socrat. Do not doubt of that. For this Governour I tell you of, has a Singular Affection for you.

God has a ſingular Love for Men.

Alcib. I think I muſt defer my Sacrifice to that time.

Socrat. You have reaſon, 'tis more ſafe ſo to do than to run ſo great a Riſque.

Alcib. Well then I'll defer it, *Socrates*; and to expreſs my Thankfulneſs for the good counſel you have given me, give me leave to place on your Head this Crown which I wear on mine. We'll preſent other Crowns to the Gods, and all the Service we owe 'em, when I ſee that happy Day; it will not be long before it come, if they pleaſe.

Socrat. I receive this Favour with very great pleaſure; and ſhall always kindly accept whatever comes from you. And as *Creon* (in *Euripides*) ſeeing *Tireſias* approach him with a Crown of Gold, which was the firſt Fruits of the Spoils of the Enemy, and with which the Athenians had honour'd him for his Art, ſaid, *I take this Crown which is the ſign of Victory for a good Omen; for you ſee, we are alſo in a great ſtorm of War*; ſo I muſt ſay I take the honour I receive at your hand for a happy preſage; for I am in no leſs a Tempeſt than *Creon*, while I am endeavouring to gain the Victory over all your Lovers.

'Tis in Euripides *his* Phœnicians.

The

The Argument of THEAGES.

THE *Ancients cited this Dialogue under the Title of* Wiſdom, *or that of* Philoſophy, *as may be ſeen in* Diogenes Laertius: *But how old ſoever theſe Titles are, they were given by Philoſophers that were unacquainted with the Deſign of* Socrates, *who here propoſes only to treat of the Education of Children, which is the Baſis and Foundation of Philoſophy. As Plants do not thrive well, unleſs it be in Ground that is well prepar'd, and which has been variouſly manured, and alſo receives the benign Influences of the Heavens; ſo Vertues will not grow, unleſs in a Soul well cultivated, and under the Influences of the divine Favour: On this good Education, not only the Happineſs of Families depends, but alſo that of Cities, Republicks, and all States; this is what* Socrates *endeavours to maintain in this Dialogue. The young People of the beſt Families of* Athens, *dazzled with the Glory of* Cimon, Themiſtocles, *and* Pericles; *and full of vain Ambition, thought of nothing but of adhering to the Sophiſts, who promiſed to make 'em very great Politicians, and to put 'em into a Capacity of governing the Athenians and their Allies. Their Parents were tinctur'd with the ſame Folly: The wiſeſt of 'em were thoſe that fear'd the Conſequences of this Ambition, and only diſcover'd the Dangers to which their Children were expos'd by the Corruption of thoſe that inſtructed Youth.* Socrates *here diſcourſes with a Father and a Son of this Character. The Son aims only*

to

to make himself a good Tyrant; and the Father does not blame this Ambition of his Son, provided he avoided the Corruption that reigned at that time. All the Business is to find a good Master. Socrates *makes an admirable Improvement of this Disposition of theirs, to shew, that one Man can never teach another true Wisdom, which alone makes Men govern well; but that the special Favour of God is requisite to this purpose, without which all the Endeavours of Masters and Schollars too prove useless; and this he confirms by Examples. This is the true Subject of this Dialogue, in which we find divers surprizing Truths which shall be explain'd in their place. This Conversation pass'd that year, in which the Athenians were beat at* Ephesus *by* Tisaphernus; *which was the 4th year of the 92d Olympiade, 407 years before the birth of Christ.* Plato *being 20 years of Age, was then the Disciple of* Socrates.

The Character of this Dialogue is the same with that of the two former.

THE-

THEAGES,

OR

Of Wisdom.

Demodocus, Socrates, Theages.

Demod. SOcrates, I have a great mind to discourse with you a little in private, if you are at leisure; and if you are not, I entreat you to take a little time for my Sake, unless your Business is very urgent.

Soc. I have always leisure, and more to serve you than any other Person; if you have a mind to discourse with me, I am ready for you.

Dem. Shall we retire into the Porch of the Temple of *Jupiter Eleutherius?*

Soc. What you please.

We need the help of a God, who is a Saviour, when we take Advice about the Education of Youth.

Dem. * Let us go then, *Socrates*, Methinks Animals, and even Man himself are like Plants: For we who manure the Earth know by experience that 'tis easy to prepare all things necessary before we plant; but when that which we have planted is come up, the care and pains we must take about it is very great and troublesome. 'Tis the same with Men: And I judge of others by my self. There's my Son; ever since he has been born, his Education will not suffer me to rest one moment, but keeps me in continual fear. Without entering into any particular

* In the Original *Demodocus* speaks like a good honest Coutrey Man, who is wholly taken up with Husbandry: But I don't think it necessary to make my Translation speak after that manner.

account

account of all the occasions of Fear I have concerning him, I'll tell you one which has but very lately appear'd; And that is an Ambition he has, which indeed is not dishonourable, but is a very nice and dangerous thing, and makes me afraid. He would fain fall upon the study of * Wisdom. Probably some of his Companions, and some young People of our Town who frequent *Athens*, give him an accounnt of some Discourses they have heard, which have disturb'd his Brain. For he's so full of Emulation that he continually torments me with importunate Intreaties, that I would give a piece of Money to some Sophist to accomplish him. 'Tis not the Charge that I fear; but I see this Passion of his will expose him to great danger. Hitherto I have restrained him by amusing him with good Words; but now that I suppose I can be Master of him no longer; I think the best course I can take is to consent to let him take his own course, for fear the Conversation he may have in secret and without my knowledg should corrupt him. Therefore I am now come to *Athens* to put him under the Tuition of some Sophist; and 'tis very happy that I have met you; for you are the Person whom above all others I should wish to consult upon this Affair. If therefore you have any Advice to give me; I earnestly intreat it of you; and you are too just to refuse me.

Advice is sacred, and consequently ought not to be lightly given: but wellthought on.

Soc. But have you not often heard, *Demodocus*, that Advice is a Sacred Thing: and if it is Sacred in all other occasions of Life, 'tis much more so in this; for of all things, on which a Man can ask advice, there is nothing more Divine than that which respects the Education of Children. First then, let You and I agree, what it is precisely that you desire, and about what we are to consult, lest I understand one thing and you another (as it may often happen); and so at the end of our Discourse we both appear

Nothing is more divine than what belongs to the Education of Children.

* Wisdom is a Word that signifies divers things, as Knowledg, Skill, Vertue. *Plato* uses it for that Science which teaches how to govern States.

ridicu-

ridiculous to our ſelves for having talk'd ſo long without underſtanding one another.

Dem. You ſay right, *Socrates.*

Soc. I ſay right, ay certainly——And yet I don't ſay ſo right as I thought, but retract in part; for it comes into my Mind, that this young Man may have a deſire very different from that which we think he has; which would render us ſtill more ridiculous for conſulting about quite another thing than the Object of his Wiſhes. 'Tis beſt therefore to begin with him, and ask him what it is that he deſires.

Dem. Yes, certainly, that's the beſt way.

Soc. But, I pray, what is this fine young Man's Name?

Dem. His Name is *Theages.*

Soc. * What an excellent, and ſacred Name have you given him! Well, then *Theages*, you deſire to become wiſe, and you urge your Father to find you a Man, whoſe Converſation may furniſh you with that Wiſdom, with which you are ſo much in Love?

Theag. Yes.

Soc. Who are thoſe Perſons you call wiſe, are they ſuch as are skillful in what they have learn'd, or the ignorant?

The. Such as are skillful.

Soc. What! has not your Father caus'd you to be inſtructed in every thing, that the Children of our beſt Citizens learn, as to read, to play on Muſical Inſtruments, to wreſtle, and to perform all other Exerciſes?

The. Yes, my Father has caus'd me to be taught all this.

Soc. Well then! and do you think there is any other Science, in which your Father is oblig'd to cauſe you to be inſtructed?

The. Yes without doubt.

* The Athenians were very careful to give fine Sacred Names to their Children: But all Names are falſe, when they don't deſcribe the Character of thoſe to whom they are given.

Soc.

Soc. What Science is that? Tell me, that I may render you some Service in the Matter.

The. My Father very well knows it; for I have very often told him of it; but he is pleas'd to speak after such a manner to you, as if he did not know what I desir'd. There's no day passes, but he disputes with me, and still refuses to commit me to the Care of some skillful Man.

Soc. But all that you have hitherto said to him, has past only between you two. Now therefore take me for an Arbitrator; and before me declare what Science it is you have a mind to attain. For if you were willing to learn that Science which teaches how to steer Ships, and I should ask you, *Theages*, what Science is it in which you complain your Father is not willing to have you instructed? Would you not immediately answer me, that 'tis the Science of Pilots?

The. Yes doubtless.

Soc. And if you were willing to learn the Art which teaches how to drive Chariots, would you not in like manner tell me, 'tis that of Charioteers?

The. I should tell you the very same thing.

Soc. Has that of which you are so desirous a Name, or has it none?

The. I believe it has a Name.

Soc. Do you know it then without knowing the Name of it?

The. I know it, and I know the Name of it too.

Soc. Tell me what it is then.

The. What other Name can it have than that of Science?

This Name is too general, and does not sufficiently explain the thing enquir'd after, as Socrates is going to shew.

Soc. But is not the Art of *Charioteers* also a Science; what do you think 'tis a piece of Ignorance?

The. No certainly.

Soc. Then 'tis a Science; what is the use of it? Does it not teach us to guide the Horses that are fasten'd to a Chariot?

The. Most certainly.

Soc. And is not the Art of Pilots also a Science?

The. So I think.

Soc. Is it not that which teaches us how to guide ships?

The. The very same.

Soc. Well what is that which you have a mind to learn, and what does that teach us to govern?

The. I think it teaches us to govern Men.

Soc. What, sick Men?

The. No.

Soc. For that belongs to the Medicinal-Art, does it not?

The. Who doubts it?

Soc. Well then does it teach us to regulate the Choir of Musicians?

The. Not at all.

Soc. For that properly appertains to Musick.

The. True.

Soc. But does it teach us to govern those who perform the Exercises?

The. No more than the others.

Soc. For that belongs to the Gymnastick Art. What sort of Men then does it teach us to govern? Explain your self clearly as I have done on the other Sciences.

The. It teaches us to govern those who are in the City.

Soc. But are there not Sick Men too in the City?

The. Without doubt there are, but I don't mean them, I speak of the other Citizens.

Soc. Let's see, if I understand well of what Art you speak, I think you don't speak of that which teaches us to govern Mowers, Vine-dressers, Plow-Men, Sowers, and Threshers; for that belongs to Husbandry. Nor do you speak of that which teaches us to govern those that handle the Saw, the Plane, and the Lathe: for that belongs to the Joyner's Art. But you speak of the Art that teaches to govern not only these but all other Artificers, and all private Persons both Men and Women: Perhaps this is the Science you mean.

The. 'Tis the very same, I had no design to speak of any other.

Soc. But, I pray, answer me, did *Ægisthus* who kill'd *Agamemnon* at *Argos*, govern those sorts of People, Artificers and private Persons, both Men and Women; or others?

The. He govern'd only such as these; are there any other to be govern'd?

Soc. Did not *Peleus* the Son of *Eacus* likewise govern these at *Phthia*? And did not *Periander* the Son of *Cypselus* rule 'em at *Corinth*? Did not *Archelaus* the Son of *Perdiccas*, who some few years since ascended the Throne of *Macedonia*, also command these sorts of People? And did not * *Hippias* the Son of *Pisistratus*, who govern'd in this City, rule our Citizens in like manner?

It was 5 or 6 years before.

He was kill'd at the end of this very Year.

The. Who doubts it?

Soc. Tell me, what do you call † *Bacis*, the Sybile and our *Amphilytus*; *when you would denote their profession.*

The. What should we call 'em but Deviners?

Soc. Very well. Answer me after the same manner about these: What do you call *Hippias*, and *Periander*, when you would denote their profession by the Dominion they Exercise?

The. Tyrants, I think; what other Name can we give 'em?

Soc. Then every one who desires to command all the People in this City, desires to acquire a Dominion like theirs, a Tyrannical Dominion, and to become a Tyrant. *The.* I think so.

* *Hippias*, the Son of *Pisistratus* was Tyrant of *Athens* four years; according to *Thucydides* he succeeded his Father, and not *Hipparchus*. After he had reigned 4 years he was banished; and 20 years after his Exile was kill'd at the Battle of *Marathon*, where he bore Arms for the Persians.

† *Bacis* was a Prophet who long before *Xerxes* made a Descent into *Greece*, predicted to the People all that should befal 'em. *Herodotus* relates some of his Prophesies in his VIII Book; and looks upon 'em to be so formal and plain, since their Accomplishment, that he says, he neither dares accuse these Oracles of Falshood himself, nor suffer others so to do, or to refuse to give Credit to 'em. *Aristophanes* speaks of this Deviner in his *Comedy of Peace*. As for *Amphilytus*, I know nothing of him.

Soc.

Soc. This then is the Science with which you are so much in Love.

The. That is a natural Consequence of what I have said.

Soc. You are a Villain! Do you desire to become our Tyrant; and have the boldness to complain that your Father does not put you under the Conduct of some Person that may qualifie you for Tyrany? ‡ And you, *Demodocus*; who know your Son's Ambition, and have wherewith to send him to be accomplish'd in this fine Science which he desires, are not you asham'd to envy him this Happiness; and not to provide him some great Master? But since he now complains of you, as you see, in my Presence; let us consider whither to send him, and if we know any one whose Conversation may make him an accomplish'd Tyrant.

Dem. Socrates, I beg of you for God's sake let us consider it together. For on such an occasion as this we have need of good Advice.

Demodocus *takes this in earnest, which* Socrates *spoke ironically.*

Soc, Hold a little, let us first know of him what he thinks of the Matter.

Dem. You may ask him what you please.

Soc. Theages, if we had to do with *Euripides*, who somewhere says,

Wise are the Tyrants, who with th' wise Converse.

and should ask him, *Euripides*, in what do you say Tyrants become wise by the Conversation of wise Men? If instead of that he should tell us,

Wise are the Plow-men, who with th' wise Converse,

we should not fail to ask him, in what are the Plow-men render'd wise? Do you think he would give us any other answer than that they are render'd wise in that which belongs to Husbandry?

The. No: He would give no other Answer.

‡ This is an Ironie of *Socrates* founded on what *Demodocus* said at the beginning of this Discourse, *viz.* that his Son had an Ambition that was not dishonourable. *Marsilius Ficinus* and *De Serres* were equally mistaken here; and not perceiving the Ironie corrupted this Passage by their Translation.

Soc. And if he ſhould tell us,

Wiſe are the Cooks, who with the wiſe Converſe, and we ſhould ask him wherein they are made wiſe? What do you think he would anſwer? Would he not ſay they are made wiſe in the Art of Cookery?

The. Without doubt.

Soc. And if he ſhould ſay,

Wiſe are the Wreſtlers, who with th' wiſe Converſe:

Would he not upon the Repetition of the ſame Queſtion give us the ſame Reply, that they are made expert in the Art of Wreſtling? *The.* Yes certainly.

Soc. This being ſo, ſince he tells us,

Wiſe are the Tyrants, who with th' wiſe Converſe:

If we ſhould ask him, *Euripides*, in what are thoſe Tyrants render'd wiſe? What anſwer do you think he would make us? in what would he make this Wiſdom conſiſt? *The.* I proteſt I can't tell.

Soc. Shall I tell you then?

The. With all my heart, if you pleaſe.

Soc. He would ſay they were made wiſe in that Art which *Anacreon* tells us, * the wiſe *Callicrete* knew perfectly well. Don't you remember his Songs?

The. I do remember it.

Soc. Well then don't you deſire to be committed to the Care of ſome Man, who is of the ſame Profeſſion with this Virgin of *Cyane*, and knows like her the Art of forming Tyrants, that you may become our Tyrant, and that of the whole City?

The. Socrates, you have play'd and jeſted on me a great while.

Soc. How! Don't you ſay you deſire to acquire that Science which will teach you to govern all the Citizens? Can you govern them without becoming their Tyrant?

The. I could heartily wiſh to become the Tyrant

* This was a Virgin who employ'd her ſelf in teaching Politicks, as *Aſpaſia*, *Diotima*, and ſome others did after her. The Verſes which *Anacreon* made on her are loſt.

of

of all Mankind, and if that be too much, at leaſt of the greateſt part of 'em; and I believe, *Socrates*, you would have the ſame Ambition as well as all other Men: Nay perhaps it would ſo little content you to be a Tyrant, that you would be a God; but I did not tell you that that was the thing I deſir'd.

This is founded on what Socrates was wont to ſay that Men ſhould labour to make themſelves like God.

Soc. What is it you deſire? Don't you ſay you deſire to govern Citizens?

The. Not to govern them by force as Tyrants do; but by their own Conſent, as thoſe great Men have done which we have had in this City.

Soc. What! as *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, *Cimon*, and other great Politicians have done?

The. Yes.

Soc. Well then, if you had a mind to become very expert in the Art of Horſeman-ſhip, to what Men do you think you ought to apply your ſelf to become a good Horſe-man? Would you go to any other than Querries?

The. No cerrainly.

Soc. Would you not make choice of the beſt Querries; thoſe that have the greateſt Number of Horſes; and ſuch as ride not only their own Horſes, but thoſe of other Men?

The. Without doubt I ſhould chooſe ſuch.

Soc. And if you would become very expert at ſhooting, would you not addreſs your ſelf to the beſt Archers; and to ſuch as beſt know how to uſe all ſorts of Bows and Arrows?

The. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Tell me then, ſince you have a mind to become expert in Politicks, do you think you can acquire this Skill in addreſſing your ſelf to any beſide great Politicians, who have a depth of Judgment in this Science, and know how to conduct, not only their own City, but many others as well of the Greeks as the Barbarians? Or do you think by converſing with any other ſort of Perſons, to become as expert as theſe great Men?

The. Socrates. I have heard talk of ſome Diſ-

courſes of yours; which you made (as 'tis ſaid) to ſhew, that * the Sons of theſe great Politicians were no better than the Sons of Coblers; and as far as I can judg, 'tis an undeniable Truth. I ſhould therefore be a great Fool to believe that any one of 'em, could give me his Wiſdom, which he did not communicate to his own Son, and which he ought to have beſtow'd on him much rather, if he were capable of doing it, than on a Stranger.

Soc. What would yo do then, *Theages*, if you had a Son that follow'd you ſo cloſely every day, telling you he had a mind to be a great Painter? and complained continually that you who were his Father, would not be at the leaſt expence to ſatisfy his deſire; while on the other ſide he deſpis'd the moſt excellent Maſters, and refus'd to go to School to 'em to learn their Art? I ſay the ſame if he had a mind to play well on the Flute, or to be an excellent Harper; ſhould you know any other way to gratify him, or any other People to ſend him to; when he ſhould refuſe ſuch Maſters?

The. For my part I know not what could be done.

Soc. This is exactly the ſame courſe that you take with your Father: How then can you be ſurpriz'd and complain, that he knows not what to do with you, nor where to ſend you to make you an Accompliſh'd Man? *For it lies wholly at your own Door.* If you will, he will immediately put you under the Conduct of our beſt Maſters; and ſuch as are moſt expert in Politicks: You have nothing to do but to chooſe your Teacher; They'll ask nothing of you. So that you may ſave your Money, and acquire with them more Reputation among the People, † than you can obtain in the Converſation of any other.

* All thoſe great Politicians could not teach their Children to be wiſe; a ſure ſign that Wiſdom can't be taught; there is nothing of it in Man, but what God puts into him, as *Socrates* proves more at large in his *Menon*.

† For the common People are very ill Judges, and may be eaſily deceiv'd, they conſtantly take thoſe Men for the moſt wiſe and skilful, who are moſt bold and inſolent.

The.

The. Well then, *Socrates*, are not you likewiſe one of thoſe Great Men? if you'll ſuffer me to attend you 'tis enough, I'll ſeek for no other Maſter.

Soc. What is that you ſay *Theages?*

Dem. Ah *Socrates*, My Son has ſaid very well, and you would do me a great Kindneſs! No, I have no greater Happineſs than to ſee my Son pleas'd with your Company; and that you are ſo good as to permit him to take this Liberty. I am aſham'd to ſay how much I deſire it; but I entreat you both for God's ſake, you, *Socrates*, to receive my Son; and you, Son, never to ſeek any other Maſter than *Socrates*. By this means you'll both deliver me from my greateſt Trouble and Fears. For I am continually ready to die with Fear leſt my Son ſhould fall into the Hands of ſome Perſon that will corrupt him.

Socrates was then perhaps the only Perſon at Athens, *with whom a Man might truſt his Children without danger.*

The. Well, Sir, you may lay aſide your Fears on my account, if you are but happy enough to perſuade *Socrates*, and engage him to be troubled with me.

Dem. Son, you have Reaſon. I'll now apply my ſelf to none but you, *Socrates*; and not to amuſe you with ſuperfluous Diſcourſe; I am ready to give my ſelf up to you, and all that I have in the World: You may entirely diſpoſe of me, if you will love my *Theages*, and procure him all that good, you are capable of doing him.

Soc. I don't wonder, *Demodocus*, that you are ſo very importunate, if you believe your Son may receive Advantage from me; for I know nothing about which a wiſe Father ought to be more earneſt and careful than about what concerns his Son; and what may make him a good Man. But that which ſurprizes me, and which I can't comprehend, is, how you came to think me capable of rendring you this great peice of Service, and of forming him into a good Citizen: And how came he to imagine me to be in a better Condition of aſſiſting him than his Father? For in the firſt place you have liv'd longer in the World than I; you have exerciſed the Principal Offices, and are the moſt conſiderable Perſon in your

What ought to be the greateſt care of a wiſe Father.

For the City was compos'd of divers Towns or Burroughs.

Town; and none is more honour'd or esteem'd than you, in all the rest of the City. Neither you nor your Son see any of these Advantages in me. But if *Theages* despises the Conversation of our Politicians; and is looking after those Persons who promise to educate Youth well, we have here *Prodicus* of *Ceos*, *Gorgias* the *Leontine*, *Polus* of *Agrigentum*, and divers others, who are of so great Ability, that as they go their Rounds from City to City, they make a shift to persuade the young People of all the noblest and richest Families, who might be instructed *Gratis* by one of their own Citizens whom they would please to choose; they make a shift I say, to persuade 'em to renounce those of their own City; and to adhere to them, tho' they must pay 'em great Summs, and after all think themselves under great Obligations to 'em. * These are the Men that you, and your Son should choose, instead of thinking of me; for I know none of those polite and happy Sciences: I would indeed understand 'em with all my heart, but I have always profess'd to acknowledge that I know nothing (as I may say) unless it be one little Science † which only respects Love. And I for my part, dare boast of being more profound in this Science, such as it is, than any of my Predecessors, or those of the present Age.

The. Sir, you see very well, *Socrates* will not trouble himself with me; if he would, I should very readily put my self under his Conduct; but he jests when he thus speaks of himself; for I know divers of my Equals, and others of a more advanc'd Age then mine; who before they attended to him had no great matter of merit; but since they have enjoy'd

* This is an Ironie which *Socrates* uses to ridicule that excessive eagerness, with which the Athenians ran to these Sophists, who were good for nothing but to corrupt their Minds.

† *Socrates* means, that he was only fit to inspire Men with the Love of Wisdom. Without this Love all is dead. This is a Principle of Life, and, as he elsewhere says, the most speedy, most certain and most efficacious help which God has given Men to bring 'em to supream Happiness.

his

his Converſation are in a little time become the fineſt Men in the World; and far ſurpaſs thoſe to whom they were much inferior before.

Soc. *Theages*, Do you know how this comes to paſs?

The. Yes truly I know it very well, and if you were will willing; I ſhould ſoon be like thoſe young Men, and ſhould have no occaſion to envy 'em.

Soc. You are miſtaken, my dear *Theages*, and are very far from the truth; which I am now going to inform you * I have had by the Favour of God, ever ſince I was born, a Genius that always accompanies, and governs me. This Genius is a Voice which whenever it ſpeaks to me always diverts me from what I have a mind to do, and never prompts me to it. When any one of my Friends communicates any deſign to me, if I hear this Voice, 'tis a certain ſign that God does not approve of this deſign, but would divert him from it. I'll name ſeveral Perſons to you, who are Witneſſes of what I ſay. You know the Gallant *Charmides*, *Glaucon's* Son: He came to me one day to acquaint me with a deſign he had to go and contend at the † *Nemean* Games. He had no ſooner begun to communicate this Matter to me, but I heard the Voice; Therefore I endeavour'd to diſſuade him from it, and ſaid thus to him; as ſoon as you began to open your Mouth I heard the Voice of the Genius that guides me, therefore I entreat you not to go. He replied, perhaps this Voice advertiſes you that I ſhall not be Crown'd: but if I don't obtain the Victory, I ſhall however exerciſe my ſelf; I ſhall engage with the reſt, and that is enough. With theſe words he left me, and went to the aboveſaid Exerciſes. You may know

* I *have had by the Favour of God*, the Greek ſays Θεΐα μοίρᾳ *by a Divine Lot*, that is to ſpeak properly *by Predeſtination*; and conſequently by the favour of God. μοῖρα is here the ſame thing as κλῆρος in the Writings of St. *Paul*, as that Learned and Pious Perſon who has lately made a ſmall extract of *Plato* has obſerv'd before me.

† One of the four famous Games of *Greece*, which were celebrated once in three Years near the City of *Nemea* in *Peloponneſus* in honour of *Archemorus*, from

from his own Mouth what befel him, and it well deserves your Notice. And if you would ask *Clitomacus*, the Brother of * *Timarchus*, what this latter told him when he was going to dye for having despis'd the Admonition of my good Genius; and again what was said to him by *Evathlus* who was so famous for running Races, and who entertained *Timarchus* when he fled, he would tell you that *Timarchus* said to him in expres Terms ——

The. What did he say to him, *Socrates?*

Soc. I am going to die because I would not believe Socrates. And if you are curious to know the Story, I'll tell it you. When *Timarchus* rose from Table with *Philemon* the Son of *Philemonides*, to go and kill *Nicias* the Son of *Heroscamander*, for none but they two were in the Conspiracy, as he rose up he said to me, *What do you say to me*, Socrates? *you have nothing to do but to stay all here and drink together; I am obliged to be gone, but will return in a moment if I can.* Upon this I heard the Voice, and immediately calling him back said to him; I beg you would not go out, my good Genius has given his wonted Signal. Upon which he stayed: But some time after rises up again, and says: *Socrates I am going.* The Voice was repeated, and I stop'd him again. In fine because he would escape me he rose up the third time without saying any thing to me; and taking his Opportunity when my Thoughts were otherwise employ'd, he slip'd out, and did that which brought him to his End; This was the reason he told his Brother he was going to die because he would not believe me. You may also learn from many of our Citizens what I told 'em about the Expedition of *Sicily*, and the Shocks that our Army would receive there. But not to mention things that are past, of which you may be easily inform'd by those that know 'em perfectly well; You may now

Under the Government of Alcibiades and Nicias.

* I suppose this is *Timarchus* of *Cheronea* who desir'd to be interr'd near one of *Socrates* his Sons who died a little before. I could never find any footstep of this History elsewhere.

make

make tryal of this Signal which my good *Genius* commonly gives me, that you may see whether he speaks true. For when the brave *Sannion* went for the Army I heard this Voice; and he is now going with * *Thrasyllus* against *Ephesus*, and the other Cities of *Ionia*; I am perswaded he'll dye there, or some Misfortune will befal him; and † I very much fear that Enterprize will not succeed. I have told you all this to make you comprehend, that even for those who are willing to adhere to me, all depends on this good Genius that governs me. ‖ For those whom he opposes can never derive any advantage from me: I can't so much as have any Conversation with 'em. There are many whom he does not hinder me from seeing; and yet these make no greater proficiency than the former; but those, whose Conversation with me is approv'd and favour'd by this good Genius are such as you told me of just now; who in a very little time make a very great progress; in some this Progress is stable and permanent, and takes deep Root; and in others 'tis but for a time: That is while they are with me they advance after a surprizing manner; but they no sooner leave me but they return to their former Condition; and don't at all differ from the Generality of Men. This is what happen'd to *Aristides*, the Son of *Lysimachus*,

* *Thrasyllus* was chosen General with *Thrasybulus* the 4th year of the 92 Olympiade.

† Indeed the Athenians were beaten and repuls'd at *Ephesus*. *Xenoph. Book* I. Therefore *Plutarch* says in the Life of *Alcibiades* that *Thrasyllus* his Army was terribly gall'd under the Walls of *Ephesus*: and that in memory of this Defeat the *Ephesians* erected a Trophy of Brass to the shame of the *Athenians*.

‖ A remarkable Passage. Here are four States of Men. Some are rejected of God for their Wickedness, which can't be hid from him, others are tolerated for a time; God gives 'em time to see, and learn, but they are not attentive, and 'tis only their own fault, that they make no progress. Others are approv'd, but these last succeed very differently: In some the good Seed falling into good Ground takes deep root, and in others it flourishes but for a time; as the Gospel says of those who receive the Word in stony Places or among Thorns. This is the Truth *Socrates* designs to teach in this Place.

and

and Grandſon to *Ariſtides*, while he was with me he made a very ſtrange Progreſs in a very ſhort time but being oblig'd to go in ſome Expedition, he embark'd: At his return he found that * *Thucydides* the Son of *Meleſias*, and Grandſon of *Thucydides* had been willing to be acquainted with me; but it happen'd the day before, I know not how, that he fell out with me for ſome Words we had in diſputing. Now *Ariſtides* coming to ſee me, after the firſt Complements; *Socrates*, ſays he, *I am juſt now told that* Thucydides *is angry with you, and acts with a great deal of Haughtineſs as if he were ſomewhat more than ordinary* 'Tis *true*, ſaid I. † *Ha*, Replied he, *what does he no longer remember what a Slave he was before he ſaw you?* 'Tis *very likely he has forgotten it*, ſaid I. *Truly Socrates*, added he, *A very ridiculous thing has happen'd to me.* I preſently ask'd him what it was. 'Tis *this*, ſaid he. *Before I went for the Army, I was capable of diſcourſing with Men of the greateſt ſenſe; and was not inferiour to any of 'em in Converſation. I made as handſome a figure as another; and always kept company with the* ‖ *beſt and moſt polite Men I could find. Whereas now 'tis quite contrary, I carefully avoid 'em, I am ſo much aſhamed of my Ignorance.* I ask'd him if this Faculty had left him ſuddenly or gradually. He anſwer'd me, *that it left him gradualy. Well how did you come by it*, ſaid I, *was it while you were Learning ſomething of me, or ſome other way? I'll tell you Socrates*, reply'd he, *'Tis a thing that will ſeem incredible, but yet 'tis very true:* ‡ *I could never learn any thing of you, as you know very well.*

* The Grand-Son of *Thucydides* who rivall'd *Pericles* in the Government.

† Men are no better than vile Slaves before they have attended to Philoſophical Diſcourſes.

‖ *Socrates* calls thoſe good and polite, who ſpent their time in diſcourſing on ſolid and agreeable Subjects.

‡ He means he learn'd nothing that had made a deep and laſting Impreſſion on his Mind, he had Opinions only, and not Science ſince he had been by himſelf, but was more knowing when he was with *Socrates*.

How

*However I made some proficiency, if I was but in the same House * where you were, tho' not in the same Room; when I could be in the same Room I advanc'd still more; and whenever you spoke, I sensibly found my self improve yet more when I had my Eyes upon you, than when I look'd another way: But this Progress was incomparably greater, when I sat near you and touch'd you, whereas now all this Habit is utterly vanish'd.* Thus you see, *Theages*, what sort of Conversation is to be had with me. † If it please God, you'll advance considerably, and in a very little time; otherwise your Endeavours will be fruitless. Judge then if it be not more advantagous, and safe for you to apply your self to one of those Masters who are constantly succesful with all their Scholars, than to follow me, with all the hazards you must run. *A handsom Banter on the Sophists.*

The. I'll tell you, *Socrates*, what we ought to do in my Opinion. When we begin to live together, let us try this God that conducts us: If he approves our Conversation; I am at the top of my Wishes: if he disapproves it; let us immediately consider what Course to take, and whether I ought to seek another Master, or should endeavour to appease this God * by Prayers, by Sacrifices, or any other Expiations, which our Deviners teach.

Dem. Don't oppose the young Man's Desires any longer. *Theages* speaks very well.

Soc. If you think 'tis best to do so; with all my heart. I agree with you.

* There are four Degrees of Light, according as you more or less approach wise Men. 'Tis something to lodg in the same House, 'tis a little more to be in the same Room; 'tis a yet greater advantage to have one's Eyes always upon 'em; that so one may loose none of their Words, but the greatest benefit of all, is to be near 'em, and if I may so speak, to be always glew'd to 'em. Few Persons are so confirm'd in Wisdom, that they can lose sight of 'em with Impunity, and without great damage. These different Degrees are still more remarkable in proportion to the Approach we make to the divine Wisdom. I believe this is all the Mystery *Socrates* designs to teach here. We see admirable Proofs of this Truth in the Writings of the Saints.

† For all the Good we either do, or receive, comes from God.

* There are but three ways Men can use to appease the Anger of God; Prayers, Sacrifices, and Purifications. The

The ARGUMENT OF *EUTYPHRON.*

IN all times, and in all Religions there have been Superſtitious Perſons and Hipocrites. Both theſe have offer'd almoſt the ſame Injury to God, and equally hurt Religion. Plato *introduces one of theſe Characters in this Dialogue; for 'tis not eaſy to determine whether* Eutyphron *acts ſuperſtitiouſly or hypocritically; the former is moſt probable,* Eutyphron *goes about to accuſe his own Father of Murder; This is a very unnatural ſtep: But on the other hand 'tis the ſtep of a Man who conſults not Fleſh and Blood; when the Queſtion is about doing an Action ſo agreeable to God as that of bringing a Criminal to Puniſhment. The Buſineſs in hand therefore here is to examine this Action to know if it be juſt. And* Plato *renews this Diſcourſe to ridicule the falſe Religions of the Pagans, and the Plurality of Gods, together with the reſt of their Fables: And to ſhew, that they who then paſt for the moſt intelligent Perſons in Matters of Religion, had indeed no knowledg of it, and render'd God only falſe Worſhip, which diſhonour'd him. This is as great a Deſign as he could have; and he executes it with marvellous Addreſs, to which purpoſe the Perſon againſt whom* Socrates *had diſputed ſerves extremely well. For* Eutyphron *was no ordinary Man; he was a Deviner; and conſequently cloth'd with the Character, and entruſted with the Office of inſtructing others in Religion. Nothing can be more ingenious, and natural than the beginning of this Dialogue, where* Plato *with*

with great Simplicity and Modesty, and without the least appearance of Affectation, discovers at first view, not only the Character of Eutyphron, *and that of all superstitious Persons, who by their Religious Mistakes are commonly carried to the Commission of all sorts of Injuries and Crimes; but also that of* Socrates, *that of his Persecutors, and in general, that of the Athenians. This Dialogue is full of excellent Precepts of Morality and Religion. There's a great deal of Ingenuity and Subtilty in it: The lively Descriptions, the frequent Ironies, and Satyrical Strokes admirably diversify it. Was there ever seen a more subtile piece of Satyr than that which* Plato *makes against* Melitus? *He is not content to mention his Name, and in what part of the City he was born; but likewise draws his Picture; and yet all these Indications can't make him known to* Eutyphron. *He that accuses* Socrates, *and thinks himself capable of reforming the Commonwealth, by shewing what it is that corrupts Youth, and overthrows Religion, is neither known to him whom he accuses, nor to the Ministers of that Religion of which he pretends to be the great Support. All the other like Strokes will be easily observ'd in Reading, and the Beauty of the Character of the superstitious Man, who believes a thing only because he believes it, and who is always near the Truth without ever attaining it, will be plainly discern'd. The Reader will see with Pleasure, that* Eutyphron *is a good honest Man, who has upright Intentions, but is so full of respect for the Fables that have been taught him, that he receives 'em all as sacred without ever entertaining the least suspicion concerning 'em; he is so swell'd with Pride, and full of that precipitant Confidence, which Superstition commonly inspires, that he publishes his Visions as certain Truths, not to be contradicted by any Man. And* Socrates, *who makes, as if he were willing to be instructed, receives his Doctrine with refin'd Ironies, and ambiguous Railleries; and at length confutes it with abundance of Strength and Solidity.*

EUTYPHRON,

OR

Of Holineſs.

Eutyphron, Socrates.

Eut. WHat News *Socrates?* What have you left the Company of *Lyceus* to come hither into the King's Porch? you have no buſineſs to bring you hither, as I have.

This King's Porch was a place on the right ſide of the Ceramique, *where one of the nine* Archons, *who was called the King, preſided for the ſpace of a Year, and took Cogniſeance of the Affairs of* Orphans, *and of* Outrages *that were committed againſt Religion.*

Soc. 'Tis ſomewhat worſe than buſineſs, *Eutyphron*, the *Athenians* call it an Accuſation.

Eut. How do you ſay? then 'tis likely ſome body accuſes you, * for I can never believe you would accuſe any one.

Soc. You are in the right.

Eut. Well who is your Accuſer?

Soc. I don't know very well my ſelf, I take him to be a Young Man who is not yet known, I think his Name is *Melitus*, he is of the Town of *Pitheus*; If you remember any one of that Quarter of the City who bears that Name, who has Lank Hair, a Thin Beard and a Crooked Noſe, that is the Man.

Eut. I don't remember any ſuch Perſon, *Socrates*, but I pray, what is the Charge he brings againſt you?

Soc. What is the Charge? Why 'tis ſuch a one as ſhews him to be no Ordinary Man. For 'tis no

* This is very remarkable. *Eutyphron* who is going to accuſe his own Father can't believe that *Socrates* is capable of accuſing any Man. *Plato* makes uſe either of the precipitancy of this Superſtitious Man, or of the good opinion he has of himſelf, to inſinuate that at *Athens* honeſt Men never drove the Trade of Accuſers.

little

little thing to be so knowing in such Important and Sublime matters at an Age so little advanc'd as his. He says he knows how our Youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt 'em. He seems to be some able Man who has taken notice of my Ignorance, and is come to accuse me for having corrupted his Companions; and to bring me before the City as our Common Mother. And it must be confess'd, he seems the only Person that knows how to lay the foundations of good Policy. For 'tis reasonable that a States-Man should always begin with the Education of Young People, to render them as Vertuous as may be; as a Good Gardiner bestowes his first Labour and Care on the Young Plants, and then passes on to the others, *Melitus* doubtless takes the same Course; and begins by cutting us up who hinder the Young Plants from sprouting and improving. After this without doubt he'll extend his beneficent Labours to those Plants that are more advanc'd; and will by this means do the greatest kindness imaginable to the City. This is what may be expected from a Person that knows so well how to begin at the right end.

The Education of Youth is the Foundation of good Policy.

Eut. I should be glad to see it, *Socrates*, but I tremble for fear of the Contrary, * for in attacking you he seems to me to attack the City in the most sacred part of it: But I pray tell me what he says you do thus to corrupt Young People.

Soc. He says I do such things as at first hearing must needs seem absurd and impossible, for he says I am Forger of Gods, that I introduce New Gods, and do not believe the Old ones. This is the Charge he has against me.

Eut. I understand you; 'tis because you say you have a Genius that dayly guides you. Upon this he accuses you of introducing new Opinions in Re-

* The Greek says, *in injuring you he labours to ruine the City, and begins by the Fire-side.* It was a Proverb in *Greece. to begin by the Fire-side.* when they spoke of beginning with what was most excellent and sacred; for the Fire side contain'd the Domestick Gods. So that this was a great Encomium of *Socrates.* Wise Men are to Cities what Domestick Gods are to Families.

ligion, and comes to defame you in this Court, well knowing that the Mob is always ready to receive this sort of Calumnies. What do not I my self meet with, when in publick Assemblies I speak of Divine things, and predict what shall come to pass? They all laugh at me as a Fool; not that any one of the things I have foretold has fail'd of its Accomplishment; but the Business is this, they envy all such as we are. And what remains for us to do? The best way is never to trouble our Heads about it; but to go on still in our own way.

Soc. My dear *Eutyphron*, is it so great an Unhappiness to be laugh'd at? For at bottom I believe the Athenians don't much trouble their Heads to examine whether a Man has a great Capacity or not; provided he does not go about to teach others what he knows. But I believe if a Man should make it his business to teach, they would be down-right Angry, either out of Envy as you intimate, or for some other Reason that we know not.

The Character of the Athenians which agrees well with the Account St. Luke gives us of 'em in the Acts of the Apostles.

Eut. I have no mind to try to my Cost, as you do, what Sentiments they have of me.

Soc. That's another Matter; * It may be you are very reserv'd, and do not willingly communicate your Wisdom to others, whereas I am affraid they think the Love I bear to all Mankind engages me too freely to teach 'em all I know, not only without asking a Reward, but even by preventing them, and pressing 'em to hear me. But if they would content themselves with laughing at me, as you say they do at you, it would be no unpleasant thing to spend some hours in this Court in Laughing and Divertisement; but if they take up the Matter in earnest, none but you Deviners know what will be the Event of it.

Eut. Perhaps you may sustain no damage, but may

* *Socrates* makes use of the Confession which he has drawn out of *Eutyphron*, to show by this Deviner the Character of those who were set up to teach Religion. They neither taught, nor refuted any thing, but through fear left the People in Superstition and Ignorance.

come

come to a happy Iſſue in your Buſineſs, as well as I in mine.

Soc. Have you buſineſs here then? are you Defendant or Plaintiff?

Eut. I am Plaintiff.

Soc. Whom do you proſecute?

Eut. If I ſhould tell you, you would take me for a Fool.

Soc. How! Do you proſecute one that can't be taken? Has he got Wings?

Eut. The Perſon I proſecute, inſtead of having Wings, is ſo old that he can ſcarce walk.

Soc. Who is he?

Eut. 'Tis my Father.

Soc. Your Father!

Eut. Yes my Father.

Soc. Of what do you accuſe him?

Eut. Of Murder.

Soc. Of Murder, good God! That's an Accuſation indeed above the comprehenſion of the People, who will never conceive that it can be juſt: an ordinary Man would have enough to do to give it any tolerable Colour. * This is a thing that belongs only to him who is arriv'd at the higheſt pitch of Wiſdom.

Eut. You ſay true, *Socrates*, it belongs only to ſuch a Perſon.

Soc. Is it any one of your Relations that your Father has kill'd? Without doubt it muſt be ſo; for you would not proſecute your Father in a Court of Juſtice for the ſake of a Stranger.

Eut. What an Abſurdity is that, *Socrates*, to think that in this reſpect there is any difference between a Relation and a Stranger! The thing is equal; that which ought chiefly to be conſider'd, is to examine whether the Perſon that has kill'd him, did

A falſe Principle: for Juſtice puſh'd too far becomes Injuſtice and Impiety.

* From this Principle of *Socrates* it follows by a juſt conſequence, that it is only God's Province to command and authorize ſuch Actions as appear ſevere and cruel to Nature, which is a great Truth.

it juſtly or unjuſtly. If it was juſtly, he ought not to be put to any trouble, but if unjuſtly, you are oblig'd to proſecute him, whatever Friendſhip or Relation there is between you. To have the leaſt Converſation with him is to make your ſelf an Accomplice of his Crime, and ſo it is not to proſecute him to bring him to Puniſhment, which alone can purifie and expiate you both. But to apprize you of the Fact. The deceaſed was one of our Farmers, who rented a piece of Land of us when we dwelt at *Naxus*: This Man having one day drank too much fell into a paſſion, and was ſo tranſported with Rage againſt one of our Slaves that he kill'd him. My Father order'd him to be caſt into a deep Pit with his Hands and Feet bound, and immediately ſent hither to conſult * one of thoſe who have the Inſpection of Religious Matters, and Caſes of Conſcience, to know what he ſhould do with him, and in the mean time neglected this poor Priſoner, and left him without ſuſtenance, as an Aſſaſſin whoſe Life was of no Conſequence; ſo that he dyed: Hunger, Cold and the Weight of his Chains kill'd him, before the Perſon my Father had ſent return'd. Upon this our whole Family falls upon me, becauſe I for the ſake of an Aſſaſſin, accuſe my Father of Murder, which they pretend he has not committed; and if he had, they maintain I ought not to proſecute him, becauſe the deceaſed was a Villain and a Murderer, and beſides they ſay 'tis an impious Action for a Son to prefer a Criminal Proceſs againſt his Father; ſo blind are they about divine things, and ſo uncapable of diſcerning what is Profane and Impious, from what is Juſt and Holy.

Soc. But, I pray, *Eutyphron*, do you your ſelf think you ſo accurately underſtand all Divine things, and that you can ſo preciſely diſtinguiſh between what

* In *Greece* there were Interpreters of divine things, who were publick Perſons, to whom the People addreſs'd themſelves in all weighty Caſes. Thoſe who were any thing devout would not undertake the leaſt thing without having firſt conſulted them.

is

is Holy, and what is Profane, that the State of the Case being as you say, you can prosecute your Father without fearing to commit an impious Action?

Eut. Else I should be very uneasy; and *Eutyphron* would scarce have any advantage above other Men, if he did not understand all these things perfectly well.

Soc. O admirable *Eutyphron*, I see then the best Course I can take, is to become your Disciple, and before the Determination of my Process, to let *Melitus* know, that I have hitherto look'd upon it as the greatest advantage in the World, to have a good Understanding in Divine Things, and to be well instructed in Religion; but now seeing he accuses me of falling into Error, and of rashly introducing new Opinions about the Deity, I have put my self into your School. So that, *Melitus* (I'll say) if you acknowledge *Eutyphron*, to be a Person of Ability in those Matters, and that he has good Notions; I declare to you I have embrac'd the same Sentiments. Therefore forbear to prosecute me any farther. And if on the contrary, you think *Eutyphron* is not Orthodox, cause the Master to be call'd in question before you meddle with the Scholar; he is the cause of all this Mischief, 'tis he that ruins both his Father and Me. He ruins me in teaching me a false Religion, and he ruins his Father in prosecuting him by the Principles of this same Religion, which you account so pernicious; and if he continues to prosecute me without any regard to my Request, or leaves me to pursue you, you will not fail to make your Appearance, and to speak the same thing which I shall have signified to him.

'Tis the greatest Advantage in the World to be well instructed in Religion.

Eut. Upon my Word, *Socrates*, if he is so impudent as to attack me, I shall soon find his weak side, and shall at least run but half the Danger.

Soc. I know it very well, and that is the reason I am so desirous of being your Disciple, being well assur'd, that no Person is so bold as to dare look

you in the face; no not *Melitus* himself; who looks so intently, and who can see so well to the bottom of my Soul, that he accuses me of Impiety.

In the mean time then, tell me, I beseech you what you just now affirm'd, and which you know so well, *viz.* what is Holy and Just, Impious and Unjust, in respect of *killing Men* for Instance, and so in all other Subjects that may offer themselves to us. Is not Sanctity always like it self in all sorts of Actions, and is not Impiety, which is it's conttary, always the same too, so that the same Idea, the same Character of Impiety is always found in every thing which is impious?

Eut. 'Tis certainly so, *Socrates.*

Soc. What is it then that you call Pious and Holy, Profane and Impious?

A wrong Definition which springs from blind Zeal.

Eut. I call that Pious and Holy, for Example, which I am doing to day, namely to prosecute every Man who commits Murder, Sacrilege, and such other Crimes, whether it be Father, Mother, Brother, or any other Person. And I call it an impious thing to suffer the Criminal quietly to enjoy his Crime. I pray, *Socrates*, mind well what I say; I'll give you very certain Proofs, that my Definition is * conformable to the Law. I have already mention'd it to many Persons, and have made 'em confess, that there is nothing more just, than not to spare a wicked Man, let him be who he will: All Men are convinc'd that *Jupiter* is the best and most just of all the Gods, and all agree, that he put his Father in Chains, because he, contrary to all manner of Justice devour'd his Children. *Saturn* had before treated his Father with yet greater Severity for some other Fault. And yet People cry out against me, when I prosecute my Father for an Atrocious Act of Injustice; and they fall into a manifest Contradicti-

* 'Tis so indeed; but it is ill applied here; and is not true on all Occasions, as it is not on this. That which *Eutyphron* here calls the Law, is the Law of Nature, which teaches us to imitate God in all we know of him.

on,

on, in judging so differently of the Actions of those Gods, and mine, * in which I had no other design than that of imitating them.

Soc. Is this the thing, *Eutyphron*, which has brought me to day to this Bar; because when I am told these Tales of the Gods I can't hear 'em without Pain? Is this the Crime with which I am going to be charg'd? If you who are so able in Matters of Religion agree with the People in this, and believe these Stories 'tis absolutely necessary that I should believe 'em too, who confess ingenuously that I know nothing of these Matters; shall I pretend to be wiser than my Teachers, and make head against them? Therefore I beg of you in the name of that God who presides over Friendship, do not deceive me, do you believe all these things you say?

Eut. I not only believe these, but others too that are more surprizing, of which the People are wholly ignorant. *Doubtless he means those Mysteries which were known only to those that were initiated.*

Soc. You seriously believe then that there are great Quarrels, Animosities and Wars among the Gods? You believe all those others Passions reign among 'em, which are so surprizing, and are represented by Poets and Painters in their Poems and Pictures, which are expos'd to view in all parts of our Temples; and † are wrought with various Colours in that mysterious Tapistry, which is carried in procession to the Citadel every fifth Year, during the *Panathenea*? must we receive all these things as so many great Truths, *Eutyphron*. *The Feast of* Minerva.

Eut. Not only these, *Socrates*, but a great many others besides, as I told you just now, which I will

* The imitation of those false Gods could only produce very ill Actions, as the Poets themselves have acknowledged.

† This Tapistry was the Sail of *Minerva*'s Ship, on which the Principal Actions of this Goddess were describ'd in Needle-work; which after it had been expos'd in the Ship at the beginning of the Feast, was carried in Procession. The Ship was roll'd along on firm Ground to the Temple of *Ceres* at *Eleusine*, from whence it was brought back, and carried to the Citadel; and the Statue of the Goddess was at last adorn'd with it.

explain to you if you pleaſe; and upon my word they'll make you wonder.

Soc. No, they will not make me wonder much, but you may explain 'em to me another time when you are more at leiſure; I pray endeavour now to explain to me what I ask'd you, a little more clearly; for you have not yet fully anſwer'd my Queſtion, you have not taught me what Holineſs is. You have only told me that that is a holy thing which you do in accuſing your Father of Murder.

Eut. And I have told you the Truth,

Soc. It may be ſo; but are there not a great many other things which you call Holy?

Eut. Without doubt there are.

Soc. I intreat you therefore to remember that what I ask'd you was not to teach me one or two holy Things among a great many others that are ſo too; but to give me a clear and diſtinct Idea of the Nature of Holineſs, and of that which cauſes all holy Things to be holy. For you told me your ſelf, that there is only one and the ſame Character which makes all holy Things to be what they are; as there is one that makes Wickedneſs to be always Wickedneſs: don't you remember it?

Eut. O ho, yes, I remember it.

Soc. Then teach me to know what this Character is, that I may have it always before my Eyes, and may uſe it as the true Model, and real Original, that ſo I may be in a Condition to affirm of every thing which I ſee you or others do, that that which reſembles it is holy, and that which does not reſemble it is wicked.

Eut. If that's it you deſire, *Socrates*, I am ready to ſatisfie you. *Soc.* Truly that's what I would have.

A Second Definition of Holineſs.

Eut. I ſay then that Holineſs is that which is agreable to the Gods, and Wickedneſs is that which is diſagreable to 'em.

Soc. Very well, *Eutyphron*, you have at laſt anſwer'd me preciſely according to my Queſtion. But I don't yet know whether you ſpeak true: However ſurely

ſurely you will know how to convince me of the Truth of what you advance.

Eut. I'll anſwer you.

Soc. Come then, let us lay down what we ſay plainly. A holy Thing, or a holy Man, is a Thing, or a Man that is agreable to God; a wicked Thing, or a wicked Man, is a Man, or Thing that is diſagreable to him; thus what is Holy and what is Wicked are directly oppoſite; are they not?

Eut. That's beyond contradiction.

Soc. I think this is very well lay'd down.

Eut. I think ſo too, *Socrates.*

Soc. But have we not alſo affirm'd that * the Gods have frequent Animoſities and Contentions among themſelves, and are often embroil'd and divided one againſt another? *Eut.* Yes, without doubt.

Soc. Therefore let us now examine what may be the Occaſion of that difference of Sentiments that produces thoſe Quarrels and that Enmity among 'em. If you and I ſhould diſpute about Numbers, to know which was the greater, would this difference make us Enemies, and carry us to all manner of Exceſſes and Violences? Should we not immediately ſet our ſelves to reckon, that we might preſently be of the ſame Mind?

Eut. 'Tis very true, we ſhould ſo.

Soc. And if we ſhould diſpute about the different bigneſs of Bodies, ſhould we not preſently go about meaſuring 'em, and would not that ſoon put an end to our Diſpute?

Eut. It would ſo.

Soc. And if we ſhould conteſt about Weight, would not our Difference be ſoon determin'd by means of a pair of Scales?

Eut. No doubt of it.

Soc. Well then, what is there, about which, if we ſhould come to diſpute without having a certain Rule to which we might recur, we ſhould be-

* *Socrates* refutes this Definition of Holineſs, by ſhewing that it can't ſubſiſt with their Theology.

come

come irreconcileable Enemies, and fall into an extravagant Paſſion one againſt the other? Perhaps none of theſe things at preſent occurs to your Mind. I'll tell you ſome of 'em, and you ſhall judge whether I am in the right. Is it not what is Juſt and Unjuſt, Comely and Indecent, Good and Evil? Are not not theſe the things about which we every day differ, and not finding a ſufficient Rule to make us accord, we fall into the greateſt Enmity? When I ſay *We* I ſpeak of all Mankind in general.

Eut. That indeed is the true Cauſe of all our Lawſuites, and all our Wars.

Soc. And if it be true, that the Gods are at Variance among themſelves about any thing, muſt it not neceſſarily be ſome one of theſe?

Eut. It muſt needs be ſo.

Soc. * According to you then, Excellent *Eutyphron*, the Gods are divided about what is Juſt and Unjuſt, Comely and Indecent; Good and Evil. For if they did not conteſt about theſe things, they would have no occaſion of wrangling, but would be always united; would they not? *Eut.* You ſay very right.

Soc. And the things which each God takes to be Comely, Good and Juſt, are lov'd by him, and the contrary hated.

Eut. Moſt certainly.

Soc. According to you then one and the ſame thing ſeems Juſt to ſome of them and Unjuſt to others, ſeeing Wars and Seditions are ſtir'd up among 'em by ſuch Diſputes as theſe. Is it not ſo?

Eut. 'Tis ſo without doubt.

Soc. Hence it follows, that one and the ſame thing is the object both of the Love and Hatred of the Gods, and is at the ſame time pleaſing and diſpleaſing to 'em.

Eut. So it ſeems.

Soc. And conſequently, according to you, what is Holy and Profane are the ſame thing.

Eut. I grant, this conſequence may be Juſt.

* *Socrates* handſomly ridicules thoſe Gods, who know not what Juſtice and Injuſtice, Vice and Vertue are.

Soc.

Soc. Than you have not anſwer'd my Queſtion, Incomparable *Eutyphron*; for I did not ask you what it was that at the ſame time was Holy and Profane, Pleaſing and Diſpleaſing to the Gods. So that I foreſee 'tis poſſible without a Miracle, that the Action you are about to day in proſecuting your Father to bring him to Puniſhment, may pleaſe *Jupiter*, and at the ſame time may diſpleaſe *Cœlus* and *Saturn*; may be approv'd by *Vulcan*, and diſapprov'd by *Juno*, and ſo of the reſt of the Gods who may be of different Sentiments.

Eut. But *Socrates*, I ſuppoſe there's no diſpute about this among the Gods, nor does any one of 'em pretend, that he who has kill'd a Man unjuſtly ſhould be ſuffer'd to go unpuniſh'd.

Soc. Neither is there any Man that pretends to that: Did you ever ſee any one that dar'd put the matter in Queſtion, whether he that had willfully murder'd a Man, or committed any other Act of Injuſtice, ought to be puniſh'd or not?

Eut. We every where hear and ſee ſcarce any thing elſe before the Tribunals but Perſons who have committed Acts of Injuſtice, ſaying and doing what they can to avoid Puniſhment.

Soc. But do the Perſons of whom you ſpeak, *Eutyphron*, confeſs that they have done thoſe Acts of Injuſtice of which they are accus'd; and after this Confeſſion maintain that they ought not to be puniſh'd?

Eut. They have no Mind to confeſs ſo, *Socrates*.

Soc. Then they do not ſay and do all they can; for they dare neither maintain nor aſſert, that when their Injuſtice is manifeſt, and ſufficiently atteſted, they ought not to be chaſtiz'd for it. Is it not ſo?

Eut. 'Tis very true.

Soc. They don't put the Matter in Queſtion, whether he that is guilty of Injuſtice ought to be puniſh'd; No body doubts of that; but that about which they diſpute is the Nature of Injuſtice, to determine in what, how, and on what Occaſion it is committed.

Eut.

Eut. That's certain.

Soc. And is it not the ſame in Heaven, if it be true, as you have aſſerted that the Gods are at Variance about what is Juſt and Unjuſt? Do not ſome of 'em affirm that others of 'em are Unjuſt, and don't the latter maintain the Contrary. For there is not one among them no more than among us who dares advance ſuch a Notion as this, that he that commits Injuſtice ought not to be puniſh'd.

Eut. All you ſay is true, *Socrates*, at leaſt in general.

Soc. You may ſay in particular too. For 'tis about particular Actions that both Men and Gods diſpute every day; if it be true that the Gods diſpute about any thing: Do not ſome ſay ſuch an Action is Juſt, and others that 'tis Unjuſt?

Eut. Yes Doubtleſs.

Soc. Come then, my dear *Eutyphron*, for my particular Inſtruction tell me what certain Proof you have that the Gods all diſapprove the Death of your Farmer, who after he had ſo barbarouſly knock'd his fellow ſervant on the head, was laid in Irons, and ſo periſh'd before your Father had receiv'd the anſwer which he expected from *Athens*. Demonſtrate to me that on this occaſion 'tis a pious and juſt Action for a Son to accuſe his Father of Murder, and to endeavour to bring him to Puniſhment for it; and ſee if you can fairly and evidently prove to me, that the Action of ſuch a Son is pleaſing to the Gods. If you do this I ſhall never ceaſe to admire and celebrate your Capacity as long as I live.

Eut. This is ſomewhat difficult indeed; to prove it to you. For my part I could prove it as evidently as——————

Soc. I underſtand you. That is to ſay, You think I have a duller head than any of your Judges; for as to them, there's no difficulty in the Caſe, you'll make it appear to them that your Farmer was unjuſtly kill'd, and that all the Gods diſapprove your Father's Action.

Eut.

Eut. I'll make it appear to 'em at clear as the Light. provided they will but hear me.

Soc. Oh! They will not fail to hear you, * provided you make a fine Speech to 'em. But I'll tell you what Reflection I just now made, while I was hearkning to what you said; I said within my self; suppose it were possible for *Eutyphron* to persuade me that all the Gods are of the Mind that this Farmer was unjustly kill'd; should I be ever the wiser, should I understand, better than I do, what is Holy and what Profane? The Death of this Farmer is displeasing to the Gods, as he pretends, I'll grant it; but this is not a definition of what is Holy, and its contrary, seeing the Gods are divided; and that which is disagreable to some of them is agreable to others: Very well, I pass that, *Eutyphron*: I am willing to suppose that all the Gods account your Father's Action unjust, and that they all abhor it: I pray then let us correct our Definition a little, and say, *That which all the Gods condemn is Profane, and that which all the Gods approve is Holy: and that which is approv'd by some of 'em, and disapprov'd by others, is neither one nor t'other, or rather is both together.* Shall we stand by this Definition of what is Holy and what Profane?

Eut. What should hinder us, *Socrates*?

Soc. For my part I'll not hinder it; but do you see your self if this suites your Opinion; and if upon this Principle you can instruct me better in what you have been endeavouring to teach me.

Eut. And for my part I shall make no Difficulty of asserting, that that is Holy which all the Gods approve, and that Profane, which they all disapprove.

Soc. Examine this Definition to see if it be true, or shall we receive it without any Ceremony? and

* *Socrates* reproaches the Athenians, that they lov'd to hear such as could talk finely, and did not much trouble their Heads about the Truth of Things: We learn from the Sacred History that this was the Character of the Athenians; they spent their Time in hearing either Novelists or Orators.

shall

ſhall we have that reſpect for our ſelves and others, as to give our Aſſent to all our Imaginations and Fancies; ſo that for a Man to tell us a thing is ſo, ſhall be ſufficient to gain our Belief; or is it neceſſary to examine what is ſaid to us?

Eut. Without doubt we ſhould examine it; and I am well aſſur'd that what we have laid down is a good Poſition.

Soc. That we ſhall ſee preſently. Hear me a little. * Is that which is Holy belov'd of the Gods, becauſe it is Holy, or is it Holy, becauſe it is belov'd of 'em?

Eut. I don't well underſtand what you ſay, *Socrates.*

Soc. I'll endeavour to explain my ſelf. Don't we ſay, that a thing is carried, and that a thing carries? that a thing is ſeen, and that a thing ſees; that a thing is mov'd, and that a thing moves it? and the like to Infinity? Do you conceive that they are different? and do you underſtand in what they differ?

Eut. I think I do.

Soc. Is not the thing belov'd different from that which loves?

Eut. A pretty Queſtion indeed!

Soc. Tell me then is the thing, which is carried, carried becauſe one carries it; or for ſome other Reaſon?

Eut. Becauſe one carries it; without doubt.

Soc. And the thing mov'd is mov'd becauſe one moves it; and the thing ſeen becauſe one ſees it?

Eut. Moſt certainly,

* This Thought is too high for *Eutyphron*, who conceiving Holineſs as a thing diſtinct from God, could not tell how to comprehend that which is Holy is at the ſame time lov'd of God, becauſe it is Holy; and Holy becauſe lov'd of God: For Holineſs comes from God, *Sanctitas primitiva*; and the Holineſs of Men is the effect of the Divine Communion, which *Socrates* underſtood, and of which he elſewhere ſpeaks. So that *Socrates* here ſpeaks with reference to the groſs manner of conceiving the things of Religion which was to be found in ignorant Men; who judg'd of this as of all other things in which the Relatives are very different, as that which is lov'd is different from that which loves, that which is moved is different from that which moves it, *&c.*

Soc.

Soc. Then it is not true that one ſees a thing becauſe it is ſeen, but on the contrary 'tis ſeen becauſe one ſees it. 'Tis not true that one moves a thing becauſe 'tis mov'd, but it is mov'd becauſe one moves it: Nor is it true, that one carries a thing becauſe 'tis carried, but 'tis carried becauſe one carries it: Do you underſtand me now? Is this plain enough? My meaning is, that one does not do a thing becauſe it is done, but that it is done becauſe one does it? that a Being which ſuffers does not ſuffer becauſe it is paſſive; but is paſſive becauſe it ſuffers. Is not this true?

Eut. Who doubts it?

Soc. Is not that which is lov'd ſomething that is done, or that ſuffers?

Eut. Certainly.

Soc. Then 'tis with that which is lov'd as 'tis with all other things; 'tis not becauſe it is lov'd that one loves it, but one the contrary 'tis becauſe one loves it that it is lov'd.

Eut. That's as clear as the Light.

Soc. What ſhall we ſay then of that which is Holy, my dear *Eutyphron*? ſhall we not ſay, it is belov'd of the Gods, as you have aſſerted?

Eut. Yes certainly.

Soc. But is it belov'd becauſe it is Holy, or is it for ſome other Reaſon?

Eut. 'Tis for no other Reaſon.

Soc. Then it is belov'd becauſe it is Holy; but it is not Holy becauſe it is belov'd.

Eut. So I think.

Soc. But is it not belov'd of the Gods becauſe the Gods love it?

Eut. Who can deny it?

Soc. * Then that which is belov'd of God is not the ſame with that which is Holy, nor that which

It is belov'd ſo far as it is Holy. 'Tis this Quality that renders it aimable.

* This is evident, ſeing what is Holy is lov'd only becauſe it is Holy; and that which is lov'd is lov'd only becauſe one loves it, there muſt needs be a difference between theſe two, *viz.* what is *Lov'd* and what is *Holy*.

is

is Holy the same with that which is belov'd, as you say; but they are very different.

Eut. How then, *Socrates?*

Soc. Because we are agreed that that which is Holy is belov'd because it is Holy, and that it is not true that it is Holy because it is belov'd; are we not agreed in that?

Eut. I confess it.

Soc. We are farther agreed that that which is belov'd of the Gods is belov'd of 'em only because they love it; and that it is not true, to say they love it, because it is belov'd.

Eut. That's right.

Soc. * But, my dear *Eutyphron*, if that which is belov'd of the Gods, and that which is Holy were the same thing, seeing that which is Holy is belov'd only because it is Holy, It would follow that the Gods should love that which they love, only because it is belov'd of 'em: And on the other hand, if that which is belov'd of the Gods were lov'd only because they love it, than it would be true likewise to say, that which is Holy, is Holy, only because 'tis belov'd of them. By this therefore you see that those two terms, *belov'd of the Gods* and *Holy* are very different. One is belov'd because the Gods love him, and another is lov'd only because he deserves to be lov'd. Thus, my dear *Eutyphron*, when you should have given me an exact answer what it is to be Holy, to be sure you were not willing to explain to me wherein the Essence of it consists by an accurate Definition, but were content to shew one of its Qualities, which is that of being belov'd of the Gods, but you have not given me an Account of the Nature of it. I conjure you therefore, if you think fit, discover this great secret to me, and beginning with it from its very Principle, teach me precisely to know what *Holiness* is, without having respect to any thing

* For if these two Terms *Belov'd* and *Holy* were the same thing, one might be put for t'other, whence all that Absurdity would follow which *Socrates* represents here.

that

that is adventitious, as whether it be belov'd of the Gods or not. For we shall have no dispute about that. Come then, tell me freely; what is it to be *Holy*, and what to be *Profane*.

For when one knows the Nature of a thing, one may easily know whether it be lov'd or hated of God.

Eut. But, *Socrates* I know not how to explain my Thoughts to you on this Subject; for all that we lay down vanishes from us, and does not continue fix'd and stable in what Condition soever we put it.

Soc. All the Principles, *Eutyphron*, which you have establish'd are somewhat like * the Figures of *Dedalus* one of my Ancestors. If I had asserted 'em to be sure you would not have fail'd to jeer and reproach me, as if I had deriv'd this pretty Quality of making things that slip out of a Man's Hands, when he thinks he holds 'em fastest: But it unhappily falls out that 'tis you that have asserted 'em. Therefore I must seek for some other turns of Raillery, for 'tis certain your Principles give us the slip, as you see very well.

Eut. For my part, *Socrates*, I need not seek any other turn of Raillery: that suites you perfectly well: for 'tis not I that inspire our reasonings with this Instability, which hinders 'em from fixing, but you are the *Dedalus*. If I were alone, I tell you they would continue firm and steady.

Soc. Then I am more expert in my Art than *Dedalus* was, he could only give this Mobility to his own Works, whereas it seems I give it not only to my own, but also to those of other Men: and that which is yet more strange is that I am thus expert against my will; for I should much rather choose

* *Dedalus* was an excellent Carver, who made Statues that had Springs within 'em, by means of which they would start out and go along as if they had been alive. There were two sorts of 'em, as appears by what is said in *Menon*. What *Socrates* says here of *Dedalus*, that he was one of his Ancestors, is only in Raillery. *Dedalus* descended from the Kings of *Athens*; and *Socrates* was very far from having the Vanity of pretending to be of that Family. His meaning is only this, that he knew how to make himself Wings, as *Dedalus* did, to fly towards Heaven, and to raise his Mind to the knowledg of divine Things. This Matter was spoken of in the first *Alcibiades*.

to have my Discourses continue fix'd and unmovable, than to have all the Riches of *Tantalus* together with all the Skill of *Dedalus* my Progenitor. But enough of this Jesting. Seeing you are affraid of the Trouble, I'll endeavour to ease you, and to open a shorter way to conduct my self to the knowledge of what is Holy. And you shall see if it does not appear to be of absolute necessity that whatever is Holy is Just. *Eut.* It cannot be otherwise.

Soc. Do you think whatever is Just is Holy, or whatever is Holy is Just? or do you suppose that that which is Just is not always Holy; but only that there are some Just things that are Holy, and others which are not so?

Eut. I can't well comprehend what you mean, *Socrates.*

Soc. And yet you have two great Advantages above me; having both more Youth, and more Capacity than I. But, as I just now told you, swimming in the Delicious abundance of your Wisdom, you are affraid of putting your self to much trouble. Shake off, I beseech you, this effeminate Softness, and apply your self a little to thinking; what I say is not very hard to be understood. For I say just the contrary to what the Poet asserts, who to excuse himself for not singing the Praises of *Jupiter*, says,

Shame every where keeps company with Fear.

I am not at all of his Mind; shall I tell you in what?

Eut. You'll oblige me in so doing.

Soc. I think 'tis not true that Shame always accompanies Fear; for I think we every Day see People in Fear of Sickness and Poverty, who yet are not at all asham'd of the things they fear. Don't you think so too?

Eut. I am of the same Mind.

Soc. On the contrary Fear always follows Shame; for is there any one who is asham'd, and put into Confusion by any Action, who does not at the same time fear the dishonour that is the Consequence of it?

Eut. It can't be otherwise, he must be affraid of it.

Soc.

Soc. Then it is not true to say,

Shame every where keeps company with Fear,

But we should say,

Fear every where keeps company with Shame.

for 'tis false that shame is continually found with fear, fear having more extent than shame: indeed shame is one part of fear, as the unequal is one part of Number. Wherever you find a number you do not necessarily find it unequal; but wherever it is unequal, there you necessarily find a Number. Do you understand me now?

Eut. Very well.

Soc. This is what I just now ask'd you; *viz.* if wherever that which is Just is to be found, there is also that which is Holy; and if wherever that which is Holy is to be found, there is also that which is Just? Now it appears that that which is Holy is not always found with that which is Just; for that which is Holy is a part of that which is Just. Shall we then lay this down as a Principle, or are you of a different Sentiment?

Eut. 'Tis a Principle that can't be contested.

Soc. Now mind what follows: if that which is Holy is a part of that which is Just; we must find out what part of that which is Just that which is Holy is. As if you should ask me what part of Number is that which is equal, and what Number is it? I should answer, that it is * the *Isosceles*, and not the *Scalene*: Don't you think so as well as I?

Eut. Yes certainly.

Soc. Now do you in like manner see if you can inform me what part of that which is just that which is Holy is; that I may let *Melitus* know, that 'tis best for him to forbear to do me any farther Injustice in accusing me of Impiety, me, who, I say, have been perfectly instructed by you what Piety and Holiness, and their Contraries are.

* The *Isosceles* signifies that which has two equal sides, for the even Number divides it self into two equal parts. And the *Scalene* is that which has two unequal Sides.

A third Definition which at bottom has something of Truth in it, but these false Teachers had not right Conceptions of it.

Eut. For my part, *Socrates*, I think that Holiness and Piety is † that part of what is Just which concerns the Care and Worship of the Gods, and that all the rest of it is that which properly respects Men.

Soc. Very well: Yet there is some little Matter still wanting. For I do not well understand what you mean by this Word [*Care*] Is this Care of the Gods the same with that which we take about all other things? For we every day say, that none but a Querry knows how to take care of a Horse, and to look well after him, do we not?

Eut. Yes doubtless.

Soc. Then the Care of Horses properly belongs to the Querry's Art.

Eut. It does so.

Soc. All Men are not fit to take care of Dogs, and to look after them, but only the Hunts-man.

Eut. None but he.

Soc. Then the Care of Dogs properly belongs to the Art of Hunting.

Eut. Without doubt it does.

Soc. And it belongs to the Grazier to take care of Oxen.

Eut. True.

Soc. Now Holiness and Piety is the Care of the Gods; Is not this what you say?

Eut. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Has not all Care for its end, the good and advantage of that which is taken care of? Don't you every day see that the Horses which an able Querry takes Care of become better, and more fit for service than others?

Eut. Yes, without doubt.

Soc. Does not the care which a good Hunts-man takes of Dogs, and that which a good Grazier

† This is true: but the Pagans had false Ideas of it; because they did not understand that this care of God which consists on our part in obeying him, in conforming to his holy Will, and in resigning our selves to him, was preceded by his care of us in creating us, and in enlightening our Minds; and this is what *Socrates* teaches in other places.

takes

takes of Oxen make both the one and the other better? and may not the like be said of all other Care? Or can you think that Care tends to hurt and spoil that which is taken care of? *Eut.* No certainly.

Soc. Then it tends to make it better.

Eut. That's right.

Soc. Then Holiness being the Care we take of the Gods, tends to their Advantage; and so the end of it must be to make 'em better. But would you dare to assert when you do any holy Action, that you make any one of the Gods better by it?

Men are uncapable of doing any thing to the advantage of God.

Eut. I am far enough from uttering such horrid Blasphemy.

Soc. Nor do I think you have any such Thought; I am very far from such a Supposition: and 'tis for this Reason I ask'd you what this Care of the Gods is, being persuaded that was not your meaning.

Eut. You have done me Justice, *Socrates*,

Soc. So much for that: But tell me then, what sort of Care of the Gods is Holiness?

Eut. 'Tis of the Nature of that Care which Servants take of their Masters.

Soc. I understand you, that is to say, Holiness is a kind of Servant to the Gods.

Eut. You hit it.

Soc. Can you tell me what Physicians operate by Means of the Art of Medicine which is their Servant? Do not they restore Health? *Eut.* Yes.

Soc. What do the Ship-Carpenters, who are in Ports do; and what do our Architects perform by the Ministry of their Servant? Don't the former build Ships and the latter Houses?

Eut. Yes certainly.

Soc. * What then do the Gods perform by the Ministry of their Servant? For you must certainly know

* *Socrates* would hereby insinuate what he elsewhere teaches, that God by the Ministry of Holiness works the Conversion of Souls, that this Conversion produces Love, and that this Love engages us to render him that which appertains to him, and which we cannot innocently refuse him.

this, since you pretend to know Religion better than any Man in the World beside.

Eut. And I have Reason to make that pretence.

Soc. Tell me then, I beseech you, what wonderful work is it that the Gods perform by making use of our Service?

Eut. They perform many very great and wonderful things.

Soc. The Generals of our Army perform many great Things too; but yet there is always one thing that is the Principal, and that is the Victory they obtain in Battel; Is it not?

Eut. 'Tis so.

Soc. And the Graziers do many good things, but the Principal is that of supplying Mankind with Food by their Labour. *Eut.* I grant it.

Soc. Well then, of all those good Things which the Gods operate by the Ministry of our Holiness, what is the Principal?

Eut. I just now told you, *Socrates*, that there needs more time and pains to arrive at an accurate knowledge of all these Things. All that I can tell you in general, is, that to please the Gods by Prayers and Sacrifices, is that which we call Holiness. And * in this consists the Welfare of Families and Cities, whereas to displease the Gods, is Impiety which utterly ruines and subverts every thing.

Soc. Indeed, *Eutyphron*, you might have told me what I ask'd in fewer words, if you had pleas'd. 'Tis easy to see you have no Mind to instruct me, for when you seem to be just in the way to do it, you presently strike off again; if you had but answer'd me a Word more, I had very well understood the Nature of Holiness. But now, (for he that asks must follow him who is ask'd) don't you say, Holiness is the Art of sacrificing and praying? *Eut.* Yes that I do.

Soc. To sacrifice, is to give to the Gods. To pray is to ask of 'em. *Eut.* 'Tis right, *Socrates*.

* In what the Safety or Ruine of Families, Cities and States consists, even by the Confession of the blindest Pagans.

Soc.

Soc. It follows then from your Discourses, that Holiness is * the Science of giving to the Gods, and asking of them. *A fourth Definition which is very true; but the Truth of which these false Teachers did not understand.*

Eut. Socrates, you perfectly comprehend my meaning.

Soc. 'Tis because I am in love with your Wisdom, and give my self up entirely to it. You need not fear that I shall let one of your Words fall to the Ground. Tell me then what is this Art of pleasing the Gods? Do you say it is to give to 'em and to ask of 'em?

Eut. Most certainly.

Soc. To ask well, must we not ask such things as we have need to receive of them?

Eut. And what then?

Soc. And to give well, must we not give them in exchange such Things as they have need to receive of us? For it would be a Folly to give any one such Things as he does not want, but are entirely useless to him. *Eut.* You say very well.

Soc. Holiness, my dear *Eutyphron*, is then a kind of Traffick betwixt the Gods and Men.

Eut. Let it be so, if you will have it so.

Soc. I would not have it so, if it be not so: But tell me, what advantage do the Gods receive from the Presents which we make 'em? For the advantage we derive from them is very evident since we have not the least Good, but what proceds from their Liberality. Of what advantage then are our Offerings to the Gods? Are we so crafty, as to draw all the Profit of this Commerce to our selves, while they derive no Advantage from it? *All the Goods of Men come from God.*

Eut. Socrates, do you think the Gods can ever draw any advantage from the Things they receive from us?

* This fourth Definition is admirable. *Socrates* designs by it to shew that Holiness leads us to ask of God, his Spirit, his Assistance and Grace; and to ask even our selves of him; for 'tis on him our very Being depends; and that it also engages us to give our selves to him. And this makes up the whole of Religion.

Soc. To what purpose then do all our Offerings serve?

Eut. They serve to signifie our Veneration, and Respect to 'em, and the desire we have to please 'em.

Soc. Then Holiness does not profit, but please the Gods?

Eut. Yes without doubt.

Soc. Then that which is Holy is only that which pleases the Gods.

Eut. 'Tis only that.

Soc. When you speak thus to me, do you wonder that your Discourse is not fix'd and steady: and dare you accuse me of being the *Dedalus*, that gives it this continual Motion; You, I say, who are a thousand times more ingenious than that great Artist, and give your Words a thousand different Turns? Don't you find that your Discourse makes only a Circle. You remember very well, that that which is Holy and that which is agreable to the Gods were not counted the same Thing by us just now; but were acknowledg'd to be very different. Don't you remember this?

Eut. I do.

Soc. Well, and don't you consider that you now say, that which is Holy is that which pleases the Gods. Is not what pleases 'em agreable to 'em?

Eut. Most certainly.

Soc. Then one of these two Things must be granted. Either that we did not well distinguish just now; or if we did, that we are now fallen into a false definition.

Eut. That's plain.

Soc. Then we must begin all again, in our enquiry after Holiness; for I shall not be weary nor discourag'd till you have inform'd me what it is. I beg you would not despise me; but bend your Mind with all the Application you can to teach me the truth, for you know it, if any Man alive does; and I will not let you go, like another *Proteus*, till you have instructed me. For if you had not a perfect

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Knowledge of what is Holy and Profane, doubtleſs you would never for the ſake of a wretched Farmer have undertaken to accuſe your Father of Murder, when the good old Man ſtoops under the Burden of Age, and has already one Foot in the Grave: But would have been ſeiz'd with Horrour to ſee your ſelf about to commit (it may be) an impious Act, and would have fear'd the Gods, and reſpected Men. So that I cannot doubt but you think you know perfectly well, what Holineſs, and its Contrary are. Inform me therefore, moſt Excellent *Eutyphron*, and do not hide your Thoughts from me,

What it is to fear God, and reſpect Men.

Eut. We'll reſerve it for another time, * for now I am a little in haſte, and 'tis time for me to leave you.

Soc. Alas, my dear *Eutyphron*, what do you intend to do! This haſty Motion of yours raviſhes from me the greateſt and ſweeteſt of all my hopes. For I flatter'd my ſelf, that after I had learn'd of you, what Holineſs is, and its Contrary, I ſhould eaſily have got out of *Melitus* his Clutches, by making it plainly appear to him, that *Eutyphron* had perfectly inſtructed me in Divine Things, that Ignorance ſhould never more prompt me to introduce of my one Head new Opinions about the Deity; and that my Life ſhould be more holy for the future.

Obſerve the Pride of this Superſtitious Man, he is juſt confounded and yet he always thinks himſelf capable of teaching what he does not know himſelf.

* The Ancients inform us that *Eutyphron* got ſome advantage by this Converſation of *Socrates:* for he drop'd his Proſecution, and let his Father alone. By which 'tis eaſy to ſee, that theſe Dialogues of *Plato* were not made upon feign'd Subjects, but had a very true and real Foundation, as well as thoſe which *Xenophon* has preſerv'd to us.

An Abridgment of the First *ALCIBIADES*, or Of the Nature of Man.

Alcibiades was one of the most ambitious and most Haughty Men in the World. His Birth, his Beauty, his Riches, and the Credit of his Tutor *Pericles*, had so puffed him up, that he thought no Person so worthy as himself to command the Athenians, and to go to their first Assembly to get himself declar'd their Captain-General. His proud and arrogant Carriage had driven away all his Lovers, who being taken only with his Beauty, were at length discourag'd by the cold Reception he gave 'em. *Socrates* was the only Person, who loving him more truly than the rest (for he lov'd him only to make him vertuous) could never be wearied out: This makes the beginning of this Dialogue.

Socrates tells *Alcibiades*, that he doubts not but he is surpriz'd to see, that as he was the first, so he is also the last of his Lovers: and that tho he was never troublesome to him, during his tender Youth, he should now follow him every where to discourse with him, without fearing the same disdainful Treatment which he gave his Rivals. *Alcibiades* confesses, he thinks it strange that he should persist in his Affection, and that he can't comprehend upon what Foundation he builds, that he should have any Hope remaining, after all his Rivals had lost theirs. *Socrates* tells him he'll give him an Account of his Reasons,

ſons, tho it be a difficult thing to ſpeak to a Perſon whom one loves, and of whom one is not belov'd. He tells him then, that if he had ſeen him likely to ſpend his whole Life in Softneſs, Lazineſs, and all the Amuſements of Youth, he ſhould have ceas'd loving him. But that as he ſaw him paſſionately aſpiring after Glory, the love he bore to him was renew'd and augmented; that he came to offer him all neceſſary Helps, becauſe of all the Lovers he had had, he was the only Perſon who was able to ſerve him in his Ambition; and that by this means he might know the difference between ſuch as love only Corporal Beauty, that frail and withering Flower, and one that loves only the Beauty of the Soul, which being perfect is the true Image of the Deity.

This great Promiſe fixes the reſtleſs Humor of this ambitious young Man, and diſpoſes him to hear what he had to ſay.

Socrates immediatly throws him into the midſt of that Aſſembly, whether he was going to get himſelf declar'd General of the Athenians; and with abundance of addreſs, ſhows him, that inſtead of that great Ability with which he flatter'd himſelf, he had indeed nothing in him but the Prejudices of his Youth, accompanied with a great deal of Arrogance and Preſumption. When you are in that Aſſembly (ſays he) you'll riſe up to ſpeak without doubt of ſuch Things as you know rather than any other Matters; for otherwiſe how could you preſume to ſpeak? But a Man knows nothing but what he has either found out himſelf, or learn'd of ſome other Perſon. I don't know any thing that you have found out your ſelf, your Knowledge is not by Infuſion; and all the Knowlege you have learn'd, is only to write, to play on the Muſick, and to perform your Exerciſes, and none of theſe Things are talk'd of in the Council. Therefore when will you go? and what will you go for? It muſt not be when they diſcourſe of Buildings; the meaneſt Brick-layer would ſpeak better than you on that Subject: Nor muſt it be when

when they are considering any Prodigies, or any Point of Divination, for that's the Business of the Diviners; and so of other Things.

Alcibiades being press'd, answers, that he'll speak when the Athenians deliberate on their Affairs.

The Matter then in Question, is how to explain what is meant by the Affairs of the Athenians.

Alcibiades says, 'tis Peace and War, and all that belongs to the highest Politicks.

Then, it must be (replies *Socrates*) when they are considering with whom, and at what time 'tis best to be at Peace, or War. But as Masters in all Arts and Sciences seek what is best and most convenient; so in Peace and War, that ought to be sought out which is best and most advantageous, that is to say, most Just; and in order to find it, 'tis necessary to know in what these consist. In what then do they consist?

Alcibiades knows not what to answer. How! (says *Socrates*,) Are you going to the Assembly of the Athenians to give 'em your Advice about Peace and War, and yet know not why War or Peace should be made?

Alcibiades answers, that War is made, either to repel some Insult, or to recover some Good.

This is something (says *Socrates*) but 'tis not all. For 'tis necessary to know, whether the Evil that is done us, is done justly or unjustly; on this Knowledge depends the knowledge of what is best and most advantageous; that which is Best being always most Just. So that on these Matters we ought to have an exact Knowledge of Justice, and to keep it always in view; and this is a thing of which you are ignorant, for of whom should you have learn'd it?

Justice (replies *Alcibiades*) may be known without a Master.

Yes, says *Socrates*, provided it be sought after: But no Man seeks for what he thinks he knows; and at every Degree of our Age we think we know what Justice is, because we speak of it throughout the whole

whole course of our Life, and nothing is more common than to hear Children complaining of the Wrongs and Injuries that are done 'em. So that we continually speak of Justice without having learn'd what it is either of our selves or others, and consequently without knowing it.

Alcibiades thinks to extricate himself out of this Difficulty by saying he learn'd it of the People.

That's a very bad Master, says *Socrates*, how should the People teach what they know not themselves? They have no Knowledge of Justice but by their Prejudices, as you have; and one certain sign that they are ignorant of it, is, that they are always at variance on this Subject, and that 'tis this difference alone that causes the Wars that desolate the World. For if the People would agree about what is Just, and Unjust, they would always live in Peace.

Alcibiades endeavours to get rid of this Difficulty, in saying that 'tis rarely deliberated in Councils whether a thing is Just or Unjust, but only whether it be Useful; for Justice and Utility (says he) are not always the same things: Seeing some notorious Acts of Injustice have been very advantageous; and a great many Persons have been destroy'd for having acted justly. Which is too true a Draught of the Politicks of most Princes. *Socrates* refutes this mischievous Opinion, and shews, that an Action can't be useful and advantageous, unless it be Comely and Just. He firsts tells him, he could prove to him, by the same Arguments that he had us'd, that he knows not what is useful any more than he does what is just, since he had neither learn'd it of any one, nor found it out of himself. But not to offend a Person so nice and tender; (for *Alcibiades* being accustom'd to the diversified and florid Discourses of the Sophists, did not like to hear the same thing twice, but lov'd Change and Variety in Language as well as in his Clothes) *Socrates* takes another Course, and asks him, if that which is Comely or Honourable is always good, or whether it sometimes ceases to be so.

Alcibiades

Alcibiades anſwers, that there are Comely and Honorable Things, which are ſometimes Evil. For Example, in a Battle, when a Man ſuccours his Friend and is kill'd in the Action, this Action is Honourable but 'tis Fatal. Another abandons his Friend, and eſcapes danger; this Action is Evil but 'tis uſeful.

Socrates anſwers, that the ſuccour a Man gives his Friend is, that which is call'd Valour, which is a thing quite different from Death, and that therefore theſe ought to be conſider'd ſeperately. So that the Queſtion is whether Valour be a Good or an Evil.

Alcibiades anſwers, that 'tis a great Good, and that he would not preſerve his Life upon the Condition of being a Coward.

Then (ſays *Socrates*) you confeſs that Cowardiſe is a greater Evil than Death: So that Valour is a greater Good than Life, and conſequently the Action of ſuccouring one's Friend is good, conſider'd as abſtracted from all its conſequences; if it is Good it is Honourable, and it can't be Honourable, without being uſeful; for whatſoever is Comely is Good, and that which is Good is Uſeful; there being nothing that is Comely and Honourable that can be Evil ſo far as it is Honourable; nor any thing which is Shameful, that can be Good ſo far as it is Shameful, which he proves by this invincible Argument: Thoſe that do good Actions are happy: Men can't be happy but by the Poſſeſſion of Good; the Poſſeſſion of Good is the Conſequence of a good Life; therefore Happineſs neceſſarily attends thoſe that do good Actions; ſo that Happineſs is a Comely and Honourable Thing, and conſequently that which is good, that which is comely, and that which is uſeful, are never different one from another. Therefore Juſtice being Comely and Good can't be oppos'd to Utility.

Alcibiades not only grants all theſe Truths; but is the Perſon that affirms 'em; for he is convinc'd by himſelf, and 'tis himſelf that makes the Anſwers. He therefore admires how it comes to paſs that the Things about which *Socrates* interrogates him, appear

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to him with quite another aſpect than they had done before: Hereupon he asks how it comes about, that upon the ſame Subject he is forc'd to anſwer ſometimes after one manner, and ſometimes after another.

Socrates informs him that this proceeds from his Ignorance, becauſe we never contradict our ſelves in the Things we know; but 'tis impoſſible for the Mind not to err in thoſe Things of which we are ignorant. But this does not ariſe abſolutely from Ignorance; ſince 'tis certain we never commit any Fault in Things of which we are ignorant, provided we know our own Ignorance; but it ſprings from a conceal'd Ignorance, when we think we know what indeed we do not underſtand. And this was exactly the Caſe of *Alcibiades*, who was going to intermeddle with Affairs of State in which he had not been inſtructed. A deplorable Condition! But ſuch as was common to him with almoſt all that had govern'd the Athenians, only *Pericles* perhaps may be excepted.

Alcibiades obſerves that *Pericles* did not arrive at ſo great a Capacity of himſelf; but had acquir'd his great *Abilities* in the Converſation of Philoſophers and Politicians. For ſtill (ſays he) as old as he is, he converſes with *Damon* the greateſt of all our Politicians.

Socrates, who perceives the Tendency of this Anſwer of *Alcibiades*, inſinuates to him, that the Company of thoſe great Men was very uſeful for the Acquirement of Vertue, in which true Accompliſhment alone conſiſts. And this he proves by the Example of *Pericles* himſelf, who had not been able to teach his own Children any thing, a ſure ſign that Vertue cannot be taught, and that he himſelf had not learn'd it from Men, becauſe 'tis the Gift of God, and there is nothing of Good in us, but what he implants; but this being too general a Queſtion he reſerves it to be treated elſewhere, and confining himſelf to his Subject, he carries on his Deſign, which is to confound the Pride of *Alcibiades*. Therefore

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he asks him how he intends to dispose of himself: *Alcibiades* answers, that he'll endeavour to get himself instructed; but at the same time gives him to understand, that since they who then concern'd themselves in Affairs of State were most of 'em ignorant Persons, he should not be oblig'd to give himself so much trouble to excel 'em; and that since he had good Natural Parts it would be an easy matter for him to out-do 'em.

Socrates amaz'd at the baseness of this Sentiment, which is but too common, gives him an admirable Lesson upon it. He represents to him, that nothing is more unworthy of a great Mind, than for a Man to propose to himself only to surpass ignorant People and Slaves: That a Statesman will never serve his Countrey well, if he is not a greater Man, not only than the Citizens whom he governs, but also than their Enemies; that the Athenians being commonly in War with the Lacedemonians, or the King of *Persia*; he ought to strive to excel those Enemies in Capacity and Vertue.

Alcibiades like a young Spark full of Vanity, asks if the Kings of *Lacedemonia*, and the King of *Persia* were not made like other Men.

Socrates shews him, that if it were so, he ought to form a great Idea of 'em in his Mind; that so he might take the greater care of himself, and render himself still more Accomplish'd. But that there was so little Truth in this, *viz.* that they were made like other men, that no Persons in the world seem'd so great as they, either for Birth, or Education, or the extent of their Dominions. And to mortify *Alcibiades* the more, he opposes the manner of his Birth and Education to that of the Kings of *Persia*. When a King of *Persia* is born (says *Socrates*) all the People that are spread over that vast Empire celebrate his Nativity, and afterwards that Day is annually kept as one of their greatest Festivals, so that in all the Provinces of *Asia*, nothing is to be seen but Sacrifices and Feasts. Whereas (says he) when we are born, my Dear *Alcibiades*;

cibiades, that Paſſage of the Comick Poet may be applied to us.

The News ſcarce to our neareſt Neighbours comes.

When the Child is born he is nurs'd under the Conduct of the moſt vertuous Eunuchs, who ſhape and faſhion his Body. When he is about ſeven Years of Age they begin to let him ſee Horſes, and to put him under the Care of Querries. He performs his Exerciſes till he is fourteen, and from that Age they give him four of the greateſt, and moſt vertuous Lords of the Country. The firſt teaches him Piety; the ſecond forms his Mind to Truth and Juſtice; the third inſtructs him to be free, and to conquer his Paſſions; and the laſt teaches him to deſpiſe Dangers and Death: For if a King ſhould be fearful he would become a Slave. Whereas you *Alcibiades*, have been brought up by a vile *Thracian* Slave, who was good for no other Office, becauſe of his extream old Age. As for Riches, there is ſtill as great a Diſproportion; the Lacedemonians being richer than all *Greece* together, and yet having an Eſtate but like that of a private Man in compariſon of the King of *Perſia*. In fine (ſays he) there is ſo great a diſparity in every thing, between theſe Kings and you, that if one ſhould go and tell the Mother of King *Agis*, or the Mother of *Artaxerxes*, that a Citizen of *Athens*, nam'd *Alcibiades*, was preparing to go and make War in their Country, they would certainly imagine that long Exerciſe, great Experience, and a conſummate Wiſdom had inſpir'd you with ſo great a Deſign. But how would they be ſurpriz'd, if they ſhould be told that 'tis no ſuch Matter! that you are young, ignorant and preſumptuous; that you never would take care to cultivate your Mind, and that you have no other Fund to carry on ſo great a Deſign, but your Beauty, your fine Shape, your Extraction, your Riches, and the Advantages of a happy Genius! They would look upon you as a Fool, becauſe in all theſe things the Lacedemoni-

ans and Perſians infinitely ſurpaſs us. Is it not a very ſhameful thing, that the very Women among our Enemies know better than you your ſelf what you ought to be, to attempt to make War againſt 'em with any hope of Succeſs? Don't think therefore that you have to do with ordinary Men. But imagine you have the greateſt Project in the World in your head; and either renounce your Ambition, or rouze from this Stupidity into which you have caſt your ſelf. The Glory with which you are ſo much charm'd is not acquir'd without a great deal of Toil and Labour; and if you would attain it you muſt take care of your ſelf; that is, you muſt endeavour to become very good.

But ſince the Word *Good* is a general Term, that ſignifies ſeveral very different things, the Queſtion is in what ſuch a Man as *Alcibiades* ought to endeavour to become good. He anſwers, that 'tis in doing thoſe things which the beſt Citizens ought to do. The beſt Citizens (he ſays) are thoſe whom we call wiſe and prudent; and Wiſdom and Prudence are neceſſary to all Arts: Thus the Anſwer of *Alcibiades* is yet too indefinite. Who then are the beſt Citizens? *Alcibiades* again anſwers, that they are thoſe who know how to command Men that live under the ſame Government, who mutually aſſiſt each other; but what is this Science that teaches how to command Men who make one and the ſame Political Body, and what is its end? *Alcibiades* ſays 'tis good Counſel, and that the end of governing well is to procure the Welfare of the People.

Socrates asks him what ought to be done to govern a State well. *Alcibiades* anſwers, that Amity and Concord ſhould be made to reign in it.

The Queſtion then is what Art produces this Amity or Concord in States. *Alcibiades* anſwers, that this is brought about when every Man minds his own Buſineſs.

This is not a ſufficient Anſwer, and *Socrates* refutes it with a great deal of Addreſs and Solidity,

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by ſhowing that when every Man only minds his own Affairs, Amity can't be among 'em, becauſe there's no Concord. For how ſhould they accord about things which are known to ſome of 'em, and unknown to others?

Alcibiades is ſo embarraſs'd that he is oblig'd to deny a Truth which he had before acknowledg'd, and to confeſs, that when the Citizens do that which is juſt, yet they can't tell how to love one another. He does not ſee what *Socrates'* aims at: His Deſign is to ſhew, that when Men only mind their Affairs, they take care only of what belongs to themſelves, and ſo confine themſelves to the knowledg of particular things, and don't aſcend to that of the Eſſence of univerſal things, the only knowledg that produces Charity the Mother of Union and Concord: Whereas the knowledg only of particular things, produces Diſorder and Diviſion.

So that to make Concord reign in a State, 'tis not enough that every one takes care of what appertains to himſelf, he muſt alſo take care of himſelf; theſe being two very different Arts. For the Art by which we take care of our ſelves is not the ſame with that by which we take care of that which appertains to us. Now to take care of one's ſelf is to know one's ſelf: But what is it to know one's ſelf? Juſt as an Artificer uſes his Tools, ſo a Man makes uſe of his Body. So that the Body is not the Man, for the Body can't uſe and govern it ſelf. Nor is the Compound the Man, for if one of the things of which we are compounded does not govern, 'tis impoſſible they ſhould govern both together: And conſequently, ſince neither the Body, nor the compound of Soul and Body together are the Man, it muſt be the Soul alone: 'Tis then only neceſſary that we know the Soul, and take care of that, if we would become truly wiſe. For to take care of our Bodies is to take care of what belongs to us; but to take care of our Souls is to take care of our ſelves; to be employed with the Care of amaſſing Riches, is

to be employ'd about things ſtill more remote than thoſe that appertain to us. Thus they who love *Alcibiades* his Body, don't love *Alcibiades* himſelf, but that which belongs to *Alcibiades*. To love *Alcibiades* is to love his Soul, to love that which is himſelf, and not that which belongs to him. Therefore we ſee thoſe that love only his Body, retire from him when the Beauty of this Body is fading; and thoſe who love his Soul, do not ceaſe to love him as long as he is vertuous, and labours by this Means to render himſelf as lovely as poſſible; and this (ſays *Socrates*) is the Cauſe of the Inconſtancy of my Rivals, and of my Steadineſs.

But what muſt we do to come to the ſight and knowledg of our Souls? *Socrates* ſpeaks divinely to *Alcibiades* on this occaſion. As our Eye, (ſays he) can't ſee it ſelf but in the Objects that repreſent it, or in another Eye; that is, in that part of the Eye, which is the moſt excellent, namely that wherein the Sight is: So the Soul to ſee and know it ſelf, muſt view it ſelf in that part of the Soul in which Wiſdom and Vertue are generated, or rather in that Soul, of which ours is but the Image, and in which Wiſdom, Vertue and Prudence are found in their ſovereign Perfection, that is, in God. For 'tis by this means only that the Soul can know God, and her Self, which is true Wiſdom. When ſhe knows her ſelf, ſhe'll alſo know what belongs to her; for we muſt firſt know our Selves before we can know what belongs to us. She'll likewiſe know whatever reſpects the things that belong to her, and what reſpects the things that belong to others. For one Art is ſufficient for all this, and this Art is the true ſort of Prudence.

He therefore that is ignorant of himſelf, is ignorant of that which appertains both to himſelf and others, and not knowing what belongs to others, he knows not what belongs to the Common-wealth, and conſequently can't be a good Miniſter of State. Nay he is not capable to govern a Family, nor ſo much as

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to conduct himself, for because he is ignorant, 'tis impossible but he must commit faults; in commiting faults, he does ill, in doing ill he is miserable, and renders those miserable who obey him. Thus he who is not wise or prudent cannot be happy, and he who is wicked can't but be miserable. So that the happiness of a City depends neither on its Riches, nor the strength of its Fortifications, nor the great number of its Troops, nor its Galleys, nor the magnificence of its Arsenals, but on Vertue, without which there is nothing but Misery in the World.

Therefore to govern a State well, 'tis necessary to provide Vertue for those that compose it, and to endeavour to communicate it to 'em. And consequently, *Alcibiades*, to satisfie your Ambition, you ought not to think of acquiring great Dominion and exorbitant Power, either for your self, or your Republick, but that Justice and Prudence for which you have so much occasion. For while you, and others act justly and prudently, you'll please God, who is the Source of true Felicity; and you'll govern your self after this Manner; if (as I just now told you) you constantly look upon the Deity, that Light in which alone you can know your self and all that belongs to you. But if you govern your self unjustly, and turn away your Eyes from the Deity to unite your self to dark Objects, you'll neither know your your self at all, nor the things that belong to you: And your Actions will be nothing but Works of Darkness; and the more Power you have, the more unhappy you'll be. *Alcibiades* can't dissent from these great Truths. But *Socrates* does not stop here; but gives the finishing stroke to mortifie his Pride in asking him, whether it is not more for the Advantage of those who are not yet endued with Vertue, to obey such as are better than themselves, than to be abandon'd to their own Conduct: And (says he) is not that which is most profitable most beautiful, and that which is most beautiful most becoming, and suitable? *Alcibiades* agrees to this. Then (says

Socrates) 'tis becoming that vicious Persons should be Slaves, and be made to obey; and consequently Vice is a base thing, and suitable to a Slave, as on the contrary Vertue is beautiful, and suitable to a Free-man. In what a Condition then are you?

Alcibiades is sensible what he means, and confesses he is not worthy of any thing but Slavery, but hopes in a little time to get rid of his Vices, if *Socrates* pleases.

You don't speak well (replies *Socrates*;) you ought to say, if God pleases, for we can do nothing without him.

Well then (says *Alcibiades*) I say (if God pleases) and I add, let us for the future change Persons; and as you have hitherto made your Court to me, I'll for the future make mine to you. I'll follow you wherever you go, and I solemnly protest to you, I'll now carefully apply my self to Righteousness.

I wish you may (says *Socrates* concluding the Discourse.) But whatever good Opinion I have of you; I am affraid of the Contagion of our Republick, and can't but tremble at the Examples that reign in it, lest they should be too strong for you and me too. For 'tis a very difficult Matter to be wise in the midst of so blind and corrupt a People.

And

An Abridgment of the Second *ALCBIADES*, or Of Prayer.

Socrates meets *Alcibiades* going into a Temple to pray, and seeing him very pensive, and with his Eyes fix'd on the Earth, he asks him on what he was thinking. What should I think on? (replies *Alcibiades* very faintly) being more concern'd about his ambitious Designs than his Prayers. It must be on some very important Matters, (says *Socrates*) for since 'tis certain, that the Gods often hear our Prayers, there's nothing that requires more Prudence and Wisdom than to pray well; so as not to request Evils of 'em, while we think we are asking Goods; or not to ask Evils of 'em willingly and knowingly as *Oedipus* did, whom *Euripides* brings in Praying that his Children might decide their rights by the Sword.

You tell me of a mad Man (says *Alcibiades*) does any Man, who is in his senses make such Prayers as those to the Gods?

Hereupon *Socrates* asks him if being mad is not oppos'd to being Prudent: If Men are not wise or foolish, as they are either in Health or Sick: for as there is no Medium between Health and Sickness, neither is there any between Wisdom and Folly. To which *Alcibiades* agrees.

Since Madness then is oppos'd to Wisdom, says *Socrates*, Folly and Madness are but one and the same thing.

For one single Subject can't have two contraries oppos'd to it, and consequently every Fool is Mad. And seeing there are always a thousand Fools to one wise-Man in the World, while we live in it we are among mad Men.

The only thing that can militate against this Principle, is that it would be impossible to live among so great a Number of mad Men; and the wise, whose Number is but small, could never escape their Fury. And yet wise Men live in Cities, therefore it seems not true to say they live with mad Men. This is what *Socrates* objects against the Truth which he has made *Alcibiades* acknowledge: But he resolves this Difficulty in shewing that there are divers Degrees of Folly, as there are divers sorts of Diseases: The Fever is a Disease, but every Disease is not the Fever. 'Tis just so with Folly. All mad Men are Fools, but all Fools are not mad. A Disease is a Genius which comprehends many Species. Folly or Imprudence in like manner comprehends many Species, which differ in degree. As Men have divided Arts and Trades among 'em, so they have shar'd Folly among themselves too; those who have the greatest share of it are said to be distracted and mad; and they who have somewhat less are call'd Fools and stupid. But because Men seek to hide these Vices under specious Names, they call the former Men of Magnanimity, and of great Spirit; and they call the others Simple, or else they say they are harmless Men, but have little Experience and much Youth. There are besides these a multitude of Names with which all sorts of Vice are disguis'd.

The next Question is in what Wisdom and Folly consist. A wise Man is one that knows what ought to be said and done, and a Fool is one that is ignorant of both. But is he that is thus ignorant, in this Condition without knowing it? Yes certainly. *Oedipus*, for Instance (says *Socrates*) was in this Condition when he made that Prayer which we spoke of before; but we shall find a great many others,

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who without being transported with Anger like him will request real Evils of God while they think they are asking real Goods. For as for *Oedipus*, if he did not ask for what was good neither did he think he ask'd it; whereas others do the contrary. To begin with your self, *Alcibiades*: If the God to whom you are going to pray should suddenly appear to you, and ask you, if you would not be willing to be King of the Athenians, of all *Greece*, nay of all *Europe*, or (if that seem'd too little for your Ambition) of the whole World, would you not be extremely pleas'd, and return home with abundance of Joy, as one who had receiv'd the greatest Good in the World? Who would not be transported with such a thing as this? (replies *Alcibiades.*) But (says *Socrates*) would you give your Life for the Empire of the Greeks, or that of all the Barbarians together? No certainly (says *Alcibiades*) for then I could not enjoy it. But what if you could enjoy it, (continues *Socrates*) and this Enjoyment must needs prove fatal to you? No (says *Alcibiades*) I would not do it on that Condition.

You see by this therefore (says *Socrates*) that it is not safe to desire or accept what we know not. How many Men after they have passionately desir'd to be Kings, and have left no Stone unturn'd to obtain their End; have become the Sacrifices of their extravagant Ambition? The Story of *Archelaus* King of *Macedonia* is yet fresh in Memory. He ascended the Throne by his Crimes, and was assassinated by his Favourite, who could not maintain himself in it above 3 or 4 days; but was murder'd by a third who was ambitious to fill the same Place.

But without looking after foreign Examples, how many of the Generals of our Army have been condemn'd to Death in our own City! how many of 'em exil'd! and how many others have we seen, who after they had pass'd through innumerable Dangers, Toils and Labours, have fallen in the midst of their Triumphs, by the Calumnies of their Enemies! A great many other Persons, after they have ardent-

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ly desir'd Children, have been very unhappy in obtaining 'em. And thus it is with the rest of our Desires; and tho' nothing is more common than Instances of this kind, yet there's scarce any Man who would refuse the Thing he desires, if God should offer it to him, or who would cease to ask it, if he were sure to obtain it. And we may every Day see Persons repenting their former Prayers, and making such as are quite contrary to 'em. Therefore we must acknowledg the Truth of what *Homer* says, *viz.* That nothing is more unjust than the Complaints Men make against the Gods, whom they accuse of being the the Cause of their Miseries, whereas they are the occasion of 'em themselves, who by their Folly draw down Mischiefs on their own Heads, which were not design'd for 'em.

A great Poet who knew the Ignorance of Mankind upon this Account, endeavour'd to cure it by giving 'em this Prayer, which I think is an admirable one. *Great God, who knowest better than we what is necessary for us, give us the good things we need, whether we ask 'em or not; and keep evil things from us, even when we ask 'em of thee.*

Then Ignorance is a very fatal thing (says *Alcibiades*) seeing it changes our Prayers into Curses, and prompts us to beg of God our own Miseries.

Hold a little, says *Socrates*, don't condemn Ignorance in General; if one sort of it is pernicious, there's another that is very useful. For instance, would not *Orestes* have been happy if he had not known his Mother, when he sought after her to kill her? For if he had not known her, he had not kill'd her, his design being only against her. So that this kind of Ignorance would have been very good for him: There is an Ignorance then (says he) which ought to be commended; and this he proves with great Evidence. And now he lays down this as a Principle, that all the Sciences in the World without that by which we know what is very good, are

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not only uſeleſs, but moſt commonly extremely dangerous.

'Tis not ſufficient (ſays he) that in the Council of a Prince, or of a Republick, there be Men of Ability in every thing that relates to Peace, War, and and all other things belonging to Politicks, if they are not expert in the knowledg of what is very good; that is if they are not under the Direction of the Divine Spirit, and do not well underſtand what is beſt, and moſt juſt, they are incapable of governing a State well; ſo that nothing but Injuſtice and Diſcord will be ſeen to reign in it. For while theſe Miniſters think they know what indeed they do not underſtand, and continually ſuffer themſelves to be led by Opinion, and not by knowledg, they never judg aright but by Accident. They are like Ships well ſtor'd with every thing needful for a long Voyage; but which for want of a Pilot can't chooſe but be loſt in a little time. It would be much more uſeful for theſe Men to be ignorant of what they know, provided they were convinc'd of their Ignorance; for then they would not intrude themſelves to give Counſel in things which they don't underſtand, and yet think they do. Therefore that Soul, that City or that Republick that would be happy muſt acquire this Science, which alone makes others turn to a good Account; without it, the greater Fortune either particular Men or States enjoy, the more impoſſible it is for 'em not to commit very great Crimes, either in acquiring Riches or augmenting their Forces, or the like. Without this Science a Man may have all others, and yet never be the better for 'em: And to ſuch a one that Verſe which *Homer* made againſt *Margites* may be apply'd.

He knew many things, but knew them all amiſs.

For this wiſe and divine Poet does not mean by this, that he did not know 'em well, as if one could properly know amiſs what one knows; but ſignifies by this Enigmatical Expreſſion, that he knew 'em all unhappily, or that it is was a great Unhap-

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pineſs to him to know 'em. For where the knowledg of God is not, there is no Good. And if theſe Sciences are unhappy to us, 'twould be better for us to be ignorant of 'em, and conſequently there is a ſort of Ignorance more uſeful than the Sciences. This is ſtill more true in Prayer than in all the other Actions of Life. And 'tis better to ask nothing of God, than to ask what is Evil of him, when we think we are asking Good, and conſequently the Prayer I have been ſpeaking of is the moſt perfect of all others.

Upon this Model the Prayer of the Lacedemonians was form'd; Who are content to ſay, *Lord, grant us what ſeems good and comely to thee.* They never requeſt any thing but this, and yet are the happieſt People in the World. To this purpoſe *Socrates* relates a Story which he had heard told by ſome old People. He ſays, the Athenians having been often overcome in the Wars they had with the Lacedemonians, reſolv'd to ſend to the Oracle of *Jupiter Ammon*, to know the Reaſon why the Gods rather favour'd the *Lacedemonians* than the *Athenians* who offer'd 'em more Sacrifices, erected more Temples and Statues in their Honour, and made 'em more Preſents, and more magnificent Oblations than all the Greeks together. Whereas the Lacedemonians were ſo guilty of Avarice in their Worſhip, that they ſcarce ſacrific'd any Beaſts but what were blemiſh'd, and mutilated; tho they were very Rich. The Prophet anſwer'd 'em in a few Words. *The Benedictions of the Lacedemonians are more agreeable to* Jupiter *than all the Sacrifices of the Greeks.* He calls their Prayers *Benedictions.* So that the Lacedemonians were belov'd of God, becauſe they knew how to pray; whereas the reſt of the Greeks were hated of him, becauſe they did not underſtand how to offer Sacrifice. And *Homer* (ſays he) ſignifies the ſame thing, when he ſays the *Trojans*, when they built a Fort, *offer'd whole Hecatombes to the Gods, the ſmoke of which aſcended to Heaven*,

Heaven, but the Gods refus'd to accept 'em becauſe they hated the ſacred City of Troy, *King* Priamus, *and his People.* The Occaſion of this hatred, was becauſe the *Trojans* knew not how to pray, but would have oblig'd God by their Sacrifices to do, not his own Will, but theirs. But God ſuffers not himſelf to be corrupted by Gifts like a Uſurer; and that man muſt be a Fool, who thinks to obtain his Favour by ſuch Sacrifices as the Wicked are better able to offer than the Righteous. God only regards the Sanctity and Purity of the Soul, and eſteems nothing but Juſtice and Wiſdom. Now none are truly Juſt and Wiſe but thoſe who know how to perform their Duty toward God and Men both in their Words and Actions. What do you think of all this, *Alcibiades?*

Alcibiades ſtruck with the Evidence of theſe Truths, anſwers, that he is not ſo ſenſeleſs, as to oppoſe his weak Underſtanding to that of God, and to contradict his Oracles.

Then don't be in ſo much haſte, *Alcibiades*, (continues *Socrates*) to offer your Prayers, leſt God to puniſh you, ſhould anſwer the Imprecations you are going to utter againſt your ſelf: For you are not a Man likely to uſe the Prayer of the Lacedemonians; you are too proud, for that is the ſofteſt name I can give your Imprudence; therefore wait till you arebetter inſtructed how to demean your ſelf, both toward God and Men.

Alas! When ſhall I be inſtructed in this? (replies *Alcibiades*) and who ſhall be my Maſter? what Pleaſure I ſhould take in obeying him!

It muſt be he who takes care of you (ſays *Socrates*) and who truly loves you; that is God, 'tis he that muſt teach you to pray well. But before he communicates to you this Knowledg of what is very good, which alone can make you diſcern what is your true Good, and ſuggeſt ſuch Prayers to you as will be for your Advantage, he muſt diſſipate the Darkneſs that beclouds your Soul; as *Minerva*, in *Homer*,

Homer, dispell'd the Mist that cover'd *Diomedes* his Eyes, and hinder'd him from distinguishing God from Man. For while we are destitute of the knowledg of God, we are incapable, either of understanding him, or of following him, and consequently 'tis impossible for us to pray well.

Let him scatter then, (replies *Alcibiades)* let him destroy this Darkness of mine; I abandon my self to his Conduct: and till that happy day comes, which, if it please God, I shall not be long expecting, I'll defer my Prayers and my Sacrifice. In the mean time give me leave to express my Thanks to you, for your wise Counsel, by putting this Crown on your head which I wear on mine.

I readily accept that Favour (says *Socrates)* and as in *the Phenicians of Euripides*, *Creon* seeing *Tiresias* coming to him with a Crown of Gold, which was the first Fruits of the Spoil of the Enemy, and with which the Athenians had honour'd him for his Art, said, *I take your Crown, which is the sign of Victory, for a good Omen, for you see we are also in a great storm of War.* So I must say I take the Honour, I now receive at your hands for a happy Presage; for I am engag'd in no less a Conflict than *Creon*; while I am endeavouring to gain the Victory over all your Lovers.

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THE ABRIDGMENT Of *EUTYPHRON*, OR Of Holineſs.

Eutyphron meets *Socrates* in the Kings Porch, which was a Place on the right Hand of the *Ceramique*, where one of the IX Archons, who was call'd *the King* preſided during his year. Surpriz'd at this Novelty, (for it was the firſt time that *Socrates* had appear'd in this place) he asks him what it was that could oblige him to leave *Lyceus* to come into this Porch. For 'tis not likely (ſays he) that you have any Proceſs here before the King, as I have. 'Tis worſe than that, (ſays *Socrates*) the Buſineſs I have is that which the Athenians call an *Accuſation*. How (ſays *Eutyphron*) does any one accuſe you then? For I can't imagine that you would accuſe any Body. *Eutyphron* who is going to accuſe his own Father, can't believe that *Socrates* would accuſe any Man; of ſuch a ſtrange piece of Extravagance, and of ſo found an Opinion of himſelf is a ſuperſtitious Man capable. And *Plato* improves this with a great deal of Addreſs to inſinuate that at *Athens* honeſt Men never follow'd the Trade of Accuſers.

Socrates ſays, he accus'd no Body. Who is it that accuſes you then? (ſays *Eutyphron*) I don't very well know him (ſays *Socrates*) he is a young Man: And not content to tell him his Name and the Place of his Birth, he draws, his Picture; which is that of

of a Man whoſe Phyſiognomy Promiſes nothing of Good: He has, ſays he, Lank Hair, a Thin Beard, and a Crooked Noſe. All theſe Marks can't make him known. This young Man (continues *Socrates*) like a great Politician, has caus'd me to be cited before the City as our common Mother, and accuſes me of forging new Gods and rejecting the old.

Oh (ſays *Eutyphron*) I perceive what the Matter is, becauſe you ſay you have a familiar Genius, a God that conducts you, *Melitus* accuſes you of introducing new Opinions, knowing very well that all ſuch things as theſe are ſuſpected by the common People, who are always ready to receive Accuſations of this kind. What do not I ſuffer, when I ſpeak of divine Things in the Aſſemblies, and am predicting what ſhall come to paſs! The People laugh at me as if I were a Fool: Not that any thing that I have foretold has fail'd of its Accompliſhment? but 'tis becauſe rhey naturally envy all ſuch as we are.

My dear *Eutyphron*, (replies *Socrates*) perhaps 'tis no ſuch great Misfortune to be laugh'd at. The Athenians don't much trouble their Heads about a Man's Ability, provided he concerns not himſelf to teach others what he knows; but if any one makes a Profeſſion of teaching, they are downright angry with him, either out of Envy, as you ſay, or for ſome other Reaſon which we know not. I don't at all deſire (ſays *Eutyphron*) to make tryal (as you have done) to my Coſt, what Sentiments the Athenians have of me.

There's a great deal of difference (replies *Socrates*, improving this Confeſſion of *Eutyphron* to ſhow, in the Perſon of this Diviner, the Character of thoſe that preſided to teach Religion, *viz.* that they taught nothing, but through fear left the People in ignorance) perhaps you are very reſerv'd and refuſe to teach what you know; whereas I fear the Athenians will think the love I bear to all Mankind induces me to tell 'em too freely all I know, without asking any Reward of 'em. But if they would only

only laugh at me (as I said just now) as you say they do at you, it would be no very troublesome or unpleasant thing to pass a few hours in laughing and jesting. But if they take up the Matter in earnest; then 'tis only for such Diviners as you to know what will be the Event.

It may be (says *Eutyphron* like a great Diviner) you'll sustain no Damage by it, and I hope you'll have a happy Issue of your Business, as well as I of mine.

Then you have some Business here, (replies *Socrates*) are you Plaintiff or Defendant? I am Plaintiff, says *Eutyphron*. Whom do you prosecute (says *Socrates*) I prosecute my Father (says th'other) your Father, good God! (says *Socrates*) and what is the Accusation then? Of what do you accuse your Father? I accuse him of Murder, (replies *Eutyphron.*) Of Murder! (says *Socrates*) That indeed is an Accusation above the reach of the People, who will never comprehend that it can be Just. For this is not an Attempt for an ordinary Man, but for one who is arriv'd to the utmost pitch of Wisdom.

You say true, *Socrates*, (replies *Eutyphron*) deluded by this Commendation. But (says the other) is it any one of your Relations that your Father has killed? without doubt (continues he) it must be so, for you would not bring your Father before a Court of Justice, if he had only kill'd a Stranger.

What an Absurdity is that (says *Eutyphron*) to think there's a difference in this respect between a Relation and a Stranger: The Case is equal; the only thing to be regarded is the Justice or Injustice of the Action; for if the Action be evil you are oblig'd to prosecute the Anthor of it, whatever Friendship or Relation is between you; for you render your self an Accomplice of his Crime to have the least Familiarity with him, and not to endeavour to bring him to punishment, which alone can purge and expiate you both. But to apprize you of the Fact, the Deceased was one of our Farmers, when we liv'd at

Naxus, he held a piece of Land of us; one Day having drank too much he fell into a Paſſion with one of our Slaves, and knock'd him o'th' Head: My Father put him into a deep Pit, bound Hand and Foot, and ſent hither to conſult thoſe who have the Inſpection of all Matters of Religion, and Caſes of Conſcience, to know what he ſhould do, and during all this time neglected the poor Priſoner, as an Aſſaſſin whoſe Life was of no conſequence; and ſo he dyed; Hunger, Thirſt and the weight of his Irons kill'd him, before the return of the Meſſenger that my Father ſent. Upon this the whole Family is mightily diſturb'd at me, becauſe for the ſake of an Aſſaſſin I accuſe my Father of Murder, which they pretend he has not committed: and if he had committed it, they maintain that I ought not to proſecute him, ſeeing the Deceaſed was a Villain and a Murderer; beſides that 'tis an Impious Action for a Son to bring a criminal Proceſs againſt his Father; ſo ignorant are they of Divine Things, and ſo incapable of diſcerning what is Profane and Impious from what is Juſt and Holy.

Socrates amaz'd at a Poſition ſo preſumptuous and falſe, asks him if he thinks he ſo exactly knows all Divine Things, and can ſo preciſely diſtinguiſh that which is holy from that which is profane; that the Caſe being as he relates it, he can proſecute his Father without fearing to commit an Impious Act.

Eutyphron, like a Superſtitious Bigot, who deſpiſes all the World beſide, and thinks he ſees more clearly into Matters of Religion than any Body elſe, anſwers, What Advantage ſhould I have above other Men, if I did not very exactly know all theſe things?

Socrates feigns himſelf extremely pleas'd that he had found a Man of ſo clear a Head and ſo great Abilities, who might give him ſo much aſſiſtance in the troubleſome Affair in which *Melitus* had engag'd him; and earneſtly conjures him to teach him what is properly holy, and what profane; and to give him ſuch

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a juſt Idea of both, as may always enable him to diſtinguiſh 'em with certainty.

Eutyphron here ſtill keeps his Character very well. That is holy (ſays he) which I am doing, namely to proſecute in a Court of Judicature every one that commits Murder, Sacrilege, or any other unjuſt Act of the like Nature, without any diſtinction; Let it be Father, Mother, Brother; *&c.* 'Tis the ſame thing.

This Definition, which ſprings rather from blind Zeal, than the knowledg of Holineſs, not ſatisfying *Socrates*, *Eutyphron* attempts to prove it by Authority. He maintains that all Religion conſiſting in imitating the Gods, he could not do a more pious and holy thing than to proſecute his own Father, ſeeing *Jupiter* put *Saturn* in Chains becauſe he devour'd his Children; and *Saturn* himſelf had treated *Cælus* with yet more Rigour for ſome other Fault.

Socrates inſinuates that he doubts of the truth of theſe Stories, becauſe even Reaſon teaches us not to attribute any unworthy thing to the Deity. However (ſays he Ironically to *Eutyphron* after his uſual manner) if you, who are ſo able a Man in Religious Matters, agree with the Common People in this, and believe theſe Traditions as well as they, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary that I ſhould believe 'em too, I who am but ignorant in theſe things. Therefore I entreat you in the Name of that God who preſides over Friendſhip, do not deceive me, but tell me if you believe that there ever were ſuch things, as you have been relating.

This Bigot who is always credulous and conceited, makes no ſcruple not only to ſay, that he believes it, but adds that he believes things yet more ſurprizing, of which the Common People are ignorant, meaning without doubt the Myſteries that were known only to thoſe that were Initiated; and maintains all the Fables of Poets and Fancies of Painters as fundamental Points of Religion.

Socrates does not trouble himself with the Confutation of 'em; that would finish the Dispute too soon, and he is not willing to offend him. Therefore he proceeds to ask him, as if he were willing to be instructed by him, what it is that he calls pious and holy, and desires him to give a clear and distinct Idea by which he may judg of every thing that is pious and holy. For a true Definition ought to make known the Essence and Nature of that which is defin'd.

Eutyphron answers, that it is that which is pleasing to the Gods, and consequently that that is profane and impious which is displeasing to 'em.

Socrates takes advantage of this Definition, and shows that the Gods being often divided among themselves, their Quarrels must needs arise from their disagreement about what is just or unjust; profane or holy. And that according to this, one and the same thing is holy and profane, seeing it pleases some of 'em and displeases others. Therefore the Definition of holy and profane can't subsist with the Plurality of Gods.

This Consequence is certain, and would be sufficient to reclaim a wise Man from that Error, and to convince him that there is but one God. But *Eutyphron* preserves his Character better than so. 'Tis no such easy matter to undeceive a superstitious Man. To elude this Consequence he engages to prove that the Action of his Father was displeasing to all the Gods, and that his was agreable to 'em.

Socrates does not press him with the Absurdity of this Persuasion, which is rather a Supposition than a Certainty. For since their Theologie acknowledges that the Gods are very often contesting about Matters of this Nature, how could *Eutyphron* be certain that they agreed about the Action he was going to undertake? In an Affair of this Consequence a greater Certainty is requisite than that which arises from Opinion: It was very easy by this Means to reduce him to an Absurdity: but *Socrates* takes another

ther courſe to expoſe the Ignorance of the Man ſtill more; and thereby to overthrow a Religion which had no better Props than theſe. Therefore he convinces him that this Definition is not perfect.

Eutyphron thinks to rectifie it by ſaying, that which is Holy is what pleaſes all the Gods; But *Socrates* anſwers, that this is only to explain one of the Properties of a holy Thing, inſtead of diſcovering the Eſſence of it. He does not ask if that which is Holy is belov'd of the Gods, no Body doubts of that: He would know why it is lov'd, and what it is that renders it worthy of Love. For if that which is holy, and that which is belov'd of the Gods were the ſame thing; ſince the Gods love that which is holy only becauſe it is holy, they would love that which they love only becauſe it was belov'd of 'em. And on the other hand, if that which is belov'd of the Gods were belov'd of 'em only becauſe they love it, it would follow that the Gods love without reaſon, and that that which is holy would be holy only becauſe it was belov'd. In a word, (he ſays) there is a great deal of difference between theſe 2 Terms, *Holy* and *Belov'd of the Gods*, and they are entirely oppoſite. For one Man is lov'd only becauſe they love him, and another is lov'd, becauſe he deſerves to be lov'd. That is to ſay, That which is Holy is belov'd of the Gods only becauſe it is Holy, but 'tis not Holy becauſe 'tis belov'd of them. The Matter in hand therefore is to explain the Nature of that which is Holy, and not its Qualities, and to define what it is and why the Gods love it. This is very perplexing to a ſuperſtitious Man, who continually takes up things without Examination, and believes a thing only becauſe he believes it.

Eutyphron does not diſſemble his Trouble but confeſſes that his Thoughts are fluctuating, and that he knows not how to fix 'em.

Socrates to make the Matter (which is very ſerious) a little pleaſant, takes occaſion from it to ſpeak of the Works of *Dedalus*, who made moveable Statues,

tues, which never ſtood ſtill but when a certain ſpring which they had was tyed and ſtop'd. He let's *Eutyphron* know that his Principles are as moveable as theſe Statues. The Governing Spring is not yet ſtop'd, but is continually going, his meaning is, that *Eutyphron* ſpoke by Opinion, and not at all by Science. To help him out therefore he asks him if he does not think that which is Holy is Juſt. To this *Eutyphron* agrees: Next to this the Queſtion is, whether that which is Holy is a part of that which is Juſt, or that which is Juſt a part of that which is Holy. 'Tis ſoon decided that what is Juſt is the Genus and what is Holy the Species. For there are many things Juſt which are not Holy; but none Holy which are not Juſt. So that what is Juſt has a larger extent than what is Holy.

Nothing now remains but to know what part of that which is Juſt that which is Holy is; *Eutyphron* ſays, 'tis that part of Juſtice which reſpects the Gods, and the Care of their Worſhip, and that the other part concerns Men only.

This Anſwer throws 'em into another Difficulty, and that is how to know in what this Religious Care conſiſts, and whether it be of the Nature of all other Cares, which tend to the Profit of that which is car'd for. For if ſo, our Holineſs muſt render the Gods better and more excellent, which would be an impious Thought.

Eutyphron anſwers, that 'tis a Care like that which Servants take of their Maſters: Holineſs then (ſays *Socrates*) is a kind of Servant to the Gods: But what do the Gods do by the Miniſtry of this Servant? For as Phyſicians operate Health by the Miniſtry of their Art; the Gods muſt needs operate ſomething by the Miniſtry of our Holineſs. Now what is it that they operate? *Eutyphron* anſwers, that they engage us to pleaſe them by our Prayers and Sacrifices, and that Holineſs and Piety conſiſt in this on which the Welfare of Families and Republicks depends. As on the contra-

ry

ry Impiety is the ruin, both of particular Perſons and States.

Socrates collects from this indefinite Anſwer, that Holineſs is the Art of ſacrificing and praying. To ſacrifice is to give, and to pray is to ask. So that Holineſs conſiſts in giving and asking. Such things only are ask'd as are wanted, and ſuch things only given as are neceſſary to thoſe to whom they are given; for it would be ridiculous to give a thing which they have no occaſion for.

From hence he draws this Concluſion, that Holineſs is a Traffick between God and Man. But what profit can God receive from our Offerings? For as for us 'tis very viſible what profit we receive from him, ſince we have not the leaſt Good but what proceeds from his Bounty: Are we then ſo crafty (ſays he) to draw all the Advantage of this Commerce to our ſelves only, ſo that God gets nothing by it?

Eutyphron preſs'd with this Argument; ſhuts up all in ſaying, that God leaves what is profitable to us, and contents himſelf with that which is pleaſant; and that 'tis our Reſpect, and Gratitude that is ſo pleaſant to him; which returns exactly to the former Definition; that that is Holy which is pleaſing to the Gods.

Socrates ſhows him, that he has hitherto only made a Circle, and entreats him not to refuſe him the knowledg of ſo great a good. But *Eutyphron* like a true Votary of Superſtion, who is always preſumptuous, and never confeſſes his Ignorance, ſeeks only how to get rid of him, and refers this Enquiry to another time, telling him ſome urgent Buſineſs calls him elſewhere.

Thus ends this Dialogue, which deſtroys the falſe Opinions which then reign'd in the World, without eſtabliſhing the true. The Death of *Socrates* occaſion'd *Plato* to write thus imperfectly and ſparingly. Beſides this is his Method, he always refutes before he teaches. But his manner of refuting fails not to make a diſcovery by way of Anticipa-

ticipation of what he designs to establish, and does maintain elsewhere. Here we see the superstitious Man is always near the Truth, but never reaches it. 'Tis certain that Holiness is pleasing to God, 'tis certain likewise that it produces a kind of Commerce between God and Men, and that this consists in Giving and Asking; but the ignorant Athenians conceiv'd this after too gross a manner.

Holiness can't be in us without Conversion, nor Conversion without Love, and this Love engages us to give our selves entirely God, and to ask of him to give himself to us, that he may keep alive in us that divine Flame which purifies our Souls, and makes us resemble him. In this consists that Commerce between God and Men, which makes up the whole of Religion, as *Socrates* and *Plato* both acknowledg'd.

The E N D.

THE

WORKS

OF

PLATO

ABRIDG'D.

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THE INTRODUCTION TO *SOCRATES*'s Apology.

IN *Eutyphron* we saw how *Socrates* attack'd the Superstition of the *Athenians* and the plurality of their Gods, by exposing the ridiculousness of the Fables with which their Divinity was stuff'd; and by that means endeavouring to bring 'em to the knowledge of the true God. They were a People devoted to Idolatry, and always upon their guard against Innovations; witness the *Acts of the Apostles*, where we see the *Athenians*, who were disturb'd at the preaching of St. *Paul*, cry'd out, *He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange Gods.* Now a People thus dispos'd, could not but be alarm'd by a Doctrine so opposite to their Errors. But that was not the first spring of their hatred of *Socrates*. The Vertue and generous Liberty of that wise Man procur'd him many secret Enemies, who, in order to get rid of a publick Censor that always twitted them with their Vices, decry'd him underhand, as being an impious Fellow, that meddled with suspected Sciences, and taught the way of promoting Injustice. *Aristophanes* was the most serviceable Instrument in spreading that Calumny. His Comedy of the Clouds had such an absolute influence upon the People, that it mov'd them to receive the Accusation brought against this Philosopher more than twenty Years after, branding him for a profligate Wretch that introduc'd new Deities. The Ch. 17. 18.

Cauſe being formally brought to a Trial, *Socrates* was oblig'd to appear before his Judges, and anſwer thoſe two ſorts of Accuſers. 'Twas above all upon this Occaſion, as being the laſt act of his Life, that he admirably kept up the Character of an ancient Philoſopher, endow'd with a divine Spirit, and a conſummate Wiſdom; who never did an unadvis'd Action, nor ſpoke ſo much as one Word amiſs. Even Death it ſelf, when threatned and preſented to his view, could not oblige him to depart one minute from the Paths of Vertue and Juſtice. He ſpeaks downright of his Innocence, and does not ſtoop to the cowardly baſe methods of begging Votes, that were then in uſe. He employs neither the Artifice nor Varniſh of human Eloquence: He has no recourſe to Supplications and Tears, he do's not bring his Wife and Children to ſoften the Judges with their Groans and Lamentations. His Defence do's not ſavour of any thing that's cringing, cowardly, baſe or little: His Diſcourſe is high, maſculine, generous, and becoming the liberty of a Philoſopher. He gave in his Defences with ſo much plainneſs and ſimplicity, that ſome of the Ancients took occaſion from thence to ſay, That he did not clear himſelf of the Charge. 'Tis true, he did not ſpeak as Perſons upon their Trial us'd to do. He contented himſelf with ſpeaking to the Judges as he us'd to do in common diſcourſe, and with propoſing ſome Queſtions to his Accuſers. So that his Part was rather a familiar Diſcourſe, than a ſtudy'd Harangue, which did not ſuit with his Genius. However, even this his careleſs Apology, was true and to the purpoſe. *Plato*, who was then preſent, afterwards gather'd it into a Body; and without adding any thing to the Truth, form'd it into a Diſcourſe, ſet off with an Eloquence, almoſt Divine; which, to my mind, do's infinitely ſurpaſs all the Maſter-Pieces of that nature yet known. No other Work can ſhew ſo much Candor and Ingenuity, joyn'd with ſo much Force. But, after all, the moſt admirable thing

thing in this Discourse, is not its Eloquence, but the fine Sentiments 'tis full of. Here Generosity, Reason, Piety and Justice, are display'd with all their Splendor; and the Maxims scatter'd here and there may justly be reckon'd Sacred. Who would not wonder at this Lesson of *Socrates*? viz. *That a Prisoner arraign'd ought not to make it his business to raise the Pity of the Judge; that he ought to affect him by his Reasons, and not by his Requests; and procure an Absolution by Justice and not by Favour: For a Judge is not plac'd on the Bench to oblige People by violating the Laws; but to do Justice pursuant to them. He swears to this purpose; and his Oath ought to be inviolable. Now an honest Man should not solicit his Judge to be guilty of Perjury; and a Judge should not suffer himself to be inveigled. Else, two innocent Persons will become two Criminals.* He teaches that an honest Man ought always to stand to his Post, let the impending Danger be never so great; that he ought to obey his Superiors, and part with his Life when they demand it. *For*, says he, *there's nothing more criminal and scandalous, than to disobey Superior Powers, whether God or Man.* He teaches us not to fear Death; but Shame, which pursues Men more swiftly than Death it self. He is of Opinion that our ordinary Exercise should be, discoursing of Vertue, and putting our selves to the test of its Rules; *for a Life without examination, is no Life at all.* In one word, this *Apology* is a perfect Model of the due Conduct of an honest Man in all the Conditions of Life, and especially of the manner how a Person unjustly accus'd ought to defend himself.

Several Persons who assisted in the Court upon this Occasion, drew up *Socrates*'s Apology; in which every one produc'd the Arguments that occurr'd to his memory, or those that affected him most; and all of 'em kept true to the lofty and magnanimous Temper of this Philosopher. After all the rest, *Xenophon* compil'd one upon the rela-

tion of *Hermogenes*, the Son of *Hipponicus*, for he himself was not then at *Athens*. Time has robb'd us of 'em all, except *Plato*'s and *Xenophon*'s: But 'tis apparent, that the one of these is much short of the other. In the first we meet with all the force of the greatest Disciple of *Socrates*, a Disciple that was present, and comes near to the true Original: Whereas the other presents us with the hand of a Disciple that was absent, and goes upon an imperfect Copy. However, even this imperfect Copy, is evidence that the Passages related by *Plato* are true; for *Xenophon* do's not only go upon the same Idea's of things, but likewise assures us that *Socrates* spoke as he says he did.

From thence 'tis evident, says Xenophon, *that* Socrates *truly spoke in that fashion.*

Do but observe, says *Montagne*, *by what Reasons* Socrates *rouses up his Courage to the hazards of War; with what Arguments he fortifies his Patience against Calumny, Tyranny and Death. You will find nothing in all this borrow'd from* Arts *and* Sciences. *The simplest may there discern their own Means and Power. 'Tis not possible more to retire, or to creep more low. He has done human Nature a great kindness, in shewing it how much it can do of it self. His Plea is plain and puerile, but of an unimaginable height, and offer'd in the last extremity. His way of arguing is equally admirable for its Simplicity and its Force. 'Tis an easier matter to speak like* Aristotle, *and live like* Cesar, *than to speak and live as* Socrates *did. Here lies the greatest Difficulty, and the last degree of Perfection, that no Art can improve.*

Book 3. Chap. 12.

But before I launch into the Apology, 'twill be necessary to say something of the Familiar Spirit that govern'd *Socrates*, which has made so much Noise in the World. Some look'd upon it as *Chimæra* and Fiction; others gave very different Accounts of it.

'Tis needless to observe that the Opinion of *Plato*, assigning to every Man from his very Birth a particular Genius or Angel to take Care of him, is a Ray of the Truth taught in the Holy Scriptures, where we hear of Men conducted by Angels, and

and Jesus Christ himself saying, that *the angels of little Children do see the face of God in Heaven without interruption.* That cannot be question'd. Upon which Account *Origen* uses those as Calumniators, who would brand the Familiar of *Socrates* for a Fable. A certain Proof, that he was truly guided by a good Genius, is that all his Life long he was Pious, Temperate, and Just; that in all Cases he always joyn'd in with the right side; that he never injur'd any Man; that he always proclaim'd War against Vice, and attack'd false Religions; that the whole Business of his Life was to make Men more Honest, and acquaint 'em with Truth and Justice. *In the 6th Book against Celsus.*

The only Difficulty is, to know how this Familiar gave him to understand its meaning, and what was the nature of that divine Voice. Doubtless Inspiration was the manner of conveyance. And *Plutarch* naturally leads us to that Thought, where he speaks of the Miracles recounted in *Homer*, who oftentimes introduces Deities coming to succour Men, and to inspire them with the knowledge of what they ought to do or avoid. His words are these. *We must either deny the Deity the Title of a moving Cause, or any Principle of our Operations; or else own that it has no other way of succouring Men and co-operating with them, than by calling up and determining the Will; by the Idea's it conveys into us. For it do's not push or act upon our Bodies; it influences neither our Hands nor our Feet: But by Vertue of certain Principles and Idea's, which it calls up within us, it stirs up the Active Faculty of our Soul, and either pushes on our Will, or else checks it and turns it another way.* *In the Life of Coriolanus.* *Here Plutarch is out, in giving too narrow a compass to the means by which God may succour men. See the Remark upon that Passage.*

But some will object, That at this rate it was not a Voice. It was a Voice; that is, an impression upon the imaginative Faculty of the Soul: Such as happens often while one's asleep, and sometimes when awake; when one fancies that he hears and sees, tho' at the same time he hears nothing and sees as little. This was the Opinion that *Plutarch*

In his Treatise of the Genius of Socrates.

entertain'd. For he says, that *Socrates* was a Man of a clear Head, of an easie and calm Temper; that is, he was not mov'd by Trouble nor disquieted by Passion; and, consequently, was entirely dispos'd to listen to the suggestions of that *Genius*, which by Vertue of its Light alone influenc'd the understanding part of the Soul, and made the same Impression upon it, that a Voice do's after it has pass'd through the Organs of the Body. 'Twas this Voice that *Homer* so admirably describes, when, speaking of the Dream that came upon *Agamemnon*, he says, that *a divine Voice surrounded him.*

There is yet another Difficulty behind. 'Tis, why this Voice had only the Power of diverting *Socrates* from things, and never egg'd him on to any thing; for *Marcilius Ficinus* is certainly out, in pretending to give such a mysterious Account of the matter, as if the Genius of *Socrates* never push'd him on, because he was not of a Martial Spirit, and always dissuaded him because he was naturally heavy; as if the Divine Being had only given him the Light to deny, and not to affirm. This is the way to elude the Argument by splitting upon greater Difficulties, or pinning the Controversie upon idle and frivolous distinctions. The more reasonable and natural account of the matter, is, that *Socrates* was vertuous to the last degree, and always bent to take up with whatever he took to be fair and honest; that upon other scores he had no business to mind but to live a simple and uniform Life, and consequently had no other occasion but to be reserv'd and backward, when his Reason offer'd to solicit him either to pass a false Judgment or to step a wrong Step.

In the Latin Translations this Apology is cover'd with Obscurity, because the Translators have not taken care to divide it, and did not perceive that it was made at three several times, which are distinctly pointed to, in the Translation I now present you with.

THE

THE APOLOGY OF *SOCRATES.*

I Know not, Athenians, what Impreſſion the Harangues of my Accuſers have made upon you. For my part, I own, that they have almoſt made me forget my ſelf; ſo artfully are their Reaſons colour'd and ſet off. And yet, I can aſſure you, they have not ſpoke one word of Truth.

But of all their Calumnies, that which ſurprizes me moſt, is, That they counſel you to beware of being ſeduc'd by my Eloquence, * and endeavour to work you into a great Opinion of it. For certainly it is the height of Impudence, not to fear the ſhame of having the Lye given them; which I am about to do, by ſhewing that I am not at all Eloquent, unleſs they call him Eloquent who can ſpeak nothing but the Truth. If that be their Plea, I own my ſelf a great Orator, but not after their faſhion; for I once more tell you, that they have not ſpoke one word of Truth: And I am now about to diſcover to you the naked Truth, in common and ſimple Expreſſions, without the Ornaments of the quaint Turns and pick'd Terms that ſet off their Diſcourſes. For I have this confidence in my ſelf, that I ſpeak the

* They cry'd up his Eloquence, in order to aggravate the Injuſtice they charg'd upon him; alledging, that he confounded the Idea's of Juſtice, and taught the way of putting a good Face upon bad Cauſes.

Truth,

Truth, and none of you ought to expect any thing elſe from me; and it wou'd be very unſuitable for one of my Age to come before you, like a School-Boy, with a ſtudy'd Harangue upon a fabulous Subject.

Wherefore the only Favour I deſire and beg of you, is, that when you find my Defences given in the moſt ordinary and common terms and ways of expreſſion, ſuch as I am always wont to make uſe of in my ordinary Interviews with you on the Exchange and publick Banks, and the other Places where I us'd to meet you often; my requeſt is, that when ye find it ſo, ye wou'd not be ſurpris'd or incens'd againſt me, for I am about to tell you the matter of Fact juſt as it ſtands.

Tho' I am now ſeventy Years old, yet this is the firſt time that ever I enter'd this Hall: I am a ſtranger to it, unacquainted with its Language and Cuſtoms. Now were I a Foreigner, you wou'd readily grant me the favour of giving in my Defences in the language and manner of my own Country. In like manner I now beg of you, as a ſtranger to this Hall, and I think my Petition is juſt, that you'd grant me the ſame Favour, and overlook my ways of expreſſion, which perhaps are not ſo good as others; tho', after all, it is poſſible they may be better, and only to mind whether I ſpeak juſtly or not; for that ought to be the chief view of a Judge, as the greateſt Vertue of an Orator conſiſts in ſpeaking nothing but the Truth.

'Tis but reaſonable that I ſhou'd firſt begin to anſwer the Charges of my firſt Accuſers, and afterwards come up with the latter in their order: For I have had a great many Accuſers before this Court theſe ſeveral Years, and all of 'em have advanc'd nothing but what's falſe. I am more afraid of my old Accuſers, than of *Anytus* and his Complices. It is true, the latter diſplay a great deal of Eloquence; but the others are the more to be redoubted, ſince they accoſted you from your Infancy, and wheedled you into a belief of what Calumnies they pleaſed.

They

They told you, there was one *Socrates*, a wise Man, that inquir'd into the actions of the Heavens and the hidden Treasures in the bosom of the Earth; who has such a dexterous way of perplexing the Ide'as of Justice and Truth, that he can make a bad Cause a good one.

The Men who spread those false Rumors are my most dangerous Enemies; for those who listen to their Surmises, are over-persuaded that Philosophers taken up with such Inquiries, believe no Gods. Besides, these Accusers are very numerous, and they have had a long while to concert their Plot; they are now very ancient, and took occasion to prepossess you with that Opinion, in an Age that generally is too credulous: For you were then but Infants for the most part, or at most in the first Years of your Youth, when they laid their Accusation against me before you, and carried it on at their own leisure, without any opposition: And, which is yet more unjust, I am not allow'd to know my Accusers. They get off with setting up a Comœdian at the head of the Charge, while all those who through Envy or Malice have wrought you into a belief of these Falshoods, and continue still underhand to throw the same Calumnies about; these Men, I say, are allow'd to lie concealed: So that I have neither the power of calling them to Account before you, nor the pleasure of refuting them in your presence; and the only way of defending my self, is, to fight with a Shadow, and speak against I do not know whom.

Wherefore consider, Athenians, that I am now to encounter two sorts of Accusers, those who arraign'd me a great while agone, and these who summon'd me lately; and I entreat you to believe that I lie under a necessity of giving in my Answers immediately to the first sort.

Now is the time then, that I am to defend my self, and in so short a space of time I am to endeavour to root out of your Minds a Calumny that you have entertain'd a long while, and which has taken

ken deep root in them. I wiſh with all my Heart that my Defences could promote your Advantage as well as my own, and that my Apology might ſerve ſome more important Deſign, than that of juſtifying my ſelf: But I perceive the Difficulties that lie in the way; and am not ſo blind, as not to ſee, where all this Buſtle will terminate. God's Will be done. My buſineſs is to obey the Law and defend my ſelf.

To return to the firſt Original of the Charge, upon which I am ſo much decry'd, and which inſpir'd *Melitus* with a boldneſs to arraign me before you; let's ſee what was the Plea of theſe my firſt Accuſers: * For their Charge muſt be put into Form, as if it were writ, and Affidavits made. 'Tis this: Socrates *is an impious Man: With a criminal curioſity he pretends to penetrate into all that paſſes in the Heavens, and to fathom what's contain'd in the Bowels of the Earth. He has the way of giving the Aſcendant to Injuſtice; and is not content to reſerve theſe Secrets to himſelf, but communicates them to others.*

This is the Accuſation: The Heads of which you have ſeen in the Comedy of *Ariſtophanes*, where one *Socrates* is repreſented as hung up in a Basket, giving out that he walks upon the Winds; with many other ſuch fooliſh Advances. Now theſe are Secrets that I am altogether a ſtranger to; I never gave my Mind to theſe ſublime Sciences: Not that I deſpiſe them, or contemn thoſe who are well vers'd in 'em, if any ſuch there be, leſt *Melitus* ſhou'd thereupon charge me with new Crimes: I wou'd only give you to know that I never meddled with theſe Sciences, as moſt of you can witneſs.

Since ye have ſo often convers'd with me, and that

* *Socrates* treats the Calumnies of *Ariſtophanes* and his firſt Enemies, as if it were a juſt Charge formally preſented upon Oath; for both the Accuſer and the Priſoner were oblig'd to ſwear, that they wou'd advance nothing but Truth: And this they call'd ἀντωμοσία.

there

there is so great a number of you who know me, I conjure you to declare if ever ye heard me speak of these things, either directly or indirectly. This may furnish you with certain Evidence, that all the other Articles of my Indictment are of a Piece with this, as being downright Untruths. And if ever you heard that I either taught, or requir'd a Reward for so doing, I'll justifie it to be a downright Calumny.

Not that I disparage those, who are capable to instruct and teach Men, such as *Gorgias* of *Leonti*, *Prodicus* of *Ceos*, and *Hippias* of *Elæa*. For these great Men have a wonderful Talent of persuading and retaining all the Youth of whatever City they go to; young Men that might apply themselves to which of their own Country-men they have a mind to, without any Charge, are so influenc'd by them, that they quit their own Country-men, and adhere to them only, paying round Sums, and acknowledging infinite Obligations besides. I have likewise heard, that there's yet another very ingenious Master in this City, who came from *Pavos*; for I met him to'ther day in the House of a Man that spends more upon Sophisters, than all the other Citizens put together, I mean *Callias*: Where happening to speak of *Callias*'s two Sons, I address'd my self to him in this fashion; Had you two young Horses, wou'd not you want to put them into the Hands of some skilful Man, and pay him well, for making them handsom, and giving them all the good qualities they ought to have? And would not this skilful Man be some good Groom or an expert Husbandman? Now you have two Children, what Master have you pitch'd upon for them? Whom have we in Town, that's well vers'd in human and political Vertues? For doubtless you have consider'd that Question already, upon the account of your Children. Tell me then if you know of any? Yes, doubtless, reply'd *Callias*. Who is it, said I; what Country is he of; and what are his demands? 'Tis *Evenus*, reply'd he, from *Pavos*: He demands † 5 *Minæ*. Whereupon I told

† *Fifty Crowns.*

told him, *Evenus* was happy, providing it was true that he knew the Art, and cou'd impart it to others.

As for me, Gentlemen, were I poſſeſs'd of ſuch Endowments, I ſhou'd be proud of 'em, and glory in them: But ſuch is my misfortune, I have no Title to them. I perceive you'll be ready to reply, * *But what have ye done then*, Socrates, *and what occaſion'd theſe Calumnies you are charg'd with? Had you never done more than your fellow Citizens, nor meddled with further buſineſs, theſe Reports of you wou'd never have had a being. Tell us therefore how the matter ſtands, that we may not paſs an unadviſed Sentence.* This, I take it, is a juſt Objection: Wherefore I'll endeavour to lay before you the occaſion of my being ſo much decry'd and talk'd of. Give ear to me, and aſſure your ſelves that I'll ſpeak nothing but Truth.

The diſrepute I lie under, is only occaſion'd by a ſort of Wiſdom within me. But what is this Wiſdom? Perhaps 'tis merely human Prudence, for I run a great risk of being poſſeſs'd of none elſe; whereas thoſe Men I mention'd but now, are wiſe above above a human pitch.

I can ſay nothing to this laſt ſort of Wiſdom, becauſe I am a ſtranger to it; and thoſe who charge it upon me, are lyars, and mean only to injure my Reputation. But I beg that you *Athenians* wou'd not be ſtartled, if I ſeem to ſpeak a little favourably of my ſelf: I ſhan't advance any thing upon my own Authority, but ſhall produce an unexceptionable Author to vouch on my behalf. For a witneſs of my Wiſdom, ſuch as it is, I refer you to the God him-

* Thus the words τοῦ τὶ ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα are to be render'd; and not as *de Serres* does, *viz. Quænam hæc eſt tua res? What's your buſineſs then?* The Judges knew very well what was *Sotrates*'s buſineſs, and conſequently can't be ſuppos'd to put that Queſtion to him. But it is very probable they might ask him what it was that brought him thither, or what he had done to merit thoſe Calumnies. *Marcilius Ficinus* was better acquainted with the Spirit of the Greek Language, for he render'd it, *Quodnam tuum eſt opus?*

ſelf

ſelf that preſides at *Delphi*. You are all acquainted with *Cairephon*, who was my Companion from my Infancy, and had the like Intimacy with moſt of you. He accompany'd you in your Exile, and return'd along with you. So that ye cannot but know what ſort of a Man *Cairephon* was, and how eager in all his Undertakings. One day, being at *Delphi*, he had the boldneſs to ask the Oracle (once more I beg you wou'd not be ſurpris'd with what I am about to ſay) I ſay, he put this Queſtion to the Oracle, Whether there was ever a Man in the World more wiſe than I. The Prieſteſs made anſwer, That there was none. His Brother, who is yet alive, can aſſure you that this is true. Wherefore I intreat you, *Athenians*, to conſider ſeriouſly the Reaſon why I preſent you with an account of all theſe things: For, it is only to ſhew you the ſpring of thoſe falſe Rumours that have taken Air againſt me.

When I heard the Oracle's Anſwer, I put the queſtion to my ſelf; What does the God mean? What is the hidden Senſe that lies couch'd under theſe words? For, I am ſenſible, that I am intitled to no Wiſdom, neither ſmall nor great. What then does the God mean in giving me out for the wiſeſt of Men? Since a Deity cannot lye. Thus I continued a long time in ſuſpence about the meaning of the Oracle, till at laſt after a great deal of trouble, it came in my mind to make this trial. I went to one of our Citizens, that paſſes for one of the wiſeſt Men in Town, and hop'd that by inſtancing him, as being a Perſon more wiſe than I, I ſhould refute the Oracle. When I examin'd this Man, who was one of our greateſt Politicians, and whoſe Name, I know, is a ſufficient recommendation. I found that all the World look'd upon him as a wiſe Man, and that he had the like thoughts of himſelf, but in effect was no ſuch Man. After this diſcovery I made it my buſineſs to convince him that he was not the Man he took himſelf to be. Now this was the occaſion which render'd me odious to this Man, and to all thoſe who aſſiſted at that interview. When

God cannot lye.

When I parted with him I reaſon'd within my ſelf, and ſaid to my ſelf, I am wiſer than this Man. 'Tis poſſible that neither he nor I know any thing that's good or valuable: But ſtill there's this difference; he is poſſeſs'd with an Opinion of his own knowledge, tho' at the ſame time he knows nothing; but I, as I know nothing, ſo I pretend to know as little. So that upon this ſcore, I thought my ſelf a little wiſer than he, becauſe I did not think that I knew what I did not know.

After that I viſited another that paſs'd for a wiſer Man than the former; but found him in the ſame Circumſtances, and by that diſcovery gain'd new Enemies. However this did not diſcourage me. I continued to make the ſame Experiment upon others. I was ſenſible that by ſo doing I drew hatred upon my ſelf, which gave me ſome trouble, becauſe I dreaded the conſequences of it. But I was convinc'd that I was bound to prefer the Voice of God to all Conſiderations, and to apply my ſelf to the moſt reputable Men, in order to find out its true meaning. And now that I muſt tell you, O *Athenians*, the truth, the whole reſult of my Inquiry was this. All thoſe who paſs'd for the wiſeſt Men, appear'd to me to be infinitely leſs diſpos'd to Wiſdom, than thoſe who were not at all ſo eſteem'd.

'Tis a common thing, thoſe who are leaſt eſteem'd are oftentimes the moſt wiſe.

To continue the Account of all my Adventures, in order to refute the Oracle. Having viſited all the great Stateſmen, I addreſs'd my ſelf to the *Poets*, both Tragedians,* Dithyrambicks and others; I made no queſtion, but I wou'd be catch'd napping, as the ſaying is, by finding my ſelf far more ignorant than they. I took up ſome of their moſt elaborate Performances, and put the queſtion to 'em, what was their meaning, what Plot or Deſign they carried on in

* The Poets who compil'd Hymns to the Honour of *Bacchus* were ſo called. Theſe Dithyrambs were full of a ſublime Rage, and conſiſted of bold and new-coin'd Words. And accordingly, in order to be ſucceſsful in compiling 'em, there was a neceſſity of being tranſported with Fury and Enthuſiaſm. See our Remarks upon the 2d Ode of the 4th Book of *Hor.*

theſe

these Pieces; as if I mean'd to be instructed. Indeed, *Athenians*, I am asham'd to tell you the truth: but after all, since I must out with it, there was not *one* Man of the whole company that was not more capable to discourse of, and assign Reasons for the Poems, than their respective Authors. Thus in a little space of time, I discover'd that † Poets do not carry on their Work by the measures of Wisdom, but by a sort of Enthusiasm, and certain impulses of Nature, like Prophets and Divines, that speak of a great many fine things which they do not understand. The Poets seem'd to me to be cast in the same Mould; and at the same time I perceiv'd, that by reason of their Poetry, they look'd upon themselves as the wisest of Men, and admirably well vers'd in all other things, that have no relation to their business, and which they do not at all understand. Then I turn'd my back upon 'em, being convinc'd that I was above them upon the same score, that entitled me to a preference before the great Politicians.

This is a mistake of Plato's, *which I observ'd in his Life.*

Having done with the Poets, to conclude my Inquiry, I address'd my self to the Tradesmen. When I accosted them, I was fully convinc'd that I understood nothing belonging to their Profession, and that I shou'd find them to be Men of clear Understandings and ready Parts: And indeed I was not deceiv'd. They knew all that I was ignorant of, and upon that score were infinitely wiser than I. But after all, O *Athenians*, the wisest among them seem'd to fall foul upon the same Shelve with the Poets. * For every Man of 'em presum'd so far upon his success in the way of his business, that he fansied himself to be admirably well vers'd in greater Matters: And this extravagant Fancy alone obscur'd their other commendable Qualities.

† Poems are not made by human Wisdom, but by a sort of Divine Inspiration; as *Socrates* makes it out, in the Dialogue call'd *Ion*.

* This Presumption of the *Athenian* Tradesmen, is a sufficient Evidence of the Spirit of the People of *Athens*. They lov'd to meddle with and judge of every thing.

Then I put the queſtion to my ſelf, as arguing on the behalf of the Oracle; whether I ſhou'd rather chuſe to continue ſuch as I was, without either the Knowledge of that ſort of Men, or their Ignorance; or to be entitled to both, and to be reduc'd to the ſame Category with them? I anſwer'd, both for my ſelf and for the Oracle, That it was infinitely preferable to continue as I was. This, Gentlemen, is the ſource of that dangerous and mortal Hatred and Enmity, which rais'd all the Calumnies I am now charg'd with, and chriſten'd me *The Wiſe*. For all who hear me, believe that I know all things; and by Vertue of that Knowledge am enabled to diſcover and expoſe the Ignorance of others. But I am of Opinion, that there's none truly Wiſe but God himſelf; and that the Oracle mean'd ſo much, in giving us to know that the utmoſt extent of human Wiſdom is no great matter; or, rather, that it is juſt nothing. And as for the Oracle's mentioning *Socrates*, doubtleſs my Name was only propos'd as an Inſtance; ſignifying to all Men, that the wiſeſt among them, is he, who, like *Socrates*, diſclaims all Wiſdom in himſelf.

God alone is Wiſe.

Who is the wiſeſt of Men.

Having fix'd upon this Truth, I purpos'd to fortifie the Idea yet more, and to obey God, in carrying on my Inquiry, not only among my own Country-men but likewiſe among ſtrangers; in order to try if I could meet with any that were truly wiſe; and, in caſe I found none, to act the Part of an Interpreter to the Oracle, and convince the World that they are ſtrangers to Wiſdom. This my Deſign does ſo engroſs both my Time and my Thoughts, that I have not leaſure, either to meddle in publick Buſineſs, or to take care of my private Affairs, and thus my Circumſtances are ſo narrow in the World, by reaſon of that continual Service and Worſhip * which I render to God.

Beſides, a great many young Gentlemen, who are

* By the Worſhip and Service done to God, he means the Pains he took in convincing the World that they have no Wiſdom, and that God alone is entitled to it.

come

come of rich Families and have Time at command, do willingly engage to follow me, and take so much pleasure in observing the Method in which I confute all other Men, that they afterwards endeavour to imitate me in baffling those they engage with: And it is not to be doubted, but that they meet with a plentiful Harvest, by reason of the infinite number of those vain Men, who fansie they know all things, tho' at the same time they know nothing, or at least very little.

All those whom they convince of their Ignorance, have their Eye upon me and not upon them; and give it out, *that there's one* Socrates, *a profligate and infamous Wretch, who corrupts the Youth:* And if any Body asks them what *Socrates* does, or what he teaches; they know nothing of the matter: But to avoid being at a stand, they have recourse to these frivolous Reproaches that are commonly cast upon Philosophers, *viz.* That he dives into the Heavens and the bosom of the Earth; that he believes in no God, and colours bad Causes with a good Countenance. For they dare not tell the true matter of Fact, that *Socrates* is too hard for them, and exposes them for making a shew of knowing what they do not know. Thus it came to pass that my ambitious, violent and numerous Enemies, supported by a mutual Union, and back'd by an Eloquence capable to seduce men, did a great while ago suggest to you, the Calumnies they had forg'd against me; and now have taken off and inveigled *Melitus*, *Anytus* and *Lycon*. *Melitus* stands by the Poets; *Anytus* represents the Politicians and Tradesmen; and *Lycon* appears for the Orators. So that you see I had reason to tell you in the beginning of my Discourse, That I shou'd look upon it as a great Miracle, if in so short a time I cou'd unhinge a Calumny, that has had so much time to take root and fortifie it self in your Minds.

This, *Athenians*, is the whole and the naked truth. I conceal nothing from you, and I disguise as little:

Tho' at the ſame time I am not ignorant, that all my advances upon this ſcore do but exaſperate the Wound. But even that is ſufficient evidence that I ſpeak the Truth, and point to the true ſource of theſe Imputations. As often as ye'll take the Pains to canvaſs them, whether now or at another time, you'll be fully convinc'd that it is ſo. And this, I take it, is a ſufficient Apology, againſt my firſt Accuſers.

I am now come up with the latter, and ſhall endeavour to anſwer *Melitus*; who, if the World will take his word for't, is a very honeſt Man, and very affectionate to his Country. To draw up the Indictment in form, as I did in anſwer to the firſt; the Purport of it is this: *Socrates is guilty of unjuſt things. He corrupts the Youth, by not believing the Gods receiv'd by his Country, and introducing new Deities.* To examine every Article apart.

His Plea is, That I am guilty of Injuſtice in corrupting the Youth. And I, on the other hand, alledge that *Melitus* is a very unjuſt Man, for arraigning Men, on purpoſe, to make a ſhew of taking much Care of things that he never troubled his head with. This Charge I am about to make good. I challenge you then, *Melitus*, tell me, is there nothing you mind ſo much as the promoting the Good and Integrity of young Men as much as is poſſible?

Melitus. No, ſure there's nothing.

Socrates. But pray tell our Judges, who it is that can render the Youth better? For it is not to be queſtion'd, but that you can tell who, ſince you make that ſo much your buſineſs. In effect, ſince you have found out and impeach'd the Perſon that corrupts them, you ought to tell who is able to ſet them right. Pray ſpeak ..... You ſee, *Melitus*, you are put to a Nonplus, and know not what to anſwer. Does not this cover you with ſhame? Is not this a convincing Proof that you never minded the Education of Youth? But once more, Who is it that's able to better the Youth?

Melitus.

Melitus. The Laws.

Socrates. That is not the thing, my Friend. I ask you who 'tis? Who is the Man? For it is a plain Caſe, that the chief thing that the Man muſt be vers'd in, is the Laws.

Melitus. I tell you, *Socrates*, that theſe Judges are the Men.

Socrates. How do you mean, *Melitus?* What! Are theſe Judges the only Men capable to inſtruct and better the Youth?

Melitus. Moſt certainly.

Socrates. But, are all theſe Judges capable ſo to do? Or, is it only a particular number of them?

Melitus. All of 'em.

Socrates. You talk ſtrangely. You have found out a great number of good Preceptors for us. But pray is the whole Audience capable likewiſe to better the Youth, or not?

Melitus. They are all likewiſe capable.

Socrates. And what do you ſay of the Senators?

Melitus. The Senators can alſo do it.

Socrates. But, my dear *Melitus*, do thoſe who harangue the publick Aſſemblies corrupt the Youth; or are they capable in like manner to better them?

Melitus. They are all likewiſe capable.

Socrates. It will follow then, that all the *Athenians* are capable to inſtruct the Youth without me; and that it is only I who corrupts them. Is not this what you mean?

Melitus. It is juſt ſo.

Socrates. I muſt needs own, that by this means you faſten a very great misfortune upon me. However, pray go on, and anſwer me. What do you think? Are Horſes in the ſame condition? Can all Men make them better, and is it only one Man that has the ſecret of ſpoiling them? Or, is it not juſt a contrary Caſe; that is, that only one Man, or a ſmall number of Jockies, know how to better them, and the reſt of Mankind, when they make uſe of 'em, do only ſpoil them? Now, is not the Caſe of

all other Animals juſt the ſame? It is certainly ſo, whether *Anytus* and you agree to it, or not: For it would be an infinite happineſs and advantage to the Youth, if there were only one Man in the World that could corrupt them, and every Body beſides were able to redreſs their Errors. But indeed, *Melitus*, you have given ſufficient Proof, that the Education of Youth did never much diſquiet you: And upon this occaſion you have plainly given the World to know, that you never minded it. However, pray, *Melitus*, anſwer me as to this Point: Whether does a Man benefit more by living with honeſt Men, or with Knaves? Return me an Anſwer, my Friend; for I put no difficult Queſtion to you. Is it not true that wicked Men do always give ſome bad Tincture to thoſe who frequent their Company, and that good Men do always benefit thoſe that live with them?

Melitus. Yes; doubtleſs.

Socrates. Is there any Man, who had rather chuſe to be prejudic'd, than to be benefitted by thoſe he lives with? Anſwer me; for the Law enjoyns you ſo to do.

Mel. No; there's none.

Soc. But now that you charge me with corrupting and debauching the Youth; whether do you alledge that I do it willingly and knowingly, or againſt my will?

Mel. Willingly and knowingly.

Soc. How then, *Melitus*, does your Wiſdom, in the Age you are now of, ſurpaſs mine at this Age ſo far, that you know very well that wicked Men do always prejudice, and good Men benefit thoſe who frequent their Company; and yet that I ſhou'd be ſo ignorant as not to know, that if I debauch any of my Followers, I run the risk of being prejudic'd by them, and at the ſame time continue to draw that Evil upon my ſelf both willingly and knowingly? In this Point, *Melitus*, I do not believe you at all; neither do I think that any Man in the World

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can believe you. For one of those two things must be true; namely, either that I do not corrupt the Youth at all; or, if I do, that it is against my will and without my knowledge. Now turn the Case upon which of these two you will; it is plain that you are a Calumniator and a Lyar. Put the Case, that I corrupt the Youth against my will; the Law does not arraign Men for involuntary Crimes. But it orders that such Men as are guilty of them, shou'd be taken aside, inform'd of 'em, and privately reprov'd for their Errors; for 'tis plain, that if I be instructed to the full, I'll cease to be guilty of what I have committed against my Will, Now you have neither counsell'd me nor instructed me; but have arraign'd me before a Tribunal, which the Law has provided for those who deserve Punishment, and not for those who stand only in need of Remonstrances. This, Gentlemen, is a convincing Proof of what I alledg'd before; namely, that *Melitus* never minded or thought of these things.

But after all, pray tell, how it is that I corrupt the Youth. According to your Information, 'tis, by teaching them to disown the Gods acknowledg'd by their Country, and to honour strange ones. Is not this your Plea?

Mel. It is just so.

Soc. Then, *Melitus*, I conjure you in the Name of all those Gods, whose Interest is now concern'd, to explain your meaning more clearly, both to me and to our Judges. For I am at a loss to know, whether you allow that I teach the Youth to believe in any Gods, and only turn their Respect from the Gods of their own Country to Foreign ones; or, whether you charge me with believing no God at all, and shaking the Belief of others? Tho' at the bottom I am effectually persuaded that there are Gods; so that Atheism is none of my Crime.

Mel. I charge you with owning no God.

Soc. You are a strange Man! How can you

talk ſo? What! Do not I believe as other Men do, that the Sun and Moon are Gods? *

Mel. Certainly, *Athenians*, he believes in no God; for he ſays the Sun is a Stone, and the Moon a piece of Earth.

Soc. My dear *Melitus*, you think you are ſpeaking to *Anaxagoras*; and treat our Judges very contemptuouſly, in thinking them ſo void of Letters, as not to know that the Books of *Anaxagoras* and *Clazomenian* are ſtuff'd with ſuch Stories. Beſides, wou'd the Youth be at the trouble of learning from me ſuch things as are contain'd in the publick Books which are ſold every day in the *Orcheſtra* for a Drachma? This wou'd furniſh them with a fair opportunity of deriding *Socrates*, for attributing to himſelf ſuch things as are not only none of his, but likewiſe abſurd and extravagant. But pray tell me, do you alledge that I own no God?

Mel. Yes, I do.

Soc. You advance incredible things, my dear *Melitus*; and are not conſiſtent with your ſelf. Suffer me to tell you, *Athenians*, that *Melitus* ſeems to me to be very inſolent, and that he has laid this Accuſation againſt me, out of a youthful preſumption to inſult over me: For he's come hither, as it were, to try me, in propoſing a Riddle, and ſaying within himſelf, I'll ſee if *Socrates*, who paſſes for ſo wiſe a Man, will be able to diſcern that I'm upon the Banter, and advance contradictory things; or, if I can gull him and all the Audience. In effect his Information preſents us with a palpable contradiction. As if he had ſaid, *Socrates is guilty of Injuſtice in owning no Gods, and in owning Gods.* And this is Banter all over. That's the Notion I have of it. I beg you would liſten to me; and, purſuant to my firſt Requeſt, wou'd not be incens'd againſt

* *Socrates* threw in this Ironical Expreſſion, in order to expoſe the ridiculouſneſs of the Religion of the *Athenians*, who look'd upon the Sun and Moon as Gods, which are only the Work of God's Hands.

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me, for addreſſing you in my ordinary way of ſpeaking.

Anſwer me, *Melitus*; Is there any Man in the World that believes that there are human things, and yet denies the being of Men? Pray anſwer, and do not make ſo much Noiſe. Is there any Man who believes that there are certain Rules for managing of Horſes, and yet believes there is no ſuch thing as a Horſe? Is there any Man that troubles himſelf with Tunes for a Flute, and yet believes that no Man can play upon it? There's no ſuch Man, to be ſure; for ſince you will not anſwer your ſelf, I'll anſwer for you. But pray anſwer me as to this Point: Is there any Man that believes divine things, and yet denies the being of a God?

Mel. No, certainly there's none.

Soc. What pains have I taken to wreſt that word out of you! * You acknowledge then that I believe and teach the being of Deities. So that whether they be new or old, you ſtill own that I believe in Deities. And to this purpoſe you ſwore in your Information. Now, if I believe that there are Deities, I muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe that there are Gods. Is not it ſo? Yes, doubtleſs. I take your ſilence for conſent. But theſe Deities or Demons, do not we take them for Gods, or the Children of Gods? Anſwer me.

Mel. Yes, doubtleſs.

* Theſe Paſſages are more important than at firſt view they ſeem to be. Whoever believes, that there are ſuch Creatures as the Children of Gods, believes that there are Gods. The acknowledging of Angels implies the belief of Gods; which is the thing that *Socrates* points to. Theſe inferior Gods are Children and Miniſters of the Supreme God, the God of Gods. Now *Socrates* own'd an infinite number of theſe ſubordinate Beings, which he look'd upon as a continued Chain deſcending from the Throne of God to the Earth, and as the Bonds of Commerce between God and Men, and the Medium which unites Heaven and Earth. This Notion of his might be taken from *Homer*'s myſterious Chain; or, perhaps he had heard of *Jacob*'s Ladder, the top whereof reach'd to Heaven, when the foot ſtood upon the Earth; upon which the Angels of God aſcended and deſcended, *Gen.* 28. 12.

Soc. And by consequence you acknowledge that I believe there are Demons, and that these Demons are Gods; you have now a fair Proof of my Allegation; namely, that you propos'd to me a Riddle, in order to divert your self to my cost; in alledging that I own'd no Gods, and yet believe there are Demons. For if Demons are Children of * God, or Bastards, if ye will; since they are said to be born of Nymphs or other Women, who is the Man that owns the Children of Gods, and yet denies the Being of the Gods themselves? This is as great an Absurdity, as if one spoke of Colts and Eaglets, and yet deny'd the Being of Horses or Eagles. So that, *Melitus*, 'tis a plain Case that you laid this Accusation against me, in order to make trial of my Parts; or else you must own that you have no lawful pretence for citing me before this Tribunal. For you will never convince any Man who has one grain of Sense, that the same Man who believes that there are such things as relate to the Gods and to Demons, will yet believe that there are neither Demons, nor Gods, nor Hero's. That's altogether impossible. But I need not enlarge my Defences before you, *Athenians:* What I have already said will suffice to make it out, that I am not guilty of Injustice, and that *Melitus*'s Charge is groundless.

The Hatred and Envy of the People is always pernicious to honest Men.

As for what I told you in the beginning, about drawing the Hatred of the Citizens upon me; you may rest satisfied that it is just so: And that, if I die, I owe my death, not to *Melitus*, nor to *Anytus*, but to that Spirit of Hatred and Envy that reigns among

* *Socrates* speaks thus in compliance with the Opinion of the People, who believ'd the Demons ow'd their Being to the Correspondence of the Gods with their Nymphs or Women. Now upon this occasion, it was not his business to attack that Error. 'Tis certain, that *Socrates* was not of that Opion; for he had learn'd of *Pythagoras*, that Demons or Angels and Hero's, that is, devout Men and Saints, are the Sons of God, because they derive from him their Being, as Light owes it's Original to a luminous Body. And in his *Timæus*, speaking of the Generation of Angels or Demons, he says, 'tis above the reach of human Nature.

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the People, which has ruin'd so many honest Men, and will still continue to bring others to the like Fate. For it is not to be hop'd that my death will conclude the Tragedy. Were it so, my Life would be but too well spent.

But perhaps some will say, *Are not you asham'd*, Socrates, *that you apply'd your self to a study that now puts you in danger of your Life?* To this Objection I'll give a satisfying Answer: Whoever is the Man that puts it to me, I must needs tell him, that he's much out, in believing that a Man of any Valour or Vertue ought to regard the Considerations of Death or Life. The only thing he ought to mind in all his Enterprises, is, to see that his Actions be just, and such as become an honest Man. Otherwise it wou'd follow from your Proposition, that the Demi-gods who dy'd at the Siege of *Troy*, were all of 'em imprudent, especially the Son of *Thetis*, who was infinitely more careful to avoid Shame than Death; insomuch that his Mother seeing him impatient to kill *Hector*, accosted him, as I remember, in these Terms; *My Son, if you revenge the death of* Patroclus *by killing* Hector, *you'll certainly die your self.* Now her Son was so little mov'd by her Threats, and contemn'd Death so much, that he was infinitely more afraid to live like a Coward, and not resent the death of his Friends. *May I die immediately*, said he, *providing I do but punish the Murderer of* Patroclus; *providing I do not lie expos'd to Contempt, and accounted an useless Burden to the Earth.* *In the 18th Book of the Iliads.*

Now, what do ye think? Does he stand upon the consideration of Danger and Death? It is a certain Truth, *Athenians*, that every Man who has pick'd out to himself an honourable Post, or is put into it by his Superiors, ought to stand up steddily, maugre all the Danger that surrounds him, without considering either Death or what is yet more terrible, but bending his whole Care to avoid shame. *Shame is more to be dreaded than Death.*

So that I shou'd be guilty of a monstrous Crime, if, after the faithful Services I have done, in expo-

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ſing my Life ſo often in the Poſts I was prefer'd to by our Generals, at *Potidæa*, *Amphipolis*, and *Delium*, I ſhould now be ſo tranſported with the fear of Death, or any other Danger, as to abandon the Poſt in which God has now placed me, enjoyning me to ſpend my life-time in the ſtudy of Philoſophy, in examining my ſelf and others. That indeed would be a criminal Deſertion, and wou'd juſtly occaſion the Arraignment of me before this Tribunal, as being a profligate Man that owns no Gods, diſobeys an Oracle, fears Death, and believes himſelf Wiſe. For to fear Death, is nothing elſe, but to believe one's ſelf to be wiſe when they are not; and to fanſie that they know what they do not know. In effect no Body knows Death; no Body can tell, but it may be the greateſt Benefit of Mankind; and yet Men are afraid on't, as if they knew certainly that it were the greateſt of Evils. Now is not this a ſcandalous Ignorance, for Men to fanſie they know what they do not know?

What is the fear of Death.

It is the greateſt Benefit to juſt Men.

For my part I differ in that Point from all other Men, and if in any thing I ſeem more wiſe than they, it is in this, That, as I do not know what paſſes in the Regions below, ſo I do not pretend to know it. All that I know is this, That there's nothing more criminal or ſcandalous, than to be guilty of an unjuſt thing, and to diſobey thoſe who are better than we, or plac'd above us, whether Gods or Men. So that I ſhall never dread or endeavour to avoid thoſe Evils that I do not know; and which, for any thing I know, may really be good. But I ſhall always dread and avoid thoſe Evils which I certainly know to be ſuch.

Diſobedience to our Superiors is not only criminal but ſhameful.

Now, after all the ſolicitations of *Anytus*, in repreſenting to you the neceſſity of bringing me to a Trial, and now that I am upon it, that you cannot diſpenſe with my Life, leſt your Sons who are already ſo much addicted to my Doctrine, ſhould be entirely corrupted: Suppoſing, I ſay, that after all theſe Remonſtrances, you ſhou'd ſay to me, *Socrates*,

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we have no regard to the Allegations of *Anytus*: We dismiss and absolve you, but upon this Condition, that you shall give over the proper suit of your Philosophy and wonted Enquiries; and in case you be found guilty of a relapse, you shall certainly die. If you cast my Absolution upon these Terms, I answer you, *Athenians*, That I honour and love you, but that I'll rather obey God than you; and that while I live I'll never abandon the exercise of Philosophy, in admonishing and checking you according to my usual Custom, and addressing my self to every one I meet in this fashion: *Since you are so honest a Man, and a Citizen of the famousest City in the World, equally renown'd for Wisdom and Valour, are not you asham'd to make it your whole business to amass Riches, and to purchase Glory, Credit and Honour; and at the same time to slight the Treasures of Prudence, Truth, and Wisdom, and not to think of improving your Soul to the highest Perfection it is capable of?* If any Man denies this to be his Case, and maintains that he minds the Concerns of his Soul, I will not take his word for't; but I'll interrogate, examine and confute him; if I find that he is not truly Vertuous, but makes a shew of being such, I'll make him asham'd, and twit him with his ignorance, in preferring vile and perishing things, to those which are infinitely more valuable, and will never part from us.

Wisdom is a Treasure that Death it self cannot rob us of.

In this fashion will I discourse the Young and the Old, the Citizens and Foreigners; but above all, you Citizens, for whom I am most concern'd. For, be it known to you, that I am commission'd by God so to do; and, I'm fully persuaded that your City never enjoy'd so great an Advantage, as this my continued Service to God. All my business is to persuade you, both Young and Old, that you ought not to doat so much upon your Body, your Riches, and other things you are fond of, but should love your Souls. I ever tell you, that Vertue does not flow from Riches; but on the contrary, that Riches spring

Riches and all good things are the product of Vertue.

ſpring from Vertue; and that all other Advantages accruing to Men, whether in publick or private ſtations, take riſe from the ſame Fountain.

If by ſpeaking theſe things I corrupt the Youth, then, of neceſſity, the Poyſon muſt lie in thoſe Maxims. For if they allege that I advance any thing different from theſe, they either are miſtaken, or impoſe upon you. After that, I have only to ſay, that whether you do as *Anytus* deſires or not: Whether you diſmiſs me, or detain me, I ſhall never act contrary to them, tho' I were to die for it a thouſand times. Be not diſturb'd, *Athenians*, at what I've ſaid, but vouchſafe me the favour of a patient Hearing: As I take it, your Patience will not be in vain, for I have ſeveral other things to acquaint you with, which may be of uſe to you. You may aſſure your ſelves, that if you put me to death, me who loves your City ſo paſſionately, you'll prejudice your ſelves more than me. Neither *Anytus* nor *Melitus* can hurt me; 'tis impoſſible they ſhould.

**Ill Men cannot do any real Injury to the good.*

* For God does not permit that the better ſort of Men ſhould be injur'd by thoſe who are worſe. All Men may kill us, or put us to flight, or beſpatter us with Calumnies: And queſtionleſs *Anytus* and the reſt look upon theſe things as great Evils, but for my part I am not of their Opinion. In my mind, the greateſt of all Evils, is the doing what *Anytus* does in perſecuting an innocent Perſon, and endeavouring to take away his Life by flagrant injuſtice.

So that upon this occaſion, *Athenians*, 'tis not out of love to my ſelf, but out of love to you, that I make this Defence. Do not ſin againſt God by your Sentence, and prove unmindful of the Preſent he has made you. For if you condemn me to death, ye will not eaſily light upon ſuch another Citizen, whom God has united to your City, † like a Fly

†When *Socrates* ſays, *They would look upon his Compariſon as ridiculous*; he twits the *Athenians* with the delicacy and niceneſs of their Ears and Taſte: For the Compariſon is not at all ridiculous, as being much the ſame with that made uſe of by the Prophet *Jeremiah*, 46. 20. *Egypt is like a very fair Heifer, but deſtruction cometh out of the North.*

to

to a Horſe (tho' perhaps you may look upon the Compariſon as ridiculous) the Horſe being generous and ſprightly, but heavy by reaſon of his fatneſs, and ſtanding in need of ſomething to rouze and awaken him. As I take it, God has pitch'd upon me, to rouze and ſpur you up, and to be always among you: And upon my word, you'll ſcarce light on another that will perform his Office as I have done. So, if you believe me, you'll diſmiſs me.

But perhaps, like Men awaken'd when they haue a mind to ſleep, you'll be uneaſie, and reject my Advice, and in compliance with *Anytus*'s Paſſion will condemn me upon very ſlight grounds. Let it be ſo. But then you'll paſs the remainder of your Life in a profound Lethargy, unleſs God take a particular Care of you, and ſend you another Man like me.

But to make it out that 'tis God who united me to your City, I preſent you with an infallible Proof, *viz.* That there's ſomething more than human in my neglecting my own private Affairs for ſo many Years, and devoting my ſelf wholly to your Intereſt, by taking you aſide one after another, like a Father or an elder Brother, and inceſſantly exhorting you to apply your ſelves to Vertue.

Had I reap'd any Benefit or Advantage by my Exhortations, you might have ſomething to ſay: But you ſee my very Accuſers, who revile me with ſo much Impudence, have not had the face to charge me with that, nor to offer the leaſt evidence of my demanding any Reward: And beſides, my Poverty is an Evidence for me that cannot lye.

'Tis poſſible ſome may think it ſtrange and unaccountable, that I ſhould have meddled in giving private Advices, and yet had not the Courage to appear in the Conventions of the People to aſſiſt my Country with Counſel. The thing that hinder'd me ſo to do, *Athenians*, was this Familiar Spirit, this Divine Voice, that ye have often heard me ſpeak of, and that *Melitus* has endeavour'd ſo much to ridicule. This Spirit has ſtuck by me from my infancy:

'Tis

'Tis a Voice that does not ſpeak but when it means to take me off from ſome Reſolution; for it never preſſes me to undertake any thing. It always thwarted me, when I mean'd to meddle in the Affairs of State, and that very ſeaſonably; for had I imbarked in ſuch matters, I had long ere now been out of the World, and had neither benefitted you nor my ſelf. Pray, be not diſturb'd if I ſpeak my Mind without diſguiſe. Whoever offers frankly and generouſly to oppoſe the whole Body of a People, whether you or others, and means to hinder the commiſſion of Iniquity in the City; will never eſcape with impunity. 'Tis abſolutely neceſſary that he who ſtands up for Juſtice, ſhould live a plain private Life, remote from publick Stations. This I'll make good, not by Words, but by matter of Fact; upon which I know ye lay much ſtreſs.

Give ear to the relation of my Adventures, and you'll find that I am uncapable of yielding to any Man, for fear of Death, in an unjuſt thing; and that by reaſon of my not complying, I muſt unavoidably fall a Sacrifice to Injuſtice. I am about to talk of things that indeed are diſagreeable; but at the ſame time are very true, and ſuch as have been tranſacted in your own Councils.

You know, *Athenians*, that I never bore any Magiſtracy (*a*), but was only a Senator. Our Antiochian Tribe was juſt come in their turn to the *Prytanæum*, when contrary to all the Laws, you at the ſame time reſolv'd to indict the ten Generals, for not taking up and interring the Corps of thoſe who were kill'd or drown'd in the Sea Fight at the Iſles (*b*) of *Arginuſæ*; and would not condeſcend to try them ſeparately: A piece of injuſtice that you afterwards

(*a*) The People of *Athens* were divided into Tribes, and 50 Men were choſen by turns out of each, who govern'd 35 Days; and were call'd *Prytani*, or Senators.

(*b*) This Battel was fought by *Callicratides* the Lacedemonian General, againſt the ten Athenian Generals, who obtain'd the Victory. *Vid. Xenoph. lib.* 1. *Hiſtor. Græc.*

were

were sensible of, and (*a*) regretted. Now I was the only Senator who upon that occasion dar'd to stand up and oppose the Violation of the Laws. I protested against your Decree, and notwithstanding all your Menaces and Out cries, and the Advances of the Orators that were preparing an Accusation against me, I chose rather to endanger my self on the side of the Law and Justice, than to suffer my self to be frighted by Chains or Death into a tame compliance with such horrid Iniquity.

Xenophon gives the very same Testimony of Socrates.

This happen'd under the popular Form of Government; but after the establishment of *Oligarchy*, the thirty Tyrants (*b*) sent for me and 14 more to the (*c*) *Tholus*, and order'd us to bring *Leon* from *Salamina*, in order to be put to death; for by such Orders they meant to cast the Odium of the ill Actions upon several Persons. Upon this occasion I gave 'em to know, not by Words but by Deeds, that, to speak coarsly, I made no account of Death, and that my only Care was to avoid the commission of Impiety and Injustice. Notwithstanding the greatness of these 30 Tyrants, all their Power did not move or influence me to violate the Law and betray my Conscience.

In the 2d Year of the 39th Olimp.

Upon our departure from the *Tholus*, the other four went to *Salamina* and brought off *Leon*; and as for me, I retir'd to my House; and doubtless my Disobedience had been punish'd by death, had not that Form of Government been establish'd soon after. There are Witnesses enough to vouch for the Truth of all that I advance.

Now judge your selves if I could have liv'd so many Years, had I embark'd in the Affairs of State: 'Tis so far from that, *Athenians*, that neither I nor

(*a*) They afterwards repented of what they had done, and order'd the Seducers of the People to be prosecuted for Defamation.

(*b*) The 30 Tyrants were set up in the first Year of the 94th Olymp. being the 64th or 65th of *Socrates*'s Age.

(*c*) The *Tholus* was a sort of Clerks Office, where the *Pritani* dined, and the Clerks sate.

any Man living could have done it. However, you ſee the only thing I always aim'd at, whether in publick or private, was never to go along with any Man, no, not with Tyrants themſelves, in an unjuſt thing.

As for the young People, whom my Accuſers would have paſs for my Diſciples, I affirm that I never made a Trade of teaching. Indeed, if any Perſons, whether young or old, were at any time deſirous to ſee me and hear my Principles, I never declin'd to give 'em ſatisfaction; for as I do not ſpeak for Money, ſo I will not hold my peace for want of it. I am at all times equally free to the Rich and the Poor, and willing to give 'em all poſſible leiſure for asking their Queſtions; or, if any of 'em chuſe rather to hear me, I give 'em ſatisfaction by anſwering my own Queſtions: And if any of theſe be found, either good or bad, I am neither to be praiſed nor blamed; for I am not the Author either of their good or bad Qualities. I never engag'd to teach 'em any thing, and in effect I never did teach 'em. If any of 'em boaſts that he ever heard from me, or was privately taught any thing beſide what I avow publickly to the whole World, you may aſſure your ſelves he does not ſpeak the Truth.

Ye have now heard, *Athenians*, the reaſon why moſt People love to hear me, and converſe ſo long with me. I have told you the naked Truth, *viz*, that they take a ſingular Pleaſure in ſeeing thoſe Men baffled who pretend to be wiſe and are not. And that you know is not at all diſagreeable. *I* have likewiſe told you, that *I* receiv'd my Orders ſo to do from God himſelf, by Oracles, Dreams, and all the other Methods which the Deity makes uſe of to make known his Pleaſure to Men.

If *I* did not ſpeak Truth, you might eaſily convict me of a Lye. For, had *I* debauch'd the Youth, of neceſſity thoſe who now are old, and conſcious that *I* perverted their Youth, would riſe up and proſecute me: Or, if they did not, to be ſure their Fathers, Uncles,

cles, or Brethren, would find it their Duty to demand Revenge upon the Debaucher of their Sons, Nephews or Brethren. Now, *I* see many of those here present, particularly *Crito* the Father of this *Critobulus*, a Man of the same City and Age with my self; *Lysanias* the *Sphecian*, Father to this *Eschines*, *Antypho* a Citizen of *Cephisia* and Father to *Epigenes*, and several others whose Brethren assist at this Meeting, as *Nicostratus* Son to *Zotidas* and Brother to *Theodotus*. 'Tis true *Theodotus* is dead, and so has no occasion for his Brother's assistance: Besides those, *I* see *Paralus* the Son of *Demodocus* and Brother to *Theages*, *Adimantus* Son to *Ariston* and Brother to *Plato* who is now before you, *Aiantodorus* Brother to * *Apollodorus*, and a great many more, of whom *Melitus* was oblig'd to have pitch'd upon one or two at least for Witnesses.

If it was an oversight in him, there's yet time enough; *I* allow him to do it now. Pray let him name them, if he can. But you'll find, *Athenians*, 'tis quite otherwise; all these Men, whose Children, whose Brethren *Melitus* and *Anytus* alledge *I* have debauch'd and entirely ruin'd; these very Men, *I* say, are all on my side. *I* do not offer to take shelter under those whom *I* have debauch'd: Perhaps they might have Reasons for defending me. But *I* put the Case upon those, whom *I* have not at all seduc'd, Men advanc'd in Years, and near Relations to these young Men: What other Reason should move them to protect me, but my Innocence and rightful Title? Do not they know that *Melitus* is a Lyar, and that *I* advance nothing but what is true? These, *Athenians*, are Arguments that may be urg'd in my Defence: And the others, which *I* pass over in silence, are of the same force and weight.

* This *Apollodorus* was likewise present. He was a Man of a very weak Head, but one that lov'd *Socrates* entirely. When *Socrates* was condemn'd, and going to Prison, he cry'd out, *That which afflicts me most*, Socrates, *is to see you die in innocence.* *Socrates* stroaking his Head with his Hand, smil'd and said, *My Friend, would you rather see me die in guilt?*

But perhaps there are some among you, who calling to mind their being formerly arraign'd in the same Place where I now stand, will be incens'd against me, upon the account, that when they were in much less danger they made suppliant Addresses to their Judges with Tears, and to move their Compassion more effectually, presented their Children, with their Friends and Relations in this Place; whereas I have no recourse to such Refuges, notwithstanding that in all probability I run the most dangerous Risque that can be. 'Tis possible, I say, that the consideration of this Difference may whet their Passion against me, and move them to cast me with Indignation.

I am unwilling to believe that there are any such here; but if there be, the most reasonable Excuse I can plead, is this: I have Relations as well as they have. To use *Homer*'s Expression, *I am neither sprung from Oak nor Stone, but am born like other Men.* I have three Sons, the eldest of whom is yet young, and the other two are but Infants: And yet I shall not bring 'em hither to get my self clear'd upon the Consideration of them.

Now, what is the reason that I won't do it? 'Tis neither a proud stiffness of Humour, nor any contempt of you; and as for my fearing or not fearing Death, that is another Question: 'Tis only with respect to your Honour and that of the whole City, that I decline it. For 'tis neither handsom nor creditable, either for you or me, to make use of such means at my Years, and under such a Reputation as I have; 'tis no matter whether it is merited or unmerited; since 'tis sufficient that by an Opinion generally receiv'd, *Socrates* has the advantage of most Men. If those who pass among you for Men of an uncommon Rank, preferable to the rest for Wisdom, Courage, or any other Vertue, should stoop to such unaccountable base and mean Actions, as if they were apprehensive of some great Evil accruing to them upon your condemning them to die, and expected

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Immortality by vertue of your Abſolution: If theſe Men, I ſay ſhould be guilty of ſuch meanneſs, they'd affront the City extreamly; for they'd give ſtrangers occaſion to imagine that the moſt vertuous Men among the *Athenians*, thoſe who are in itled to Honours and Dignities, by way of preference to all others, are nothing different from the loweſt-ſpirited Women. Now this, *Athenians*, you ought to beware of; you that are poſſeſs'd of ſome Reputation and Authority: And ſuppoſing I deſign'd to do any ſuch thing, you would be oblig'd to ſtop me, and give me to know that you'd ſooner condemn one that means to excite your Compaſſion by theſe Tragical Scenes, and by that means to expoſe your City to be ridiculed; than one that with Tranquility and Repoſe expects what Sentence you pleaſe to pronounce.

But to wave the Topick of the City's Glory, which is ſenſibly wounded by ſuch Indignities; Juſtice it ſelf forbids ſupplicating the Judge, or extorting an Abſolution by Requeſts. A Judge ought to be perſuaded and convinc'd. He is not plac'd upon the Bench to oblige Men by violating the Laws, but to do juſtice purſuant to the Laws. He is ſworn ſo to do by an Oath that ought to be inviolable. 'Tis not in his Power to favour whom he pleaſes: He is oblig'd to do Juſtice. We ought not therefore to bring you into a cuſtom of Perjury, and you ought to hinder thoſe who attempt it. For both thoſe who tempt you, and you who comply, do equally wound Juſtice and Religion, and both are involv'd in the guilt. *The Duty of a Judge.*

Wherefore, *Athenians*, do not you expect that I'll have recourſe to ſuch things, as I take to be neither Creditable, Juſt, nor Pious, eſpecially upon this Occaſion where I ſtand arraign'd of Impiety by *Melitus*. Should I move you by Prayer, and force you to break your Oath, that would be evidence that I taught you to believe no Gods; and thus in offering to juſtifie my ſelf, I ſhould entangle my ſelf in the very

Charge of my Adversaries, and prove against my self that I believe in no Gods. But I am very far, *Athenians*, from being of that Principle. I am more convinc'd of the Being of a God, than my Accusers are; and am so well satisfied in the Point, that I resign my self to you and to God, that ye may judge as ye think fit, both for your selves and for me.

Socrates *having spoken in this manner, the Judges put it to the Vote, and he was found guilty by 33 Voices: After which* Socrates *begun again to speak.*

I Am not at all troubled, *Athenians*, at the Sentence ye have now pronounc'd. Several things keep me from being disturb'd, especially one thing, *viz.* That I was fully prepar'd before-hand, and have met with nothing more than I expected. For I did not think to have come so near to an Absolution, but expected to be cast by a greater majority of Votes. I finding now that I am only cast by 33 Votes, I fansie I have escap'd *Melitus*'s Prosecution; and not only so, but I think 'tis evident, that if *Anytus* and *Lyson* had not joyn'd in the Accusation, * he had lost his 1000 Drachms, since he had not the fifth part of the Votes on his side. *Melitus* then thinks I deserve death, in a good time! And as for me, what Punishment † shall I allotto my self? You shall see plainly,

* An Accuser was oblig'd to have one half of the Votes, and a fifth part more, or else was fin'd in 1000 Drachms, *i. e.* 100 Crowns. *Theophrast.* in his Book of Laws; and *Demosthenes* against *Androtion.*

† To understand this, we must know, that when the Criminal was found guilty, and the Accuser demanded a Sentence of death; the Law allow'd the Prisoner to condemn himself to one of these three Punishments, *viz.* perpetual Imprisonment, a Fine, or Banishment. This Privilege was call'd τιμᾶσθαι; and was first enacted on the behalf of the Judges, that they might not scruple to pass Sentence upon those who by condemning themselves own'd their guilt. *Socrates* was catch'd in this Snare; but *Xenophon* testifies that he did not condemn himself at all, and would not allow his Friends to do it, because 'twas in effect an acknowledgment of the Crime. Only, in obedience to the Laws, and in order to proclaim his Innocence, instead of a Punishment, he demanded a Reward worthy of himself.

Athenians,

Athenians, that I'll pitch upon what *I* deserve, Now, what is't that *I* must condemn my self to, for not concealing what Good I've learn'd in my life-time, for slighting what others court very earnestly, *I* mean, Riches, care of Domestick Affairs, Offices, Dignities; and for never embarking in a Party or engaging in any Office, which things are commonly practis'd in this our City? *I* always look'd upon my self as a Man of more Honesty and Goodness, than to preserve my Life by such pitiful shifts. Besides, you know, *I* never would engage in any Profession that did not enable me at once to promote your Advantage and my own; and that my only Aim was, to be always in readiness to procure to each of you in private the greatest of all good things, by persuading you not to set your Mind upon your Possessions, till you had taken Care of your selves in studying Wisdom and Perfection; just as a City ought to be taken care of, before the things that belong to it; and in like manner every other principal thing is intitled to a preference in our Thoughts, before its Appurtenances.

After all these Crimes, what is my demerit? Doubtless, *Athenians*, if you proportion the Reward to the Merit, *I* deserve some considerable Good, suitable to such a Man as *I* am. Now what is't that's suitable for a poor Man that's your Benefactor, and wants leisure and opportunity for Exciting and Exhorting you? Nothing suits better with such a Man, than to be entertain'd in the *Prytanæum*; that's more due to him than to those of you that have brought off the Trophies of Victory from the Horses and Chariot Races in the Olympick Games. For these Victors purchase you a seeming Happiness by their Victories; but as for me, I make you really happy by mine. Besides, they stand not in need of such a supply, but I do. In justice therefore you ought to adjudge me a Recompence worthy of my self; and to be maintain'd upon the Publick is no more than I deserve.

Those Victors were look'd upon as Gods.

Perhaps you may charge me with Arrogance and Self-conceit in ſpeaking thus to you, as you did but now, when I ſpoke againſt the Supplications and Prayers of Priſoners. But there's nothing of that in the caſe: Pray hear me.

'Tis one of my Maxims, That *knowingly and willingly we ought not to do the leaſt harm to any Man.* My time is ſo ſhort that I cannot upon this Occaſion ſtay to recommend it to you. If the ſame Law prevail'd here that is obſerv'd elſewhere, enjoyning that a Trial upon Life and Death ſhould laſt not one but ſeveral days, I am perſuaded I could make you ſenſible of its importance. But how is it poſſible to wipe off ſo many Calumnies in ſo ſhort a ſpace of time? However, being convinc'd that I ought to injure no Man, how ſhould I behave towards my ſelf if I own'd my ſelf worthy of a Puniſhment, and paſſed Sentence againſt my ſelf? What! Should I be afraid of the Puniſhment adjudg'd by *Melitus*, a Puniſhment that I cannot poſitively ſay whether 'tis Good or Evil; and at the ſame time pitch upon another ſort of Puniſhment, that I am certain is Evil? Shall I condemn my ſelf to perpetual Impriſonment? Why ſhould *I* live always a ſlave to the eleven Magiſtrates? Shall it be a Fine, and continuing in Priſon till *I* pay it? That is much at one, for *I* have nothing to pay it with. It remains then that *I* ſhould chuſe Baniſhment, and perhaps you will confirm my choice: But indeed, *Athenians*, *I* muſt needs be much blinded by the love of Life, if *I* did not perceive that, ſince you who are my fellow Citizens could not brook my Converſation and Principles, but were always ſo gall'd by them, that you were never at eaſe till you got your ſelves rid of me; much more will others be unable to brook 'em. That would be a pure way of living for *Socrates*, at theſe Years to be expell'd *Athens*, and wander from City to City like a Vagabond in Exile! *I* am very well ſatisfied, that wherever *I* went the younger ſort would liſten to me juſt as they do here: If *I* thwart-

thwart 'em, they'll solicit their Fathers to expel me; and if *I* do not, their Parents and Kinsmen will expel me upon their Account:

But perhaps some Body will say; *Why*, Socrates, *when you go from hence, cannot you hold your peace and live quietly?* *I* see plainly, that to persuade you to any thing, is a most difficult Enterprise; for if *I* tell you that my silence would be disobedience to God, and upon that account * *I* cannot hold my peace; you will not believe me, you'll look upon the whole Story as a mysterious Irony. And if on the other hand *I* acquaint you, that a Man's greatest Happiness consists in discoursing of Vertue all the days of his Life, and entertaining himself with all the other things you have heard me speak of, either in examining my self or others, since a Life without examination is no Life: You'll believe me yet less. However, 'tis just as *I* tell you, tho' you cannot believe it. But, after all, *I* am not accustom'd to think my self worthy of any Punishment. Indeed, if *I* were rich, *I* would amerce my self in such a Sum as *I* might be able to pay. But *I* am not in a Condition, unless you would allow the Fine to be proportion'd to my Indigency; and so perhaps I might make shift to pay a *Mina* of Silver. Indeed *Plato*, who is here present, and *Crito*, and *Critobulus*, and *Apollodorus* would have me stretch it to 30 *Mina's*, which they'll answer for. And accordingly I amerce my self in thirty *Mina's*, and I give you them for very creditable Surety.

A Man's greatest Happiness consists in discoursing of Vertue.

A life without examination is no life.

Ten Crowns.

300 Crowns.

Socrates *having amerc'd himself in obedience to the Laws, the Judges took the Matter into Consideration, and without any regard to the Fine, condemn'd him to die. After the Sentence was pronounc'd,* Socrates *began again, thus.*

INdeed, *Athenians*, your impatience and precipitancy will draw upon you a great Reproach, and give the Envious occasion to censure your City, for

* 'Twere impossible in *Socrates* to disobey God, and conceal the Truths he was oblig'd to reveal. What a noble Example is this in a Pagan!

con-

condemning that wise Man *Socrates:* For to lighten the Scandal, they'll call me Wife, tho' *I* am not. Whereas had you staid but a short while, my death had come of it self, and thrown into your Lap what you now demand. You see my Age has run the most of its round, and draws very near to a conclusion. *I* do not make this Address to all my Judges, but only to those that voted my Condemnation. Do you think that *I* had been condemn'd, if *I* had thought it my Duty to try every means for procuring my Absolution; and if so, do you think *I* had wanted persuasive and touching Expressions? 'Tis not such words that *I* have been wanting in, but in Boldness, in Impudence, and in a desire to gratifie you by telling you such Stories as you love to hear. Doubtless you had been infinitely well pleased, to see me cry, groan, whine, and stoop to all the other mean shifts that are commonly made use of by Prisoners at this Bar. But upon this occasion, *I* did not think it my Duty to stoop to any thing so base and scandalous; and now that the Sentence is past, *I* do not repent of avoiding the Indignity, for *I* chuse rather to die upon the Defence I've now made, than to live by such Prayers and Supplications as you require. Neither Civil nor Military Justice allows an honest Man to save his Life any how. For in Duels it happens often that a Man may easily save his Life by throwing down his Arms, and begging quarter of his Enemy: And in like manner in all other Dangers, a Man that's capable of saying or doing any thing, may hit upon a thousand Expedients for avoiding Death. To escape dying, *Athenians*, is not the greatest Difficulty; shame falls in upon us more swiftly, and is much harder to avoid. And accordingly in this juncture, *I* who am stiff and old, am only attack'd and overtaken by the slowest of the two; whereas my Accusers, who are vigorous and strong, are catch'd by the swiftest; I mean, Infamy. Thus am *I* about to be deliver'd up to Death by

'Tis infinitely more difficult to avoid Shame than Death.

your

your Orders, and they (*a*) are surrender'd to Infamy and Injustice by the Orders of Truth. *I* am very well contented with my Sentence, and so are they with theirs. Thus things are as they ought to be, and our Shares could not have been more justly or better divided.

In the next place *I* have a mind to foretel you, who have condemn'd me, what will be your fate; for *I* am now just arriv'd at the Minute, (*b*) that affords a Man the steddiest Thoughts, and enables him to Prophesie, upon the approach of Death. *I* tell you then, that no sooner shall you have put me to death, but (*c*) the Vengeance of God will pursue you with more Cruelty than you have shewn to me. By ridding your selves of me, you design'd only to throw off the troublesome Task of giving an Account of your Lives; but *I* tell you before-hand, you shall not compass your End.

A greater number of Persons will rise up and censure you. Tho' you perceiv'd it not, 'twas my presence that has hitherto restrain'd 'em: But after my death, they will make you very uneasie; and forasmuch as they are younger than *I*, will prove more troublesome and hard to be rid of. For if you fansie to your selves, that putting such Persons to death is an effectual way to restrain others, and prevent their upbraiding you, you are much mistaken.

(*a*) *Socrates* is condemn'd by the Injustice of Men, but his Judges are condemn'd by the Orders of Truth. Thus were the *Athenians* only criminal, both with respect to God in disowning *Socrates*'s God; and trampling under foot the the Oracle of *Apollo*; and with respect to Men in debauching the Youth, particularly *Alcibiades*, *Hipponicus*, *Critias*, and an infinite Number of others. *Max. de Tyr.*

(*b*) At the point of Death Mens Thoughts are steddier, than in the career of Life; because at that time Passion is dethron'd, and the Soul begins to retrieve its Liberty. This was *Homer*'s Opinion; and there's no difficulty in tracing a higher source for it, than that Poet.

(*c*) This Prediction was fulfill'd in a raging Plague that soon after laid *Athens* desolate; and all the Misfortunes that over-run this injust Republick, and indeed all *Greece*, were taken for a certain Mark of Divine Vengeance.

That

That way of ridding your ſelves of your Cenſors, is neither honeſt nor practicable. A better way, which is at once very eaſie and honeſt, is, not to ſtop their Mouths, but to amend your Lives. So much for thoſe who voted my Condemnation.

As for you, *Athenians*, who gave your Votes for my Abſolution, *I* would gladly diſcourſe you, while the Head Magiſtrates are buſie, till *I* be carried to the Place of Execution: *I* beg therefore a Minute's Audience, for ſince we have ſo much time, why may not we confer together. *I* mean to repreſent to you a thing that happen'd to me but now, and give you to underſtand what it imports. 'Tis a marvellous thing, *my Judges* (for in calling you *my Judges* I am not at all miſtaken) that *I* met with but now. The Divine Law, that has advis'd me ſo often, and upon the leaſt occaſion never fail'd to divert me from whatever I mean'd to purſue, that was not fit for me; this Law has not given me any ſign this day, on which *I* have met with what moſt Men take to be the greateſt of Evils: It did not diſcover it ſelf to me, neither in the morning when *I* came (*d*) from my Houſe, nor when *I* enter'd this Hall, nor when *I* began to ſpeak. At other times it frequently interrupted me in the middle of my Diſcourſe; but this day it has not thwarted me in any thing that *I* deſign'd either to ſay or to do. Now *I* am about to tell you what this means. It is very probable that what I am now to encounter is a very great Good; for certainly 'tis a miſtake to look upon Death as an Evil. And for an evident Proof of the contrary, let's conſider, that, if I had not been to meet with ſome good thing to-day, God, under whoſe Care *I* am, would not have fail'd to acquaint me, purſuant to his uſual Cuſtom. Let's fathom the depth of this Matter, in order to demonſtrate that the belief of Death's being a good thing, is a well-grounded Hope.

The Unjuſt do not deſerve the Name of Judges.

(*d*) For *Socrates* was not Impriſoned till after his Condemnation.

One

One of these two things must be true, (*a*) Either Death is a privation of Thought, or it is the Soul's Passage from one Place to another. If it be a privation of Thought, and, as 'twere, a peaceable Sleep undisturb'd by Dreams, then to die is great gain. After one Night of such Tranquility, free from disturbance, Care, or the least Dream; I'm confident, if a Man were to compare that Night with all the other Nights and Days of his past Life, and were oblig'd to tell in Conscience and in Truth, how many Nights or Days of his whole Life-time he had passed more happily than that one: I'm confident, *I* say, that not only a private Man, but the great King himself, wou'd find so small a Number, that it would be very easie to count 'em. Now if Death does in any measure resemble such a Night, *I* have justly given it the Appellation of great gain; since its whole time is only a long continued Night.

If Death be a Passage from this Place to another, and the Regions below are a Place of Rendezvous for those who liv'd here; pray, my Judges, what greater Good can a Man imagine? For if a Man quits his counterfeit Judges here, for true ones in the Regions below, who, they say administer Justice with so much Equity, such as *Minos*, *Rhadamanthus*, *Æacus*, *Triptolemus*, and all the other Demi-Gods, who were so just in this Life; will not that be a happy

(*a*) By this Dilemma *Socrates* does not call in question the Immortality of the Soul, but points to the two Opinions of Philosophers, some of whom thought the Soul fell with the Body; and others, that the former survive'd the latter. Now he offers to prove that Death is not ill in either of these Opinions: For, says he, if the Soul dies, 'tis annihilated, and consequently void of Thought; and if it survives, we are happier after Death than before. Some decry *Socrates*'s Ratiocination, in alledging a third state of the Soul, where after death it stays to undergo the Punishment due to its Crimes. But that's a meer Quibble; for *Socrates* speaks only of good Men, who having obey'd God, may expect a blessed Immortality: For he likewise taught that the Wicked suffer eternal Punishment in the World to come; as we shall see in his *Phedon*: And he did not in the least pretend that those Wretches had no occasion to fear Death.

change?

change? At what rate would not you purchaſe a Conference with *Muſeus*, *Heſiod*, and *Homer*? For my part, if ſuch a thing be practicable, I'd die a thouſand times to enjoy ſo great a Pleaſure. What tranſports of Joy ſhall *I* encounter, when *I* meet *Palamedes*, *Ajax* the *Telamonian*, and all the other Heroes of Antiquity, who in this Life were Victims of Injuſtice! How agreeable will it be to put my Adventures in the Balance with theirs! But the infinitely greateſt and moſt valuable Pleaſure will conſiſt in ſpending the time in putting Queſtions and Interrogatories to thoſe great Men, (*b*) in order to ſtrike out the diſtinction between the truly Wiſe, and thoſe who falſly fanſie themſelves to be ſuch. Who would not give all he has in this World for a Conference with him who led the numerous Army againſt *Troy*, or *Ulyſſes* or *Siſyphus*, and 100000 other Men and Women, whoſe Converſation and Diſcoveries would afford an inexpreſſible Felicity? Theſe Men are infinitely more happy than we, and inveſted with Immortality. Upon which Account, my Judges, you ought to encounter Death with ſteddy Hopes, as being perſuaded of this certain Truth, (*c*) that an honeſt Man needs fear no Evil, either in this or the future Life, and that the Gods take Care of all his Concerns: For what has now happen'd to me, is ſo far from being the effect of Chance, that *I* am fully convinc'd, 'tis infinitely better for me to die, and be rid of the encumbrances of this Life. And for that reaſon, God who regulates my Conduct, did not thwart me to day. So that *I*

He ranks theſe three Poets together, as being the Authors of the Pagan Theology.

No Evil can betide the Juſt either in this or a future Life.

(*b*) By interrogating them upon all the Actions of their Life, and the Reaſons that influenc'd 'em: For *Socrates* here ſpeaks of the Wiſdom they were really poſſeſs'd of, or fanſied themſelves to poſſeſs in this World; and does not at all imply that ny in a bleſſed State are capable of believing themſelves Wiſe when they are not.

(*c*) This was the preſumption of a Heathen, who was ignorant of the fatal effects of Sin and Corruption; for which the juſteſt ought alway to tremble. So that this Maxim of *Socrates* is only applicable to thoſe, whoſe Sins through God's Mercy are not imputed to them.

have

have no Resentment against my Accusers or those who voted my Condemnation; notwithstanding that they mean'd, not to do me any Kindness, but to prejudice me, which might afford me just grounds of Complaint. One thing I have to beg of 'em is this; That when my Children grow up, if they make you uneasie, as *I* did, that you * would punish 'em severely. But if you find that they prefer Riches to Vertue, and take themselves to be somewhat, when in effect they are nothing; pray be not wanting in checking them, and exposing them, for not minding those things which deserve all their Care, and believing themselves to be what they are not. But now, 'tis time we should all retire to our respective Offices, you to live, and I to die. But whether you or I are going upon the better Expedition, † 'tis known to none but God alone.

* *Socrates* is so content to die for the sake of Justice, that he desir'd his Judges to treat his Children in the same fashion, if so be they prov'd so happy as to give 'em the same trouble that he did; that is, if, they made it their business to correct their Injustice, their Idolatry, and all their other Vices.

† *Socrates* did not speak this out of Ignorance, for he knew very well that the Just were happier in their Death, than the Wicked in their Life. But the People that had but just condemn'd him, were not in a Condition to relish that Maxim; upon which account *Socrates* tells 'em, that *God alone knew*; and accordingly God quickly gave 'em all to know the difference between the Fate of *Socrates* and that of his Judges. The *Athenians* repented their putting to death an innocent Person, and publickly lamented the loss of him, whom they had condemn'd by a publick Sentence. The Schools and Places for Exercise were shut up; *Socrates*'s Statue was erected, and a Chappel consecrated to his Memory; and his Accusers prosecuted. *Melitus* was torn in pieces, *Anytus* was expell'd the *Heraclea* where he shelter'd; and all the Abettors of the Conspiracy, were look'd upon as curs'd, and excommunicated, and reduc'd to such a pitch of Despair, that most of 'em laid violent Hands on themselves.

THE

THE INTRODUCTION TO *CRITO.*

Socrates, in his Apology, has furnish'd us with an admirable Model of an honest Man's Defences, when unjustly arraign'd. And in this Dialogue, which is Intituled, *Of what is to be done*, he gives us a yet more perfect Plan of the Conduct of a good Man, and the Obedience he owes to Justice and the Laws, even in dying when they require it, tho' at the same time 'twere easie for him to escape. While *Socrates* lay in Prison, his Friends being more concern'd for his Life than himself, had retain'd the Goaler. Every thing was in readiness for accomplishing his Escape; and *Crito* goes into the Prison before day, to tell him the good News, and persuade him not to slight the precious Opportunity. *Socrates* hears him, and commends his Zeal: But before he would comply, starts the Question, Whether it was just for him to depart the Prison, without the Consent of the *Athenians*. So that the Point to be decided in this Dialogue, is, whether a Man unjustly condemn'd to die, can innocently withdraw himself from the hand of Justice and the Law. *Socrates* was the only Man of the Age he liv'd in, that call'd that in Question; and, which is yet more surprising, were he now alive, he would be the only Man in this our Age. All that we see before our Eyes, or read of in our Histories; in a word, all the Instances of what Men have done through

through the love of Life and the fear of Death, have so debauch'd our Judgments, that we are scarce capable to judge of what true Justice requires, and are apt to call every thing Just, that's universally practis'd. Now there cannot be a more capital Error. However, since the Conduct of a Heathen, that chose rather to die than to break the Course of Justice, would seem to us the effect of Folly or strong Prejudice; let's try if we can hit upon any solid Rule that may reclaim us by its Authority, and convince us by its Light. The Christian Religion affords a great many such: But we shall confine our selves to one, which in a sovereign degree is justly intitled to both these Characters. St. *Paul* being in Prison in *Macedonia*, one Night the Prison Doors open'd and his Chains dropp'd off; and he was so far from making his Escape, that he hinder'd others to do it. *Peter* being imprison'd by *Herod*, who had resolv'd to put him to death after the Passover, made his Escape the Night before the Day of Execution. But how did he do it? God did not content himself with unlocking his Chains, and opening the Prison Doors, but sent an Angel who push'd him on, and forc'd him to go along. This was the Conduct of the Saints. Tho' the Prison be open, they do not offer to make their Escape. Nothing less than an Angel can oblige 'em to depart the Prison. *Socrates*, who was no Saint, but follow'd as close as possible the same Light that guides and illuminates the Saints, observes the same Conduct: They open'd the Prison and unty'd his Chains, but his Angel was silent, and he would not stir. He preferr'd an innocent Death before a criminal Life: But before he came to a Resolution, he heard the Reasons of his Friend, who speaks with a great deal of force, and omits nothing that could move him: And after that, with a Divine Eloquence, confronted him with inconteſtable Maxims, grounded upon Truth and Justice, in which one may trace the Rays of the Evangelical Doctrine, *viz. That we ought to slight the Opinions*

of Men, and regard only the Judgment of God; that it is not living, but living well, that should be our wish; that Justice is the life, and Injustice the death of the Soul; that we ought not to injure our Enemies, or resent the Injuries we receive; that 'tis better to die, than to sin; that we must obey the Law of our Country; that the Injustice of Men cannot justifie our disrespect to the Laws; and that the Laws of this World have Sister-Laws in the other, which revenge the Affronts put upon 'em here.

These were the Principles that *Socrates* went upon. Those who take the pains to examine 'em and weigh their Consequences, will be fully satisfied, not only that *Socrates* acted the part of an honest Man in refusing to make his Escape, but likewise that he could not be a good Man if he did otherwise. And 'twas with this view, that *Quintilian* said, This Philosopher, by quitting the small remainder of his Life, retriev'd all the former Part of his Life, and likewise gain'd a Life to all Ages. 'Tis such Thoughts as these that our Soul should always have in view, in order to keep out Vice; for if once we relent and allow the Enemy to gain some ground, under a specious Pretence and a taking Appearance, it will quickly master all, and overrun all the Banks that should stop its course.

CRITO:

CRITO: Or, *Of what we ought to do.*

Socrates and *Crito.*

Soc. WHat's the matter you come here so soon, *Crito?* As I take it, 'tis yet very early.

Crit. 'Tis true.

Soc. What a Clock may it be then?

Crit. A little before the break of Day.

Soc. I wonder the Goaler let you in.

Crit. He is one I know very well. I have been with him here often; and he is in some measure oblig'd to me.

Soc. Are you but just come? Or, is it long since you came?

Crit. I have been here a pretty while.

Soc. Why did not you awaken me then, when you came in?

Crit. Pray God forbid *Socrates.* For my own part I would gladly shake off the Cares and Anxiety that keep my Eyes from closing. But when I enter'd this Room, I wonder'd to find you so sound asleep, and was loth to awaken you, that I might not rob you of these happy Minutes. Indeed, *Socrates*, ever since I knew you, I have been always charm'd with your Patience and calm Temper; but in a distinguishing manner in this juncture, since in the Circumstances you are in, your Eye looks so easie and unconcern'd.

The Tranquillity of Socrates on the Eve preceeding his Death.

His Calmness and Patience.

Soc. Indeed, *Crito*, it would be a great indecency in one of my Age to be apprehensive of Death.

Crit. Ay! And how many do we see every day, under the like misfortunes, whom Age doe's not exempt from those Fears!

Soc. That's true. But after all, what brought you hither so early?

Crit. I came to tell you a troublesome piece of

News, which, tho' they may not seem to affect you, yet they overwhelm both me and all your Relations and Friends with unsufferable Grief. In fine, *I* bring the most terrible News that ever could be brought.

Soc. What News? Is the Ship arriv'd from *Delos*, upon the return of which *I* am to die?

Crit. It is not yet arriv'd; but without doubt it will be here this day according to the Intelligence we have from some Persons that came from *Sunium* and left it there. For at that rate, it cannot fail of being there to day, and so to morrow you must unavoidably die.

Soc. Why not, *Crito?* Be it so, since 'tis the Will of God. However, *I* do not believe that Vessel will arrive this day.

Crit. What do you ground that Conjecture upon?

Soc. I'll tell you. *I* am not to die till the day after the arrival of the Vessel.

Crit. At least those who are to execute the Sentence, say so.

Soc. That Vessel will not arrive till to morrow, as I conjecture from a certain Dream I had this Night, about a Minute ago. (*a*) And it seems to me a happiness that you did not awaken me.

Crit. Well, what is the Dream?

Socrates's *remarkable Dream.*

Soc. I thought, I saw a very handsom comely Woman, clad in white, come up to me, who calling me by Name said, (*b*) *In three days thou shalt be in the fertile* Phthia.

Phthia *was* Achilles's *Country.*

Crit.

(*a*) He speaks on this fashion, because the Dreams of the morning were look'd upon as more distinct and true. *Certiora & volatiora somniari affirmant sub extimis noctibus, quasi jam emergente animarum vigore, producto sopore.* Tertul. de Anima.

(*b*) In the 9th Book of the Iliads, *Achilles* threatning to retire, says to *Ulysses*, *After to morrow you shall see the* Hellespont *cover'd with my Ships, and if* Neptune *afford me a happy Voyage, in three days I shall arrive at the fertile* Phthia. 'Twas this last Verse that *Socrates* had from the Mouth of the Woman in his Dream; for our Dreams always bear a proportion to our *Genius's, Habits,* and ways of thinking. Nothing can be a stronger Evidence

Crit. That's a very ſtrange Dream, *Socrates.*

Soc. 'Tis a very ſignificant one, *Crito.*

Crit. Yes, without doubt. But for this time, prithee, *Socrates* take my Advice, and make your Eſcape. For my part, if you die, beſides the irreparable loſs of a Friend, which I will ever lament, I am afraid that a great many People, who are not well acquainted neither with you nor me, will believe that I have forſaken you, in not employing my intereſt for promoting your Eſcape, now that 'tis in my Power. Is there any thing more ſcandalous, than to lie under the diſrepute of being wedded to my Money more than my Friend? For, in ſhort, the People will never believe, that 'twas you who refus'd to go from hence when we preſſed you to be gone.

The vulgar People can never conceive that a Man condemn'd to die will not make his Eſcape, if he can.

Soc. My dear *Crito*, why ſhould we be ſo much concern'd for the Opinion of the People? Is it not enough, that the more ſenſible part, who are the only Men we ought to regard, know how the Caſe ſtands?

Crit. But you ſee, *Socrates*, there's a neceſſity of being concern'd for the Noiſe of the Mob; for your Example is a ſufficient inſtance, that they are capable of doing not only ſmall but the greateſt of Injuries, and diſplay their Paſſion in an outragious manner, againſt thoſe who are once run down by the vulgar Opinion.

Soc. * Would to God, *Crito*, the People were capable to do the greateſt of Injuries! Were it ſo, they

Evidence of the gentle and eaſie Thoughts that *Socrates* had of Death, than his Application of this Paſſage, by which he repreſents Death as a fortunate Voyage to one's own Country. The *Grammarians*, who are always ty'd up to the Letter, were never able to point out the Beauty and Delicacy of this Paſſage: For they only turn'd it into a coarſe Idea of Death, upon the reſemblance of the word, *Phthia* with φθίνειν, to *corrupt*, as if a Grecian could ever have miſtaken φθίη for φθίσις.

* This is a noble Principle of *Socrates*'s. None can do the greateſt Harm, but thoſe who are able to do the greateſt Good. And this can only be attributed to God, not to Men.

would likewiſe be capable of doing the greateſt Good. That would be a great happineſs. But neither the one nor the other is poſſible. For they cannot make Men either wiſe Men or Fools.

Crit. I grant it. But pray anſwer me. Is it not out of Tenderneſs to me and your other Friends, that you will not ſtir from hence? For fear, leſt upon your Eſcape we ſhould be troubled and charged with carrying you off; and by that means be oblig'd to quit our Poſſeſſions, or pay a large Sum of Money, or elſe ſuffer ſomething more fatal than either? If that be your Fear, ſhake it off, *Socrates*, in the name of the Gods. Is not it highly reaſonable that we ſhould purchaſe your Eſcape at the rate of expoſing our ſelves to theſe Dangers, and greater ones if there be occaſion? Once more, my dear *Socrates*, believe me and go along with me.

Soc. I own, *Crito*, that I have ſuch Thoughts and ſeveral other beſides in my view.

Crit. Fear nothing, I intreat you; for in the firſt place they require no great Sum to let you out. And on the other hand, you ſee what a pitiful condition * thoſe are in, who probably might arraign us: A ſmall Sum of Money will ſtop their Mouths; my Eſtate alone will ſerve for that. If you ſcruple to accept of my offer; here is a great number of ſtrangers, who deſire nothing more than to furniſh you with what Money you want. *Simmias* the *Theban*, himſelf, has brought up very conſiderable Sums. *Cebes* is capable to do as much, and ſo are ſeveral others. Let not your Fears then ſtifle the Deſire of making your Eſcape. And as for what you told me t'other day, in the Court, that if you made your Eſcape, you ſhould not know how to live; pray let not that trouble you: Whither ſoever you go, you'll be belov'd in all Places of the World. If you'll go to *Theſſaly*, I have Friends there who will honour you according to your merit, and think themſelves

* Thoſe who made a Trade of accuſing at *Athens*, were a poor ſort of People, whoſe Mouths were eaſily ſtopp'd with Money.

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happy in supplying you with what you want, and covering you from all occasions of fear in their Country. Besides, *Socrates*, without doubt you are guilty of a very unjust thing in delivering up your self, while 'tis in your Power to make your Escape, and promoting what your Enemies so passionately wish for. For you not only betray your self, but likewise your Children, by abandoning them when you might make a shift to maintain and educate 'em : You are not at all concern'd at what may befall them. Tho' at the same time they are like to be in as dismal a Condition, as ever poor Orphans were. A Man ought either to have no Children, or else to expose himself to the Care and Trouble of breeding them. You seem to me to act the softest and most insensible Part in the World ; whereas you ought to take up a Resolution worthy of a generous Soul ; above all, you who boast that you pursued nothing but Vertue all the days of your life. I tell you, *Socrates*, I am asham'd upon the account of you and your Relations, since the World will believe 'twas long of our Cowardlines that you did not get off. In the first place they'll charge you with standing a Trial that you might have avoided ; then they'll censure your Conduct in making your Defences ; and at last, which is the most shameful of all, they'll upbraid us with forsaking you through fear or Cowardice, since we did not accomplish your Escape. Pray consider of it, my dear *Socrates* ; if you do not prevent the approaching Evil, you'll bear a part in the Shame that will cover us all. Pray advise with your self quickly. But now I think on't, there is not time for advising, there's no choice left, all must be put in execution the next Night, for if we delay longer, all our Measures will be broke. Believe me, I intreat you, and do as I bid you.

This was the Judgment of Men ; the steddiness of Socrates past'd for Laziness and Insensibility.

Because he did not stoop to the Judges, but spoke rather like an Accuser than a Prisoner.

Socrates, my dear *Crito*, your good-will is very commendable, provided it agrees with right Reason : But if it swerves from that, the stronger it is, the

more is it blame-worthy. The first thing to be consider'd, is, whether we ought to do as you say, or not? For you know 'tis not of yesterday that I've accustom'd my self only to follow the Reasons that appear most just after a mature examination. Tho' Fortune frowns upon me, yet I'll never part with the Principles I have all along profess'd. These Principles appear always the same, and I esteem them equally at all times. So, if your Advice be not back'd by the strongest Reasons, assure your self I will never comply, not if all the Power of the People should arm it self against me, or offer to frighten me like a Child, by laying on fresh Chains, and threatning to deprive me of the greatest Good, and oblige me to suffer the cruellest Death. Now, how shall we manage this Enquiry justly? To be sure, the fairest way is to resume what you have been saying of the vulgar Opinions; that is, to enquire, whether there are some Reports that we ought to regard, and others that are to be slighted; or, whether the saying so is only a groundless and childless Proposition. I have a strong desire, upon this occasion, to try in your presence, whether this Principle will appear to me in different Colours from what it did while I was in other Circumstances, or whether I shall always find it the same; in order to determine me to a Compliance or Refusal.

Reason and Justice ought to regulate our Estimate of the Kindness of Friends.

If I mistake not, 'tis certain, that several Persons who thought themselves Men of Sense, * have often maintain'd in this Place, that of all the Opinions of Men, some are to be regarded, and others to be slighted. In the name of the Gods, *Crito*; do not you think that was well said? In all humane appearance you are in no danger of dying to morrow, and therefore 'tis presum'd that the fear of the present Danger cannot work any change upon you. Wherefore, pray consider it well. Do not you think they spoke justly who said, that all

* This probably had been maintain'd in some of the former Conferences in Prison, for *Socrates*'s Friends met every day in the Prison to keep him Company.

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the Opinions of Men are not always to be regarded, but only some of 'em; and those not of all Men, but only of some? What do you say? Do not you think 'tis very 'true? *What choice we ought to make of Opinions.*

Crit. Very true.

Soc. At that rate then, ought not we to esteem the good Opinions and slight the bad ones?

Crit. Ay, doubtless.

Soc. Are not the good Opinions then those of wise Men, and the bad ones those of Fools?

Crit. It cannot be otherwise.

Soc. Let's see then, how you will answer this: A Man that makes his Exercises, when he comes to have his Lesson, whether shall he regard the Commendation or Censure of who ever comes first, or only of him that is either * a Physician or a Master?

Crit. Of the last to be sure.

Soc. Then he ought to fear the Censure, and value the Commendation of that Man alone; and slight what comes from others.

Crit. Without doubt.

Soc. For that Reason, this young Man must neither eat nor drink, nor do any thing, without the Orders of that Master, that Man of Sense, and he is not at all to govern himself by the Caprices of others.

Crit. That's true.

Soc. Let's fix upon that then. But suppose he disobeys this Master, and disregards his Applause or Censure; and suffers himself to be blinded by the Caresses and Applauses of the ignorant Mob; will not he come to some harm by this means?

Crit. How is it possible it should be otherwise?

Soc. But what will be the nature of this harm that will accrue to him thereupon; where will it terminate, and what part of him will it affect?

Crit. His Body without doubt, for by that means he'll ruine himself.

* For they perform those Exercises either for their Health, or else to improve their Dexterity and Strength: For the first they follow'd the Orders of a Physician; and for the other, they were directed by a Master.

Soc.

Soc. Very well; but is not the Case the same all over? Upon the point of Justice or Injustice, Honesty or Dishonesty, Good or Evil, which at present are the subject of our Dispute, shall we rather refer our selves to the Opinion of the People, than to that of an experienc'd wise Man, who justly challenges more Respect and Deference from us, than all the World besides? And if we do not act conformably to the Opinion of this one Man, is it not certain, that we shall ruine our selves, and entirely lose that which only lives and gains new strength by Justice, and perishes only through Unjustice? Or, must we take all that for a thing of no account?

Crit. I am of your Opinion.

The Soul lives only by Justice.

Soc. Take heed, I intreat you; if by following the Opinions of the Ignorant we destroy that which is only preserv'd by Health and wasted by Sickness; can we survive the Corruption of that, whether it be our Body or somewhat else?

Crit. That's certain.

Soc. Can one live then after the corruption and destruction of the Body?

Crit. No, to be sure.

Soc. But can one survive the Corruption of that which lives only by Justice, and dies only through Injustice? Or, is this thing (whatever it be) that has Justice or Injustice for its Object, to be less valued than the Body?

Crit. Not at all.

Soc. What, is it much more valuable then?

Crit. A great deal more.

In all our Actions we ought only to regard the Truth; i. e. God who alone is Truth it self.

Soc. Then my dear *Crito*, we ought not to be concern'd at what the People say; but what that says, who knows what's just and what's unjust; and that alone is nothing else but the Truth. Thus you see, you establish'd false Principles at first, in saying that we ought to pay a Deference to the Opinions of the People, upon what is just, good, honest, and its contraries. Some perhaps will object, that the People is able to put us to death.

Crit.

Crit. To be sure, they'll start that Objection.

Soc. 'Tis also true. But that does not alter the nature of what we were saying; that's still the same. For you must still remember, that 'tis not Life, but a good Life that we ought to court. *To live is nothing; but to live well is all in all.*

Crit. That's a certain Truth.

Soc. But is it not likewise certain, that this good Life consists in nothing else but Honesty and Justice? *A good life consists only in Honesty and Justice.*

Crit. Yes.

Soc. Now, before we go further, let's examine upon the Principles you've agreed to, whether my departure from hence without the permission of the *Athenians* is just or unjust. If it be found just, we must do our utmost to bring it about; but if 'tis unjust, we must lay aside the Design. For as to the Considerations, you alledg'd just now, of Money, Reputation and Family: These are only the Thoughts of the baser Mob, who put innocent Persons to death, and would afterwards bring 'em to life if 'twere possible. But as for us who bend our thoughts another way, all that we are to mind, is whether we do a just thing in giving Money, and lying under an Obligation to those who promote our Escape? Or, whether both we and they do not commit a piece of Injustice in so doing? If this be an unjust thing, we need not reason much upon the Point, since 'tis better to abide here and die, than to undergo somewhat more terrible than Death. *A Character of the Mob.* *Death is preferable to the commission of an unjust thing.*

Crit. You are in the right of that, *Socrates:* Let's see then how it will fall.

Soc. We shall go hand in hand in the Enquiry. If you have any thing of weight to answer, pray do it when I have spoken, that so I may comply; if not, pray forbear any further to press me to go from hence without the Consent of the *Athenians.* I shall be infinitely glad, if you can persuade me to do it; but I cannot do it without being first convinc'd. Take notice then whether my way of pursuing this Enquiry satisfie you, and do your utmost to make answer to my Questions.

Crit.

Crit. I will.

Difference of Times and Persons will not justifie the doing Injustice to any Man.

Soc. Is it true, that we ought not to do an unjust thing to any Man? Or, is it lawful in any measure to do it to one, when we are forbid to do it to another? Or, is it not absolutely true, that all manner of Injustice is neither good nor honest, as we were saying but now? Or, in fine, are all these Sentiments which we formerly entertain'd, vanish'd in a few days? And is it possible, *Crito*, that those of years, our most serious Conferences, should resemble those of Children, and we at the same time not be sensible that 'tis so? Ought we not rather to stand to what we have said, as being a certain Truth, that all Injustice is scandalous and fatal to the Person that commits it; let Men say what they will, and let our Fortune be never so good or bad?

Injustice is scandalous and fatal to him that is guilty of it.

Crit. That's certain.

Soc. Then we must avoid the least measure of Injustice.

Crit. Most certainly.

Soc. Since we are to avoid the least degree of it, then we ought not to do it to those who are unjust to us, notwithstanding that this People thinks it lawful.

Crit. So I think.

Soc. But what! Ought we to do Evil or not?

Crit. Without doubt we ought not.

'Tis unjust to do Evil for Evil.

Soc. But is it Justice, to repay Evil with Evil, pursuant to the Opinion of the People, or is it unjust?

Crit. 'Tis highly unjust.

Soc. Then there's no difference between doing Evil and being Unjust?

Crit. I own it.

Soc. Then we ought not to do the least Evil or Injustice to any Man, let him do by us as he will. But take heed, *Crito*, that by this Concession you do not speak against your own Sentiments. For I know very well, there are few that will go this length: And 'tis impossible for those who vary in their Sentiments

timents upon this Point, to agree well together. Nay, on the contrary, the contempt of one another's Opinions, leads 'em to a reciprocal contempt of one anothers Persons. Consider well then, if you are of the same Opinion with me; and let us ground our Reasonings upon this Principle, That we ought not to do Evil for Evil, or treat those unjustly who are unjust to us. For my part, I never did, nor never will entertain any other Principle. Tell me then if you have chang'd your Mind; if not, give ear to what follows.

Socrates owns that few will grant this Truth, That we ought not to seek Revenge, or repay Evil for Evil.

Crit. I give ear.

Soc. Well; a Man that has made a just Promise, ought he to keep it or to break it?

Crit. He ought to keep it.

Soc. If I go from hence then, without the Consent of the *Athenians*, shall not I injure some People, and especially those who do not deserve it? Or, shall we in this follow what we think equally just to every Body?

It is a visible Wrong to the Laws and the State.

Crit. I cannot answer you, for I do not understand you.

Soc. Pray take notice: When we put our selves in a way of making our Escape, or going from hence, or how you please to call it, suppose the Law and the Republick should present themselves in a Body before us, and accost us in this manner: Socrates, *what are you going to do? to put in execution what you now design, were wholly to ruine the Laws and the State: Do you think a City can subsist when Justice has not only lost its force, but is likewise perverted, overturn'd, and trampled under foot by private Persons?* What Answer could we make to such and many other Questions? For, what is it, that an Orator cannot say upon the overturning of that Law, which provides that Sentences once pronounc'd shall not be infring'd? Shall we answer, That the Republick has judg'd amiss, and passed an unjust Sentence upon us? Shall that be our Answer?

Socrates introduces the Laws and the State speaking to him.

The ordinary Answer of those who trample under foot Justice and the Laws.

Crit.

Crit. Ay, without any ſcruple, *Socrates.*

Soc. What will the Laws ſay then? *Socrates, is it not true, that you agreed with us to ſubmit your ſelf to a publick Trial?* And if we ſhould ſeem to be ſurpris'd at ſuch Language, they'll continue perhaps; *Be not ſurpris'd*, Socrates, *but make anſwer, for you your ſelf us'd to inſiſt upon Queſtion and Anſwer. Tell then what occaſion you have to complain of the Republick and of us, that you are ſo eager upon deſtroying it? * Are not we the Authors of your Birth? Is not it by our means that your Father married her who brought you forth? What fault can you find with the Laws we eſtabliſh'd as to Marriage?* Nothing at all, ſhould I anſwer. *As to the nouriſhing and bringing up of Children, and the manner of your Education, are not the Laws juſt that we enacted upon that Head, by which we oblig'd your Father to bring you up to Muſick and the Exerciſes?* Very juſt, I'd ſay. Since you were born, brought up, and educated under our Influence, durſt you maintain that you are not our Nurſe-Child, and ſubject as well as your Father? And if you are, do you think to have equal Power with us, as if it were lawful for you to inflict upon us all that we enjoyn you to undergo? But ſince you cannot lay claim to any ſuch Right againſt your Father or your Maſter, ſo as to repay Evil for Evil, Injury for Injury; how can you think to obtain that Privilege againſt your Country and the Laws, in ſo much that if we endeavour to put you to death, you'll counter-act us, by endeavouring to prevent us, and to ruine your Country and its Laws? Can you call ſuch an Action juſt, you that are an inſeparable follower of true Vertue? Are you ignorant that your Country is more conſiderable, and more worthy of Reſpect and Veneration before God and Man, than your Father, Mother, and all your Relations together? That you

A Refutation of that Pka.

The Regard we ought to have to our Country.

* This is an admirable way of making out the Obligation of all Men to obey the Laws of their Country, by Virtue of the Treaty made between 'em.

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ought to honour your Country, yield to it, and humour it more than an angry Father? That you must either reclaim it by your Counsel, or obey its Injunctions, and suffer without grumbling all that it imposes upon you? If it orders you to be whipp'd or laid in Irons, if it sends you to the Wars, there to spend your Blood, you ought to do it without demurring; you must not shake off the Yoak, nor flinch or quit your Post; but in the Army, in Prison, and every where else, ought equally to obey the Orders of your Country, or else assist it with wholsom Counsel. For, if offering Violence to a Father or a Mother is a piece of grand Impiety, to put a force upon one's Country is a much greater. What shall we answer to all this, *Crito?* Shall we acknowledge the Truth of what the Laws advance?

Crit. How can we avoid it?

Soc. Do you see then, *Socrates*, continue they, what reason we have to brand your Enterprise against us as unjust? Of us you hold your Birth, your Maintenance, your Education; in fine, we have done you all the Good we are capable of, as well as to the other Citizens. Indeed, we do not fail to make publick Proclamation, that 'tis lawful for every private Man, if he does not find his Account in the Laws and Customs of our Republick, after a mature examination, to retire with all his Effects whither he pleases. And if any of you cannot comply with our Customs, and desires to remove and live elsewhere, not one of us shall hinder him, he may go where he pleases. But on the other hand, if any one of you continues to live here, after he has consider'd our way of administring Justice, and the Policy observ'd in the State; then we say he is in effect oblig'd to obey all our Commands, and we maintain that his Disobedience is unjust on a threefold account, for not obeying those to which he owes his Birth, for trampling under foot those that educated him, and for violating his Faith after he engag'd to obey us, and not taking the Pains to make

make Remonſtrances to us, if we happen to do an unjuſt thing. For notwithſtanding that we only propoſe things without uſing any Violence to procure Obedience, and give every Man his choice either to obey us or reclaim us by his Counſel and Remonſtrances, yet he does neither the one nor the other. And we maintain, *Socrates*, that if you execute what you are now about, you will ſtand charg'd with all theſe Crimes, and that in a much higher degree than if another private Man had committed the ſame Injuſtice. If I ask'd 'em the reaſon, without doubt they'd ſtop my Mouth by telling me that I ſubmitted my ſelf in a diſtinguiſhing manner to all theſe Conditions; and we, continue they, have great Evidence that you were always pleas'd with us and the Republick; for, if this City had not been more agreeable to you than any other, you had never continued in it, no more than the other *Athenians*. None of the Shows could ever tempt you to go out of the City, except once that you went to ſee the * Games at the *Iſthmus*: You never went any where elſe, excepting your Military Expéditions, and never undertook a Voyage, as others are wont to do. You never had the Curioſity to viſit other Cities, or enquire after other Laws, as being always contented with us and our Republick: You always made a diſtinguiſhing choice of us, and on all occaſions teſtified that you ſubmitted with all your Heart to live according to our Maxims. Beſides, your having had Children in this City is an infallible Evidence that you lik'd it. In fine, in this very laſt juncture you might have been ſentenc'd to Baniſhment if you would, and might then have done with the Conſent of the Republick, what you now attempt without their Permiſſion. But you were ſo ſtately, ſo unconcern'd at Death, that in your own Terms you preferr'd Death to Baniſhment. But

i. e. *So as to follow them.*

For if he had ſentenc'd himſelf to baniſhment, the Athenians *had confirm'd it.*

* Theſe Games were celebrated at the *Iſthmus* of *Corinth* to the Honour of *Neptune* every three Years, after they were receiv'd by *Theſeus*.

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how you have no regard to these fine Words, you are not further concern'd for the Laws, since you are going to overturn 'em: You do just what a pitiful Slave would offer to do, by endeavouring to make your Escape, contrary to the Laws of the Treaty you have sign'd, by which you oblig'd your self to live according to our Rules. Pray answer us; did not we say right in affirming that you agreed to this Treaty, and submitted your self to these Terms, not only in Words but in Deeds? What shall we say to all this, *Crito*? And what can we do else but acknowledge that 'tis so?

All our Actions, conformable to the Laws of a Country, are so many Ratifications of the Treaty made with it.

Crit. How can we avoid it, *Socrates*?

Soc. What else then, continue they, is this Action of yours, but a violation of that Treaty and all its Terms? That Treaty that you were not made to sign either by force or surprise, nor without time to think on't: For you had the whole course of your 70 Years to have remov'd in, if you had been dissatisfied with us, or unconvinc'd of the Justice of our Propolals. You neither pitch'd upon *Lacedemon* nor *Creet*, notwithstanding that you alwys cry'd up their Laws; nor any of the other Grecian Cities or strange Countries. You have been less out of *Athens*, than the Lame and the Blind, which is an invincible Proof that the City pleas'd you in a distinguishing manner, and consequently that we did, since a City can never be agreeable if its Laws are not such. And yet at this time you counter-act the Treaty. But, if you'll take our Advice, *Socrates*, we would have you to stand to your Treaty, and not expose your self to be ridicul'd by the Citizens, by stealing out from hence. Pray consider what advantage can redound either to you or your Friends, by persisting in that goodly Design. Your Friends will infallibly be either expos'd to Danger, or banish'd their Country, or have their Estates forfeited. And as for your self, if you retire to any neighbouring City, such as *Thebes* or *Megara*, which are admirably well govern'd, you'll there be look'd

upon as an Enemy. All that have any love for their Country, will look upon you as a Corrupter of the Laws. Beſides, you'll fortifie in them the good Opinion they have of your Judges, and move 'em to approve the Sentence given againſt you: For a Corrupter of the Law will at any time paſs for a Debaucher of the Youth and of the vulgar People. What, will you keep out of theſe well-govern'd Cities, and theſe Aſſemblies of juſt Men? But, pray will you have enough to live upon in that Condition? Or, will you have the face to go and live with them? And pray what will you ſay to 'em, *Socrates?* Will you preach to them, as you did here, that Vertue, Juſtice, the Laws, and Ordinances, ought to be reverenc'd by Men? Do not you think that this will ſound very ridiculous in their Ears? You ought to think ſo. But perhaps you'll quickly leave theſe well-govern'd Cities, and go to * *Theſſaly* to *Crito*'s Friends, where there is leſs Order and more Licentiouſneſs; and doubtleſs in that Country they'll take a ſingular Pleaſure in hearing you relate in what Equipage you made your Eſcape from this Priſon, that is cover'd with ſome old Rags, or a Beaſts Skin, or diſguis'd ſome other way, as Fugitives are wont to be. Every Body will ſay, This old Fellow, that has ſcarce any time to live, had ſuch a ſtrong Paſſion for living, that he did not ſtand to purchaſe his Life by trampling under foot the moſt ſacred Laws. Such Stories will be bandy'd about of you, at a time when you offend no Man; but upon the leaſt occaſion of Complaint, they'll teaſe you with a thouſand other Reproaches, unworthy of you. You'll ſpend your time in ſneaking and inſinuating your ſelf into the Favour of all Men, one after another, and owning an equal ſubjection to 'em all. For, what can you do? Will you feaſt perpetually

* *Theſſaly* was the Country where Licentiouſneſs and Debauchery reign'd. And accordingly *Xenophon* obſerves that 'twas there that *Critias* was ruin'd.

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in *Theſſaly*, as if the good Cheer had drawn you thither? But what will become then of all your fine Diſcourſes upon Juſtice and Vertue? Beſides, if you deſign to preſerve your Life for the ſake of your Children; that cannot be in order to bring 'em up in *Theſſaly*, as if you could do 'em no other Service but make them ſtrangers. Or, if you deſign to leave 'em here, do you imagine that during your Life they'll be better brought up here, in your abſence, under the Care of your Friends? But will not your Friends take the ſame Care of 'em after your death, that they'd do in your abſence? You ought to be perſuaded, that all thoſe who call themſelves your Friends, will at all times do them all the Service they can. To conclude, *Socrates*, ſubmit your ſelf to our Reaſons, follow the Advice of thoſe who brought you up; and do not put your Children, your Life, or any thing whatſoever, in the Balance with Juſtice; to the end, that when you arrive before the Tribunal of *Pluto*, you may be able to clear your ſelf before your Judges. For do not you deceive your ſelf; if you perform what you now deſign, you'll neither better your own Cauſe nor that of your Party; you will neither enlarge its Juſtice nor Sanctity, either here or in the Regions below. But, if you die bravely, you owe your death to the Injuſtice, not of the Laws, but of Men; whereas if you make your Eſcape, by repulſing ſo ſhamefully the Injuſtice of your Enemies, by violating at once both your own Faith and our Treaty, and injuring ſo many innocent Perſons, as your ſelf, your Friends, and your Country together with us; we will ſtill be your Enemies as long as you live. And when you are dead, our Siſters, the Laws in the other World, will certainly afford you no joyful reception, as knowing that you endeavoured to ruine us. Wherefore do not prefer *Crito*'s Councel to ours.

The Laws are juſt, and Injuſtice comes from Men.

Methinks, my dear *Crito*, I hear what I have now ſpoke, juſt as * the Prieſts of *Cybele* fanſie they hear the Cornets and Flutes : And the ſound of theſe Words makes ſo ſtrong an impreſſion in my Ears, that it ſtops me from hearing any thing elſe. Theſe are the Sentiments I like; and all you can ſay to take me off of them, will be to no purpoſe. However, if you think to ſucceed, I do not hinder you to ſpeak.

Crit. I have nothing to ſay, *Socrates.*

Soc. Then be eaſie, and let us bravely run this Courſe, ſince God calls and Conducts us to it.

* *Socrates* means that all theſe Truths make no ſlight Impreſſion upon him, but pierce him, and inſpire him with an Ardour, or rather a holy Fury, that ſtops his Ears from hearing any thing to the contrary. The ſound of the Cornets and Flutes of the Prieſts of *Cybele* inſpir'd the Audience with Fury, and why ſhould the ſound of Divine Truths fall ſhort of the ſame Vertue, and leave their Hearers in a lukewarm indifferency? This Temper of *Socrates* juſtifies and explains what *Diogenes* ſaid of him; when ſome Body ask'd *Diogenes*, what he thought of *Socrates?* He anſwer'd, *That he was a mad Man*; for *Socrates* ſhew'd an incredible Warmth in purſuing whatever he took to be juſt.

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THE INTRODUCTION TO *PHEDON.*

Socrates in his *Apology* and in his *Crito* teaches us, how we ought to form our Lives; and here he inſtructs us how to die, and what Thoughts to entertain at the hour of death. By explaining his own Views and Deſigns, which were the Springs of all his Actions, he furniſhes us with a Proof of the moſt important of all Truths, and of that which ought to regulate our Life. For the Immortality of the Soul is a Point of ſuch importance that it includes all the Truths of Religion, and all the Motives that ought to excite and direct us. So that our firſt Duty is to ſatisfie our ſelves in this Point: Self-Love, and meer human Intereſt ought to ſpur us up to underſtand it; not to ſpeak, that there is not a more fatal Condition than to be ignorant of the nature of Death, which appears as terrible as unavoidable: For according to the Notion we have of it, we may draw Conſequences directly oppoſite, for managing the Conduct of our Lives and the Choice of our Pleaſures.

Socrates ſpends the laſt day of his Life in diſcourſing with his Friends upon this great Subject: He unfolds all the Reaſons that require the belief of the Immortality of the Soul, and refutes all the Objections they mov'd to the contrary, which are the very ſame that are made uſe of at this day. He demonſtrates the Hope they ought to have of a hap-

pier Life; and lays before them, all that this bleſſed Hope requires, to make it ſolid and laſting, to prevent their being deluded by a vain Hope, and after all meeting with the Puniſhment allotted to the Wicked, inſtead of the Rewards provided for the Good.

This Conference was occaſion'd by a Truth that was caſually ſtarted, *viz.* That a true Philoſopher ought to deſire to die, and to endeavour it. This Poſition taken literally, ſeem'd to inſinuate that a Philoſopher might lay violent Hands on himſelf. But *Socrates* makes it out, that there's nothing more unjuſt; and that, for ſo much as Man is God's Creature and Property, he ought not not to remove out of this Life without his Orders. What ſhould it be then that made the Philoſopher have ſuch a love for Death *? What is the Ground of this Hope? Here we are preſented with the Grounds aſſign'd by a Heathen Philoſopher, *viz.* Man is born to know the Truth, but he can never attain to a perfect Knowledge of it in this Life, by reaſon that his Body is an Obſtacle: Perfect Knowledge is reſerv'd for the Life to come. Then the Soul muſt be Immortal, ſince after death it operates and knows. As for Man's being born for the Knowledge of Truth, that cannot be call'd in queſtion, ſince he was born to know God.

* *It could be nothing but the hope of the good things he expected in another Life.*

From thence it follows, that a true Philoſopher hates and contemns this Body, which ſtands in the way of his Union to God, that he wiſhes to be rid of it, and looks upon Death as a Paſſage to a better Life. This ſolid Hope gives Being to that true Temperance and Valour which is the Lot of true Philoſophers; for other Men are only valiant through Fear, and temperate through Intemperance; their Vertue is only a Slave to Vice.

They object to *Socrates*, That the Soul is nothing but a Vapour, that vaniſhes and diſperſes it ſelf at death. *Socrates* combats that Opinion with an Argument that has a great deal of ſtrength in his Mouth,

Mouth, but becomes much ſtronger when ſupported by the true Religion, which alone can ſet it in its full Light. 'The Argument is this: In Nature, contraries produce their contraries. So that Death being an Operation of Nature, ought to produce Life, that being its contrary. And by Conſequence the Dead muſt be born again; the Soul then is not dead, ſince it muſt revive the Body.

Before we proceed further, 'tis fit to take notice of an Error, that is couch'd under this Principle, which only the Chriſtian Religion can at once diſcover and refute. 'Tis, that *Socrates* and all other Philoſophers are infinitely miſtaken in making Death a natural thing. There's nothing more falſe. Death is ſo far from being Natural, that Nature abhors it, and it was far from the Deſign of God in the ſtate in which Man was firſt created. For he created him Holy, Innocent, and by conſequence Immortal; 'twas only Sin that brought Death into the World; but this fatal League betwixt Sin and Death could not triumph over the Deſigns of God, who had created Man for Immortality: He knew how to ſnatch the Victory out of their Hands, by bringing Man to Life again, even in the Shades and Horrors of Death it ſelf. Thus ſhall the Dead revive at the Reſurrection, purſuant to the Doctrine of the Chriſtians, which teaches that Death muſt give up thoſe whom it has ſwallow'd down. So that the Principle that *Socrates* did not fully comprehend, is an unſhaken Truth, which bears the Marks of the ancient Tradition that the Heathens had alter'd and corrupted.

The third Argument alledg'd by *Socrates*, as a Proof of the Immortality of the Soul, is that of Remembrance; which likewiſe bears the Marks of that ancient Tradition corrupted by the Heathens. To find out the Truth couch'd under this Argument, I advance the following Conjectures.

It ſeems the Philoſophers grounded this Opinion of Remembrance upon ſome Texts of the Prophets

that they did not well understand, such as that of *Jeremiah*, *Before I form'd thee in the Belly I knew thee.* And perhaps their Opinion was fortified by the Idea's and Instinct we have of several things that were never learn'd in this World. In short, we meet with unquestionable Marks of certain Resentments that revive some Lights within our Minds, or the Remains of a past Grandeur that we lost by Sin. And from whence do those proceed? That inexplicable Cypher has no other Key but the Knowledge of Original Sin. Our Soul was created so as to be adorn'd with all manner of Knowledge suitable to its Nature; and now is sensible of its being depriv'd of the same. The Philosophers felt this Misery, and were not admitted to know the true Cause; in order to unriddle the *Mystery*, they invented this creation of Souls before the Body, and a remembrance that is the Consequence thereof. But we who are guided by a surer Light, know, that if Man were not degenerate, he would still enjoy the full knowledge of the Truths he formerly knew; and if he had never been any other than corrupted, he would have had no Idea's of these Truths. This untyes the Knot. Man had knowledge before he was corrupted, and after his Corruption forgot it. He can recover nothing but confus'd Idea's, and stands in need of a new Light to illuminate them. No human Reason could have fathom'd this. It faintly unravell'd part of the Mystery as well as it could, and the Explication it gave discovers some footsteps of the ancient Truth. For it points both to the first state of Happiness and Knowledge, and to the second of Misery and Obscurity. Thus may we make an useful Application of the Doctrine of Remembrance, and the Errors of Philosophers may oftentimes serve to establish the most incomprehensible Truths of the Christian Religion, and shew that the Heathens did not want Traditions relating to 'em.

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The fourth Argument is taken from the nature of the Soul. Deſtruction reaches only compounded Bodies. But we may clearly perceive, that the Soul is ſimple and immaterial, and bears a reſemblance of ſomething divine, immortal and intelligent: for it imbraces the pure Eſſence of Things, it meaſures all by Idea's which are eternal Patterns, and unites it ſelf to them when the Body does not hinder it: So that 'tis Spiritual, Indiſſoluble, and conſequently Immortal, as being not capable of diſſolution by any other means than the Will of him who created it.

Notwithſtanding the force of theſe Proofs, and their tendency to keep up this hope in the Soul, *Socrates* and his Friends own that 'tis almoſt impoſſible to ward off Doubts and Uncertainties. For our Reaſon is too weak and degenerate to arrive at the full knowledge of Truth in this World. So that 'tis a wiſe Man's buſineſs, to chuſe from amongſt thoſe Arguments of the Philoſophers, for the Immortality of the Soul, that which to him ſeems beſt and moſt forcible, and capable to conduct him ſafely through the dangerous Shelves of this Life, till he obtain a full Aſſurance either of ſome Promiſe, or by ſome Divine Revelation; for that is the only Veſſel that's ſecure from danger. By this the moſt refin'd Paganiſm pays Homage to the Chriſtian Religion, and all colour or excuſe for Incredulity is took off. For the Chriſtian Religion affords Promiſes, Revelations, and which is yet more conſiderable, the Accompliſhment of 'em.

They moy'd two Objections to *Socrates*; one, that the Soul is only the Harmony reſulting from the juſt proportion of the qualities of the Body; the other, that tho' the Soul be more durable than the Body, yet it dies at laſt after having made uſe of ſeveral Bodies; juſt as a Man dies after he has worn ſeveral Suits of Clothes.

Socrates, before he makes any Anſwer, ſtops a little, and deplores the misfortune of Men, who by hearing the Diſputes of the Ignorant, that contradict

tradict every thing, perſuade themſelves, that there's no ſuch thing as clear, ſolid and ſenſible Reaſons, but that every thing is uncertain. Like as thoſe who being cheated by Men become Men-haters; ſo they being impoſed upon by Arguments, become haters of Reaſon; that is, they take up an abſolute hatred againſt all Reaſon in general, and will not hear any Argument. *Socrates* makes out the Injuſtice of this Procedure. He ſhews that when two Things are equally uncertain, Wiſdom directs us to chuſe that which is moſt advantageous with the leaſt danger. Now, beyond all diſpute, ſuch is the Immortality of the Soul; and therefore ought to be embrac'd. For if this Opinion prove true after our Death, are not we conſiderable Gainers? And if it prove falſe, what do we loſe?

Then he attacks that Objection which repreſents the Soul as a Harmony, and refutes it by ſolid and convincing Arguments, which at the ſame time prove the Immortality of the Soul.

His Arguments are theſe. Harmony always depends upon the Parts that conſpire together, and is never oppoſite to them; but the Soul has no dependance upon the Body, and always ſtands on the oppoſite ſide. Harmony admits of leſs and more, but the Soul does not: From whence it would follow, that all Souls ſhould be equal, that none of 'em are vicious, and that the Souls of Beaſts are equally good, and of the ſame nature with thoſe of Men: Which is contrary to all Reaſon.

In Muſick the Body commands the Harmony; but in Nature the Soul commands the Body. In Muſick, the Harmony can never give a ſound contrary to the particular Sounds of the Parts that bend or unbend, or move; but in Nature the Soul has a contrary ſound to that of the Body: It attacks all its Paſſions and Deſires, it checks, curbs and puniſhes the Body. So that it muſt needs be of a very different and oppoſite nature; which proves its Spirituality and Divinity. For nothing but what is Spi-

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tual and Divine can be wholly oppoſite to what is Material and Earthly.

The Second Objection was, That tho' the Soul might outlive the Body, yet that does not conclude its Immortality: Since we know nothing to the contrary, but that it dies at laſt, after having animated the Body ſeveral times.

In anſwer to this Objection, *Socrates* ſays we muſt trace the firſt Original of the Being and Corruption of Entities. If that be once agreed upon, we ſhall find no difficulty in determining what Things are corruptible and what not. But what Path ſhall we follow in this Enquiry? Muſt it be that of Phyſicks? Theſe Phyſicks are ſo uncertain, that inſtead of being inſtructive, they only blind and miſlead us. This he makes out from his own Experience. So that there's a neceſſity of going beyond this Science, and having recourſe to Metaphyſicks, which alone can afford us the certain Knowledge of the Reaſons and Cauſes of Beings, and of that which conſtitutes their Eſſences. For Effects may be diſcover'd by their Cauſes; but the Cauſes can never be known by their Effects. And upon this account we muſt have recourſe to the Divine Knowledge, which *Anaxagoras* was ſo ſenſible of, that he uſher'd in his Treatiſe of Phyſicks by this great Principle, That Knowledge is the Cauſe of Being. But inſtead of keeping up to that Principle, he fell in again with that of ſecond Cauſes, and by that means deceiv'd the Expectation of his Hearers.

In order to make out the Immortality of the Soul, we muſt correct this order of *Anaxagoras*, and ſound to the bottom of the above-mention'd Principle: Which if we do, we ſhall be ſatisfied that God placed every Thing in the moſt convenient State. Now this beſt and moſt ſuitable State muſt be the Object of our Enquiry. To which purpoſe we muſt know wherein the particular Good of every particular Thing conſiſts, and what the general Good of all Things is. This diſcovery will make out the Immortality of the Soul.

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In this view *Socrates* raiſes his Thoughts to immaterial Qualities, and eternal Idea's; that is, he affirms that there's ſomething that is in it ſelf good, fine, juſt and great, which is the firſt Cauſe: And that all Things in this World that are good, fine, juſt, or great, are only ſuch by the communication of that firſt Cauſe: Since there is no other Cauſe of the Exiſtence of Things, but the participation of the Eſſence proper to each Subject.

This Participation is ſo contriv'd, that Contraries are never found in the ſame Subject: From which Principle it follows by a neceſſary Conſequence, That the Soul, which gives Life to the Body, not as an accidental Form that adheres to it, but as a ſubſtantial Form, ſubſiſting in its ſelf, and living formally by it ſelf, as the corporeal Idea, and effectually enlivening the Body, can never be ſubject to Death, that being the Oppoſite of Life: And that the Soul being uncapable of dying, cannot be worſted by any attack of this Enemy; and is in effect imperiſhable, like the immaterial Qualities, Juſtice, Fortitude and Temperance; but with this difference, that theſe immaterial Qualities ſubſiſt independently and of themſelves, as being the ſame Thing with God himſelf; whereas the Soul is a created Being, that may be diſſolv'd by the Will of its Creator. In a word, the Soul ſtands in the ſame relation to the Life of the Body, that the Idea of God does to the Soul.

The only Objection they could invent upon this Head, was, that the greatneſs of the Subject, and Man's natural Infirmity, are the two Sources of Man's diſtruſt and incredulity upon this Head. Whereupon *Socrates* endeavours to dry up thoſe two Sources.

He attacks their Diſtruſt by ſhewing that the Opinion of the Soul's Mortality, ſuits all the Idea's of God. For, by this Mortality, Vertue would be prejudicial to Men of Probity, and Vice beneficial to the Wicked; which cannot be imagin'd. So that there's a neceſſity of another Life for rewarding the good and puniſhing the bad. And the Soul being

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Immortal, carries along with it into the other World, its good and bad Actions, its Vertues and Vices, which are the occasion of its eternal Happiness or Misery. From whence, by a necessary Consequence we may gather, what care we ought to have of it in this Life.

To put a stop to the torrent of Incredulity, he has recourse to two Things, which naturally demand a great deference from Man, and cannot be denied without a visible Authority. The first is, the Ceremonies and Sacrifices of Religion it self, which are only Representations of what would be put in execution in Hell. The other is, the Authority of Antiquity, which maintain'd the Immortality of the Soul: In pursuit of which, he mentions some ancient Traditions, that point to the Truth publish'd by *Moses* and the Prophets, notwithstanding the Fables that overwhelm 'em. Thus we see, a Pagan, supplies the want of Proof, which is too natural to Man, and silences the most obstinate Prejudices, by having recourse to the Oracles of God, which they were in some measure acquainted with; and by so doing makes answer to *Simmias*, who had objected that the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, stood in need of some Promise or Divine Revelation to procure its reception. Tho' some blinded Christians reject the Authority of our Holy Writ, and refuse to submit to it; yet we see a Pagan had so much Light as to make use of it to support his Faith, if I may so speak, and to strengthen his sweet Hope of a blessed Eternity. He shews, that he knew how to distinguish the fabulous Part of a Tradition from the Truth, and affirms nothing but what is conformable to the Scriptures, particularly, the last Judgment of the Good and the Bad; the necessary Purgation of those who depart this Life under a load of Sin; the eternal Torments of those who committed mortal Sins in this Life; the Pardon of Venial Sins after Satisfaction and Repentance; the Happiness of those who during the whole course

courſe of their Lives renounc'd the Pleaſures of the Body, and only courted the Pleaſure of true Knowledge; that is, the knowledge of God; and beautified their Souls with proper Ornaments, ſuch as Temperance, Juſtice, Fortitude, Liberty and Truth. He does not joke upon the groundleſs *Metempſychoſis*, or return of Souls to animate Bodies in this Life; but ſpeaks ſeriouſly, and ſhews that after Death all's over, the Wicked are thrown for ever into the bottomleſs Abyſs, and the Righteous convey'd to the Manſions of Bliſs: Thoſe who are neither righteous nor wicked, but committed Sins in this Life, which they always repented of, are committed to Places of torment, till they be ſufficiently purified.

When *Socrates* made an end of his Diſcourſe, his Friends ask'd what Orders he would give concerning his Affairs. *The only Orders I give you*, reply'd he, *is to take Care of your ſelves, and to make your ſelves as like to God as poſſible.* Then they ask'd him, how he would be interr'd? This Queſtion offended him. He would not have himſelf confounded with his Corps, which was only to be interr'd. And tho' the Expreſſion ſeems to import little, he ſhew'd that ſuch falſe Expreſſions gave very dangerous Wounds to the Souls of Men.

He goes and bathes. His Wife and Children are brought to him. He talks to 'em a minute, and then diſmiſſes 'em. Upon his coming out of the Bath, the Cup is preſented to him. He takes it, recollects his Thoughts within himſelf, prays, and drinks it off with an admirable tranquillity of Mind. Finding that he approach'd his End, he gave 'em to know that he reſign'd his Soul into the Hands of him who gave it, and of the true Phyſician who was coming to heal it. This was the exit of *Socrates*. Paganiſm never afforded ſuch an admirable Example. And yet a certain modern Author is ſo ignorant of its Beauty, that he places it infinitely below that of *Petronius*, the famous Diſciple of *Epicurus*. *He did not employ the laſt Hours of his Life*, ſays that Author;

Author, *in discoursing of the Immortality of the Saul*, &c. *but having chosen a more pleasurable and natural sort of Death, imitated the sweetness of the Swans, and caused some agreeable and touching Verses to be recited to him.* This was a fine imitation: It seems *Petronius* sung what they read to him. But this was not all. *Nevertheless* continues he, *he reserv'd some Minutes for thinking of his Affairs, and distributed Rewards to some of his Slaves, and punish'd others.*

Let them talk of Socrates, says he, *and boast of his Constancy and Bravery in drinking up the Poyson!* Petronius *is not behind him; nay, he is justly entitled to a preference upon the score of his forsaking a Life infinitely more delightful than that of the Sage Grecian, and that too with the same Tranquillity of Mind, and Evenness of Temper.*

We have no need of long Comments, to make out the vast difference between the death of *Socrates*, and that of this Epicurean, whom *Tacitus* himself, notwithstanding his Paganism, did not dare to applaud. On one side, we are presented with the view of a Man, that spent his last Minutes in making his Friends better, recommending to them the hopes of a blessed Eternity, and shewing what that Hope requires of them: A Man that died with his Eyes intent upon God, praying to him, and blessing him, without any reflections upon his Enemies who condemn'd him so unjustly. On the other side we meet with a voluptuous Person, in whom all Sentiments of Vertue are quite extinguish'd; who, to be rid of his own Fears, occasion'd his own Death, and in his exit would admit of no other Entertainment but agreeable Poems and pleasant Verses; who spent the last Minutes of his Time in rewarding those of his Slaves, who doubtless had been the Ministers and Accomplices of his Sensualities, and seeing those punish'd, who perhaps had shewn an aversion to his Vices, and disserv'd him in the way of his Pleasures. A good Death ought to be usher'd in by a good

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Life. Now, a Life ſpent in Vice, Effeminacy and Debauchery, is much ſhort of one entirely taken up in the Exerciſe of Vertue, and the ſolid Pleaſures of true Knowledge, and adorn'd with the venerable Ornaments of Temperance, Juſtice, Fortitude, Liberty, and Truth. One of *Socrates*'s dying words was, that thoſe who entertain'd bad Diſcourſes upon Death, wounded the Soul very dangerouſly. And what would not he have ſaid of thoſe who ſcruple not to write 'em?

But 'tis probable this Author did not foreſee the Conſequence of this unjuſt Preference. He wrote like a Man of this World, that never knew *Socrates*. Had he known him, he had certainly form'd a juſter Judgment. And in like manner, if he had known *Seneca* or *Plutarch*, he had never equall'd or prefer'd *Petronius* to them. Had he made the beſt uſe of his Underſtanding, he would have ſeen Reaſons to doubt that the *Petronius* now read, is not the *Petronius* of *Tacitus*, whoſe Death he ſo much admires, and would have met with ſome juſt Objections, which at leaſt give occaſion to ſuſpect its being ſuppoſitious. But to return to *Socrates*.

His Doctrine, of Death's being no Affliction; but on the contrary, a Paſſage to a happier Life, made a conſiderable Progreſs. Some Philoſophers gave ſuch lively and forcible Demonſtrations of it in their Lectures, that the greateſt part of their Diſciples laid violent Hands on themſelves, in order to overtake that happier Life. *Ptolomæus Philadelphus* prohibited *Hegeſias* of *Cyrene* to teach it in his School, for fear of diſpeopling his Countries. And the Poets of that Prince's Court ſiding with their Prince, as commonly they do, us'd all means to decry that Doctrine, and thoſe who were prevail'd upon to embrace it. 'Twas their pernicious Complaiſance that occaſion'd what we now read in *Callimachus* againſt the Immortality of the Soul; and above all that famous Epigram, *Cicero* alledges to have been writ againſt *Cleombrotus* of *Ambracia*, but was certainly

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design'd likewise against *Plato*. 'Tis to this purpose. Cleombrotus *of* Ambracia *having paid his last Compliment to the Sun, threw himself headlong from the top of a Tower into Hell : Not that he had done any thing worthy of Death; but only had read* Plato's *Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul.*

But, after all, it redounds to the Glory of *Socrates* and *Plato*, and the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul; that none but such Enemies as these oppose it.

Phedon : Or, *A Dialogue of the Immortality of the Soul.*

Echecrates and *Phedon.*

Echec. *Phedon*, were you by when *Socrates* drank the Poyson, or did any Body give you an Account how he behav'd in that juncture?

Phed. I was present.

Echec. What were his last Words then, and how dy'd he? You'll oblige me much with the relation: For the *Phliasians* have but little Correspondence with the *Athenians*, and 'tis a great while since we had any Stranger from *Athens* to acquaint us how things went. We only heard that he dy'd after drinking the Poyson; but could not understand any Particulars relating to his Death.

The Inhabitants of Phlius, *a City in the* Peloponnesus.

Phed. What! Did not you hear how he was arraign'd?

Echec. Yes truly, some Body told us that; and we thought it strange that his Sentence was so long in being put in execution after his Trial.

Phed. * That happen'd only by chance. For the

* *Phedon*'s Discourse implies that the time of the Ships departure was uncertain: 'Twas either anticipated or retarded, as the Condition of the Ship and other Occurrences requir'd. This uncertainty occasions the Difficulty of finding the true Date of *Socrates*'s Death.

day before his Trial, the Stern of the Sacred Ship which the *Athenians* send every Year to *Delos*, was crown'd for the Voyage.

Echec. What is that Sacred Ship?

Phed. If you believe the *Athenians*, it is the same Ship in which *Theseus* transported the 14 young Children to *Crete*, and brought 'em safe back again; and 'tis said the *Athenians* at that time vow'd to *Apollo*, that if the Children were preserv'd from the impending Danger, they would send every Year to *Delos* Presents and Victims aboard the same Vessel. And this they do ever since. As soon as the Ship is clear'd and ready to put to Sea, they purifie the City, and observe an inviolable Law for putting none to Death before the return of the Ship. Now sometimes it stays long out, especially if the Winds be contrary. This Festival, which is properly call'd *Theoria*, commences when the Priest of *Apollo* has crown'd the Stern of the Ship. Now, as I told you, this happen'd on the day preceeding *Socrates*'s Trial. And 'twas upon that Account that he was kept so long in Prison, after his Commitment.

Echec. And during his Imprisonment, what did he do? What said he? Who was with him? Did the Judges order him to be kept up from Visits? And did he die without the Assistance of his Friends?

Phed. Not at all; several of his Friends stay'd with him to the last Minute.

Echec. If you're at leisure, pray relate the whole Story.

Phed. At present I have nothing to do, and so shall endeavour to satisfie your Demands. * Besides, I take the greatest Pleasure in the World, in speaking, or hearing others speak of *Socrates*.

* *Phedon* had been infinitely oblig'd to *Socrates*; for being taken Prisoner in War, and sold to a Merchant that bought Slaves; *Socrates*, who was mighty fond of his Genius, oblig'd *Alcibiades* or *Crito* to ransom him; and receiv'd him into the Number of his Friends and Disciples.

Echec.

Echec. Assure your self, *Phedon*, you shall not take more pleasure in speaking, than I in hearing. Begin pray, and above all, take Care to omit nothing.

Phed. You'll be surpris'd when you hear what a Condition I was then in. I was so far from being sensibly touch'd with the misfortune of a Friend whom I loved very tenderly, and who died before my Eyes; that I envy'd his Circumstances, and could not forbear to admire the Goodness, Sweetness and Tranquillity that appear'd in all his Discourses, and the Bravery he shew'd upon the approach of Death. Every thing that I saw, furnish'd me with a Proof that he did not pass to the Shades below without the assistance of some Deity, that took Care to conduct him and put him in possession of that transcendent Felicity of the Blessed. But, as on one hand, these Thoughts stifled all the Sentiments of Compassion, that might seem due at such a mortifying sight: So on the other hand, they lessen'd the Pleasure I was wont to have in hearing all his other Discourses, as affecting me with that sorrowful reflexion, that in the space of a Minute this divine Man would leave us for ever. Thus was my Heart toss'd with contrary Motions, that I could not define. 'Twas not properly either Pleasure or Grief, but a confused mixture of these two Passions, which produc'd almost the same effect in all the By-standers. One while we melted into Tears; and another while gave surprising Signs of real Joy and sensible Pleasure. Above all, *Apollodorus* distinguish'd himself upon this Occasion; you know his humour.

The same Apollodorus *is spoken of in the* Apology.

Echec. No Body knows it better.

Phed. In him was the difference of these Motions most observable. As for me and all the rest, our Behaviour was not so distinguishing, as being mix'd with the Trouble and Confusion I spoke of just now.

Echec. Who was there then beſides your ſelf?

Phed. There were no other *Athenians*, but *Apollodorus*, *Critobulus*, and his Father *Crito*, *Hermogenes*, *Epigenes*, *Eſchines*, *Antiſthenes*, *Cteſippus*, *Menexemus*, and a few more. *Plato* was ſick.

Echec. Were there no Strangers?

Phed. Yes; *Simmias* the *Theban*, with * *Cebes*, and *Phedondes*; and from *Megara*, *Euclides* and *Terpſion*.

Echec. What! Were not *Ariſtippus* and *Cleombrotus* there?

Phed. No, ſure; † for 'tis ſaid they were at *Ægina*.

Echec. Who was there beſides?

Phed. I believe I have named moſt of thoſe that were there.

Echec. Let's hear then what his laſt Diſcourſes were.

* 'Tis the ſame *Cebes* who made the Table that we now have; which is an Explication of an Allegorical Table, that he ſuppoſes to have been in the Temple of *Saturn* at *Thebes*; and contains a very ingenious Scheme of a Man's whole Life. It hints at all the Doctrines of *Socrates*, and the Style reſembles that of *Plato*.

† The Delicacy and Salt of this Satyr is thus explain'd by *Demetrius Phalereus*. *Plato*, ſays he, had a mind to ſuppreſs the Scandal that *Ariſtippus* and *Cleombrotus* drew upon themſelves, by feaſting at *Ægina*, when *Socrates* their Friend and Maſter was in Priſon, without daigning to go to ſee him, or even to aſſiſt on the day of his Death, tho' they were then at the entry of the Athenian Harbour. Had he told the whole Story, the Invective had been too particular. But with an admirable Decency and Artfulneſs he introduces *Phedon*, giving a Liſt of thoſe who aſſiſted at his Death, and making Anſwer to the Queſtion, (Whether they were there or not?) That they were at *Ægina*; pointing at once to their Debauchery and Ingratitude. This ſtroak is the more biting, that the Thing it ſelf paints out the Horror of the Action, and not he that ſpeaks. *Plato* might ſecurely have attacked *Ariſtippus* and *Cleombrotus*; but he choſe rather to make uſe of this Figure, which in effect gives the greater Blow. This is a notable Piece of delicate Satyr. *Athenæus* by charging *Plato* with ſlander upon this ſcore prejudic'd himſelf, more than *Plato*, who will always be cry'd up for having this Zeal for his Maſter.

Phed.

Phed. I ſhall endeavour to give you a full Account: For we never miſſed one day in viſiting *Socrates*. To this End we met every morning in the Place where he was try'd, which joyn'd to the Priſon; and there we waited till the Priſon Doors were open; at which time we went ſtraight to him, and commonly paſſed the whole day with him. On the day of his Execution, we came thither ſooner than ordinary, having heard as we came out of the City that the Ship was return'd from *Delos*. When we arriv'd the Goaler that uſed to let us in, came out to us and deſir'd we ſhould ſtay a little and not go in till he came to conduct us. For, ſays he, the eleven Magiſtrates are now untying *Socrates*, and acquainting him that he muſt die, as this day. When we came in we found *Socrates* * unty'd, and his Wife *Xantippe* (you know her) ſitting by him with one of his Children in her Arms; and as ſoon as ſhe ſpy'd us, ſhe fell a crying and making a noiſe, as you know Women commonly do on ſuch Occaſions. *Socrates*, ſaid he, *this is the laſt time your Friends ſhall ſee you.* Upon which *Socrates* turning to *Crito*, ſays, *Crito, pray ſend this Woman home.* Accordingly it was done. *Crito*'s Folks carry'd *Xantippe* off, who beat her Face and cry'd bitterly. In the mean time *Socrates*, ſitting upon the Bed, ſoftly ſtroaks the place of his Leg where the Chain had been ty'd, and ſays, To my mind what Men call Pleaſure, is a pretty odd ſort of a Thing, which agrees admirably well with Pain; tho' People believe it is quite contrary, becauſe they cannot meet in one and the ſame Subject. For whoever enjoys the one, muſt unavoidably be poſſeſs'd of the other, as if they were naturally joyn'd.

These Magiſtrates were the Overſeers of the Priſon and Priſoners, and the Executors of the Sentences of the Judges.

How Pleaſure agrees with Pain.

Had *Æſop* been aware of this Truth, perhaps he had made a Fable of it; and had told us that

* At *Athens*, after the Sentence was pronounc'd to the Criminal, they unty'd him, as being a Victim to Death, which it was not lawful to keep in Chains.

Socrates feigning that the Gods ty'd Pleasure and Pain to one Chain, makes that the Subject of a Fable.

God designing to reconcile these two Enemies, and not being able to compass his End, contented himself with tying them to one Chain; so that ever since the one follows the other, according to my Experience at this Minute. For the Pain occasion'd by my Chain, is now follow'd by a great deal of Pleasure.

I am infinitely glad, replies *Cebes* interrupting him, that you have mention'd *Æsop*. For by so doing you have put it in my Head to ask you a Question that many have ask'd of me, of late, especially *Evenus*. The Question relates to your Poems in turning the Fables of *Æsop* into Verse, and making a Hymn to *Apollo*. They want to know what mov'd you, that never made Verses before, to turn Poet since you came into the Prison? If *Evenus* asks the same Question of me again, as I know he will, what would you have me to say?

Evenus of Paros, an Elegiack Poet, the first that said Habit was a second Nature.

What mov'd Socrates to make Verses after his Condemnation.

You have nothing to do, says *Socrates*, but to tell him the plain matter of Fact as it stands; *viz.* That I did not at all mean to rival him in Poetry, for I knew such an attempt was above my reach; but only to trace the meaning of some Dreams, and put my self in a capacity of obeying, in case Poetry happen'd to be the Musick that they allotted for my Exercise. For you must know, that all my lifetime I have had Dreams, which always recommended the same Thing to me, sometimes in one Form and sometimes in another. *Socrates*, said they, *apply your self to Musick*. This I always took for a simple Exhortation, like that commonly given to those who run Races, ordering me to pursue my wonted course of Life, and carry on the study of Wisdom, that I made my whole Business, which is the most perfect Musick. But since my Trial, the Festival of *Apollo* having retarded the execution of my Sentence, I fansied these Dreams might have order'd me to apply my self to that vulgar and common sort of Musick: And since I was departing this World, I thought it safer to sanctifie my self by

His Dreams ordering him to apply himself to Musick.

Wisdom is the perfectest Musick.

How to sanctifie one's self before their exit.

by obeying the Gods, and essaying to make Verses, than to disobey them. Pursuant to this Thought, my first Essay was a Hymn to the God whose Festival was then celebrated. After that I consider'd that a true Poet ought not only to make Discourses in Verse, but likewise Fables. Now finding my self not disposed to invent new Fables, I apply'd my self to those of *Æsop*, and turn'd those into Verse that came first into my Mind.

'Tis not Verse but Fable that makes a Poet; which is pursued at length in Aristotle's Poeticon.

This, my dear *Cebes*, is the Answer you're to give *Evenus*. Assure him, that I wish him all happiness; and tell him, that if he be wise, he'll follow me. For in all appearance I am to make my Exit this Day, since the *Athenians* have given Orders to that effect.

What sort of Counsel is that you give to *Evenus*, replies *Symmias*; I have seen that Man often: And by what I know of him, I can promise you he'll never follow you with his Will.

What, says *Socrates*, is not *Evenus* a Philosopher?

For a Poet ought to be a Philosopher; or else he's a sorry Poet.

I think so, says *Symmias*.

Then, replies *Socrates*, he, and all others that are worthy of that Profession, will be willing to follow me. I know he will not kill himself, for that, they say, is not lawful. Having spoke these words he drew his Legs off the Bed, and sate down upon the Ground; in which Posture he entertain'd us the whole remaining part of the Day.

Self-murder is unlawful.

Cebes put the first Question to him, which was this. How do you reconcile this *Socrates*, that 'tis not lawful to kill one's self, and at the same time that a Philosopher ought to follow you?

What, replies *Socrates*, did neither you nor *Symmias* ever hear your Friend * *Philolaus* discourse that Point?

* *Philolaus* was a Pythagorean Philosopher, who could not fail to assert his Master's Doctrine, of the unlawfulness of Self-murder. He wrote only one Volume, which *Plato* purchased at 400 Crowns.

No, reply'd they, he never explain'd himself clearly upon that Point.

As for me, replies *Socrates*, I know nothing but what I have heard, and shall not grudge to communicate all that I have learn'd. Besides, there's no Exercise so suitable for a Man upon the point of Death, as that of examining and endeavouring thorowly to know what Voyage this is that we must all make, and making known his own Opinion upon it.

What is the ground of that Assertion, says *Cebes*, that 'tis not lawful for a Man to kill himself? I have often heard *Philolaus* and others say that it was an ill Action, but I never heard 'em say more.

Man cannot deliver himself, but must wait till God deliver him.

Have Patience, says *Socrates*, you shall know more presently, and perhaps you'll be surprised to find it an eternal Truth that never changes; whereas most other Things in this World alter according to their Circumstances; this is still the same, even in the Case of those to whom Death would be more agreeable than Life. Is it not a surprising thing that such Men are not allow'd to possess themselves of the Good they want, but are oblig'd to wait for another Deliverer?

Jupiter only knows that, replies *Cebes* smiling.

The Discourses to the People in the Ceremonies and Mysteries of the Pagan Religion.

This may seem unreasonable to you, says *Socrates*, but after all it is not so. The Discourses we are entertain'd with every day in our Ceremonies and Mysteries, *viz. That God has put us in this Life, as in a Post which we cannot quit without his leave*, &c. These I say, and such like Expressions, may seem hard, and surpass our Understanding. But nothing is easier to be understood, or better said, than this, *That the Gods take Care of Men, and that Men are one of the Possessions that belong to the Gods.* Is not this true?

Man's being God's Property, is a Proof that he has no right to kill himself.

Very true, replies *Cebes*.

Would not you your self, continues *Socrates*, be angry if one of your Slaves kill'd himself without your

your order, and would not you punish him severely if you could?

Yes, doubtless, replies *Cebes.*

By the same reason, says *Socrates*, a Man should not kill himself, but should wait for an express order from God for making his Exit, like this sent me now.

That stands to Reason, says *Cebes*; but your saying, That a Philosopher ought nevertheless to desire to die, is what I think strange, and I cannot reconcile these two Opinions, especially if it be true, what you said but now, that the Gods take care of Men, as being their Property: For that a Philosopher should not be troubled to be without the Gods for his Guardians, and to quit a Life where such perfect Beings, the better Governours of the World, take Care of him, seems very unreasonable to me. Do they imagine they'll be more capable to govern themselves, when left to themselves? I can easily conceive that a Fool may think it his Duty to flee from a good Master at any rate; and will not be convinc'd that he ought to stick to what is good, and never lose sight of it: But I affirm, that a wise Man will desire never to quit a Dependance upon a perfecter Being than himself. From whence I infer the contrary of what you advanced, and conclude that the Wise are sorry to die, and Fools are fond of death.

Cebes objects, *that Men should be unwilling to leave this Life, since the Gods are their Guardians here.*

The wise will ever desire to depend upon God.

Socrates seem'd to be pleas'd with *Cebe*'s Wit; and turning to us, told us, that *Cebes* has always something to object; and takes care not to assent at first to what is told him.

Cebes's *Objection is only a Quibble, without any solidity.*

Indeed, replies *Simmias*, I must say I find a great deal of reason in what *Cebes* advances. What can the Sages pretend to gain, by quitting better Masters than themselves, and willingly depriving themselves of their Aid? Do you mind that; 'tis you alone that he addresses himself to, meaning to reprove you for your Insensibility, in being so willing to part with us, and quit the Gods, who, according

to

to your own Words, are ſuch good and wiſe Governors.

You are in the right of it, ſays *Socrates :* I ſee you mean to oblige me to make formal Defences, ſuch as I gave in at my Tryal.

That's the very thing, replies *Simmias.*

Socrates refutes Cebes's Objection, and proves, that the wiſe ſhould deſire death. The Gods take Care of Men in the other World. Then, ſays *Socrates*, you muſt ſatisfie your ſelves, ſo that this my laſt Apology may have more influence upon you, than my former had upon my Judges. For my part, *continues he*, if I thought I ſhould not find in the other World Gods as good and as wiſe, and Men infinitely better than we, 'twould be a piece of Injuſtice in me not to be troubled at death. But be it known to you *Simmias* and to you *Cebes*, that I hope to arrive at the Aſſembly of the Juſt. Indeed in this Point I may flatter my ſelf; but as for my finding in the other World Maſters infinitely good and wiſe, that I can aſſure you of, as much as things of that Nature will bear; and therefore it is that death is no trouble to me, hoping that there's ſomething reſerv'd for the dead after this Life, and that the good meet with better Treatment in the World to come than the bad.

He means that perhaps he has not Goodneſs enough to make good his hopes of being received into the Aſſembly of the Juſt. The Good are better treated in the other World, than the Bad. How, replies *Simmias*, would you have quitted this Life, without communicating thoſe Sentiments to us? This methinks will be a common Good; and if you convince us of all that you believe with reference to this Point, you have made a ſufficient Apology.

The Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul ſhould be communicated to others That's what I deſign to try, ſays *Socrates*; but I would firſt hear what *Crito* has to ſay : I thought he had a mind to offer ſomething a pretty while ago.

I have nothing to ſay, replies *Crito*, but what your Executioner has been puſhing me on to tell you this great while, that you ought to ſpeak as little as you can for fear of over-heating your ſelf, ſince nothing is more contrary to the Operation of Poiſon; inſomuch that if you continue to ſpeak ſo

(a) you'll

(*a*) you'll be obliged to take two or three Doſes.

Let him do his Office, ſays *Socrates*; let him make ready two Doſes of Poiſon, or three if he will.

I knew you would give me that anſwer, replies *Crito*; but ſtill he importunes me to ſpeak to you.

Pray let that alone, ſays *Socrates*, and ſuffer me to explain before you who are my Judges, for what Reaſons, a Man enlightned by Philoſophy, ought to die with Courage and a firm hope that in the other World he ſhall enjoy a Felicity beyond any thing in this. Pray do you *Simmias* and *Cebes* liſten to my Arguments.

True Philoſophers learn to die all their life-time.

True Philoſophers make it the whole buſineſs of their life-time to learn to die. Now 'tis extreamly ridiculous for them, after they run out a whole Courſe inceſſantly in order to compaſs that one end, to flinch and be afraid when it comes up to them, when they are juſt in a Capacity of obtaining it after a long and painful Search.

Whereupon *Simmias* laughed and told him, in earneſt *Socrates* you make me laugh, notwithſtanding the ſmall occaſion I have to laugh in this Juncture. For I am certain the greateſt part of thoſe who hear you talk ſo, will ſay you talk much better of the Philoſophers than you believe. Above all, the Athenians would be glad that all the Philoſophers would learn that Leſſon ſo well as to die in Effect; and they'l be ready to tell you, death is the only thing they are worthy of.

A Satyrical Rub upon the Athenians, who could not abide Philoſophers.

Simmias, replies *Socrates*, our Athenians would ſo ſpeak the Truth, but without knowing it to be ſuch: For they are ignorant in what manner Philoſophers deſire to die, or how they are worthy of it. But let us leave the *Athenians* to themſelves; and

(*a*) Probably the Executioner mean'd by this Advice to keep fair with *Socrates*, and ſave his Money; for he was to furniſh the Hemlock, of which a pound (the common Doſe) coſt 12 Drachms, *i. e.* 3 Livres and 12 d. See *Plutarch* upon the death of *Phocion*, who was obliged to pay his Executioner for a Doſe of Poiſon.

talk

talk of things within our own Company. Does Death appear to be any thing to you?

Yes, without doubt; replies *Simmias*.

Is it not, continues *Socrates*, the Separation of Soul and Body; so that the Body has a separate Being and the Soul another?

What is Death.

Just so, says *Simmias*.

Let's try then, my dear *Simmias*, if your Thoughts and mine agree. By that means we shall set the Object of our present Enquiry into a clearer light. Do you think a Philosopher courts what the World calls Pleasure, as that of Eating, Drinking, *&c.*

Philosophers do not court Pleasures.

Not at all, *Socrates*.

Nor that of Love?

By no means.

Do you think they pursue or mind the other Pleasures relating to the Body, such as good Cloths, handsome Shoes, and the other Ornaments of the Body? Whether do you think they value or slight those things when necessity does not inforce their Use?

In my mind, replies *Simmias*, a true Philosopher must needs contemn them.

Then you believe, continues *Socrates*, that the Body is not at all the Object of the Care and Business of a Philosopher: But on the contrary, that his whole Business is to separate himself from it, and mind only the concerns of his Soul.

Most certainly.

All the Philosophers Business is to cut off all Commerce between Soul and Body.

Thus, continues *Socrates*, 'tis plain upon the whole that a Philosopher labours in a more distinguishing manner, than other Men to purchase the Freedom of his Soul, and cut off all Commerce between it and the Body. I am likewise of the Opinion, *Simmias* that most Men will grant, that whoever avoids those Corporeal Things, and takes no pleasure in them (*a*) is not worthy to live; and that he who does

(*a*) 'Tis a Truth acknowledged by almost all the World, That he who doe's not enjoy the Pleasures of the Body, is not worthy to live. So that 'tis a true Saying, That a Philosopher is worthy of nothing but death.

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not use the Pleasures of the Body is near to death.

You speak Truth, *Socrates*.

But what shall we say of the acquiring of Prudence? Is the Body an Obstacle or not, when employ'd in that work? I'll explain my meaning by an Example: Have Seeing and Hearing any thing of Truth in them, and is their Testimony faithful? Or are the Poets in the right in singing that we neither see nor hear things truly? For if these two Senses of Seeing and Hearing are not true and trusty, the other, which are much weaker, will be far less such. Do not you think so?

The Bodies being an Obstacle in the acquest of prudence is a proof of this truth

The uncertainty of the Senses.

Yes, without doubt, replies *Simmias*.

When does the Soul then, continues *Socrates*, find out the Truth? We see that while the Body is join'd in the Enquiry, this Body plainly cheats and seduces it.

The Body deceives the Soul.

That's true, says *Simmias*.

Is it not by reasoning that the Soul embraces Truths? And does it not reason better than before, when 'tis not encumber'd by Seeing or Hearing, Pain or Pleasure? When shut up within it self, it bids adieu to the Body, and entertains as little Correspondence with it as is possible; and pursues the knowledge of things without touching them?

The Soul reasons best, when undisturbed by the Body, and separated from it.

That's incomparably well spoken.

Is it not especially upon this occasion that the Soul of a Philosopher despises and avoids the Body, and wants to be by it self?

I think so.

What shall we say then, my dear *Simmias*, of all the Objects of the Soul? For instance, shall we call Justice something or nothing?

We must certainly give it the Title of *Something*.

Shall we not like wise call it *Good* and *Fine*?

Ay, doubtless.

But did you ever see these Objects with the Eyes of your Body?

No, to be sure.

Or

The Essence of things is known, not by the Senses, but by the operation of the Soul alone.

Or with any other Sense? Did you ever touch any of those things I now speak of, such as Magnitude, Health, Fortitude, and, in a Word, the Essence of all other things? Is the truth of them discover'd by the Body? Or is it not certain, that whoever puts himself in a condition to examine them more narrowly, and trace them to the bottom, will better compass the end, and know more of them?

That's very true.

The more the Soul is disengaged from the Body the more piercing are its Thoughts.

Now the simplest and purest way of examining things, is to pursue every Particular by Thought alone, without offering to support our Meditation by seeing, or backing our Reasonings by any other Corporeal Sense; by employing the naked Thought without any mixture, and so endeavouring to trace the pure and genuine Essence of things without the Ministry of the Eyes or Ears; the Soul being, if I may so speak, entirely disengaged from the whole Mass of Body, which only cumbers the Soul, and cramps it in the quest of Wisdom and Truth, as often as it is admitted to the least Correspondence with it. If the Essence of things be ever known, must it not be in the manner above-mention'd?

Right *Socrates*; you have spoke incomparably well.

The Language of the Philosophers among themselves.

The Obstacles raised by the Body in the search of Truth.

It not only disturbs us with Diseases, but often sinks our Judgments and Senses.

Is it not a necessary Consequence from this Principle, continues *Socrates*, that true Philosophers should have such Language among themselves. This Life is a Road that's apt to mislead us and our Reason in all our Enquires; because while we have a Body, and while our Soul is drown'd in so much Corruption, we shall never attain the Object of our Wishes, *i. e.* Truth. The Body throws a thousand Obstacles and Crosses in our way by demanding necessary Food: And then the Diseases that ensue do quite disorder our Enquiry: Besides, it fills us with Love, Desires, Fears and a thousand foolish Imaginations; insomuch that there's nothing truer than the common Saying, That *the Body will never conduct us to Wisdom.* What is it that gives rise to

Wars

Wars and occasions Sedition and Duelling? Is it not the Body and its Desires? In effect, all Wars take rise from the Desire of Riches, which we are forc'd to heap up for the sake of our Bodie, in order to supply its wants, and serve it like Slaves. 'Tis this that cramps our Application to Philosophy. And the greatest of all our Evils is, that when it has given us some respite, and we are set upon Meditation, it steals in and interupts our Meditation all of a sudden. It cumbers, troubles and surprizes us in such a manner that it hinders us to descry the Truth. Now we made it out, that in order to trace the Purity and Truth of any thing, we should lay aside the Body, and only employ the Soul to examine the Objects we pursue. So that we can never arrive at the Wisdom we court, till after death. Reason is on our side. For if it is impossible to know any thing purely while we are in the Body, one of two things must be true: Either the Truth is never known, or it is known after death; because at that time the Soul will be left to it self and freed of its burden, and not before. And while we are in this Life, we can only approach to the Truth, in proportion to our removing from the Body, and renouncing all Correspondence with it that is not of meer Necessity, and keeping our selves clear from the Contagion of its Natural Corruption, and all its filth, till God himself comes to deliver us. Then indeed being freed from all bodily Folly, we shall converse in all probability with Men that enjoy the same Liberty; and shall know within our selves the pure Essence of things, which perhaps is nothing else but the Truth. But he who is not pure, is not allow'd to approach to Purity it self. This, my dear *Simmias* as I take it, should be the Thought and Language of true Philosophers. Are not you of the same mind?

The Body cannot conduct us to wisdom.

The Body is the cause of all the disorders in the World.

An Argument proving, that after this Life the Soul will know the Truth better than in this Life.

Truth is the knowledge of the pure essence of things.

Most certainly, *Socrates*.

Then,

Then, my dear *Simmias*, whoever ſhall arrive where I am now going, has great reaſon to hope, that he will there be poſſeſſed of what we look for here with ſo much Care and Anxiety, ſo that the Voyage I am now ſent upon, fills me with a ſweet and agreeable hope. And it will have the ſame Effect upon all who are perſwaded that the Soul muſt be purged before it knows the Truth. Now the Purgation of the Soul, as we were ſaying but juſt now, is only its ſeparation from the Body, its accuſtoming it ſelf to retire and lock it ſelf up, renouncing all Commerce with it as much as poſſible, and living by its ſelf, whether in this or (*a*) the other World, without being chained to the Body.

The Purgation of the Soul, is the removing it from the Correſpondence with the Body.

All that's true, *Socrates*.

Well! what we call *Death*, is not that the diſengagement and ſeparation of the Body from the Soul?

Moſt certainly.

Are not the true Philoſophers the only Men that ſeek after this Diſengagement, and is not that Separation and Deliverance their whole Buſineſs?

So I think, *Socrates*.

Is it not a ridiculous fancy, that a Man that has lived in the Expectation of Death, and during his whole life-time has been preparing to dye, upon his arrival at the Point of deſir'd Death, ſhould think to retire and be afraid of it? Would not that be a very ſcandalous Apoſtacy?

This is what Socrates *mean'd to prove.*

How ſhould it be otherwiſe?

'Tis certain then, *Simmias*, that Death is ſo far from being terrible to true Philoſophers, that 'tis

(*a*) The Obſtacles rais'd in the purſuit of Wiſdom, inſpir'd the true Philoſophers with ſuch an averſion to the Body, that they pleas'd themſelves with the fancy, that after death they ſhould be rid of it for ever. They knew no better; and though they had ſome Idea of the Reſurrection, yet they were abſolutely ignorant that the Body will be likewiſe purged and glorified, that this corruptible Body would put on Incorruptibility, and the mortal Part be inveſted with Immortality.

their

their whole buſineſs to die. Which may be eaſily infer'd thus. If they ſlight and contemn their Body, and paſſionately deſire to enjoy their Soul by it ſelf, is it not a ridiculous way of belying themſelves, to be afraid and troubled when that Minute comes? And is it not a piece of Extravagance to decline going to that Place, where thoſe who get to it, hope to obtain the good things they have wiſh'd for all their life-time? For they deſir'd Wiſdom and a Deliverance from the Body, as being their Burden and the Object of their hatred and contempt. Do not many upon the loſs of their * Miſtreſſes, Wives or Children, willingly cut the Thread of Life, and convey themſelves into the other World, meerly upon the hope of meeting there and cohabiting with the Perſons they love? And ſhall a true lover of Wiſdom, and one that firmly hopes to attain to the Perfection of it in the other World, ſhall he be ſtartled by Death, and be unwilling to go to the Place that will furniſh him with what his Soul loves? Doubtleſs, my dear *Simmias*, if he be a true Philoſopher, he'll go with a great deal of Pleaſure; as being perſwaded that there's no place in the Regions below, that cannot furniſh him with that pure Wiſdom that he's in queſt of. Now if things ſtand thus, would it not be a piece of extravagance in ſuch a Man to fear death?

To be ſure, ſays *Simmias*, it would be ſo with a witneſs.

And conſequently, continues *Socrates*, when a Man ſhrinks and retires at the Point of death, 'tis a certain Evidence that he loves not Wiſdom, but his

* The greateſt part, though ſcarce convinc'd of the Immortality of the Soul us'd to kill themſelves upon the loſs of what they lov'd, hoping to retrieve it in the other World: And is it not reaſonable that the true Philoſophers, who are fully convinced of that Truth, and fully perſwaded that true Wiſdom is to be enjoy'd in the infernal World? is it not reaſonable that thoſe Men ſhould give Death a welcome Reception?

The three common Causes of our averſion to death.

own Body, or Honour, or Riches, or perhaps all the three together.

'Tis ſo, *Socrates.*

Fortitude and Temperance are peculiar to Philoſophers

Then, *Simmias*, does not that we call *Fortitude* belong in a peculiar manner to Philoſophers? And does not *Temperance*, or that ſort of Wiſdom that conſiſts in controuling our Deſires, and living ſoberly and modeſtly, ſuit admirably well with thoſe who contemn their Bodies and live Philoſophically?

That's certain, *Socrates.*

Were you to inſpect into the Fortitude and Temperance of other Men, you'd find 'em very ridiculous.

How ſo, *Socrates?*

You know, ſays he, all other Men look upon Death as the greateſt Affliction.

That's true, replies *Simmias.*

The Courage and Valor of thoſe who deſpiſe death is often the effect of fear

When thoſe you call *Stout*, ſuffer Death with ſome Courage, they do it only for fear of ſome greater evil.

That I muſt grant.

And by Conſequence, all Men, bating the Philoſophers, are only ſtout and valiant through Fear. And is it not ridiculous to believe a Man to be brave and valiant, that is only influenced by Fear and Timerouſneſs?

You are in the right of it, *Socrates.*

Men are temperate thro' Intemperance.

Is not the Caſe the ſame with your temperate Perſons? 'Tis only Intemperance makes 'em ſuch. Though at firſt view this may ſeem impoſſible, yet it is no more than what daily Experience ſhews to be the reſult of that fooliſh and ridiculous Temperance. For ſuch Perſons diſclaim one Pleaſure, only for fear of being robb'd of other Pleaſures that they covet, and which have an Aſcendant over them. They'll cry out to you as long as you will, that Intemperance conſiſts in being rul'd and over-aw'd by our Paſſions; but at the ſame time that they give you this fine Definition, 'tis only their Subjection to ſome predominant Pleaſures, that makes them diſcard others.

others. Now this is much what I said but now, that they are only temperate through Intemperance.

The exchange of Passions, is not the true Road to Vertue.

That's very clear, *Socrates.*

Let us not be impos'd upon, my dear *Simmias.* The straight Road to Vertue, does not lye in shifting Pleasures for Pleasures, Fears for Fears, or one Melancholy Thought for another, and imitating those who change a large piece of Money, for many small ones. But Wisdom is the only true and unalloyed Coin, for which all others must be given in Exchange. With that piece of Money we purchase all, Fortitude, Temperance, Justice. In a Word, that Vertue is always true, which accompanies Wisdom, without any dependance upon Pleasures, Grief, Fears or any other Passions. Whereas all other Vertues strip'd of Wisdom, which run upon a perpetual Exchange, are only shadows of Vertue. True Vertue is really and in effect a purgation from all these sorts of Passions. Temperance, Justice, Fortitude and Prudence or Wisdom it self, are not exchanged for Passions; but cleanse us of them. And it is pretty evident, that those who instituted the Purifications, call'd by us *Teletes*, i. e. *Perfect Expiations*, were Persons of no contemptible Rank, Men of great Genius's, who in the first Ages mean'd by such Riddles to give us to know (*a*) that whoever enters the other World without being initiated and purified, shall be hurled headlong into the vast Abyss; and that whoever arrives there after due purgation and expiation, shall be lodged in the Apartment of the Gods. For, as the Dispensers of those Expiations say, *There are many who bear the Thyrsus, but few that are possess'd by the Spirit of God.* Now those who are thus possess'd, as I take it, are the true Phi-

Wisdom is the only true Coin; it fetches all things. A rich Pearl that ought to be purchased at the expence of our whole Estate.

Vertue without wisdom, is but a shadow of Vertue.

True Vertues are cleansers and privations not exchanges.

Such as Orpheus, Musæus, &c.

The ancient Purifications are only Ænigmas. As if he had said, many are devout, but few truly pious.

The Thyrsus was a spear wrapt in Vines or Ivy carried by the followers of Bacchus.

(*a*) There's a pleasant Passage to this purpose in the second Book of his Republ. They say, That by vertue of these Purifications and Sacrifices, we are deliver'd from the Torments of Hell; but if we neglect 'em we shall be liable to all the Horrors of the same.

loſophers. I have try'd all means to be liſted in that number, and have made it the buſineſs of my whole life-time to compaſs my end. If it pleaſe God, I hope to know in a Minute, that my Efforts have not been ineffectual, and that Succeſs has crown'd my Endeavours. This, my dear *Simmias*, and my dear *Cebes*, is the Apology with which I offer to juſtifie my not being troubled or afflicted for parting with you and quitting my Governours in this Life; hoping to find good Friends and Rulers there, as well as here. This, the vulgar cannot digeſt. However, I ſhall be ſatisfied if my Defence take better with you, than they did with my Judges.

Socrates having thus ſpoke; *Cebes* took up the Diſcourſe to this purpoſe: *Socrates*, I ſubſcribe to the Truth of all you have ſaid. There's only one thing that Men look upon as incredible, *viz.* what you advanced of the Soul. For *(a)* almoſt every Body fancies, that when the Soul parts from the Body, it is no more, it dies along with it; in the very minute of parting it vaniſhes, like a Vapour or Smoak, which flies off and diſperſes and has no Exiſtence. For if it ſubſiſted by it ſelf, were gather'd and retired into it ſelf, and freed from all the above-mentioned Evils; there were a fair and promiſing Proſpect, aſcertaining the Truth of what you have ſaid. But, that the Soul lives after the death of a Man, that it is ſenſible, that it acts and thinks, that *I* ſay, needs both inſinuation and ſolid proofs to make it go down.

(a) This was the Imagination of thoſe who denied the Immortality of the Soul. The Author of the Book of Wiſdom, has ſet 'em in their true Colours. *Our Life* (ſays he) *is but a Breath; after death it vaniſhes like a Vapour, and paſſes as a Cloud, or a Miſt diſperſed by the Rays of the Sun.* Then he tells us, that thoſe who entertain 'emſelves with ſuch Language, *were not acquainted with the Secrets of God, for God created Man incorruptible, after his own Image, and the hope of the Righteous is full of Immortality.* Now this is juſt *Socrates*'s Doctrine.

You

You say right, *Cebes*, replies *Socrates*: But how shall we manage this Affair? Shall we in this interview examine whether that is probable or not?

I shall be mighty glad, says *Cebes*, to hear your Thoughts upon the Matter.

At least, says *Socrates*, I cannot think that any Man hearing us, tho' he were a Comedian, would upbraid me with Raillery, and charge me with not speaking of such Things as concern us very much. If you have a mind that we should trace this Affair to the bottom; my Opinion is, that we should proceed in the following Method, in order to know whether the Souls of the Dead have a being in the other World, or not.

A Satyrical Touch upon Aristophanes, *who in his Comedy of the Clouds had charg'd* Socrates *with amusing himself only with trifles.*

(*b*) 'Tis a very ancient Opinion, That Souls quitting this World repair to the Infernal Regions, and return after that to live in this World. If so be, that Men return to Life after Death, it follows necessarily that during that interval their Souls are lodg'd in the lower Regions: For if they had not a Being, they could not return to this World. And this will be a sufficient Proof of what we affirm, (*c*) if we be convinc'd that the Living spring from the Dead: If otherwise, then we must look out for other Proofs.

(*b*) The first Argument grounded on the Opinion of the *Metempsychosis*; which *Socrates* only makes use of to shew that it supposed the future Existence of Souls for a certain Truth.

(*c*) Since all Things take rise from their Contraries; Life cannot swerve from the common Rule. Now if Life come from Death, then the Soul has a Being. This is a certain Truth, but can only be made out by the Resurrection. Wherefore St. *Paul* tells the Opposers of that Truth; *Thou Fool, that which thou sowest is not quicken'd except it die*, 1 Cor. 15. 36. *Socrates* goes upon the same Principle, but 'tis only the Christian Religion that can explain it. *Plato* and *Socrates* had some Idea of the Resurrection; but they spoil'd it by mingling it with the gross Doctrine of *Pythagoras*. They drew false Consequences from a Principle that's very true in it self. Besides this Principle has a very dangerous Error couch'd under it, which we refuted in the Preface.

That's certain, says *Cebes*.

But to assure our selves of this Truth, replies *Socrates*; 'tis not sufficient to examine the Point upon the Comparison with Men; but likewise upon that with other Animals, Plants, and whatever has a vegetable Principle. By that means, we'll be convinc'd that all things are born after the same manner; that is, whatever has a contrary, owes its first rise to its contrary. For instance *handsome* is the contrary to *ugly*, and *just* of *unjust*. And the same is the Case of an infinite number of other Things. Now let's see if it be absolutely necessary, that whatever has a contrary, should spring from that contrary: As when a Thing becomes bigger, of necessity it must formerly have been lesser, before it acquir'd that magnitude. And when it dwindles into a lesser form, it must needs have been greater before its diminution. In like manner, the *strongest* arises from the *weakest*, and the *swiftest* from the *slowest*.

That's a plain Truth, says *Cebes*.

And pray, continues *Socrates*, when a Thing becomes worse, was it not formerly better; and when it grows just, is it not because it was formerly more unjust?

Yes, surely *Socrates*.

Then 'tis sufficiently prov'd that every Thing is generated by its contrary.

Sufficiently, *Socrates*.

Between two Contraries there is always a medium, which we may call the Point of their Generation.

But, is not there always a certain *medium* between these two Contraries? There are two Births, or two Processions, one of *this* from *that*, and another of *that* from *this*. The *medium* between a greater and a lesser Thing, is increase and diminution. The same is the Case of what we call mixing, separating, heating, cooling, and all other Things *in infinitum*. For, tho' it sometimes falls so out, that we have not Terms to express those Changes and *Mediums*, yet Experience shews that by an absolute necessity, Things take rise from one another, and pass reciprocally from one to another through a *medium*.

There's

There's no doubt of that.

And what, continues *Socrates*, has not Life likewise its Contrary, as awaking has sleeping?

Without doubt, says *Cebes*.

What is that Contrary?

Death.

Since these two Things are contrary, do not they take rise one from the other? And between these two, are there not two Generations, or two Processions?

The Procession of Life from Death, and that of Death from Life.

Why not?

But, says *Socrates*, I am about to tell you how the now-mention'd Combination stands, and to shew you the Original and Progress of each of these two Things which make up the Compound. Pray tell me how awaking and sleeping are related. Does not sleep beget watchfulness, and watching sleep; and is not the generation of sleep, the falling asleep; and that of watching, the awaking?

Of Watching and Sleeping.

All very clear.

Now, pray view the Combination of Life and Death. Is not Death the contrary of Life?

Yes.

And does not one breed the other?

Yes.

What is it that Life breeds?

Death.

What is it that Death breeds?

It must certainly be Life.

Then, says *Socrates*, all living Things and Men are bred from Death.

A full Proof of the Resurrection.

So I think, says *Cebes*.

And by Consequence, continues *Socrates*, our Souls are lodg'd in the infernal World after our Death.

The Consequence seems just.

But of these two Generations, one, *viz.* Death, is very palpable; it discovers it self to the Eye, and is touch'd by the Hand.

Most certainly.

If Death did not produce its contrary, Nature would be defective.

Shall not we then attribute to Death the Virtue of producing its contrary, as well as to Life? Or, shall we say, that Nature is lame and maim'd on that score?

There's an absolute necessity, replies *Cebes*, of ascribing to Death the Generation of its Contrary.

What is that Contrary?

Reviving, or returning to Life.

If there be such a thing as returning to Life, 'tis nothing else but the Birth of the Dead returning to Life. And thus we agree, that the Living are as much the Product of the Dead, as the Dead are of Living. Which is an incontestable Proof, that the Souls of the Dead must remain in some Place or other, from whence they return to Life.

That, as I take it, says *Cebes*, is a necessary Consequence from the Principles we have agreed on.

And as I take it, *Cebes*, these Principles are well grounded: Consider 'em your self. (*a*) If all these Contraries had not their Productions and Generations in their turns, which make a Circle, and if there were nothing but one Birth and one direct Production from one to the other Contrary, without the return of the last Contrary to the first that produc'd it; were it not so, all Things would terminate in the same Figure, and be affected in the same manner, and at last cease to be born.

How do you say, *Socrates*?

A Proof of the last Proposition.

There's no difficulty in conceiving what I now say. If there were nothing but sleep, and if sleep did not produce watching, (*b*) 'tis plain that every thing would be an Emblem of the Fable of *Endymion*, and nothing would be seen any where, because the same thing must happen to them that happen'd

(*a*) If Death did not give rise to Life, as Life does to Death, all Things would quickly be at an End, and tumble into their Primitive Chaos.

(*b*) If Life did not spring from Death, all Things would at last sleep like *Endymion*, whom the Moon lull'd eternally asleep, according to the Fable.

to

to *Endymion*, *viz.* they must always sleep. If every thing were mingled, without any subsequent separation, we should quickly see *Anaxagoras*'s Doctrine fulfill'd, and all Things jumbled together. At the same rate, my dear *Cebes*, if all living Things died, and being dead, continued such without reviving, would not all Things unavoidably come to an end at last, in so much that there would not be a living Thing left in being? For, if living Things did (*c*) not arise from dead ones, when the living ones die, of necessity all Things must at the last be swallow'd up by Death, and entirely annihilated.

That is to say, all things would quickly tumble into their Primitive Chaos.

It is necessarily so, replies *Cebes*; all that you have said seems to be unconteſtable.

As I take it, *Cebes*, there can be no Objection made against those Truths; neither are we mistaken in receiving them; for 'tis certain there is a return to Life; 'tis certain that the Living rise out of the Dead; that the Souls departed have a Being, and upon their return to this Life, the good Souls are in a better, and the bad ones in a worse Condition.

'Tis certain that Death must deliver up those it has swallow'd.

Socrates in this Place seems only to own one return to this Life, which is that of the Resurrection.

What you now advance, says *Cebes* interrupting *Socrates*, is only a necessary Consequence of another Principle that I have often heard you lay down, *viz.* That (*a*) all our acquir'd Knowledge is only Remembrance. For, if that Principle be true, we must necessarily have learn'd at another time what we call to mind in this. Now that's impossible, without our Soul had a Being before its being invested with this human form. So that this same Principle concludes the Immortality of the Soul.

But *Cebes*, says *Simmias* interrupting him, what Demonstration have we of that Principle? Pray re-

(*c*) I've corrected this Passage, by reading μὴ γένοιτο; for without μὴ 'twas not Sense.

(*a*) *Socrates* made use of that Principle, as being establish'd to his Hand, and a necessary Consequence of the Creation of Souls before the Body. But he did not teach it for a certainty, as we shall see in *Menon*.

fresh

freſh my Memory with it, for at preſent it is out of my Head.

There's a very pretty Demonſtration for it, replies *Cebes*. All Men being duly interrogated, find out all Things of themſelves : Which they could never do without Knowledge and right Reaſon. Put 'em at unawares upon the Figures of Geometry, and other things of that nature, they preſently perceive that 'tis as 'tis ſaid.

Simmias, ſays *Socrates*, if you will not rely upon this Experience, pray try whether the ſame method will not bring you over to our Sentiments. Do you find great difficulty in believing that Learning is only Remembring ?

I do not find very much, replies *Simmias*; but I would gladly learn that Remembrance you ſpeak of. By what *Cebes* has ſaid, I almoſt remember it, and I begin to believe it; but that ſhall not hinder me to hear with pleaſure the Arguments you can offer for it.

I argue thus, replies *Socrates*. We all agree, that in order to remember, a Man muſt have known before what he then calls to mind.

Moſt certainly.

(*b*) And let us likewiſe agree upon this, That Knowledge coming in a certain manner is Remembrance. I ſay, in a certain manner; for Inſtance, when a Man by ſeeing, hearing, or perceiving a thing by any of the Senſes, knows what it is that thus ſtrikes the Senſes; and at the ſame time imagines to himſelf another thing, independent of that Knowledge, by Virtue of a quite different Knowledge; do not we juſtly ſay, that the Man remembers the Thing that comes thus into his Mind ?

How do you ſay, replies *Simmias* ?

(*b*) *Socrates*'s Proofs only conclude a remembrance of things once known, and afterwards forgot in this Life; not of things learn'd in the other World, for the Soul is not created before the Body. This Doctrine of Remembrance is of admirable uſe for making out Original Sin, as I ſhew'd in the Introduction.

I ſay

I say, replies *Socrates*, for Example, that we know a Man by one sort of Knowledge, and a Harp by another.

That's certain, quoth *Simmias*.

Well then, continues *Socrates*, do not you know what happens to Lovers, when they see the Harp, Habit, or any other Thing that their Friends or Mistresses us'd to make use of? It is just, as I said but now. Upon seeing and knowing the Harp, they form in their Thoughts the Image of the Person to whom the Harp belongs. This is Remembrance. Thus it often falls out, that one seeing *Simmias*, thinks of *Cebes*. I could cite a thousand other Instances. This then is Remembrance, especially when the Things call'd to mind are such as had been forgot through length of time or being out of sight.

By reason of their intimacy, which occasion'd their being always together.

That's very certain, quoth *Simmias*.

But, continues *Socrates*, upon seeing the Picture of a Horse or Harp, may not one call to mind the Man? And upon seeing the Picture of *Simmias*, may not one think of *Cebes*?

Sure enough, says *Simmias*.

Much more, continues *Socrates*, upon seeing the Picture of *Simmias*, will he call to mind *Simmias* himself.

Ay, with ease.

From all these Instances we infer, that Remembrance is occasion'd sometimes by things that are like the thing remembred; and sometimes by things that are unlike. But when one remembers a thing by virtue of a likeness, does it not necessarily come to pass, that the Mind at first view discovers whether the Picture does resemble the thing design'd, lamely or perfectly.

It must needs be so, replies *Simmias*.

Then pray mind whether your Thoughts of what I am about to say agree with mine. Is not there something that we call Equality? I do not speak of the equality observ'd between one Tree and another, one Stone and another, and several other things

He speaks of an intelligible, not a sensible Equality.

things that are alike. I ſpeak of abſtracted equality of things. Shall we call that ſomething or nothing ?

Surely, we ſhould call it ſomething ; but that will only come to paſs when we mean to ſpeak Philoſophically and of marvellous things.

But then do we know this Equality ?

Without doubt.

He means to prove that the knowledge of this intelligible Equality cannot be acquir'd in this World, and therefore muſt be referr'd to the other.

(*a*) From whence do we derive that Knowledge? Is it not from the things we mention'd but now ? 'Tis upon ſeeing equal Trees, equal Stones, and ſeveral other things of that nature, that we form the Idea of that Equality, which is not either the Trees or the Stones, but ſomething abſtracted from all ſubjects. Do not you find it ſuch ? Pray take notice. The Stones and the Trees are always the ſame, and yet do not they ſometimes appear unequal ?

Sure enough.

What ! Do equal things appear unequal ? Or, does equality take up the form of unequality ?

By no means, *Socrates.*

Otherwiſe Equality and Inequality would meet in the ſame Subject ; which is a Contradiction.

Then Equality and the thing which is equal are two different things.

Moſt certainly.

But after all theſe equal things, which are different from Equality, furniſh us with the Idea and Knowledge of that abſtracted Equality.

That's true, replies *Simmias.*

The caſe is the ſame, whether this Equality bear a reſemblance to the things that occaſion'd its Idea, or not.

(*a*) *Socrates* is out in thinking to prove that the knowledge of intelligible Qualities was acquir'd in the other World. That Knowledge is the effect of the Light with which God illuminates the Soul, or the Tracks of the Impreſſions that are not quite defac'd by Sin : 'Tis the remainder of the Knowledge we have loſt, and of the Perfection we have forfeited. So that, if *the other Life* be taken in *Socrates*'s Senſe, the Propoſition is falſe ; if in ours, for the ſtate of the Soul before Sin, 'tis true.

Moſt

Moſt certainly.

When, upon ſeeing one thing, you call to mind another, 'tis no matter if it be like it or not; ſtill it is remembrance.

Without doubt.

But what ſhall we ſay to this, continues *Socrates*; when we behold Trees or other things that are equal, are they equal according to the equality of which we have the Idea, or not?

For the ſenſible Equality is never ſo perfect as the Intellectual.

Very far from it.

Then we agree upon this. When a Man ſees a thing before him, and thinks it would be equal to another thing, but at the ſame time is far from being ſo perfectly equal, as the equality of which he has the Idea: Then, I ſay, (*b*) he who thinks thus, muſt neceſſarily have known beforehand this intellectual Being which the thing remſembles, but imperfectly.

There's an abſolute Neceſſity for that.

And is not the caſe the ſame, when we compare things equal with the equality?

Sure enough, *Socrates*.

Then of neceſſity we muſt have known that Equality before the time, in which we firſt ſaw the equal things, and thereupon thought, that they all tended to be equal as equality it ſelf, but could not reach it.

That's certain.

This Principle is true, but the Conſequence he draws from it is falſe.

But we likewiſe agree upon this, That this Thought can be deriv'd from nothing elſe but one of our Senſes, from ſeeing, touching, or feeling one way or other: And the ſame Concluſion will hold of all Beings, whether Intellectual or Senſible.

All things will equally conclude for what you deſign.

Then, 'tis from the Senſes themſelves that we

(*b*) Tho' he muſt have known it, it does not follow that he knew it in the other Life, unleſs it be thereby meant the very inſtant of the Creation of the Soul.

derive

derive this Thought; that all the Objects of our Senſes have a tendency towards this intellectual Equality, but comes ſhort of it. Is it not?

Yes, without doubt, *Socrates*.

In effect, *Simmias*, (*a*) before we began to ſee, feel, or uſe our Senſes, we muſt have had the knowledge of this intellectual Equality; elſe we could not be capable to compare it with the ſenſible things, and perceive that they have all a tendency towards it, but fall ſhort of its Perfection.

That's a neceſſary Conſequence from the Premiſes.

But is it not certain, That immediately after our Birth, we ſaw, we heard, and made uſe of our other Senſes?

Very true.

Then it follows, that before that time we had the knowledge of that Equality?

Without doubt.

This Conſequence is only true in our Senſe.

(*b*) And by Conſequence we were poſſeſs'd of it before we were born.

So I think.

If we poſſeſs'd it before we were born, then we knew things before we were born, and immediately after our birth knew not only what is equal, what great, what ſmall, but all other things of that nature. For what we now advance of Equality, is equally applicable to Goodneſs, Juſtice, Sanctity; and, in a word, to all other things that have a real

(*a*) One might have anſwer'd, That we had not that Knowledge before we were born, but receiv'd it afterwards by the gradual Communication of Light from God into the Soul. But, as 'tis certain that the Soul was created full of Light and Perfection, ſo this Truth was known to the Pagans, and upon that account *Socrates*'s Friends were oblig'd to aſſent to what he ſaid. And after all, if by the firſt Life of the Soul, we underſtand the very Inſtant of Creation, or the State of the Soul before the Fall, the Propoſition is true.

(*b*) We knew before we ſinn'd; we loſt our Knowledge by ſinning; and re-call it again by Virtue of the Light imparted by God to the Soul.

(*c*) Ex-

(*c*) Exiſtence. So that of neceſſity we muſt have known all theſe things before we came into this World.

That's certain.

And being poſſeſs'd of that Knowledge, if we did not forget apace every Day, we ſhould not only be born with it, but retain it all our life-time. For to know, is only to preſerve the Knowledge we have receiv'd, and not to loſe it. And to forget, is to loſe the Knowledge we enjoy'd before.

That's certain, *Socrates*.

Now, if, after having poſſeſs'd that Knowledge before we were born, and having loſt it ſince, we come to retrieve it by the miniſtry of our Senſes, which we call Learning, ſhall not we juſtly entitle it *Remembrance* ?

With a great deal of reaſon, *Socrates*.

(*d*) For we have agreed upon this; That 'tis very poſſible, that a Man ſeeing, hearing, or perceiving one thing, by any of his Senſes, ſhould frame to himſelf the imagination of another thing that he had forgot; to which the thing perceiv'd by the Senſes has ſome relation, whether it reſembles the other, or not. So that one of two things muſt neceſſarily follow. Either we were born with that Knowledge, and preſerv'd it all along; or elſe retriev'd it afterwards by way of remembrance. Which of theſe two, do you pitch upon, *Simmias*; are we born with that Knowledge; or do we call it to mind after having had it and forgot it ?

Indeed *Socrates*, I do not know which to chuſe at preſent.

(*c*) The Greek Expoſition is very remarkable; it runs thus; *Things upon which we have put this Stamp, That 'tis ſo.* That is, to diſtinguiſh Things that have a true Exiſtence, from ſenſible Things that have no true Exiſtence.

(*d*) 'Twas agreed before, that upon ſeeing one thing we call to mind another unſeen; as upon ſeeing a Lute we think of a Miſtreſs; upon ſeeing equal Trees, we call to mind Equality.

But

But mind what I'm about to say to you, and then let's see which you'll chuse. A Man that knows any thing, can he give a reason of his Knowledge or not?

Doubtless he can, *Socrates*.

A great Panegyrick upon Socrates. *What Modesty was this in* Plato?

And do you think all Men can give a Reason for what we have been speaking of?

I wish they could, replies *Simmias*; but I'm afraid to morrow we shall have none here that's capable to do it.

Then you think all Men have not this Knowledge?

No sure.

(*a*) Do they call to mind then, the things they have known?

That may be.

At what time did our Souls learn that Knowledge? It cannot be since we were Men.

No sure.

Then it must be some time before that?

Yes, without doubt.

But this is a false Principle.

And by consequence, *Simmias*, our Souls had a Being before that time; that is to say, before they were invested with a humane Form, while they were without the Body, they thought, they knew and understood.

Unless you'll allow, *Socrates*, that we learn'd it in the Minute of our Birth. There's no other time left.

Be it so, my dear *Simmias*, (*b*) but at what other time did we lose it? For we did not bring it into

(*a*) If they are not then born with that Knowledge; then they must have forgot it, and recover'd it again by way of remembrance. A false Consequence.

(*b*) All the Heathen Philosophers are at a loss to find out the time of this forgetting. They were sensible that God created the Soul full of Light and Understanding, but did not perceive that the first Man lost that Light and Knowledge by his Rebellion; and that if he had continued innocent, he had transmitted to us those valuable Qualities together with his Innocence; as well as now he is fallen, he transmitted to us Obscurity and Sin.

the

the World with us, as we concluded but now. Did we lose in the same Minute that we obtain'd it? Or, can you assign any other time?

No, *Socrates*; I did not perceive that what I said was to no purpose.

* Then, *Simmias*, this must be a standing Truth; That if the Objects of our daily Conversation, have a real Existence; I mean, if Justice, Goodness, and all that Essence with which we compare the Objects of our Senses; and which having an Existence before us, proves to be of the same Nature with our own Essence, and is the Standard by which we measure all things; I say, if all these things have a real Existence, our Soul is likewise entitled to Existence, and that before we were born; and if these things have no Being, then all our Discourses are useless. Is it not a standing Truth, and withal a just and necessary Consequence, that the Existence of our Souls before our birth, stands and falls with that of those things?

That Consequence, replies *Simmias*, seems to me to be equally just and wonderful: And the result of the whole Discourse affords something very glorious and desirable on our behalf, since it concludes, that before we were born our Souls had an Existence, as well as that intelligible Essence you mention'd but now. For my part, I think there's nothing more evident, and more sensible, than the Existence of all these Things, Goodness, Justice, *&c.* and you have sufficiently made it out.

The Parallel is not just. All these intelligible Beings are nothing else but God himself; but the Soul is not God, 'tis the work of God.

Now for *Cebes*, says *Socrates*; for *Cebes* must likewise be convinc'd.

I believe, replies *Simmias*, tho' he is the stiffest Man upon Earth, and very much proof against Arguments,

* *Socrates* means to prove, that as Goodness, Justice, and all those intelligible Beings, which are the Patterns of the sensible and real Beings, subsist intelligibly in God from all Eternity; so our Soul exists by it self, and has an eternal Being in the Idea of God; and from this Idea it derives all its Knowledge.

yet he'll own your Proof to be very convincing. In the mean time, tho' I am ſufficiently convinc'd that our Souls had a Being before we were born: I have not yet heard ſufficient Proof, for its continuing after our Death. For that popular Opinion, which *Cebes* mention'd but now, remains in all its force, *viz.* That after the death of Man, the Soul diſperſes and ceaſes to be. And indeed I cannot ſee why the Soul ſhould not be born, or proceed from ſome Part or other, and have a Being before it animates the Body in this Life; and when it removes from the Body, ceaſe to be, and make its exit as well as the Body.

You ſpeak well, *Simmias*, ſays *Cebes*; to my mind, *Socrates* has only prov'd the half of what he propos'd. 'Tis true, he has demonſtrated that the Soul has a Being before the Body; but, to compleat his Demonſtration, he ſhould have prov'd that our Soul has an Exiſtence after Death, as well as before this Life.

But I have demonſtrated it to you both, replies *Socrates*; and you'll be ſenſible of it, if you join this laſt Proof with what you acknowledg'd before, *viz.* That the Living riſe from the Dead. * For if 'tis true, that our Soul was in being before we were born; then of neceſſity when it comes to life, it proceeds, ſo to ſpeak from the Boſom of Death; and why ſhould not it lie under the ſame neceſſity of being after Death, ſince it muſt return to Life? Thus what you ſpeak of is made out. But I perceive both of you deſire to ſound this Matter to the bottom; and are apprehenſive, like Children, that, when the Soul departs the Body, the Winds run away with it and diſperſe it, eſpecially when a Man dies in an open Country in a place expos'd to the Winds.

* Tho' our Soul has no being before our coming into the World, yet it continues after Death, ſince it muſt return to Life by the Reſurrection, and the Living take riſe from the Dead. The defeat of Death is the triumph of Life. This Proof of the neceſſary riſe of the Living from the Dead, is an admirable ſupport for our Chriſtian Hope.

Where-

Whereupon *Cebes* ſmiling, replied, Pray then *Socrates*, try to diſcuſs our Fears, or rather convince us, as if we fear'd nothing: Tho indeed there be ſome among us who lie under thoſe childiſh Apprehenſions. Perſuade us then not to fear Death, as a vain Phantome.

Theſe Spells and Exorciſms muſt be look'd for in the Word of God.

As for that, ſays *Socrates*, you muſt employ Spells and Exorciſms every day, till you be cur'd.

But pray, *Socrates*, where ſhall we meet with that excellent Conjurer, ſince you are going to leave us?

'Twas from thoſe Nations, whom he calls barbarous, that he deriv'd the Rays of that Truth, that the Soul is Immortal.

Greece is large enough, replies *Socrates*, and well ſtor'd with learned Men. Beſides, there are a great many barbarous Nations, which you muſt ſcour in order to find out the Conjurer, without ſparing either Labour or Charges: For you cannot imploy your Money in a better Cauſe. You muſt likewiſe look for one among your ſelves; for 'tis poſſible there may be none found more capable to perform thoſe Enchantments, than your ſelves.

We ſhall obey your Orders, *Socrates*, in looking out for one: But in the mean while, if you pleaſe, let's reſume our former Diſcourſe.

With all my Heart, *Cebes*.

Well ſaid, *Socrates*.

* The firſt Queſtion, we ought to ask of our ſelves, ſays *Socrates*, is, what ſorts of Things they are that are apt to be diſſipated; what Things are liable to that accident, and what part of thoſe Things? Then we muſt enquire into the nature of our Soul, and form our Fears or Hopes accordingly.

That's very true.

Only compounded Things can naturally be diſſipated.

Is it not certain, that only compounded Things, or ſuch as are of a compoundible nature, admit of

* Hitherto *Socrates* endeavour'd to make good the Exiſtence of Souls before their Bodies, as being a point of the receiv'd Theology. And foraſmuch as the Principle is falſe, 'twas impoſſible for him to give better proof, ſince a Lye does not admit of demonſtration. But now he's about to make good the future Exiſtence and Immortality of the Soul, by ſolid unſhaken Arguments.

He adds naturally, because the Will of God may controul Nature.

being diſſipated at the ſame rate that they were compounded? If there are any uncompounded Beings, they alone are free from this Accident, and naturally uncapable of diſſipation.

That I think is very clear, replies *Cebes*.

Change, a ſign of compoſition.

Is it not very likely, that Things which are always the ſame, and in the ſame condition, are not at all compounded; and that thoſe which are liable to perpetual changes, and are never the ſame, are certainly compounded?

I am of your mind, *Socrates*.

Intellectual Beings, &c.

Let us berake our ſelves to the Things we were ſpeaking of but now, the Exiſtence whereof is never conteſted either in Queſtion or Anſwer; are theſe always the ſame, or do they ſometimes change? Equality, Beauty, Goodneſs, and every ſingular Thing; *i. e.* the Eſſence it ſelf; do theſe receive the leaſt alteration, or are they ſo pure and ſimple that they continue always the ſame, without undergoing the leaſt change?

Of neceſſity, replies *Cebes*, they muſt cotinue ſtill the ſame without alteration.

And all theſe fine things, ſays *Socrates*, ſuch as Men, Horſes, Habits, Movables, and a great many other things of the ſame nature, are they entirely oppoſite to the former, that they never continue in the ſame condition, either with reference to themſelves, or to others; but are ſubject to perpetual alterations.

They never continue in the ſame condition, replies *Cebes*.

Now theſe are the things that are viſible, touchable, or perceptible by ſome other Senſe; whereas the former, which continue ſtill the ſame, can only be reach'd by Thought, as being immaterial and inviſible.

That's true, *Socrates*.

If you pleaſe, continues *Socrates*, I'll inſtance in two things, one viſible, the other inviſible; one ſtill the ſame, and the other betraying continual alterations.

With

With all my Heart, says *Cebes.*

Let's see then; are not we compounded of a Body and a Soul; or is there any other Ingredient in our Composition?

No, sure.

Which of the two kinds of things does our Body most resemble?

All Men own that it is most conformable to the visible sort.

And pray, my dear *Cebes*, is our Soul visible or invisible?

At least, 'tis invisible to Men.

He adds to Men, implying that 'tis visible to God.

But when we speak of visible or invisible things, we mean with reference to Men, without minding any other Nature. Once more then; is the Soul visible, or not?

'Tis not visible.

Then 'tis immaterial and invisible?

Yes.

And by Consequence the Soul is more conformable than the Body to the invisible kind of things; and the Body suits better with the visible?

There's an absolute necessity for that.

The Condition of the Soul, when engag'd in Matter.

When the Soul makes use of the Body in considering any thing, by seeing, hearing, or any other Sense, (that being the sole function of the Body to consider things by the Senses) should not we then say that the Body draws the Soul upon mutable things. In this condition it strays, frets, staggers, and is giddy like a Man in drink, by reason of its being engag'd in matter. Whereas when it pursues things by it self, without calling in the Body, it betakes it self to what is Pure, Immortal, Immutable; and, as being of the same Nature, dwells constantly upon it while it is Master of it self. Then its Errors are at an end, and it is always the same, as being united to what never changes: And this Passion of the Soul is what we call Wisdom or Prudence.

Its condition when disengag'd.

Wisdom is that state of the Soul, when it is divorc'd from the Passions of the Body, & united constantly to God.

That's admirably well ſpoke, *Socrates*, and a very great Truth.

After all, then, which ſort of things does the Soul ſeem to reſemble moſt?

To my mind, *Socrates*, there's no Man ſo ſtupid and ſtiff, as not to be oblig'd by your Method of Arguing, to acknowledge that the Soul bears a greater reſemblance and conformity to the immutable Being, than to that which is always upon the change.

And as for the Body?

It bears a greater reſemblance to the other.

The Soul being the Image of God, ought to command and the Body to obey.

Let's try yet another way. During the conjunction of Body and Soul, Nature orders the one to obey and be a Slave, and the other to command and hold the Empire. Which of theſe two Characters is moſt ſuitable to the Divine Being; and which to that that is Mortal? Are not you ſenſible, that the Divine is only capable of commanding and ruling; and what is Mortal is only worthy of obedience and ſlavery?

Sure enough.

Which of theſe two then agrees beſt with the Soul?

'Tis evident, *Socrates*, that our Soul reſembles what is Divine, and our Body what is Mortal.

The nature of the Soul.

You ſee then, my dear *Cebes*, the neceſſary reſult of all, is, that our Soul bears a ſtrict reſemblance to what is Divine, Immortal, Intellectual, Simple, Indiſſolvable; and is always the ſame and always like it: And that our Body does perfectly reſemble what is human, mortal, ſenſible, compounded, diſſolvable, always changing, and never like it ſelf. Can any thing be alledg'd, to deſtroy that Conſequence, or to make out the contrary?

The nature of the Body.

No, ſure, *Socrates*.

Does not it then ſuit with the Body to be quickly diſſolv'd, and with the Soul to be always indiſſolvable, or ſomething very near it?

That's a ſtanding Truth.

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(*a*) Accordingly you see every day, when a Man dies, his visible Body, that continues expos'd to our view, and which we call the Corps; that alone admits of dissolution, alteration and dissipation; this, I say, does not immediately undergo any of these Accidents, but continues a pretty while in its entire form, or in its flower, if I may so speak, (*b*) especially in this Season. Bodies imbalm'd after the manner of those in *Egypt*, remain entire for an infinity of Years: And even in those that corrupt, there are always some Parts, such as the Bones, Nerves, or the like, that continue, in a manner immortal. Is not this true?

That is to say, without Corruption or Wounds.

Very true.

Now as for the Soul, which is an invisible Being, that goes to a Place like it self, marvellous, pure, and invisible, in the infernal World; and returns to a God full of Goodness and Wisdom; which I hope will be the fate of my Soul in a minute, if it please God: Shall a Soul of this nature, and created with

(*a*) *Socrates* is about to shew the ridiculousness of the Opinion of the Souls dissipation after death. What! shall the Body, a compounded Being, subsist a pretty while after death; and the Soul, a simple Being, be immediately dissipated? After what has been said, the ridiculousness is very plain.

(*b*) This Passage is enough, to stun the Criticks, who make a great bustle to find out the precise time of *Socrates*'s death; and after straining hard in demonstrating the Attick Calender, and computing its Months, assure us he died in the Month of *July*. Here, to their great misfortune, *Socrates* himself says he died in the Season in which Corps keep best. The Month of *July* is not entitled to that Character, especially in *Greece*. So that they must make a new Computation. But how came this Passage to escape their view? The reason is plain. Most of 'em do not read the Originals. When they look for any thing, they content themselves with running over a Translation. Now the translation of this Passage is very faulty. Neither *Marsilius Ficinus*, nor *de Serres* understood it. They took ὥρᾳ for the good Condition and entireness of the Parts; whereas it signifies the Season. Upon which mistake the one renders ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, *cum quadam moderatione*; and the other *corpore perbelle affecto*.

all these Advantages, be dissipated and annihilated, as soon as it parts from the Body, as most Men believe? No such thing, my dear *Simmias* and my dear *Cebes*. I'll tell you what will rather come to pass, and what we ought to believe steddily. If the Soul retain its Purity without any mixture of filth from the Body, as having entertain'd no voluntary Correspondence with it; but on the contrary, having always avoided it, and recollected it self within it self in continual Meditations; that is, in studying the true Philosophy, and effectually learning to die; for Philosophy is a preparation to death: I say, if the Soul depart in this Condition, it repairs to a Being like it self, a Being that's Divine, Immortal, and full of Wisdom; in which it enjoys an unexpressible Felicity, as being freed from its Errors, its Ignorance, its Fears, its Amours that tyrannised over it, and all the other Evils retaining to human Nature; and, as 'tis said of those who have been initiated in holy Mysteries, it truly passes a whole course of Eternity with the Gods. Ought not this to be the Matter of our Belief?

The State of the departed Souls of those who serv'd God in sincerity all their life time.

The initiation into Mysteries, was only a Shadow of what was to be compleated in the other World.

Sure enough, *Socrates*.

But if the Soul depart full of Uncleanness and Impurity, as having been all along mingled with the Body, always employ'd in its Service, always possess'd by the love of it, wheedled and charm'd by its Pleasures and Lusts; insomuch that it believ'd there was nothing real or true beyond what is Corporeal, what may be seen, touch'd, drank or eaten, or what is the Object of Carnal Pleasure; that it hated, dreaded and avoided what the Eyes of the Body could not descry, and all that is intelligible and can only be enjoy'd by Philosophy: Do you think, I say, that a Soul in this condition can depart pure and simple from the Body? No

The future state of impure Souls.

Impure Souls believe there's no reality in any thing but what is Corporeal.

All intelligible things are only obscurity to the Eyes of the Body.

No sure, *Socrates*, that's impossible.

On the contrary, it departs stain'd with Corporeal Pollution, which was rendred natural to it by its continual Commerce and too intimate Union with the Body, at a time when it was its constant Companion, and was still employ'd in serving and gratifying it. *A Soul polluted and bespatter'd with filth.*

Most certainly.

This Pollution, my dear *Cebes*, is a gross, heavy, earthy and visible Mass, and the Soul loaded with such a weight, is dragg'd into that visible Place, not only by the Weight, but by its own dreading the Light and the invisible Place; and, as we commonly say, it wanders in the (*a*) Church-yards round the Tombs, where dark Phantoms and Apparitions are often seen; such as these Souls that did not depart the Body in purity of Simplicity, but polluted with that earthy and visible Matter that makes them degenerate into a visible Form. *Impure Spirits frequenting Sepulchres.*

That's very likely, *Socrates*.

Yes, without doubt, *Cebes*; and 'tis also likely that 'tis not the good but the bad Souls that are forc'd to wander in those Places of Impurity; where they suffer for their former ill Life, and continue to wander, till, through the love they have to this corporeal Mass which always follows 'em, they engage again in a new Body, and in all probability plunge themselves into the same Manners and Passions, as were the Occupation of their first Life. *An Error taken from Pythagoras's Metempsychosis taken in a gross Sense.*

How do you say, *Socrates?*

I say, *Cebes*, that, for Instance, those who made their Belly their God, and lov'd nothing but Insolence and Impurity, without any Shame, and with-

(*a*) *Socrates* speaks here of the impure Spirits that dwelt among Tombs in Church-yards, such as are mention'd in the the Gospel, *Matth.* 8. 28. *Mark* 5. 2. *Luke* 8. 26. which wander'd Night and Day round the Tombs and upon the Mountains. He alledges they were corrupt and polluted Souls, which bore the Pollution they had contracted by Sin, in plunging themselves too deep in Matter.

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out any Reſerve ; thoſe (*b*) enter into the Bodies of Aſſes or ſuch like Creatures. Do not you think this very probable ?

Yes, ſure, *Socrates*.

And thoſe Souls which lov'd only Injuſtice, Tyranny and Rapine, are employ'd to animate the Bodies of Wolves, Hawks and Faulcons. Where elſe ſhould Souls of that ſtamp go ?

No where elſe, *Socrates*.

The caſe of all the reſt is much the ſame. They go to animate the Bodies of Beaſts of different Species, according as they reſemble their firſt courſes.

According to theſe Principles, it cannot be otherwiſe.

The Fate of thoſe who are temperate and juſt by Habit, without the aſſiſtance of Philoſophy.

The happieſt of all theſe Men, whoſe Souls are ſent to the moſt agreeable Place, are thoſe who have always made a profeſſion of Popular and Civil Vertues, which are call'd *Temperance* and *Juſtice* ; to which they have brought themſelves only by Habit and Exerciſe, without any aſſiſtance from Philoſophy and the Mind.

How can they be ſo happy then ?

'Tis probable, that after their death, their Souls are join'd to the Bodies of politick and meek Animals, ſuch as Bees, Waſps, and Ants ; or elſe return to human Bodies, and become temperate and wiſe Men. But as for approaching to the Nature of God, that is not at all allow'd to thoſe who did not

(*b*) In the Life of *Plato*, we took notice of this Opinion of Souls paſſing into other Bodies, whether of Men or Beaſts ; and endeavour'd to diſcover its Source ; I ſhall only add, that by *Socrates*'s way of expreſſing himſelf, one would believe that this imaginary Tranſmigration of Souls was grounded upon thoſe impure Spirits that enter'd into Men and Beaſts. We are not to doubt, but that in thoſe Times of Obſcurity, under the real Empire of the Devil, there were a great many People poſſeſs'd in that manner ; and that was a ſufficient Ground for forming the Idea of the Tranſmigration of Souls, that being moſt apt to frighten 'em. They fanſied that theſe impure Spirits took to themſelves Bodies in the Sepulchers where they dwelt.

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live Philosophically, and whose Souls did not depart with all their Purity. That great Privilege is reserv'd for the Lovers of true Wisdom. And 'tis upon the consideration of this, my dear *Simmias* and my dear *Cebes*, that the true Philosophers renounce the Desires of the Body, and keep themselves up from its Lusts: They are not apprehensive of the ruine of their Families or of Poverty, as the Vulgar are, and those who are wedded to their Riches: They fear neither Ignominy nor Reproach, as those do who court only Dignities and Honours. In a word, they renounce all things, and even themselves.

A fine Character of true Philosophers: They fear neither Poverty, Ignominy, nor Death: They renounce themselves and all things besides.

It would not be suitable for them to do otherwise, replies *Cebes*.

No, sure, continues *Socrates:* In like manner all those who value their Souls, and do not live for the Body, depart from all such Lusts, and follow a different Course from those insensible Creatures that do not know where they go. They are persuaded that they ought not to do any thing contrary to Philosophy, or harbour any thing that destroys its Purifications, and retards their Liberty; and accordingly resign themselves to its Conduct, and follow it whithersoever it leads 'em.

They are insensible that know not where they go.

The Purifications of Philosophy.

How do you say, *Socrates?*

I'll explain it to you. The Philosophers finding their Soul tied and chain'd to the Body, and by that means oblig'd to employ the Body in the pursuit of Objects which it cannot follow alone; so that it still floats in an Abyss of Ignorance; are very sensible that the force of this Bond lies in its own Desires, insomuch that the Prisoner it self helps to lock up the Chains: They are sensible that Philosophy coming to seize upon the Soul in this Condition, gently instructs and comforts it, and endeavours to disengage it, by giving it to know that the Eye of the Body is full of Illusion and Deceit, as well as all its other Senses, by advertising it not

The force of the Bond that imprisons the Soul consists in its own Desires.

The Soul is always headed by the Body.

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to use the Body further than Necessity requires; and advising it to recollect and shut up it self within it self; to receive no Deposition but its own, after it has examin'd within it self the intrinsick Nature of every thing, and stripp'd it of the Covering that conceals it from our Eyes; and to continue fully persuaded that whatever is tried by all its other Senses, being different from the former discovery, is certainly false. Now whatever is tried by the corporeal Senses, is visible and sensible. And what it views by it self without the ministry of the Body, is invisible and intelligible. So that the Soul of a true Philosopher, being convinc'd that it should not oppose its own Liberty, disclaims, as far as is possible, the Pleasures, Lusts, Fears, and Sorrows of the Body: For it knows that when one has enjoy'd many Pleasures, or given way to extream Grief or Timorousness, or given himself to his Desires; he not only is afflicted by the sensible Evils known to all the World, such as the loss of Health or Estate, but is doom'd to the last and greatest of Evils; an Evil that is so much the more dangerous and terrible, that it is not obvious to our Senses.

Whatever the Soul examines by the bodily Senses, is false.

Why the Soul disclaims all the Passions of the Body.

What Evil is that, *Socrates?*

'Tis this; that the Soul being forc'd to rejoyce or be afflicted upon any occasion, is persuaded that what causes its Pleasure or Grief, is a real and true thing, tho' at the same time it is not: And such is the nature of all sensible and visible Things that are capable to occasion Joy or Grief.

The greatest and most terrible affliction of a Soul given over to its Passions of the Body.

That's certain, *Socrates.*

Are not these Passions then the chief Instruments particularly that imprison and mew up the Soul within the Body?

How's that *Socrates?*

Every Pleasure, every melancholy Thought, being arm'd with a strong and keen Nail, nails the Soul to the Body with such force, that it becomes material and corporeal, and fancies there are no real and true Objects but such as the Body accounts so.

Every Passion has a Nail that fastens the Soul to the Body.

For

For as it entertains the same Opinions, and pursues the same Pleasures with the Body, so it is oblig'd to the same Actions and Habits: For which reason it cannot descend in Purity to the lower World, but is daub'd all over with the pollution of the Body it left, and quickly re-enters another Body, where it takes Root as if it had been sown, and puts a Period to all Commerce with the Pure, Simple, and Divine Essence.

That's very certain, *Socrates.*

These are the Motives that oblige the true Philosophers to make it their business to acquire Temperance and Fortitude, and not such Motives as the Vulgar think of. Are not you of my Opinion, *Cebes?*

Yes, sure.

All true Philosophers will still be of that mind. Their Soul will never entertain such a Thought, as if Philosophy should disengage it, to the end that when 'tis freed, it should follow its Pleasures, and give way to its Fears and Sorrows; that it should put on its Chains again, and always want to begin again, like *Penelope*'s Web. On the contrary, it continues in a perfect tranquility and freedom from Passion, and always follows Reason for its Guide, without departing from its Measures; it incessantly contemplates what is true, divine, immutable, and above Opinion, being nourish'd by this pure Truth; it is convinc'd that it ought to follow the same course of Life while it is united to the Body; and hopes that after Death, being surrender'd to that Immortal Being as its Source, 'twill be freed from all the Afflictions of the human Nature. After such a Life, and upon such Principles, my dear *Simmias* and *Cebes*, what should the Soul be afraid of? Shall it fear, that upon its departure from the Body, the Winds will dissipate it, and run away with it; and that annihilation will be its fate?

The Business of a true Philosopher, during his whole life-time.

Socrates, having thus spoke, he stop'd for a pretty while, seeming to be altogether intent upon what he

XXXV

he had said. Most of us were in the same Condition; and *Cebes* and *Simmias* had a short Conference together. At last *Socrates* perceiving their Conference, ask'd 'em what they were speaking of; do you think, says he, that my Arguments are lame? I think indeed there is room left for a great many Doubts and Objections, if any will take the Pains to retail 'em out. If you are speaking of any thing else, I have nothing to say. But tho' you have no Doubts, pray do not stand to tell me freely if you think of any better Demonstration, and make me a Companion in your Enquiry, if you think I can assist you to compass your End.

Socrates desires 'em to make Objections, that his Arguments might be confirm'd.

I'll tell you, says *Simmias*, the naked Truth. It is a pretty while since *Cebes* and I thought of some Doubts; and being desirous to have 'em resolv'd, push'd on one another to propose 'em to you. But we were both afraid to importune you, and propose disagreeable Questions in the unseasonable hour of your present Misfortune.

O! my dear *Simmias*, replies *Socrates* smiling' certainly I should find great difficulty in persuading other Men that I find no misfortune in my present Circumstances; since I cannot get you to believe it. You think that upon the score of Foreknowledge and Divining I am infinitely inferiour to the Swans. When they perceive approaching Death, they sing more merrily than before, (*a*) because of the Joy they have in going to the God they serve. But Men, through the fear of Death, reproach the Swans, in saying that they lament their Death, and tune their Grief in sorrowful Notes. They forget to make this Reflection, that no Fowl sings

Socrates is angry with his Friends, for reckoning his present Condition an unfortunate one.

He could not take a better Method to shew that he reckon'd no Misfortune in his Death, than this of rallying upon the Vulgar and Pythagorean Religion.

No Fowl sings out of Grief.

(*a*) As if their Fowls were admitted to the Mansions of the Blessed. *Socrates* ridicules that Opinion: We shall see afterwards, that they admitted Beasts to the Land of the Just; of which they had a very confus'd Idea. But that's to another purpose.

when

when it is hungry, or cold, or ſad; nay, not the Nightingale, the Swallow, or the Lapwing, whoſe Muſick they ſay is a true Lamentation, and the effect of Grief. But after all, theſe Fowls do not all ſing out of Grief; and far leſs the Swans, which by reaſon of their belonging to *Apollo* are Diviners, and ſing more joyfully on the day of their death than before, as foreſeeing the Good that awaits them in the other World. And as for me, I think I ſerve *Apollo* as well as they, I am conſecrated to that God as well as they, I have receiv'd from our common Maſter the Art of Divining, as well as they, and I am as little concern'd for making my Exit as they are. So that you may freely propoſe what Doubts you pleaſe, and put Queſtions to me, as long as the eleven Magiſtrates ſuffer me to be here.

You ſay well, *Socrates*, replies *Simmias*; ſince it is ſo, I'll propoſe my Doubts firſt, and then *Cebes* ſhall give in his. I agree with you, that it is impoſſible, or at leaſt very difficult, to know the truth in this Life; and that it is the property of a lazy and a dull Head, not to weigh exactly what he ſays, or to ſuperſede the Examination before he has made all his Efforts, and be oblig'd to give over by unſurmountable Difficulties. For one of two things muſt be done: We muſt either learn the Truth from others, or find it out our ſelves. If both ways fail us, amidſt all humane Reaſons, we muſt pitch upon the ſtrongeſt and moſt forcible, and truſt to that as to a Ship, while we paſs through this ſtormy Sea, and endeavour to avoid its Tempeſts and Shelves; till we find out one more firm and ſure, ſuch as (*a*) Promiſe or Revelation, upon which we may

Of all humane Reaſons a wiſe Man ſhould pick out the beſt, and moſt capable to conduct him ſafe in this ſtormy Sea.

(*a*) This is a very remarkable Paſſage. Here the Philoſophers acknowledge that we ſhould endeavour to make out the Immortality of the Soul by our own Reaſon; and that as this Reaſon is very weak and narrow, ſo it will always be aſſaulted by Doubts and Uncertainty; and that nothing but a Divine Promiſe or Revelation can diſperſe the Clouds of Ignorance

The Promise of God, is a Vessel that fears no Danger.

may happily accomplish the Voyage of this Life, as in a Vessel that fears no Danger. I shall therefore not be asham'd to put Questions to you, now that you allow me; and shall avoid the Reproach I might one day cast upon my self, of not having told you my Thoughts upon this occasion. When I survey what you spoke to me and to *Cebes*, I must own I do not think your Proofs sufficient.

Perhaps you have reason, my dear *Simmias*; but where does their insufficiency appear?

Simmias's first Objection; that the Soul is a sort of Harmony of the same date and standing with the Body.

In this; that the same things might be asserted of the Harmony of a Harp. For one may reasonably say that the Harmony of a Harp, well string'd and well tun'd, is invisible, immaterial, excellent and divine; and that the Instrument and its Strings are the Body, the compounded earthy and mortal Matter. And if the Instrument were cut in pieces, or its Strings broken, might not one with equal reason affirm, that this Harmony remains after the breaking of the Harp, and has no end? For, since it is evident, that the Harp remains after the Strings are broken, or that the Strings, which are likewise mortal, continue after the Harp is broken or dismounted; it must needs be impossible, might one say, that this immortal and divine Harmony should perish before that which is mortal and earthy; nay, it is necessary that this Harmony should continue to be without the least damage, when the Body of the Harp and its Strings are gone to nothing. For, without doubt *Socrates*, you are sensible that we hold the Soul to be something that resembles a Harmony; and that as our Body is a Being compos'd

Ignorance and Infidelity. Now the Christian Religion is the only thing that furnishes us, not only with Divine Promises and Revelations, but likewise with the accomplishment of 'em by the Resurrection of Christ, *who became the first-fruits of them that slept*, 1 Cor. 15. 20. And thus according to the Philosophers themselves, the Church is the only Vessel that fears no Danger, in which we may happily accomplish the Voyage of this Life.

of

of hot and cold, dry and moist; so our Soul is nothing else but the Harmony resulting from the just proportion of these mix'd Qualities. Now, if our Soul is only a sort of Harmony; 'tis evident, that when our Body is over-stretch'd or unbended by Diseases, or any other Disorder, of necessity our Soul with all its Divinity must come to an end, as well as the other Harmonies which consist in Sounds, or are the effect of Instruments; and that the Remains of every Body continue for a considerable time, till they be burnt or moulder'd away. This you see, *Socrates*, might be alledg'd in opposition to your Arguments, that if the Soul be only a mixture of the Qualities of our Body, it perishes first in what we call *Death*.

That the Soul is only a Harmony resulting from the just proportion of the four Qualities.

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Then *Socrates* look'd upon us all, one after another, as he did often, and began to smile. *Simmias* speaks with reason, says he, His Question is well put, and if any of you has a greater dexterity in answering his Objections than I have, why do you not do it? For he seems thoroughly to understand both my Arguments and the Exceptions they are liable to. But before we answer him, 'tis proper to hear what *Cebes* has to object, that while he speaks we may have time to think upon what we are to say; and after we have heard 'em both, that we may yield if their Reasons are uniform and valid, and if otherwise, may stand by our Principles to the outmost. Tell us then, *Cebes*, what it is that hinders you to agree with what I have laid down.

I'll tell you, says *Cebes*; your Demonstration seems to be lame and imperfect; it is faulty upon the same Head that we took notice of before. That the Soul has a Being before its entrance into the Body, is admirably well said; and, I think, sufficiently made out; but I can never be perswaded that it has likewise an Existence after Death. At the same time, I cannot subscribe to *Simmias*'s Allegation, that the Soul is neither stronger nor more durable than the Body; for to me it appears to be infinitely

Cebes objects, that tho' the Soul may be more lasting than the Body, and may animate several Bodies, yet that does not hinder it to be mortal.

finitely more excellent. But why then, (ſays the Objection) do you refuſe to believe it? Since you ſee with your Eyes, that when a Man is dead, his weakeſt Part remains ſtill; is it not therefore abſolutely neceſſary that the more durable Part ſhould laſt yet longer? Pray, take notice if I anſwer this Objection right. For to let you into my meaning, I muſt uſe Reſemblance or Compariſon as well as *Simmias*. Your Allegation, to my mind, is juſt the ſame, as if upon the death of an old Taylor, one ſhould ſay this Taylor is not dead; he has a Being ſtill ſomewhere or other; and for Proof of that, here's the Suit of Clothes he wore, which he made for himſelf; ſo that he is ſtill in being. If any one ſhould not be convinc'd by this Proof, he would not fail to ask him, whether the Man or the Clothes he wears is moſt durable? To which of neceſſity he muſt anſwer, that the Man is: And upon this foot, your Philoſopher would pretend to demonſtrate, that ſince the leſs durable poſſeſſion of the Taylor is ſtill in being, by a ſtronger Conſequence he himſelf is ſo too. Now, my dear *Simmias*, the Parallel is not juſt; pray hear what I have to anſwer to it.

'Tis evident at firſt view, that the Objection is ridiculous. For the Taylor, having us'd ſeveral Suits of Clothes, died after them, and only before the laſt Suit, which he had not time to wear; and tho' this Suit ſurviv'd the Man, if I may ſo ſpeak, yet we cannot ſay that the Man is weaker or leſs durable than the Suit of Clothes. This Simile is near enough, for as the Man is to his Suit of Clothes, ſo is the Soul to the Body; and whoever applies to the Soul and Body what is ſaid of the Man and his Suit of Clothes, will ſpeak to the purpoſe. For he'll make the Soul more durable, and the Body a weaker Being, and leſs capable to hold out for a long time. He'll add, that every Soul wears ſeveral Bodies, eſpecially if it lives ſeveral Years. For the Body waſtes while the Man is yet alive, and the

the Soul ſtill forms to it ſelf a new habit of Body out of the former that decays; but when the laſt comes to die it has then its laſt Habit on, and dies before its conſumption; and when the Soul is dead, the Body quickly betrays the weakneſs of its Nature, ſince it corrupts and moulders away very ſpeedily. So that we cannot put ſuch confidence in your Demonſtration as to hold it for a ſtanding Truth, that our Souls continues in being after Death. For ſuppoſing 'twere granted that our Soul has not only a Being antecedent to our Birth, but that, for any thing we know, the Souls of ſome continue in being after Death; and that 'tis very poſſible they may return again to the World, and be born again, ſo to ſpeak, ſeveral times, and die at laſt; for the Strength and Advantage of the Soul beyond the Body conſiſts in this, that it can undergo ſeveral Births, and wear ſeveral Bodies one after another, as a Man does Suits of Clothes: Suppoſing, I ſay, that all this were granted, ſtill it cannot be denied but that in all thoſe repeated Births it decays and waſtes, and at laſt comes to an end in one of the Deaths. However, 'tis impoſſible for any Man to diſcern in which of the Deaths 'tis totally ſunk: Since Things ſtand thus, whoever does not fear Death, muſt be ſenſleſs; unleſs he can demonſtrate that the Soul is altogether Immortal and Incorruptible. For otherwiſe every dying Man muſt of neceſſity be afraid for his Soul, for fear leſt the Body it is a quitting be its laſt Body, and leſt it periſh without any hopes of return.

The Soul re-animates a dead and corrupt Body.

Thoſe who hold the Soul to be mortal, ſtill fear its annihilation.

Having heard 'em propoſe theſe Objections we were very much troubled, as we afterwards told 'em; that at a time when we were juſt convinc'd by *Socrates*'s Arguments, they ſhould come to amuſe us with their Objections, and throw us into a fit of Unbelief and Jealouſie, not only of all that had been ſaid to us by *Socrates*, but likewiſe of what he might ſay for the future; for we would always be apt to believe that either we were not proper Judges of

Phedon *reſumes the Diſcourſe and addreſſes himſelf to Echecrates.*

the Points in debate, or elſe that his Propoſitions were in themſelves incredible.

Echec. Indeed *Phedon*, I can eaſily pardon your trouble upon that account. For I my ſelf, while I heard you relate the Matter, was a ſaying to my ſelf, what ſhall we believe hereafter, ſince *Socrates*'s Arguments, which ſeem'd ſo valid and convincing, are become doubtful and uncertain? In effect, that Objection of *Simmias*'s, that the Soul is only a Harmony, moves me wonderfully, and always did ſo. It awakes in me the memory of my being formerly of the ſame Opinion. So that my belief is unhing'd; and I want new Proofs to convince me that the Soul does not die with the Body. Wherefore, prithe tell me *Phedon*, in the Name of God, how *Socrates* came off; whether he ſeem'd to be as much nettled as you; or, if he maintain'd his Opinion with his wonted Temper; and in fine, whether his Demonſtration gave you full ſatisfaction, or ſeem'd chargeable with Imperfections. Pray tell me the whole Story, without omitting the minuteſt Circumſtance.

Phed. I proteſt to you, *Echecrates*, I admir'd *Socrates* all my life-time, and upon this occaſion admir'd him more than ever. That ſuch a Man as he had his Anſwers in a readineſs, is no great ſurpriſal; but my greateſt admiration was to ſee in the firſt place with what Calmneſs, Patience and good Humour he receiv'd the Objections of theſe Youngſters; and then how dexterouſly he perceiv'd the Impreſſion they had made upon us, and cur'd us of the ſame. He rallied us like Men put to flight after a Defeat, and inſpir'd us with a freſh Ardor to turn our Heads and renew the Charge.

Socrates's Temper, Sweetneſs and Patience in Diſputes.

Echec. How was that?

Phed. I am about to tell you. As I ſate at his Right-hand upon a little Stool lower than his, he drew his Hand over my Head, and taking hold of my Hair that hung down upon my Shoulders, as he was wont to do for his Diverſion; *Phedon*, ſays

he

he, will not you cut this pretty Hair to morrow? 'Tis probable I shall, said I. If you take my Advice, said he, you will not stay so long. How do you mean? said I. Both you and I, continues he, ought to cut our Hair if our Opinion be so far dead that we cannot raise it again; were I in your place and defeated, I would make a Vow, (*a*) as the Men of *Argos* did, never to wear my Hair till I conquer'd these Arguments of *Simmias* and *Cebes*. But, said I, *Socrates* you have forgot the old Proverb, that *Hercules* himself is not able to engage two. And why, says he, do not you call on me to assist you as your *Iolas*, while 'tis yet time? And accordingly I do call on you, said I, not as *Hercules* did *Iolas*, but as *Iolas* did *Hercules*. 'Tis no matter for that, says he, 'tis all one. Above all, let us be cautious to avoid one great Fault. What Fault, said I? That, said he, of being Reason-haters; for such there are as well as Man-haters. The former is the greatest Evil in the World, and arises from the same Source with the hatred of Man. For the latter comes from one Man's plighting his Faith for another Man, without any Precaution or Enquiry, whom he always took for a true-hearted, solid and trusty Man, but finds him at last to be a false, faithless Cheat: And thus being cheated in several such Instances, by those whom he look'd upon as his best Friends, and at last weary of being so often noos'd, he equally

'Twas a Custom among the Greeks *to cut off their Hair at the death of their Friends, and throw it into the Tombs.*

The belief of the Immortality of the Soul, is so good a Friend, that we ought to cut off our Hair when it dies.

As Hercules *called* Iolas *to assist him to conquer the Hydra.*

i. e. *While I am yet alive.*

XXCIX

To hate Reason is the greatest of Evils, which is often occasion'd by Disputes.

As Man hating grows insensibly, so does Reason-hating.

(*a*) The *Argives* being routed by the *Spartans*, with whom they wag'd War for seising the City of *Thyre*, cut their Hair, and swore solemnly never to suffer it to grow, till they had re-taken the Town that belong'd to 'em; which happen'd in the 57th Olympiad, when *Cræsus* was besieg'd at *Sardis*. *Herodot. lib.* 1.

hates all Men, and is convinc'd there is not one that is not Wicked and Perfidious. Are not you ſenſible, that this Man-hating is form'd at this rate by degrees? Yes, ſure, ſaid I. Is it not a great ſcandal then, continued he, and a ſuperlative Crime to converſe with Men, without being acquainted with the Art of trying them and knowing them? For if one were acquainted with this Art, he would ſee how Things ſtand, and would find that the Good and the Wicked are very rare, but thoſe in the middle Region ſwarm in infinite Numbers.

He who would converſe ſafely with Men, ought to be acquainted with the art of knowing them.

How do you ſay, *Socrates?*

I ſay, *Phedon*, the Caſe of the good and bad is much the ſame with that of very large or very little Men. Do not you ſee that there's nothing more uncommon than a very big or a very little Man? The Caſe is the ſame with reference to Dogs, Horſes, and all other Things; and may likewiſe be apply'd to ſwiftneſs and ſlowneſs, handſomneſs and deformity, whiteneſs and blackneſs. Are not you convinc'd, that in all theſe Matters the two Extreams are very uncommon, and the *medium* is very common?

The Extreams of all Things are uncommon, and the medium is very common.

I perceive it very plainly, *Socrates.*

If a Match were propos'd for Wickedneſs, would not there be very few that could pretend to the firſt Rank?

Few Men arrive at the laſt pitch of wickedneſs.

That's very likely, *Socrates.*

'Tis certainly ſo, replies he. But upon this ſcore, the Caſe of Reaſon and Men is not exactly the ſame. I'll follow you ſtep by ſtep. The only reſemblance of the two lies in this, that when a Man unskill'd in the Art of Examination, entertains a Reaſon as true, and afterwards finds it to be falſe, whether it be ſo in it ſelf or not; and when the ſame thing happens to him often, as indeed it does to thoſe who amuſe themſelves in diſputing with the Sophiſters that contradict every thing; he at laſt believes himſelf to be extraordinary well skill'd, and fanſies he's the only Man that has perceiv'd

The progreſs of Reaſoning.

that

that there's nothing true or certain either in Things or Reasons, but that all is like *Eurypus*, in a continual flux and reflux, and that nothing continues so much as one Minute in the same state.

Those who fancie that Socrates and Plato taught no positive Truths, but reckon'd every Thing uncertain, may undeceive themselves by reading this Passage.

That is the pure Truth, *Socrates*.

Is it not then a very deplorable misfortune, my dear *Phedon*, that while there are true, certain, and very comprehensible Reasons, there should be Men found, who after they have suffer'd 'em to pass, call 'em again in question upon hearing these frivolous Disputes, where sometimes Truth and sometimes Falshood comes uppermost; and instead of charging themselves with these Doubts, or blaming their want of Art, cast the blame at last upon the Reasons themselves; and being of a sowre Temper, pass their life in hating and calumniating all Reason, and by that means rob themselves both of Truth and Knowledge.

There are some true, certain, and very comprehensive Reasons.

The Fate of those who are wont to dispute with cross and contradictory Men.

That's certainly a most deplorable thing, said I.

We ought to be very cautious, continues he, that this misfortune be not our lot; and that we are not prepossess'd by this Thought, that there's nothing solid or true in all Arguments whatsoever. We should rather be perswaded that 'tis our selves who are wanting in Solidity and Truth; and use our utmost Efforts to recover that Solidity and justness of Thought. This is a Duty incumbent upon you, who have time yet to live; and likewise upon me who am about to die: And I am much afraid, that upon this occasion I have been so far from acting the Part of a true Philosopher, that I have behav'd my self like a Disputant overborn with Prejudice; as all those Ignorants do, who in their Disputes do not mind the perception of the Truth, but mean only to draw their Hearers over to their Opinions. The only difference between them and me, is, that convincing my Audience of the Truth of what I

For the belief of the Immortality of the Soul is useful both for living and for dying well.

The Character of an ignorant and bigotted Disputant.

advance is not my only aim; Indeed, I shall be infinitely glad if that come to pass; but my chief scope is to perswade my self of the truth of these things; for I argue thus, my dear *Phedon*, and you'll find that this way of arguing is highly useful. If (*a*) my Propositions prove true, it is well done to believe them; and if after my death they be found false, I still reap that Advantage in this Life, that I have been less affected by the Evils which commonly accompany it. But I shall not remain long under this Ignorance. If I were, I should reckon it a great misfortune: But, by good luck, it will quickly be dispell'd. Being fortified by these Thoughts, my dear *Simmias* and *Cebes*, I make account to answer your Objections; and if you take my Advice, you'll relie less upon the Authority of *Socrates*, than that of the Truth. If what I am about to advance appear true, embrace it; if otherwise, attack it with all your force. Thus I shall neither deceive my self, nor impose upon you by the influence of Zeal and Good-will, or quit you like a Wasp that leaves its Sting in the Wound it has made.

The advantages redounding from the belief of the Immortality of the Soul, supposing it to be false.

To begin then, pray see if I remember right what was objected. *Simmias*, as I take it, rejects our belief, only becaufe he fears our Souls, notwithstanding their being Divine and more Excellent, will die before our Bodies, as being only a sort of Harmony. And *Cebes*, if I mistake not, granted that the Soul is more durable than the Body, but thinks it possible that the Soul, after having us'd several

A short Recapitulation of the two Objections.

(*a*) If these are true, I am a great Gainer with little Trouble; if false, I lose nothing: On the contrary, I have gain'd a great deal: For besides the Hope that supported me through my Afflictions, Infirmities and Weaknesses, I have been faithful, honest, humble, thankful, charitable, sincere and true, and have only quitted false and contagious Pleasures in exchange for real and solid ones. *M. Pascal* in his *Art.* 7. has enlarg'd upon this Truth, and back'd it with a Demonstration of infinite force.

Bodies,

Bodies, may die at last when it quits the last Body, and that this death of the Soul is a true Death. Are not these the two Points I am to examine, my dear *Simmias* and *Cebes*?

When they had all agreed that the Objections were justly summ'd up; he continued thus: Do you absolutely reject all that I have said, or do you acknowledge part of it to be true? They answer'd, That they did not reject the whole. But what, says he, is your Opinion of what I told you? *viz.* that *Learning* is only *Remembrance*, and that by a necessary Consequence the Soul must have an Existence before its conjunction with the Body.

As for me, replies *Cebes*, I perceiv'd the evidence of it at first view; and do not know any Principles of more certainty and Truth. I am of the same Mind, says *Simmias*, and should think it very strange if ever I chang'd my Opinion.

Socrates *makes out the absurdity of* Simmias's *Objection by his own Thoughts.*

But, my dear *Theban*, continues *Socrates*, you must needs change it, if you retain your Opinion that Harmony is compounded, and that the Soul is only a sort of Harmony arising from the due Union of the Qualities of the Body: For 'tis presum'd you would not believe your self, if you said that Harmony has a Being before those Things of which it is compos'd.

Harmony cannot exist before the Instrument that gives it.

Sure enough, replies *Simmias*, I would not believe my self if I did.

Do not you see then, continues *Socrates*, that you are not of a piece with your self, when you say the Soul had a Being before it came to animate the Body, and at the same time, that it is compounded of Things that had not then an Existence? Do not you compare the Soul to a Harmony? And is it not evident that the Harp, the Strings, and the very discordant Sounds exist before the Harmony, which is an Effect that results from all these Things, and perishes sooner than they? Does this latter part of your Discourse suit with the first?

For there's discord in the Sounds, before Concord; and so they are antecedent to the Harmony.

Not

Not at all, replies *Simmias*.

And yet, continues *Socrates*, if ever a Diſcourſe be all of a piece, it ought to be ſuch when Harmony is its Subject.

That's right, ſays *Simmias*.

But yours is not ſo, continues *Socrates*. Let's hear then which of theſe two Opinions you ſide with : Whether is Learning only Remembrance, or is the Soul a ſort of Harmony ?

I ſide with the firſt, replies *Simmias*.

Compariſons and Similes are commonly fallacious.

(*a*) And that Opinion I have explain'd to you, without having any recourſe to Demonſtrations full of Similes and Examples, which are rather colours of the Truth, and therefore pleaſe the People beſt; but as for me, I am of Opinion that all Diſcourſes proving their Point by *Similes*, are full of vanity, and apt to ſeduce and deceive, unleſs one be very cautious, whether it relate to Geometry or any other Science : Whereas the Diſcourſe I made for proving that Knowledge is Remembrance, is grounded upon a very creditable Hypotheſis : For I told you that the Soul exiſts as well as its Eſſence before it comes to animate the Body. By Eſſence I mean

(*a*) *Marſilius Ficinus* and *de Serres* have ſtrangely miſunderſtood this Paſſage, not only in making *Simmias* ſpeak all this ; but what is more conſiderable, in putting a favourable Conſtruction on thoſe words, μετὰ εἰκότ@ τινὸς ἢ ἐυπρεπείας, which the one renders, *veriſimilis tantum venuſtique exempli indicatione* ; and the other, *ex veriſimili quadam convenientia* ; and in ſeparating the words ἀνὰ ἀποδείξεως ; whereas they are joyn'd ; for *Socrates* ſays, *I made this Diſcourſe, without having recourſe to Demonſtrations cramm'd with Similes and Colours, that take ſo much with the People.* In effect *Socrates* did not ſo much as make uſe of one Compariſon in making good the Opinion of Remembrance. Whereas *Simmias* had brought in the Compariſon of a Harp to prove that the Soul is a Harmony. Now there's nothing miſleads the Ignorant more than Similitudes, for the Imagination is ſo ſeduc'd by the repreſentation, that it blindly embraces all that preſents it ſelf to it. And by that means this Opinion of *Simmias*'s did always meet with a favourable reception, and does to this day among the Ignorant. This is a very important Paſſage, and deſerv'd a larger Explication.

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the Principle from which it derives its Being, which has no other name, but *that which is*. And this Proof I take to be good and sufficient.

By that reason, says *Simmias*, I must not listen either to my self or others, who assert the Soul to be a sort of Harmony.

Harmony depends upon the Ingredients in its Composition; but the Soul does not.

In earnest *Simmias*, replies *Socrates*, do you think that a Harmony, or any other Composure, can be any thing different from the Parts of which it is compounded?

By no means, *Socrates*.

Or can it do or suffer, what those Parts do not? *Simmias* answer'd, It could not. Then, says *Socrates*, a Harmony does not precede, but follows the Things it is composed of. And it cannot have Sounds, Motions, or any thing else contrary to its Parts.

Harmony is never contrary to its Parts; but the Soul is to the Body.

No sure, replies *Simmias*. But what, continues *Socrates*, is not all Harmony only such in proportion to the Concord of its Parts?

I do not well understand you, says *Simmias*.

I mean, according as the Parts have more or less of Concord, the Harmony is more or less a Harmony. Is it not?

Yes, sure.

The Soul, as such, is not capable of receiving less or more.

Can we say of the Soul, at the same rate, that a small difference makes a Soul to be more or less a Soul?

No, sure, *Socrates*.

How is it then, in the Name of God? Do not we say, for Example, that such a Soul endow'd with Understanding and Vertue, is good; and another fill'd with Folly and Mischief, is wicked? Is not this right?

Yes, sure, quoth *Simmias*.

But those who hold the Soul to be a Harmony, what will they call these Qualities of the Soul, that Vice and that Vertue? Will they say, the one's Harmony, and the other Discord? That a vertuous and good Soul, being Harmony in its Nature, is entitled

titled to another Harmony; and that a vicious wicked Soul wants that additional Harmony.

I cannot be positive, replies *Simmias*; but indeed 'tis very probable the Patrons of that Opinion may advance some such thing.

But we concluded, that one Soul is not more or less a Soul than another; that is, that it is not more or less a Harmony, than another Harmony.

I own it, says *Simmias*.

And since it is not more or less a Harmony then, it has not more or less Concord. Is it not so?

Yes, sure, *Socrates*.

And since it has not more or less of Concord; can one have more Harmony than another, or must the Harmony of 'em all be equal?

Questionless it must be equal.

All Souls would be equal: Which is an absurdity.

Since one Soul cannot be more or less a Soul than another, by the same reason it cannot have more or less of Concord than another.

That's true.

Then it follows necessarily that one Soul cannot have either more Harmony or more Discord than another?

I agree to it.

And by consequence, since the Soul is of that Nature, it cannot have more Vertue or Vice than another; if so be that Vice is Discord, and Vertue Harmony?

That's a standing Truth, says *Simmias*.

If the Soul were a Harmony, there would be no such thing as a vicious Soul.

Or, would not right Reason rather say that Vice could find no place in the Soul, if so be the Soul is Harmony; for Harmony, continuing in its perfect, Nature, is not capable of Discord?

There's no question of that.

In like manner the Soul, while perfectly a Soul, is not capable of Vice.

According to the Principles we agreed upon, I cannot see how it shou'd.

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From the same very Principles, it will follow that the Souls of all Animals are equally good, since they are equally Souls.

The Souls of Brutes would be of the same nature with those of Men.

So I think, says *Simmias.*

But do you think that it stands with right Reason, if the Hypothesis of the Souls being a Harmony be true?

No, sure, *Socrates.*

Then I ask you, *Simmias*, if of all the Parts of a Man, the Soul is not best entitled to Command, especially when she is Prudent and Wise?

In Man the Soul commands the Body, whereas in Musick the Body commands the Harmony.

There's no other Part can pretend to it.

Does it Command by giving way to the Passions of the Body, or by resisting them? As for Example, when the Body is seiz'd with Thirst in the cold Fit of a Fever, does not the Soul restrain it from drinking? Or, when 'tis hungry, does it not restrain it from eating? As well as in a thousand other Instances, which manifestly shew that the Soul curbs the Passions of the Body. Is it not so?

Without question.

The Soul thwarts the Passions of the Body; which it could not do, if it were a Harmony.

But we agreed above that the Soul being a sort of Harmony, can never sound contrary to the sound of those things which raise, or lower, or move it; nor have other Passions, different from those of its Parts; and that it is necessarily oblig'd to follow them, as being uncapable to guide them.

'Tis certain we agreed upon that, says *Simmias*: How could we avoid it?

But, says *Socrates*, is it not evident that the Conduct of the Soul is the downright contrary? That it governs and rules those very Things which are alledg'd for Ingredients in its Composition; that it thwarts and attack's 'em almost all its life-time; that is every way their Mistress, punishing and repressing some by the harder measures of Pain, School-Exercises and Physick; and treating others more gently, as contenting it self with threatning or insulting over its Lusts, Passion and Fear. In a word, we see the Soul speaks to the Body as something

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of a different Nature from it self; which *Homer* was sensible of, when, in his *Odysses* he tells that *Ulysses beating his Breast, rebuk'd his Heart, and said to it, Support thy self, thou hast stood out against harder and more difficult things than these.*

Homer *knew that the Nature of the Soul is different from that of the Body, in the beginning of the 19th Book of his* Odyss.

Do you think the Poet spoke that, under the apprehensions of the Souls being a Harmony to be manag'd and conducted by the Body? Or, do not you rather believe that he knew, 'twas the Souls part to Command, and that it is of a more Divine Nature than Harmony?

Yes, *Socrates*; I swear I am persuaded *Homer* knew that Truth.

And by Consequence, my dear *Simmias*, continues *Socrates*, there is not the least Colour of Reason for the Souls being a Harmony; should we assert it to be such, we should contradict both *Homer*, that divine Poet, and likewise our selves. *Simmias* yielded; and *Socrates* proceeded thus.

I think we have sufficiently temper'd and moderated this (*a*) Theban Harmony, so that it will do us no harm. But *Cebes*, how shall we do to appease and disarm this (*b*) *Cadmus*? How shall we hit on a Discourse, duly qualified with a persuasive force?

Why Cebes *was call'd* Cadmus *see* Rem.

If you'll be at the pains, *Socrates*, you can easily find such a Discourse. The last you had against the Harmony of the Soul, mov'd me mightily, and

(*a*) He calls *Simmias*'s Opinion a *Theban Harmony*, alluding to the Fable of *Amphion*, who by the Harmony of his Harp built the Walls of *Thebes*. In like manner *Simmias* with his pretended Harmony rear'd up the humane Body.

(*b*) He calls *Cebes* another *Cadmus*, because as *Cadmus* by sowing the Teeth of the Dragon he had kill'd, fetch'd out of the Bosom of the Earth a Race of fierce Men that liv'd but one Minute: So *Cebes* by the Opinion of the Mortality of the Soul, a thing more poysonous than the Teeth of a Dragon, made all Men earthly and beastly, and left 'em but a very short Life.

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indeed beyond my expectation: For when *Simmias* propos'd his Doubts, I thought nothing short of a Prodigy or Miracle could solve 'em: And I was mightily surpris'd when I saw he could not stand your first Attack. So that now it will be no surprisal to me to see *Cadmus* undergo the same fate.

My dear *Cebes*, replies *Socrates*, do not you speak too big upon the matter, lest Envy should overturn all I have said, and render it useless and ineffectual. But that's in the Hands of God. As for us, let us approach one another, as *Homer* says, and try our Strength and Arms. What you want comes all to this Point; you would have the Immortality and Incorruptibility of the Soul demonstrated, to the end that a Philosopher, who dies bravely in the hopes of being infinitely more happy in the other World than in this, may not hope in vain. You say, the Soul's being a durable and divine Substance, existing before its joyning with the Body, does not conclude its Immortality; and the only Inference that it will bear, is, that it lasts a great while longer, and was in being many Ages before us, during which it knew and did several things; but without Immortality: For on the contrary, the first Minute of its descent into the Body, is the Commencement of its Death; or, as it were a Disease to it: For it passes this Life in Anguish and Trouble, and at last is quite swallow'd up and annihilated by what we call Death. You add, that 'tis the same thing, whether it animates a Body only once, or returns to it several times, since that does not alter the occasion of our Fears, forasmuch as all wise Men ought still to fear Death, while they are uncertain of the Immortality of their Souls. This, I take it, is the Summ of what you said; and I repeat it so often, on purpose, that nothing may escape my view, and that you may have the opportunity of adding, or impairing as you please.

Those who believe the Mortality of the Soul, ought to fear Death. Its annihilation is a sufficient cause of fear to all wise Men.

At present, says *Cebes*, I have nothing to alter: That

That is the just Summ of all I have yet said.

Socrates was silent a pretty while, as being drown'd in profound Meditation: At last, *Cebes*, says he, 'tis truly not a small matter that you demand; for in order to a just satisfaction, there's a necessity of making a narrow Enquiry into the cause of Generation and Corruption. If you please I'll tell you what happen'd to me upon this same very matter; and if what I say seem useful to you, you shall be at liberty to make use of it to support your Sentiments.

With all my heart, says *Simmias*.

Socrates in his youth was a great lover of Physicks.

Pray give ear then, says *Socrates*: In my youth I had an insatiable desire to learn that Science, which is call'd *Natural History*; for I thought it was something Great and Divine to know the Causes of every thing, of their Generation, Death, and Existence. And I spar'd no Pains, nor omitted any Means; for trying in the first place, if (*a*) a certain corruption of hot and cold, will, as some pretend, give Being and Nourishment to Animals; if the Blood makes the Thought; if Air or Fire, or the Brain alone is the cause of our Senses, of Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, *&c.* if Memory and Opinion take their rise from these Senses, and if Knowledge be the result of Memory and Opinion. Then I wanted to know the causes of their Corruption, and extended my curiosity both to the Heavens and the cavities of the Earth, and would fain have known the Cause of all the *Phænomena* we meet with. At last, after a great deal of trouble, I found my self strangely unqualified for such Enquiries; and of this I am about to give you a sensible Proof. (*b*) This fine study made me so blind in

(*a*) *Socrates* said he was ignorant of all these Things, because he knew nothing but Second Causes. Now to know them justly, one ought to know God, and the Vertue he displays in Nature.

(*b*) Its utmost reach amounts to no more than an imperfect Knowledge of Second Causes. Now these Second Causes do not lead us into the knowledge of the Essence of Things.

in the Things I knew more evidently before, according to my own and other Persons Thoughts, that I quite forgot all that I had known upon several Subjects, particularly that of a Man's growth. I thought 'twas evident to the whole World, that a Man grows only by eating and drinking: For Flesh being added to Flesh, Bones to Bones, and all the other Parts joyn'd to their similar Parts by Nourishment, make a small Bulk to swell and grow, so that a little Man becomes large. This was my Thought. Do not you think 'twas just?

A strange effect of the study of Physicks: It blinds instead of improving the Understanding.

Yes sure, replies *Cebes*.

Mind what follows, says *Socrates*: I thought likewise that I knew the Reason why one Man is taller than another by the Head, and one Horse higher than another: And with reference to plainer and more sensible Things, I thought, for Instance, that ten was more than eight, because two were added to it; that two Cubits were larger than one, because they contain'd one half more.

And what are your present Thoughts of those Things, says *Cebes*?

I am so far, replies *Socrates*, from thinking that I know the Causes of all these things; that, when one is added to one, I do not believe I can tell whether it is that very one to which the other is added that becomes two; or whether the one added, and the one to which the addition was made make two together? For in their separate state, each of 'em was one and not two; and after their being

He afterwards gives the Reason of these Doubts.

Physicks were sadly mismanag'd, when they could not shew how or why one and one make two.

A Man is so far from improving his Knowledge by them, that he must needs own his Ignorance of the Things he pretended to know. All Philosophers at this day know that Nourishment by the means of Heat is the cause of the growth of any Animal. But they're all at a loss to know by what Virtue it grows or ceases to grow, and what are the limits of its growth. What misfortune is it for a Man to plod all his life-time for the knowing of nothing!

plac'd one by the other, they became two. Neither can I tell how, upon the diviſion of any thing, what was formerly one becomes two, from the very minute of diviſion: For that Cauſe is quite contrary to that which makes one and one become two. There this one, and this one become two, by reaſon of their being plac'd near and added, the one to the other: But, here this one Thing becomes two by reaſon of its diviſion and ſeparation. Far leſs do I pretend to know whence this one Thing comes, and by this Method (*i. e.* by Phyſical Reaſons) I cannot find out how the leaſt Thing takes riſe or periſhes, or how it exiſts. But without ſo much Ceremony, I mix another Method of my own with this, for by this I can learn nothing: Having one day heard ſome Body reading a Book of (*b*) *Anaxagoras*'s, who ſaid the Divine Intellect was the cauſe of all Beings, and drew 'em up in their proper Ranks and Claſſes; I was raviſh'd with Joy. I perceiv'd there was nothing more certain than this Principle, that the Intellect is the cauſe of all Beings. For I juſtly thought that this Intellect having methodis'd all Things and rank'd 'em in their Claſſes, (*c*) planted every Thing in the Place and Con-

He means that he has recourſe to the firſt Cauſe, for explaining any Point in the Phyſicks. A noble beginning for Anaxagoras.

(*b*) *Anaxagoras* was the firſt that ſaid the Intellect or Spirit of God rank'd the Parts of Matter, and put 'em in motion. And 'twas that Principle that uſher'd in his Phyſicks. This fair *Exordium* gave *Socrates* occaſion to think that he would explain all the Secrets of Nature, by unfolding the divine Vertue diſplay'd upon it, and aſſigning the Reaſons why every Thing was ſo and ſo. But that Philoſopher did not keep up to his firſt Principle; for he wav'd the firſt Cauſe, and inſiſted on ſecond Cauſes, and by ſo doing fruſtrated the expectation of his Readers.

(*c*) Here *Socrates* recals us to the firſt Truth, that God created all Things good, and in their beſt ſtate; according to *Moſes*, who ſays, *God ſaw all Things that he had made, and behold they were very good.* Now in order to know why Things are thus good, we muſt enquire into the Nature of this Original Goodneſs, and ſurvey the ſtate they were created in. What a ſorry thing is Phyſicks then, that knows nothing but ſecond Cauſes, or rather, that does not certainly know theſe ſecond Cauſes?

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dition that was best and most useful for it, in which it could best do and suffer whatever the Intellect had allotted to it; and I apprehended that the result of this Principle, was, that the only Thing a Man ought to look for, either for himself or others, is this better and more useful thing: For having once found what is best and most useful, he'll necessarily know what is worst, since there is but one Knowledge both for the one and the other.

Upon this score I was infinitely glad, that I had found such a Master as *Anaxagoras*, who I hop'd would give a satisfactory Account of the Cause of all Things; and would not only tell me, for Instance, that the Earth is broad or round, but likewise assign the necessary Cause obliging it to be so: Who would point out to me what was best, and at the same time give me to understand why it was so. In like manner, if he affirm'd the Seat of the Earth to be in the Centre of the World, I expected he would give me a Reason why it was so: And, after I should have received sufficient Instruction from him, design'd never to admit of any other Cause for a Principle.

What a true Natural Philosopher ought to teach.

I prepare some Questions to be put to him concerning the Sun, Moon, and other Stars, in order to know the Reasons of their Revolutions, Motions, and other Accidents, and why what each of them does is always the best: For I could not imagine, that after he had told me, that the Intellect rank'd them, and drew them up in order, that he cou'd give me no other reason of that Order than this, that it was best. And I flatter'd my self with hopes, that after he had assign'd both the general and particular Causes, he would give me to know, wherein the particular Good of every individual Thing, as well as the common Good of all Things consists. I would not have parted with these Hopes for all the Treasures of the World.

Indeed, that Knowledge would be more precious than all Treasures: But it is not attainable in this Life.

So I bought his Books with a great deal of Impatience, and made it my Business to peruse 'em as

ſoon as poſſibly I could, in order to a ſpeedy knowledge of the Good and the Evil of all Things: But I found my ſelf fruſtrated of my mighty Hopes; for as ſoon as I had made a ſmall progreſs in the peruſal, I found the Author made no uſe of this Intellect, and aſſign'd no Reaſon of that fine Order and Diſpoſition; but aſſign'd as Cauſes the Air, Whirlwinds, the Waters, and other Things equally abſur'd.

Socrates ridicules the Phyſicks that inſiſt only on ſecond Cauſes.

His whole Performance ſeem'd to reach no farther, than if a Man ſhould ſay, that *Socrates* does all by the Intellect, and after that, meaning to give a Reaſon for all my Actions, ſhould ſay, for Inſtance, to day I am ſet upon my Bed, becauſe my Body is compoſed of Bones and Nerves; the Bones being hard and ſolid, are ſeparated by the Joints; and the Nerves being capable to bend and unbend themſelves, tye the Bones to the Fleſh, and the Skin, which receives and includes both the one and the other; that the Bones being diſengag'd at the Joints, the Nerves which bend and unbend, enable me to fold my Legs as you ſee, and that forſooth is the reaſon that I ſit in this Poſture: Or, if a Man pretending to aſſign the Cauſe of my preſent Conference with you, ſhould inſiſt only upon the ſecond Cauſes, the Voice, the Air, Hearing, and ſuch other Things, and ſhould take no notice of the true Cauſe, *viz.* that the *Athenians* thought it fit to condemn me, and that by the ſame reaſon I thought it fitteſt for me to be here, and patiently wait the execution of my Sentence; for I can ſafely (*a*) ſwear that theſe Nerves and theſe Bones ſhould long ere now have been tranſlated to *Megara*, or *Bœotia*, if

Under the Notion of Nerves he comprehends Muſcles.

(*a*) In the Greek it runs, *For I ſwear by the Dog.* *Lactantius* checks him for this Oath. But St. *Auguſtin* in *Lib.* IV. *Of the true Religion*, juſtifies him, as if *Socrates* mean'd to give the *Athenians* to know, that even a Dog, being the Workmanſhip of God, deſerv'd more Honour than all the Idols they ſwore by. It may likewiſe be alledg'd that *Socrates* ſwore by a Dog, a Gooſe, *&c.* in order to accuſtom Men to forbear taking the Name of God ſo often in vain.

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that had been fitter for me, and if I had not been ſtill perſuaded that it was better and fitter for me to endure the Puniſhment I am doom'd to by my Country, than to flee like a Slave or a baniſh'd Perſon. As I take it, 'tis highly ridiculous to aſſign ſuch Cauſes upon ſuch an Occaſion, and to reſt ſatisfied in them.

If it be replied, That without Bones and Nerves, and ſuch other Things, I could not do what I mean to do; the Allegation is true. But it ſavours of the greateſt Abſurdity, to fanſie that theſe Bones or Nerves ſhould be the cauſe of my Actions rather than the choice of what is beſt; and that my Intellect is employed on that ſcore: For that were to ſink the Difference between the Cauſe, and the Thing without which the Cauſe could not be ſuch. And yet the vulgar People, who take Things by hearſay, and ſee by other Peoples Eyes, as if they walk'd in thick Darkneſs, take the true Cauſe of Things to be of that Nature. Purſuant to this Notion ſome ſurround the Earth with a *Vortex* that turns eternally round, and ſuppoſe it to be fix'd in the Centre of the Univerſe: Others conceive it to be a broad and large Trough, which has the Air for its Baſe and Foundation. And as for the Power of him who rank'd and diſpoſed of every Thing to its beſt advantage that is not in their view, and they don't believe that he's intitled to any Divine Vertue: They fanſie they know of a ſtronger and more immortal Atlas, more capable to ſupport all Things. And this good and immortal Tye, that is only capable to unite and comprehend all Things, they take for a *Chimera*.

The utmoſt reach of Phyſicks.

Here they are at a ſtand.

This was the Opinion of Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, *and* Democritus.

This Atlas is their own Judgment, overrun with Obſcurity and Weakneſs.

I am not of their mind, but would willingly liſt my ſelf a Diſciple to any that could tell me this Cauſe, let it be what it will. But, ſince I could not compaſs the knowledge of it, neither by my ſelf nor others; if you pleaſe, I'll give you an Account of a ſecond Trial I made in order to find it.

I am very desirous to hear it, says *Cebes*.

After I had wearied my self in examining all things, I thought it my Duty to be cautious of avoiding what happens to those who contemplate an Eclipse of the Sun: For they lose the sight of it, without they be so careful as to view its Reflection in Water or any other *Medium*. A Thought much like to that came into my Head, and I feared I would lose the Eyes of the Soul, if I viewed Objects with the Eyes of the Body, or employ'd any of my Senses in indeavouring to know 'em. I thought I should have recourse to Reason, and contemplate the Truth of all Things as reflected from it. 'Tis possible the Simile I use in explaining my self, is not very just (*a*): For I my self cannot affirm, that he who beholds Things in the Glass of Reason, sees 'em more by Reflection and Similitude, than he who beholds 'em in their Operations. However, the way I followed was this: From that time forward I grounded all upon the Reason that seemed to be best, and took all for Truth, that I found conformable to it, whether in Things or Causes. And what was not conformable I rejected, as being false. I'll explain my meaning more distinctly; for I fancy you do not yet understand me.

By contemplating Objects with the Eyes of the Body, we lose the Eyes of the Mind.

They ought to be look'd upon through a Medium, *and that* Medium *is Reason.*

I'll swear, says *Cebes*, I do not well understand you.

But, after all, says *Socrates*, I advance no new thing. This is no more than what I have said a thousand times, and particularly in the foregoing Dispute: For all that I aim at, is to demonstrate what sort of Cause this is, that I sought after so carefully: I begin with his Qualities, which are so much talked of, and which I take for the Founda-

(*a*) He justly checks himself: for Reasons are not like other *Mediums*: they give us to know the Essence of Things in some measure, which the Operations do not.

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tion. I ſay then, there is ſomething that is good, fine, juſt and great of it ſelf. If you grant me this Principle, I hope by it to demonſtrate the Cauſe, and make out the Immortality of the Soul.

The Immaterial and Eternal Qualities have a neceſſary relation to the Immortality of the Soul; ſuch as a Cauſe has to its Effects.

I grant it, ſays *Cebes:* you cannot be too quick in perfecting your Demonſtration.

Mind what follows, and ſee if you agree to it as I. Take it, if there is any thing fine, beſides fineneſs it ſelf, it muſt be ſuch by partaking of that firſt good: and ſo of all the other Qualities. Are you of this Opinion?

I am.

I proteſt, cotinues *Socrates*, I cannot well underſtand all the other learned Cauſes, that are commonly given us. But if any Man ask me what makes a thing fine, whether the livelineſs of its Colours, or the juſt proportion of its Parts and the like; I wave all theſe plauſible Reaſons, which ſerve only to confound me; and without Ceremony or Art, make anſwer, and perhaps too ſimply, that its fineneſs is only owing to the preſence, or approach, or communication of the original fine Being, whatever be the way of that communication. For I am not yet certain in what manner it is: I only know certainly, that all theſe fine Things are render'd ſuch by the preſence of this fine Being. While I ſtand by this Principle, I reckon I cannot be deceiv'd; and I am perſwaded, that I may ſafely make anſwer to all Queſtions whatſoever, that all fine Things owe their Fineneſs to the preſence of the above-mentioned Being. Are not you of the ſame mind?

This is an Irony.

Nothing is fine but what communicates of the firſt fine being, i. e. *according to the proportion of its conformity to the Idea and Deſign of God, the firſt Cauſe of all Things.*

Yes, ſure, *Socrates.*

Are not great and ſmall things render'd ſuch in like manner? If one told you, that ſuch a thing is

larger than another by the Head; (*a*) would not you think the Expreſſion far from being exact; and would not you make anſwer, that whatever is larger is render'd ſuch by magnitude it ſelf, and what is ſmaller owes its littleneſs to littleneſs it ſelf? For if you ſaid, that ſuch a thing is greater or ſmaller than another by the Head, I fancy you would fear being cenſur'd, for making both the greater and leſſer thing to be ſuch by the ſame cauſe; and beſides, for uſing ſuch an Expreſſion as ſeems to imply, that the Head, which is a ſmall part, makes the largneſs of the greater, which in effect is a Monſter; for what can be more abſurd than to ſay, that a ſmall Matter makes a thing large? Would not you fear ſuch Objections?

Yes, ſure, replies *Cebes*, ſmiling.

By the ſame reaſon would not you be afraid to ſay, that ten is more than eight, and ſurpaſſes it by two? And would not you rather ſay, that ten are more than eight by quantity? In like manner, of two Cubits would not you ſay, they are larger than one by magnitude, rather than by the half? For ſtill there's the ſame occaſion of fear.

You ſay well.

But when one is added to one, or a thing divided into halfs, would not you avoid ſaying, that in the former Caſe addition makes one and one two, and in the latter diviſion makes one thing become two? And would not you proteſt, that you know no other cauſe of the exiſtence of things, than the participation of the eſſence that's peculiar to every ſubject; and conſequently no other reaſon why one and one makes two, but the participation of *duality*, as one is one by the participation of unity? Would not you diſcard theſe additions, diviſions and all the other fine anſwers, and leave 'em to thoſe who know more

Of an immaterial Eſſence, depending upon the firſt Truth, viz. God, in which it ſubſiſts, and from whence it proceeds.

(*a*) *Socrates* does not condemn the receiv'd Expreſſions, but means to ſhew, that they do not reach the Nature and Eſſence of Things; and, being always ty'd to Matter, cannot bear up to the true Eſſence that does all.

than

than you do? And, for fear of your own Shadow, as the Proverb goes, or rather of your Ignorance, would not you confine your self to this Principle? And, if any one attack'd it, would not you let it ſtand without daigning him an anſwer, till you had ſurveyed all the conſequences, to ſee if they are of a piece or not? And if afterwards you ſhould be obliged to give a reaſon for them, would not you do it by having recourſe to ſome of theſe other *Hypotheſes*, that ſhould appear to be the beſt; and ſo proceed from *Hypotheſis* to *Hypotheſis*, till you lighted upon ſomething that ſatisfied you, as being a ſure and ſtanding truth? At the ſame time you would be loth to perplex and confound all things as thoſe Diſputants do, who call all things in queſtion. 'Tis true, theſe Diſputants perhaps are not much concern'd for the truth; and by thus mingling and perplexing all things by an effect of their profound knowledge, they care ſure to pleaſe themſelves. But as for you, if you are true Philoſophers, you'll do as I ſay.

A true way of finding out the truth.

For the Effects are not ſufficient to lay open the Nature and Eſſence of Cauſes.

Simmias and *Cebes* jointly replied, that he ſaid well.

Echec. Indeed, *Phedon*, I think it no wonder; for to my mind, *Socrates* explain'd his Principles with a wonderful neatneſs, ſufficient to make an impreſſion upon any Man of common Senſe.

Phed. All the Audience thought the ſame.

Echec. Even we, who have it only at ſecond hand, find it ſo. But what was ſaid next?

Phed. If I remember right, after they had granted, that the *Species* of things have a real Subſiſtance; and that the things participating of their Nature, take their denomination from them; then, I ſay, *Socrates* interrogated *Cebes*, as follows:

By Species, he means the eternal Idea's of things, which ſubſiſt really, i.e. in the Intellect of God.

If your Principle be true, when you ſay *Simmias* is larger than *Socrates* and leſſer than *Phedon*; do not you imply, that both Magnitude and Littleneſs are lodged at the ſame time in *Simmias*?

Yes, replies *Cebes*.

But

'Tis only true upon the Comparison.

But do not you own, that this Propoſition, *Simmias* is bigger than *Socrates*, is not abſolutely and in it ſelf true? For *Simmias* is not bigger becauſe he is *Simmias*, but becauſe he is poſſeſſed of magnitude. Neither is he bigger than *Socrates* becauſe *Socrates* is *Socrates*, but becauſe *Socrates* has littleneſs in the compariſon with *Simmias*'s magnitude. Neither is *Simmias* leſſer than *Phedon*, becauſe *Phedon* is *Phedon*, but becauſe *Phedon* is big, when compared to *Simmias*, who is little.

That's true.

Thus, contiues *Socrates*, *Simmias* is called both big and little, as being between two: By partaking of bigneſs he is bigger than *Socrates*, and by partaking likewiſe of littleneſs he is leſſer than *Phedon*. Then he ſmil'd and ſaid, Methinks I have inſiſted too long upon theſe things; but I ſhonld not have amus'd my ſelf with theſe large Strokes, had not it been to convince you more effectually of the truth of my Principle: for, as I take it, not only magnitude it ſelf cannot be at the ſame time big and ſmall: but beſides, the magnitude that is in us does not admit of littleneſs, and has no mind to be ſurpaſſed; for either the magnitude flees and yields its place when it ſees its Enemy approaching, or elſe it vaniſhes and periſhes entirely, and, when once it has receiv'd it, it deſires to continue as it is. As I, for inſtance, having receiv'd littleneſs, while I am as you ſee me, cannot but be little: for that which is big does never attempt to be little: And in like manner littleneſs never encroaches upon magnitude. In one word, any of the Contraries, while it is what it is, is never to be found with its contrary; but either diſappears or periſhes when the other comes in.

He means to prove that two Contraries can never meet in the ſame Subject.

Cebes agreed to it: but one of the Company, I forgot who, addreſſed, himſelf to *Socrates* thus: In the Name of all the Gods, did you not ſay contrary to what you now advance? Did not you conclude upon this, that greater things take riſe from the leſſer,

leſſer, and the leſſer from the greater; and, in a word, that contraries do ſtill produce their contraries? Whereas now, as I take it, you alledge, that can never be.

Whereupon *Socrates* put his Head further out of the Bed, and, having heard the Objection, ſaid to him, Indeed you do well to put us in mind of what we ſaid; but you do not perceive the difference between the former and the latter. In the former we aſſerted, that every contrary owes its being to its contrary: And in the latter we teach, that a contrary is never contrary to it ſelf, neither in us, nor in the courſe of nature (*a*). There we ſpoke of things that had contraries, meaning to call every one of 'em by their proper Names: but here we ſpeak of ſuch things as give a denomination to their Subjects, which we told you, could never admit of their contraries. Then, turning to *Cebes*, did not this Objection, ſays he, likewiſe give you ſome trouble?

Contraries do in effect ſucceed one another; but never are found together. Thus cold, while it is cold, can never become heat.

No, indeed, *Socrates*, replies *Cebes*; I can aſſure you, that few things are capable to trouble me at preſent.

Then we are agreed upon this ſimple Propoſition, ſays *Socrates*, that a contrary can never be contrary to it ſelf.

That's true, ſays *Cebes*.

But what do you ſay to this? Is Cold and Heat any thing?

Yes ſure.

What, is it like Snow and Fire?

No, ſure, *Socrates*.

(*a*) That is, there he ſpoke of ſenſible things which have contraries, and are capable of receiving theſe contraries reciprocally, as a little thing becomes big, and a big thing little. But here he ſpeaks of the things themſelves, the intelligible contraries, ſuch as cold and heat, which give name to the ſubjects they're lodg'd in by their own name, and are never capable of receiving their contraries, for cold can never become heat, nor heat cold. They are always what they are.

Then

He speaks of heat and cold, as abstracted from their subjects.

Then you own, that Heat is different from Fire, and Cold from Snow?

Without queſtion, *Socrates.*

I believe you'll likewiſe own, that when the Snow receives Heat, it is no more what it was, but either gives way, or diſappears for good and all, when the Heat approaches. In like manner the Fire will either yield or be extinguiſhed when the Cold prevails upon it; for then it cannot be Fire and Cold together.

'Tis ſo, ſays *Cebes.*

As the even and odd numbers.

There are alſo ſome contraries that not only give name to their Species; but likewiſe impart it to other things different from it, which preſerve its figure and form while they have a being. For inſtance, Muſt not an odd thing have always the ſame name?

Yes, ſure.

For the ternary number partakes of the odd.

Is that the only thing that is ſo called? Or, is not there ſome other thing different from it, which muſt needs be called by the ſame name, by reaſon that it belongs to its nature never to be without odds. For inſtance, Muſt not the ternary number be called not only by its own name, but likewiſe by the name of an odd number; tho' at the ſame time to be odd and to be three are two different things? Now ſuch is the nature of number three, five, and all other odd numbers; each of 'em is always odd, and yet their nature is not the ſame with the nature of the odd. In like manner, even numbers, ſuch as two, four, eight, are all of 'em even, tho' at the ſame time their nature is not that of the even. Do not you own this?

How can I do otherwiſe, *Cebes?*

Pray mind what I infer from thence. 'Tis, that not only thoſe contraries which are incapable of receiving their contraries; but all other things which are not oppoſite one to another, and yet have always their contraries; all theſe things, I ſay, are uncapable of receiving a form oppoſite to their own;

and

and either disappear or perish upon the appearance of the opposite form. For instance: Number three will sink a thousand times rather than become an even number while it continues to be three. Is it not so?

Yes, sure, replies *Cebes.*

But, after all, says *Socrates*, two are not contrary to three.

No, sure.

Then the contrary Species are not the only things that refuse admission to their contraries; since, as you see, other things that are not contrary cannot abide the approach of that which has the least shadow of contrariety. *As two cannot receive three, nor three two, tho' they are not contraries.*

That's certain.

Do you desire then that I should define 'em as near as possible?

Ay, withal my Heart, *Socrates.*

Must not Contraries be such things as give such a form to that in which they are lodg'd, that it is not capable of giving admission to another thing that's contrary to them? *The definition of contraries.*

How do you say?

I say as I said but now. Wherever the Idea or Form of three is lodg'd, that thing must of necessity continue not only to be three but to be odd.

Who doubts that?

And by consequence 'tis impossible for the Idea or Form that's contrary to its constituent Form, ever to approach.

That's a plain case.

Well, is not the constituent Form an odd?

Yes.

Is not *even* the Form that's contrary to the odd?

Yes.

Then the Form of even is never lodg'd in three?

No, sure.

Then three is uncapable of being even?

Most certainly.

And that, because three is odd?

Yes, sure

Now

Now this is the concluſion I mean'd to prove, That ſome things, that are not contrary to one another, are as uncapable of that other thing, as if it were truly a contrary; as for inſtance, tho' three is not contrary to an even number, yet it can never admit of it. For two brings always ſomething contrary to an odd number, like fire to cold, and ſeveral other things. Would not you agree then to this definition, that a contrary does not only refuſe admiſſion to its contrary, but likewiſe to that which being not contrary brings upon it ſomething of a contrary nature, which by that ſort of contrariety, deſtroys its form?

I pray you let me hear that again, ſays *Cebes*; for 'tis worth the while to hear it often.

I ſay, number *five* will never be an even number; juſt as ten, which is its double, will never be odd; no more than three fourths, or a third part, or any other part of a whole will never admit of the form and idea of the whole. Do you not underſtand me, do you take me up, and do you agree with what I ſay?

I underſtand you; I apprehend you to a Miracle; and I agree with you too.

Since you underſtand me, ſays *Socrates*; pray anſwer me as I do you; that is, anſwer me, not what I ask, but ſomething elſe, according to the Idea and Example I have given you; I mean, that beſides the true and certain way of anſwering ſpoken of already, I have yet another in my view that ſprings from that and is fully as ſure. For inſtance, if you ask me, what it is, that being in the Body, makes it hot, I would not give you this ignorant, tho' ſure Anſwer, that 'tis Heat: but would draw a more particular Anſwer from what we have been ſpeaking of, and would tell you, that it is Fire: And, if you ſhould ask what it is that makes the Body ſick, I would not ſay, 'twas the Diſeaſe but the Fever. If you ask me what makes a Number odd, I would not tell you, that it is the odneſs, but unity, and ſo of the reſt.

For theſe anſwers ſtill make room for new queſtions, and ſo there's no end. We ſhould always have recourſe to the firſt cauſes or the ſubſtantial cauſe.

Do you underſtand what I mean?

I

I underſtand you perfectly well, replies *Cebes*.

Anſwer me, then, continues *Socrates*; what makes the Body live? *He does not ſay Life, but the Soul.*

The Soul.

Is the Soul always the ſame?

How ſhould it be otherwiſe.

Does the Soul then carry Life along with it into all the Bodies it enters?

Moſt certainly.

Is there any thing that's contrary to Life, or is there nothing?

Yes, Death is the Contrary of Life.

Then the Soul will never receive that which is contrary to what it carries in its Boſom? That's a neceſſary Conſequence from our Principles. *For the Soul can no more receive its contrary, than the odd can the even, or two three.*

'Tis a plain Conſequence, ſays *Cebes*.

But what Name do we give to that which refuſes admiſſion to the Idea and Form of Evenneſs?

'Tis the odd Number.

How do we call that which never receives Juſtice, and that which never receives Good?

The one is called Injuſtice, and the other Evil.

And how do we call that which never admits of Death?

Immortal.

Does the Soul admit of Death?

No.

(*a*) Then the Soul is immortal.

Moſt certainly.

Is that fully demonſtrated, or was the Demonſtration imperfect?

It is fully made out, *Socrates*.

(*b*) If an odd Number of neceſſity were incorruptible, would not three be ſo too?

(*a*) His meaning is, that the Soul is as far from dying, as Good from giving admiſſion to Evil, or Juſtice to Injuſtice, or an Odd to Even: and that the Soul is immortal, as neceſſarily as three is odd.

(*b*) If the Soul be immortal, it is incorruptible, *i. e.* it reſiſts and triumphs over all the Aſſaults of Death.

Who

Who doubts it?

If whatever is without Heat were neceſſarily incorruptible, would not Snow, when put to the Fire, withdraw it ſelf ſafe from the Danger? For ſince it cannot periſh, it will never receive the Heat notwithſtanding its being held to the Fire.

What you ſay is true.

In like manner, if that which is not ſuſceptible of Cold, were by a natural Neceſſity exempted from periſhing, tho' a whole River were thrown upon the Fire, it would never go out, but, on the contrary, would come off with its full force.

There's an abſolute Neceſſity for that, ſays *Cebes*.

Then of neceſſity we muſt ſay the ſame of what is immortal, If that which is immortal is incorruptible, tho' Death approach to the Soul, it ſhall never fall in the Attack: For, as we ſaid but now, the Soul will never receive Death, and will never die; juſt as three or any odd Number will never be even; Fire will never be Cold; nor its Heat be turn'd into Coldneſs.

(*a*) Perhaps ſome may anſwer, That 'tis true, the odd can never become even, by the acceſſion of what is even, while it continues odd; but what ſhould hinder the even to take up the room of the odd when it comes to periſh? To this Objection (*b*) it cannot be anſwer'd, that the odd does not periſh, for it is not incorruptible. Had we eſtabliſh'd its incorruptibility, we ſhould juſtly have maintain'd, that notwithſtanding the attacks of the even, the odd

(*a*) *Socrates* prevents an Objection, *viz.* That the Soul, while it is a Soul, does not receive Death; but, upon the approach of Death, it ceaſes to be what it was. To this he gives a ſatisfactory Anſwer.

(*b*) He means, that a real and ſenſible odd cannot become even by the arrival of an even occaſioning the diſappearance of the odd: for a real odd is not exempted from periſhing. But the Soul is immortal, as three is odd, ſo that it cannot die, but continues for ever, as well as Life, Juſtice, the Proportions of Numbers, an intelligible Odd, &c.

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or three would ſtill come off without loſs: and we ſhould have aſſerted the ſame of Fire, Heat, and ſuch other things, ſhould not we?

Moſt certainly, ſays *Cebes*.

And, by conſequence, if we agree upon this, that every immortal thing is incorruptible, it will neceſſarily follow, not only that the Soul is immortal, but that it is incorruptible. And if we cannot agree upon that, we muſt look out for other Proof.

There's no occaſion for that, *Socrates*, replies *Cebes*; for what is it that ſhould avoid Corruption and Death, if an immortal and eternal Being be liable to them?

All the World will agree, ſays *Socrates*, that God, and Life it ſelf, and whatever 'tis that is immortal, does not periſh.

(*a*) At leaſt, ſays *Cebes*, all Men will profeſs ſo.

The Conſequence is abſolutely neceſſary and certain.

And, by conſequence, continues *Socrates*, when a Man comes to die, his mortal and corruptible Part dies; but the immortal Part goes off ſafe and triumphs over Death.

That's plain and evident.

Then, my dear *Cebes*, if there be any ſuch thing as an immortal and incorruptible Being, ſuch is the the Soul; and by conſequence our Souls ſhall live hereafter.

I have nothing to object, ſays *Cebes*; and cannot but yield to your Arguments. But if *Simmias* or any of the Company has any thing to offer, they'll do well not to ſtifle it; for when will they find another

(*a*) *Cebes* means, that Men will be forc'd to ſay ſo, becauſe, perhaps, they have not Light enough to defeat theſe Reaſons, tho' 'tis poſſible they are none of the beſt. *Socrates* preſently ſmells this to be the Importance of *Cebes*'s Words; and, on that view, makes this incomparable Reply, That the Gods will yet more agree to it; meaning to give us to know, that Truth is more Truth in the Intellect of God, than in the Mind of Man, which is always too weak to comprehend it.

occasion for discoursing and satisfying themselves upon these important Subjects?

The greatness of the Subject, and the natural Weakness of Men, are two great Occasions of their uncertainty with reference to the Immortality of the Soul.

For my part, says *Simmias*, I cannot but subscribe to what *Socrates* has said: but I own, that the Greatness of the Subject and the natural Weakness of Man, occasion within me a sort of Distrust and Incredulity.

You have not only spoke well, says *Socrates*; but besides, notwithstanding the apparent Certainty of our first *Hypothesis*, 'tis needful you should resume them, in order to a more leisurely view, and to convince your self more clearly and effectually. If you understand 'em sufficiently, you'll willingly second my Thoughts, as much as is possible for a Man to do: and when you are once fully convinc'd, you'll need no other Proof.

He exhorts his Friends to survey his Arguments more maturely after his Death, being perswaded that the more they dwell upon 'em, the more they'll be convinc'd of their truth.

That's well said, replies *Cebes*.

The rewarding the Good and punishing the Wicked in the other World, being Consequents of the Immortality of the Soul, require our Care of the Soul in this Life.

(*a*) There's one thing more, my Friends, that is a very just Thought, *viz.* That if the Soul is immortal, it stands in need to cultivating and improvement, not only in the Time, that we call the Time of Life; but for the Future, or what we call the Time of Eternity: for if you think justly upon this Point, you'll find it very dangerous to neglect the Soul. Were Death the Dissolution of the whole Man, it would be (*b*) a great Advantage to the Wicked after Death,

(*a*) 'Tis not enough that the Understanding be convinc'd of the Immortality of the Soul: The Affections must likewise be mov'd. To which end he represents the Consequences of that important Truth, and all that it requires.

(*b*) The Wicked would be happy, if the Soul were mortal. This Principle has a considerable Proof of the Immortality of the Soul couch'd in it; for, if the Soul were mortal, Vertue would be pernicious to the Good, and Vice would be serviceable to the Wicked, which is unworthy of God. And by consequence there must be another Life, for rewarding the Good, and punishing the Bad.

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to be rid at once of their Body, their Soul, and their Vices. But forasmuch as the Soul is immortal, the only Way to avoid those Evils and obtain Salvation, is to become Good and Wise: for it carries nothing along with it, but its good or bad Actions, and its Vertues or Vices, which are the cause of its eternal Happiness or Misery, commencing from the first Minute of its arrival in the other World. And 'tis said, that after the Death of every individual Person, the *Demon* or *Genius*, that was Partner with it and conducted it during Life, leads it to a certain Place, where all the Dead are oblig'd to appear in order to be judg'd, and from thence are conducted by a Guide to the World below. And, after they have there received their good or bad Deserts, and continued there their appointed Time, another Conductor brings 'em back to this Life, after several Revolutions of Ages. Now this Road is not a plain united Road, else there would be no occasion for Guides, and no Body would miss their Way: But there are several By-ways and Cross-ways, as I conjecture from the Method of our Sacrifices and religious Ceremonies. So that a temperate wise Soul follows its Guide, and is not ignorant of what happens to it: but the Soul, that's nail'd to its Body, as I said just now, that is inflam'd with the love of it, and has been long its Slave, after much struggling and suffering in this visible World, is at last dragg'd along against its Will by the *Demon* allotted for its Guide: and when it arrives at that fatal Rendezvous of all Souls, if it has been guilty of any Impurity, or polluted with Murder, or has committed any of those atrocious Crimes, that desperate and lost Souls are commonly guilty of, the other Souls abhor it and avoid its Company: It finds neither Companion nor Guide, but wanders in a fearful Solitude and horrible Desart; till after a certain time Necessity drags it into the Mansions it deserves; whereas the temperate and pure Soul, has the Gods themselves for its Guides and Conductors, and goes to cohabit with them in

The Soul carries nothing into the other World, but its good or bad Actions.

The Sacrifices and Ceremonies of the Pagans were only Figures. The Lie did always imitate the Truth.

the Manſions of Pleaſure prepar'd for it. For, my Friends, there are ſeveral marvellous Places in the Earth; and 'tis not at all ſuch as the Deſcribers of it are wont to make it, (*a*) as I was taught by one who knew it very well.

How do you ſay, *Socrates*, ſays *Simmias*, interrupting him? I have likewiſe heard ſeveral things of the Earth, but not what you have heard. Wherefore I wiſh you would be pleas'd to tell us what you know.

To recount that to you, my dear *Simmias*, I do not believe we have any occaſion for (*b*) *Glaucus*'s Art. But to make out the Truth of it, is a more difficult Matter, and I queſtion if all *Glaucus*'s Art can reach it. Such an Attempt is not only above my Reach; but ſuppoſing it were not, the ſhort Time I have left me will not ſuffer me to imbarque in ſo long a Diſcourſe. All that I can do, is, to give give you a general Idea of this Earth and the Places it contains.

That will be enough, ſays *Simmias*.

In the firſt place, continues *Socrates*, I am perſuaded, that if the Earth is plac'd in the middle of Heaven, (the Air) as they ſay it is, it ſtands in no

(*a*) *Socrates* does not mention who taught him this Doctrine of the pure Earth: But it is no hard matter to find out the Author. *Proclus* himſelf acknowledges, that *Socrates* and *Plato* ow'd this *Idea* to the Sacred Tradition of the *Egyptians*, that is to the *Hebrews*, ὁ καὶ ἡ τῶν αἰγυπτίων ἱερὰ φήμη παραδέδοκε. In Tim. lib. 1.

(*b*) When they mean'd to imply the difficulty of a thing, they were wont to ſay, by way of Proverb, That they ſtood in need of *Glaucus*'s Art, who, from a Man, became a Sea-God. But thoſe who comment upon this Proverb, alledge it was made upon another *Glaucus*, who invented the Forging of Iron. But I am induc'd to believe the contrary, by this, that the Fable of *Glaucus*, the Sea-God, was founded upon his being an excellent Diver; to which it is probable *Socrates* alluded: In earneſt, if one would viſit the Earth he ſpeaks of, of which ours is only a Sediment, he muſt be a better Diver than *Glaucus*, in order to paſs the Currents and Seas that divide 'em. He muſt raiſe his Thoughts above all Earth or material Things.

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need either of Air or any other Support to prevent its fall: for Heaven it self is wrapp'd equally about it, and its own *equilibrium* is sufficient to keep it up: for whatever is equally pois'd in the middle of a thing, that presses equally upon it, cannot incline to either side, and consequently stands firm and unmovable. This I am convinc'd of.

You have reason so to be, replies *Simmias*.

I am further persuaded, that the Earth is very large and spacious, and that we only inhabit that part of it which reaches from the River *Phasis* to the Straits of *Gibraltar*, upon which we are scatter'd like so many Ants dwelling in Holes, or like Frogs that reside in some Marsh near the Sea. There are several other Nations that inhabit its other Parts that are unknown to us: for all over the Earth there are Holes of all Sizes and Figures, always fill'd with gross Air, and cover'd with thick Clouds, and over-flown by the Waters that rush in on all sides.

The Idea of this pure Earth is taken from the Writings of the Prophets, from whence the Egyptians *deriv'd it.*

There is another pure Earth above the pure Heaven where the Stars are, which is commonly call'd *Æther*. The Earth we inhabit is properly nothing else but the Sediment of the other, and its grosser part which flows continually into those Holes. We are immur'd in those Cells, tho' we are not sensible of it, and fancy we inhabit the upper part of the pure Earth; much after the same rate, as if one living in the Deeps of the Sea should fancy his Habitation to be above the Waters; and, when he sees the Sun and other Stars through the Waters, should fancy the Sea to be the Heavens; and, by reason of his Heavineſs and Weakneſs, having never put forth his Head or rais'd himself above the Waters, should never know that the Place we inhabit is purer and neater than his, and should never meet with any Person to inform him. This is just our Condition: we are mew'd up within some Hole of the Earth, and fancy we live at the top of all; we take the Air for the true Heavens, in which the Stars run

their rounds. And the cauſe of our Miſtake is our Heavineſs and Weakneſs that keep us from ſurmounting this thick and muddy Air. If any could mount up with Wings to the upper Surface, he would no ſooner put his Head out of this groſs Air, but he would behold what's tranſacted in thoſe bleſſed Manſions; juſt as the Fiſhes, skipping above the Surface of the Waters, ſee what's done in the Air in which we breath. And if he were a Man fit for long Contemplation, he would find it to be the true Heaven and the true Light; in a word, to be the true Earth. For this Earth that we inhabit, theſe Stones and all theſe Places are entirely corrupted and gnaw'd, juſt as whatever is in the Sea is corroded by the ſharpneſs of the Salts. And the Sea produces nothing that's perfect or valuable. It contains nothing but Caves and Mud; and wherever any Ground is found, there's nothing but deep Sloughs, nothing comparable to what we have here. Now the Things in the other Manſions are more above what we have here, than what we have here is above what we meet with in the Sea. And, in order to make you conceive the Beauty of this pure Earth ſituated in the Heavens, if you pleaſe, I'll tell you a pretty Story that's worth your hearing.

For the true Heavens and true Light cannot be known without long and continual Meditation.

Socrates *undervalued all the Productions of the Sea, which we now eſteem ſo much.*

We ſhall hear it, ſays *Simmias*, with a great deal of Pleaſure.

(*a*) Firſt of all, my dear *Simmias*, continues *Socrates*, if one looks upon this Earth from a high Place, they ſay, it looks like one of our Packs cover'd with twelve Welts of different Colours. For it is vary'd with a greater number of different Colours, of which thoſe made uſe of by our Painters are but ſorry Pat-

(*a*) This Deſcription of the Beauty of this pure Earth, the Manſion of the Bleſſed, is grounded on the 54th Chapter of *Iſaiah*, and the 28th of *Ezechiel*.

terns.

terns. For the Colours of this Earth are infinitely more clean and lively. One is an admirable Purple; another a Colour of Gold, more ſparkling than Gold it ſelf; a third a White more lively than the Snow, and ſo on of all the reſt, the Beauty whereof leaves all our Colours here far behind it. The Chinks of this Earth are fill'd with Water and Air, which make up an infinity of admirable Shadows, ſo wonderfully diverſified by that infinite variety of Colours.

In this ſo perfect an Earth, every thing has a Perfection anſwerable to its Qualities. The Trees, Flowers, Fruits, and Mountains are charmingly beautiful; they produce all ſorts of precious Stones, of an incomparable Perfection, Cleanneſs and Splendour; thoſe we eſteem ſo much here, ſuch as Emeralds, Jaſper and Saphir, are but ſmall parcels of them. There is not one in that bleſſed Earth that is not infinitely more pretty than any of ours. The Cauſe of all which is, that all theſe precious Stones are pure, neither gnaw'd nor ſpoil'd by the ſharpneſs of the Salts, or the corruption of the Sediment or Dregs that fall from thence into our lower Earth, where they aſſemble, and infect not only the Stones and the Earth, but the Plants and Animals, with all ſorts of Pollution and Diſeaſes.

Beſides all theſe Beauties now mention'd; this bleſſed Earth is enrich'd with Gold and Silver, which being ſcatter'd all over in great abundance, caſts forth a charming Splendor on all ſides: ſo that a ſight of this Earth, is a view of the Bleſſed. It is inhabited by all ſorts of Animals, and by Men, ſome of whom are caſt into the centre of the Earth, and others are ſcatter'd about the Air, as we are about the Sea. There are ſome alſo that inhabit the Iſles, form'd by the Air near the Continent. For there (a)

The Notion of theſe Animals ſeems to be taken from the Viſions of Ezechiel.

(a). In this Deſcription we may perceive moſt of the Strokes of that given by *Moſes* of the terreſtrial Paradiſe, which was a Type of this Land of the Juſt, the true Paradiſe. And, what I take to be very remarkable, we may plainly ſee that theſe Philoſophers held this pure Earth to be actually in being at the ſame time with this our impure and groſſer Earth.

the Air is the ſame thing, that Water and the Sea are here: and the *Æther* does them the ſame Service that the Air does to us. Their Seaſons are ſo admirably well temper'd, that their Life is much longer than ours, and always free from Diſtempers: And as for their Sight, Hearing, and all their other Senſes; and even their Intellect it ſelf; they ſurpaſs us as far as the *Æther* they breath in exceeds our groſs Air for Simplicity and Purity. They have ſacred Groves, and Temples actually inhabited by the Gods, who give evidence of their preſence by Oracles, Divinations, Inſpirations, and all other ſenſible Signs; and who converſe with 'em. They ſee the Sun and Moon, without an intervening Medium, and view the Stars as they are in themſelves. And all the other Branches of their Felicity are proportional to theſe.

This is the Situation of that Earth, and this is the Matter of all that ſurrounds it. All about it, there are ſeveral Abyſſes in its Cavities, ſome of which are deeper and more open than the Country we inhabit; others are deeper, but not ſo open; and ſome again have a more extenſive Breadth but a leſſer Depth. All theſe Abyſſes are bor'd through in ſeveral Parts, and have Pipes communicating one with another, thro' which there runs, juſt as in the Caves of Mount *Ætna*, a vaſt quantity of Water, very large and deep Rivers, Springs of cold and hot Waters, Fountains and (*a*) Rivers of Fire, and other Rivers of Mud, ſome thinner and ſome thicker and more muddy, like thoſe Torrents of Mud and of Fire that are caſt out from Mount *Ætna*.

Theſe Abyſſes are fill'd with theſe Waters in proportion to their falling out of one into another. All theſe Sources move both downwards and upwards, like a Veſſel hung above the Earth; which Veſſel

(*a*) *Plato* borrow'd from the Writings of the Prophets, thoſe Rivers of Fire prepar'd for the Puniſhment of the Wicked after their Judgment; and particularly had read the eighth Chapter of *Daniel*. *Theodoret*.

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is naturally one, and indeed the greateſt of theſe Abyſſes: It goes acroſs the whole Earth, and is open on two ſides. *Homer* ſpeaks of it, when he ſays (*b*), I'll throw it into the obſcure *Tartarus*, that's a great way from hence; the deepeſt Abyſs under the Earth. *Homer* is not the only Author that call'd this Place by the Name of *Tartarus*: Moſt of the other Poets did the ſame. *In the beginning of the 8th Book of his Iliads.*

All the Rivers rendezvous in this Abyſs, and run out from thence again. Each of theſe Rivers is tinctur'd with the nature of the Earth through which it runs. And the reaſon of their not ſtagnating in theſe Abyſſes is this, that they find no Ground, but roul and throw their Waters upſide down. The Air and Wind that girds 'em about, does the ſame, for it follows them both when they riſe above the Earth, and when they deſcend towards us. And juſt as in the reſpiration of Animals there is an inceſſant ingreſs and egreſs of Air, ſo the Air that's mingled with the Waters accompanies them in their ingreſs and egreſs, and raiſes raging Winds.

When theſe Waters fall into this lower Abyſs, they diffuſe themſelves into all the Channels of the Springs and Rivers, and fill them up; juſt as if one were drawing up Water with two Pails, one of which fills as the other empties. For theſe Waters flowing from thence, fill up all our Channels; from whence diffuſing themſelves all about, they fill our Seas, Rivers, Lakes and Fountains. After that they diſappear, and diving into the Earth, ſome with a large compaſs, and others by ſmall turnings, repair to *Tartarus*, where they enter by other Paſſages than thoſe they came out by, and withal much lower. Some re-enter on the ſame ſide, and others on the oppoſite ſide to that of their egreſs; and ſome a-

(*a*) The Prophet *Ezekiel* calls this *Tartarus*, *The nether Part of the Earth*. He ſpeaks of the Rivers and Waters in the Pit, *chap.* 31. 14, 13. & 32. 18. But long before *Ezekiel*, *Homer*, had the ſame Idea's from the Tradition of the *Egyptians*.

gain

gain enter on all ſides, after they have made one or ſeveral turns round the Earth ; like Serpents folding their Bodies into ſeveral rows ; and having gain'd entrance, riſe up to the middle of the Abyſs, but cannot reach further, by reaſon that the other half is higher than their level. They form ſeveral very great and large Currents ; but there are four (*a*) principal ones, the greateſt of which is the outermoſt of all, and is call'd the Ocean.

Oppoſite to that is *Acheron*, which runs through the deſart Places, and diving through the Earth, falls into the Marſh, which from it is call'd the *Acheruſian Lakes*, whither all Souls repair upon their departure from this Body ; and having ſtay'd there all the time appointed, ſome a ſhorter ſome a longer time, are ſent back to this World to animate Beaſts.

Between *Acheron* and the *Ocean*, there runs a third River, which retires again not far from its Source, and falls into a vaſt ſpace full of Fire : There it forms a Lake greater than our Sea, in which the Water mix'd with Mud boils, and ſetting out from thence all black and muddy, runs along the Earth to the end of the *Acheruſian* Lake without mixing with its Waters ; and after having made ſeveral turnings under the Earth, throws it ſelf underneath *Tartarus* ; and this is the flaming River call'd *Phlegeton*, the Streams whereof are ſeen to fly up upon the Earth in ſeveral Places.

Oppoſite to this is the fourth River, which falls firſt into a horrible wild Place, of a bluiſh Colour, call'd by the name of *Stygian*, where it forms the

(*a*) Theſe four Rivers which have their Courſe in the places appointed for the puniſhment of the Wicked, might have been imagin'd from the four Rivers of the *Terreſtrial Paradiſe*. As the Apartment of the juſt was water'd by four Rivers, which enlarg'd its Delightfulneſs ; 'twas proper that the Apartment of the Wicked ſhould likewiſe be water'd by four Rivers of a contrary nature, which might add to the Horror of that Place of Darkneſs and Sorrow.

for-

formidable Lake of *Styx*. And after it has tinctur'd it self with horrible qualities from the Waters of that Lake, dives into the Earth, where it makes several turns, and directing its Course over-against *Phlegeton*, at last meets it in the Lake of *Acheron*, where it does not mingle its Waters with those of the other Rivers, but after it has run its round on the Earth, throws it self into the *Tartarus* by a Passage opposite to that of *Phlegeton*. This fourth River is call'd by the Poets *Cocytus*. Nature having thus dispos'd of all these Things; when the Dead arrive at the Place whither their *Demon* leads them, they are all tried and judged, both those that liv'd a holy and just Life, and those who wallow'd in Injustice and Impiety.

The Judgment of the Good and the Bad.

Those who are found to have liv'd neither entirely a criminal nor absolutely an innocent Life, are sent to the *Acheron*. There they imbark in Boats, and are transported to the *Acherusian* Lake, where they dwell, and suffer Punishment proportionable to their Crimes; till at last being purg'd and cleansed from their Sins, and set at Liberty, they receive the Recompence of their good Actions.

The Judgment of those, who are neither absolutely criminal nor innocent.

Those whose Sins are uncurable, and have been guilty of Sacrilege and Murder, or such other Crimes, are by a just and fatal Destiny, thrown headlong into *Tartarus*, where they are kept Prisoners for ever.

The Judgment of those who are guilty of mortal Sins.

But those who are found guilty of curable (Venial) Sins, tho very great ones, such as offering Violence to their Father or Mother in a Passion, or killing a Man and repenting for it all their life-time; must of necessity be likewise cast into *Tartarus*: But after a Years abode there, the Tide throws the Homicides back into *Cocytus*, and the Parricides into *Phlegeton*, which draws them into the *Acherusian* Lake: There they cry out bitterly, and invoque those

The Sentence upon those who are guilty of great Sins, curable by Repentance.

By Parricides he means those who offer Violence to their Parents. For killing a Parent is an irremissible Sin.

whom

whom they kill'd or offer'd Violence to, to aid them; and conjure them to forgive 'em, and to suffer 'em to pass the Lake, and give them admittance. If they're prevail'd with, they pass the Lake, and are deliver'd from their Misery; if not, they are cast again into *Tartarus*, which throws them back into these Rivers; and this continues to be repeated, till they have satisfied the injur'd Persons. For such is the Sentence pronounc'd against them.

Socrates teaches that satisfaction must precede the Pardon of Sins.

But those who have distinguish'd themselves by a holy Life, are releas'd from these earthly Places, these horrible Prisons; and are receiv'd above into that pure Earth, where they dwell; and those of 'em who are sufficiently purg'd by Philosophy, live for ever without their Body; and are receiv'd into yet more admirable and delicious Mansions, which I cannot easily describe, neither do the narrow Limits of my Time allow me to launch into that Subject.

This was a great Error among the Heathens. They did not believe that the Body could be glorified.

What I told you but now, is sufficient, my dear *Simmias*, to shew that we ought to labour all our life-time to purchase Vertue and Wisdom, since we have so great a Hope, and so great a Reward propos'd to us.

A blessed Immortality is a great Price set before us.

No Man of Sense can pretend to assure you, that all these Things are just as you have heard. But all thinking Men will be positive that the State of the Soul, and the Place of its abode after death, is absolutely such as I represent it to be, or at least very near it, provided the Soul be Immortal: And will certainly find it worth his while to run the Risque: For what Danger is more inviting? One must needs be charm'd with that blessed Hope. And for this Reason I have dilated a little upon this Subject.

Socrates *assures us that the Matter is so, but is not positive of the Manner.*

What Danger more inviting, than to venture a finite Loss for an infinite Gain?

Every

Every one that during his life-time renounc'd the Pleasures of the Body, that look'd upon the Appurtenances of the Body as foreign Ornaments, and siding with the contrary Party, pursued only the Pleasures of true Knowledge, and beautified his Soul, not with foreign Ornaments, but with Ornaments, suitable to its nature, such as Temperance, Justice, Fortitude, Liberty and Truth: Such a one, being firmly confident of the Happiness of his Soul, ought to wait peaceably for the Hour of his removal, as being always ready for the Voyage, when ever his Fate calls him.

The Pleasures of true Knowledge.

The suitable Ornaments of the Soul.

As for you, my dear *Simmias* and *Cebes*, and all you of this Company, you shall all follow me when your Hour comes. Mine is now, and as a tragical Poet would say, the surly Pilot calls me abroad; wherefore 'tis time I should go to the Bath: For I think 'tis better to drink the Poyson after I am wash'd, in order to save the Women the trouble of washing me after I'm dead.

Socrates having thus spoke, *Crito* address'd himself to *Socrates*, thus: Alas then! in God's Name be it: But what Orders do you give me and the rest here present, with reference to your Children or your Affairs, that by putting them in execution, we may at least have the Comfort of obliging you?

What I now recommend to you, *Crito*, replies *Socrates*, is what I always recommended, *viz.* To take Care of your selves. You cannot do your selves a more considerable piece of Service, nor oblige me and my Family more, (*a*) than to promise me at

To ask nothing of our Friends but that they take Care of themselves.

(*a*) There's a great deal of Sense in what *Socrates* here tells his Friends: He desires 'em only to take Care of themselves, because if they take Care of themselves, they'll prove good Men; and, being such, will do all good Offices to his Family, tho' they did not promise it: For good Men are honest, and take pleasure in doing Good, and love their Neighbour. Whereas if they neglect themselves, notwithstanding all their fair Promises, they would not be capable to do any thing either for him or themselves. None but good Men can do Services. How great is this Truth!

All is comprehended in that Prayer.

this

this time ſo to do. Whereas if you neglect your ſelves, and refuſe to form your Lives according to the (*b*) Model I always propoſed to you, and follow it as it were by the footſteeps; all your Proteſtations and offers of Service will be altogether uſeleſs to me.

We ſhall do our utmoſt, *Socrates*, replies *Crito*, to obey you. But how will you be buried?

Juſt as you pleaſe, ſays *Socrates*: if you can but catch me, and if I do not give you the ſlip. At the ſame time, looking upon us with a gentle ſmile, I cannot, ſays he, compaſs my End in perſuading *Crito* that this is *Socrates* who diſcourſes with you and methodiſes all the Parts of his Diſcourſe; and ſtill he fanſies that *Socrates* is the thing that ſhall ſee Death by and by. He confounds me with my Corps; and in that view asks how I muſt be buried? And all this long Diſcourſe that I made to you but now, in order to make it out, that as ſoon as I ſhall have taken down the Poyſon, I ſhall ſtay no longer with you, but ſhall part from hence and go to enjoy the Felicity of the Bleſſed; in a word, all that I have ſaid for your Conſolation and mine, is to no purpoſe, but it is all loſt, with reference to him. I beg of you that you would be Bail for me to *Crito*, but after a contrary manner to that in which he offer'd to Bail me to my Judges; for he engag'd that I would not be gone: Pray engage for me, that I ſhall no ſooner be dead, but I ſhall be gone, to the end that poor *Crito* may bear my death more ſteddily, and when he ſees my Body burnt or interr'd, may not deſpair, as if I ſuffer'd great Miſery; and ſay at my Funeral, that *Socrates* is laid out, *Socrates* is carried out, *Socrates* is interr'd. For you muſt know, my dear *Crito*, ſays he turning to him, that ſpeaking amiſs of Death is

(*b*) This Model is God; for he ſtill told 'em that they ſhould render themſelves conformable to God, as much as human Weakneſs would bear.

not

not only a Fault in the way of ſpeaking, but likewiſe wounds the Soul. You ſhou'd have more Courage and Hope, and ſay that my Body is to be interr'd. *That* you may interr as you pleaſe, and in the manner that's moſt conformable to our Laws and Cuſtoms.

Bad Diſcourſes give dangerous Wounds to the Soul.

Having ſpoke thus, he roſe and went into the next Room to bathe. *Crito* follow'd him, and he deſired we ſhould attend him. Accordingly we all attended him, and entertain'd our ſelves one while with a Repetition and farther Examination of what he had ſaid, another while in ſpeaking of the miſerable State that was before us. For we all look'd upon our ſelves as Perſons depriv'd of our good Father, that were about to paſs the reſt of our Life in an Orphan-ſtate.

After he came out of the Bath, they brought his Children to him; for he had three, two little ones, and one that was pretty big: And the Women of his Family came all in to him. He ſpoke to them ſome time in the preſence of *Crito*, gave 'em their Orders, and order'd 'em to retire, carry his Children along with 'em, and then came back to us. 'Twas then towards Sun ſetting, for he had been a long while in the little Room.

When he came in he ſat down upon his Bed, without ſaying much: For much about the ſame time the Officer of the Eleven Magiſtrates came in, and drawing near to him, *Socrates*, ſays he, I have no occaſion to make the ſame Complaint of you, that I have every day of thoſe in the ſame Condition: For as ſoon as I come to acquaint 'em, by Orders from the Eleven Magiſtrates, that they muſt drink the Poyſon, they are incens'd againſt me and curſe me: But as for you, ever ſince you came into this Place, I have found you to be the moſt even temper'd, the calmeſt and the beſt Man that ever enter'd this Priſon; and I am confident that at preſent you are not angry with me; doubtleſs you are angry with none but thoſe who are the cauſe of your

your misfortune. You know 'em without naming. On this Occasion, *Socrates*, you know what I come to tell you; farewell, endeavour to bear this Necessity with a constant Mind. Having spoke thus, he began to cry, and turning his Back upon us, retir'd a little. Farewell my Friend, says *Socrates*, looking upon him, I'll follow the Counsel thou giveſt me. Mind, says he, what Honesty is in that Fellow: During my Imprisonment he came often to see me, and discours'd with me: He's more worth than all the rest: How heartily he cries for me! Let us obey him with a handsom meen, my dear *Crito*; if the Poyson be brew'd, let him bring it; if not, let him brew it himself.

But methinks *Socrates*, says *Crito*, the Sun shines upon the Mountains, and is not yet set; and I know several in your Circumstances did not drink the Poyson till a long time after the Order was given; that they supp'd very well, (*a*) and enjoy'd any thing they had a mind to: Wherefore I conjure you not to press so hard; you have yet time enough.

He alludes to a Verse of Hesiod, *who says, 'tis an unlucky sparing when one's come to the bottom.*

Those who do as you say, *Crito*, says *Socrates*, have their own Reasons; they think it is just as much gain'd: And I have likewise my Reasons for not doing so; for the only Advantage I can have by drinking it later, is to make my self ridiculous to my self, in being so foolishly fond of Life, as to pretend to husband it in the last Minute, when there is no more to come. Go then, my dear *Crito*, and do as I bid you do, and do not vex me no longer.

Whereupon *Crito* gave the Sign to the Slave that waited just by. The Slave went out, and after he had spent some time in brewing the Poyson, return'd accompanied by him that was to give it, and

(*a*) This affords us an admirable Prospect of the infinite difference between *Socrates* and those brutish Men, who died without any other Sentiments of their Misery.

brought

brought it all together in a Cup. *Socrates* seeing him come in; that's very well, my Friend, say he; but what must I do? For you know best, and 'tis your business to direct me.

You have nothing else to do, says he, but whenever you have drank it, to walk until you find your Legs stiff, and then to lie down upon your Bed. This is all you have to do. And at the same time he gave him the Cup, *Socrates* took it, not only without any Commotion, or change of Colour or Countenance, but with Joy; and looking upon the Fellow with a steddy and bold Eye, as he was wont to do, What do you say of this Mixture, says he, is it allowable to make a Drink-Offering of it? *Socrates*, replied the Man, we never brew more at once, than what serves for one Dose.

I understand you, says *Socrates:* But at least it is lawful for me to pray to the Gods, that they would bless the Voyage, and render it happy. This I beg of 'em with all my Soul. Having said that, he drank it all off, with an admirable Tranquillity and an unexpressible Calmness. *Socrates prays before he swallows the Poyson.*

Hitherto we had, almost all of us, the power to refrain from Tears; but when we saw him drink it off, we were no longer Masters of our selves. Notwithstanding all my Efforts, I was oblig'd to cover my self with my Mantle, that I might freely regrate my Condition; for 'twas not *Socrates*'s misfortune, but my own, that I deplor'd, in reflecting what a Friend I was losing. *Crito*, who likewise could not abstain from crying, had prevented me, and risen up. And *Apollodorus*, who scarce ceased to cry during the whole Conference, did then howl and cry aloud, insomuch that he mov'd every Body. Only *Socrates* himself was not at all mov'd: On the contrary, he chid them: What are you doing, my Friends, says he; What! such fine Men as you are! O! Where is Vertue? Was not it for this Reason that I sent off those Women, for fear they

ſhould have fallen into thoſe Weakneſſes; for I always heard it ſaid that a Man ought to die in Tranquillity, and bleſſing God? Be eaſie then, and ſhew more Conſtancy and Courage. Theſe words fill'd us with Confuſion, and forc'd us to ſuppreſs our Tears.

We ſhould die calmly, bleſſing God.

In the mean time he continued to walk, and when he felt his Legs ſtiff, he lay down on his Back, as the Man had order'd him. At the ſame time, the ſame Man that gave him the Poyſon, came up to him, and after looking upon his Legs and Feet, bound up his Feet with all his force, and ask'd him if he felt it? He ſaid, No. Then he bound up his Legs; and having carried his Hand higher, gave us the Signal that he was quite cold. *Socrates* likewiſe felt himſelf with his Hand, and told us, that when the Cold came up to his Heart, he ſhould leave us. All his lower Belly was already frozen: And then uncovering himſelf, for he was cover'd, *Crito*, ſays he, (theſe were his laſt Words) * *We owe a Cock to* Æſculapius, *diſcharge this Vow for me, and do not forget it.* It ſhall be done, ſays *Crito*; but ſee if you have any thing elſe to ſay to us. He made no Anſwer, and after a little ſpace of time departed. The Man, who was ſtill by him, having uncover'd him, receiv'd

i.e. *His Head was cover'd, that nothing might trouble him.*

Socrates's *laſt Words.*

Having ſpoke theſe Words, he drew his Cloak again over his Head.

* Thoſe who have not div'd into the true meaning of *Socrates*, charge him with Idolatry and Superſtition, upon the ſcore of this Cock that he had vow'd to *Æſculapius*. But theſe words ſhould not be taken literally; they are ænigmatical, as many of *Plato*'s are; and can never be underſtood, without we have recourſe to Figures and Allegories. The Cock here is the Symbol of Life, and *Æſculapius* the Emblem of Phyſick. *Socrates*'s meaning is, that he reſigns his Soul into the hands of the true Phyſician, who comes to purifie and heal him. This Explication ſuits admirably well with the Doctrine taught by *Socrates* in this ſame Treatiſe, where he ſhews that Religious Sacrifices were only Figures. *Theodoret* had a juſter Notion of this Paſſage, than *Lactantius* and *Tertullian*, for he not only did not condemn it, but inſinuated that it

receiv'd his laſt Looks, which continued fix'd upon him. *Crito* ſeeing that, came up and cloſed his Mouth and Eyes.

This, *Echecrates*, was the *Exit* of our Friend, a Man, who † beyond all diſpute, was the beſt, the wiſeſt, and the juſteſt of all our Acquaintance.

it was Figurative; in his 7th Diſcourſe of the Cure of the Opinions of the *Pagans*. I am perſuaded, ſays he, that *Socrates* order'd a Cock to be ſacrific'd to *Æſculapius*, to ſhew the Injuſtice of his Condemnation; for he was condemn'd for owning no God. He own'd a God, and ſhew'd that his God ſtood in no need of our Sacrifices or Homage, and requir'd nothing elſe from us but Piety and Sanctity.

† *Xenophon*, that faithful Hiſtorian of the Actions and memorable Sayings of *Socrates*, gives him the ſame Encomium; and having ſaid, that he was the beſt Man in the World, and the greateſt Favourite of God, concludes in theſe Words: *If any Man be of another Mind, pray let him compare his Manners and Actions with thoſe of other Men, and then let him judge.* In effect, that is the true way of judging of Men. Nothing but the true Religion did ever form a more wonderful and divine Man than he was.

THE INTRODUCTION TO *LACHES.*

THE Education of Children is a thing of ſuch Importance, that the welfare of Families and the good of Eſtates depend wholly upon it. 'Tis no wonder then, that *Socrates*, who lov'd his Country intirely, was ſo watchful in hindring the *Athenians* to take falſe Meaſures in reference to that; and made it his buſineſs to cure their falſe Prejudices. The greateſt Prejudice, and perhaps the moſt pernicious to the Republick, was that which they entertain'd of Valour. The Wars they were then engag'd in, together with thoſe that threaten'd 'em afar off, had inſpir'd 'em with ſuch a Martial Ardour, that they thought of nothing but training up their Children to the Exerciſe of Arms; as being perſuaded that, *that* was the only way to render them ſerviceable to their Country. Beſides, Chance it ſelf had fortified the Thought; for not long before a ſort of Fencing-Maſter came to *Athens*, who talk'd wonders of his Art, and pretended to teach Valour, and to put his Scholars in a Condition to reſiſt by themſelves a greater number of Enemies. The People crouded to his School, and the young People quitted all, to betake themſelves to this Exerciſe. *Socrates*, foreſeeing the dangerous Conſequences of this their Application, labours to prevent it. And that is the Subject of this Conference.

As

As this Dialogue is capable to recommend it self by its great Title, so the Characters of its Actors ought to whet our Curiosity. *Lysimachus*, Son to the great *Aristides*, and *Melesias* Son to the great *Thucidides*, being gall'd with the thoughts of their bad Education, and resolv'd to take more Care of their Children, than their Fathers had taken of them; went to see for *Nicias* and *Laches*, who made already a considerable Figure in the Republick, and carried 'em to see this Fencing-Master. After the Show was over, they ask'd the Advice of these two Friends, whether they approv'd of that Exercise, and whether they should have their Children to learn it, or not? So the explication of Valour was the Subject of Discourse. And 'twas very probable that no Man would speak better upon that Subject, than these two, who had given Proof of their Valour on several Occasions. But, after all, they do not think themselves capable to decide such a difficult Question, without help: Therefore they call in *Socrates* to assist 'em, as being one that made the Interest of Youth his whole study; and, besides, gave Proof of an Heroick Courage at the Siege of *Potidæa*, and the Battle of *Delium*. *Nicias* is of Opinion that the Exercise is very proper for Youth, and admirably well fitted for rendring them brave and clever; and looks upon it as a means leading to a good End, *viz.* the Art of War. *Laches* attacks this Opinion, and makes out the uselessness of that Exercise by the insignificancy of its Teachers, who never did a good Action in their whole lifetime; and as for Valour, had never purchased the least Reputation in the Army. *Socrates* is called in to decide the Controversie. At first he pleads his Incapacity for an Excuse: But afterwards insinuates that there's a necessity of knowing Men, before one can be acquainted with Valour. He makes out the falsity of the Notion that great Men had of this Vertue, which is still kept up to this day: And tho' he does not reveal his Mind plainly to those

who call every thing in queſtion; yet one may eaſily perceive his Opinion to be this, That Valour is a Vertue that reaches all the Actions of our Life, and includes all other Vertues. For a valiant Man, is one that's always accompanied by Prudence, and judges equally of things, paſt, preſent, and to come; who being acquainted with all the Good and Evil, that is, has been, or is to come, is in a Condition to arm himſelf againſt the one, and omits nothing to compaſs the other. So that to be Valiant, one muſt be Good; and to educate Youth aright, they muſt be taught wiſely to avoid all Evil, and purſue all the Good they can reach, not only from Men, but, which is more important, from God himſelf: And to ſpare neither Labour nor Life in the purſuit. This is *Socrates*'s Doctrine. And *Plato* has made the World a good Preſent, in preſerving this excellent Conference: For we ought not to look upon it as a trial of Wit; it is entitled to a wonderful Solidity. Purſuant to this Doctrine of *Socrates*, we ſee plainly that the moſt valourous of all Men were the Martyrs; for their Valour was accompanied by a true Prudence, which taught 'em to diſtinguiſh what is truly Terrible, from that which is not; to know the paſt, preſent, and future Happineſs or Miſery; and mov'd 'em to ſcreen themſelves from the one, and purſue the other at the expence of their Lives.

It ſeems *Ariſtotle* did not perceive the full force and ſolidity of theſe Principles of *Socrates*, when he arraign'd him for ſaying that Valour was a Science. Doubtleſs, it is a Science, but a divine one, that cannot be learn'd from Men.

The ſolidity of this Dialogue is mix'd with a wonderful agreeableneſs: For whether we mind the Beauty of his Characters, the Livelineſs of the Narrative, the Spirit of the Dialogue, or the Satyrical Stroaks 'tis full of, we find nothing more perfect in its kind. His Satyr upon thoſe mighty Politicians who employ'd all their Care upon Affairs of State,

and

and neglected their Children, suffering them to be overrun by Vice; this, I say, is very natural. *Socrates* means by it to shew, that these great Men do more harm to the Commonwealth, by this unhappy Negligence, than ever they did good by all the Services they have done. His Satyr against Fencing-Masters is likewise very Ingenious, in which the Character of our Modern Pretenders is admirably well drawn. Those who have taken notice of *Nicias* in *Thucidides*, haranguing in the Athenian Council against the Sicilian Expedition; will here find an exact Transcript of his true Character. And that which above all deserves to be remark'd, is *Plato*'s Dexterity in crying up *Socrates*, and setting his Merit in a great Light.

This Dialogue is suppos'd to have been compos'd soon after the Defeat of the *Athenians* at *Delium*, which happen'd in the first Year of the 89th Olympiad. And to determine the Time more nicely, it may be fix'd the very next Year, during the Truce between the *Athenians* and *Lacedemonians*. 'Tis purely Moral, and of the same Character with the Dialogues of the first Volume.

LACHES:

OR, OF

VALOUR.

Lyſimachus, Son of *Ariſtides* the Juſt.
Meleſias, Son to *Thucidides*.
Ariſtides, Son to *Lyſimachus*. } Both of 'em very
Thucidides, Son to *Meleſias*. } young.
Nicias, General of the *Athenians*.
Laches, another *Athenian* General.
Socrates.

Lyſim. WELL, *Nicias* and *Laches*, you have ſeen this Man, who * parry'd in Armour juſt now. When *Meleſias* and I deſir'd you to come and ſee this Show, we did not tell you the Reaſons that oblig'd us to it: But now we'll tell you; being perſuaded that we may ſpeak to you with an entire Confidence. Moſt People laugh at theſe Exerciſes; and when one asks their Advice, they're ſo far from communicating their Thoughts, that they only try to pump thoſe who come to conſult 'em, and ſpeak againſt their own Sentiments. As for you, we know you have added the hight of

* I uſe the ſame Terms as are now in uſe, becauſe the Exerciſe this Man taught was much the ſame with what is now taught in our Fencing-Schools. He taught 'em to fence in Armour with Sword and Buckler, and to reſiſt ſeveral Combatants at once, by parrying and ſtriking. 'Tis pretty remarkable, that this ſort of Fencing-Maſters was not known at *Athens* till after the Defeat at *Delium*.

Sincerity

Sincerity to a great Capacity; and we hope you'll tell us ingenuously what your Thoughts are in reference to the Subject we are about to mention. The upshot of all this Preamble is this. Each of us has a Son. There they are. That Youth, the Son of *Melesias*, is called *Thucidides*, by his Grand-Father's Name: And this, which is mine, is called *Aristides* after my Father. We are resolved to take a singular Care of their Education; and not to do as most Fathers do, who, when their Children come to be young Men, throw the Bridle on their Neck, and suffer 'em to live according to their fansie. We design to keep 'em still in awe, and educate 'em to the best advantage. And forasmuch as you have likewise Children, we fansie you have Thought as much as any Man upon the Method of making 'em Vertuous: Or, if you have not yet consider'd of it by reason of their want of Years, we presume you will not take it ill that we put you in mind, that this is an indispensable Duty; and that we oblige you to deliberate with us what Education all of us should give our Children. The Occasion of our coming to see for you was this.

The Negligence of the Athenians in the Education of their Children.

Tho' the Discourse may seem already too long, yet you'll have the Goodness to hear it out. You know *Melesias* and I have but one Table, and these Children eat with us: We shall conceal nothing from you, and, as I told you at first, shall speak to you with an entire Confidence. Both he and I have entertain'd our Children with a thousand and a thousand brave Actions done by our Fathers both in Peace and War, while they headed the *Athenians* and their Allies: But, to our great misfortune, we can tell 'em no such thing of our selves: This covers us with Shame: We blush for it before our Children, and are forc'd to cast the blame upon our Fathers; who, after we grew up, suffer'd us to live in Softness and Luxury, and in pernicious Licentiousness; while they were employing all their Care for the Interest of others. This we incessantly remon-

The Injustice of Fathers that mind only Publick Affairs, and neglect the Education of their Children.

remonſtrate to theſe Children, telling them that if they neglect themſelves and diſobey us, 'twill prove a diſcredit to them; whereas if they will take pains, they may quickly approve themſelves to be worthy of the Name they bear. They anſwer, they'll obey us; and upon that account we wanted to know what they ſhould be taught, and what Education we ſhould give 'em, in order to their beſt Improvement. Some Body told us, there was nothing more proper for a young Gentleman, than Fencing; and extoll'd to the very Heavens this Man who perform'd his Exerciſe before us juſt now, and preſs'd us to come and ſee him. Accordingly we thought it convenient to come and take you along with us as we paſs'd; not only that you might partake of the Pleaſure, but likewiſe that you ſhould communicate to us your Knowledge; and that we might all conſult together upon the Care we ought to have of our Children. And this is all I had to ſay to you. Now, 'tis your turn to aid us with your Counſel, in telling us whether you approve or condemn the above-mention'd Exerciſe of Arms; and adviſing us what Occupation, what Inſtructions we ſhould give our Children; or, in fine, in giving us to know what Conduct you deſign to follow for your own Children.

Nic. Lyſimachus, I commend your Thought; I am very ready to join with you in this Deliberation; and I'll engage that *Laches* will be as glad as I am to act a Part in the Conference.

Lac. You may engage for that, *Nicias*. In my mind, all that *Lyſimachus* has ſaid againſt his Father and the Father of *Melcſias*, is admirably well ſaid; not only againſt them, but againſt us and all thoſe who embark in the Government of a State: For, as he ſaid, we wave the Education of our Children and our Domeſtick Affairs, and mind 'em no more than if we had neither Houſe nor Family. *Lyſimachus* you have ſpoke admirably well; but I'm ſurpris'd that you ſhould call us to conſult with you upon

that

that Subject, and not *Socrates* who is our Fellow Citizen; and besides, bends all his Thoughts upon things relating to the Education of Children, in pursuing the Sciences that are most useful to them, and finding out the most suitable Occupations.

Lys. How do you say, *Laches*? Would *Socrates* apply himself to what concerns the Instruction of Youth? *This poor Man took* Socrates *for a Philosopher, that minded only the study of Nature.*

Lac. I assure you, he would, *Lysimachus.*

Nic. And I assure you of the same. For 'tis not four days since he gave me a Musick-Master for my Son, one *Damon*, brought up by *Agatholces*; who, besides all the Excellencies of his Art, is possess'd of all the other Qualities that can be desir'd in a Tutor for a Child of his Birth.

Lys. Indeed, both *Socrates*, and you *Nicias*, and *Laches*, must pardon this Ignorance in me and all others of my Age: We are not acquainted with the young Folks, for we scarce stir abroad, by reason of our old Age: But, *Socrates*, if you have any good Counsel to give to me, who am your Countryman, pray do it: I can say that 'tis your Duty, for you are a Friend of our Family from Father to Son. Your Father *Sophroniscus* and I were always good Friends and Comerades from our Infancy; and our Friendship lasted till his very death without interruption. At present it comes into my Head, that I have heard these Children mention the name of *Socrates* a thousand times in their Interviews among themselves, of whom they speak much Good; and I never minded to ask of 'em if they spoke of *Socrates* the Son of *Sophroniscus*. But now, pray tell me Children, is this the *Socrates* I have heard you speak of so often?

Aristides and *Thucidides* both together. Yes, Father, 'tis the same.

Lys. I am infinitely glad of that. Take heart, my dear *Socrates*, you keep up the Reputation of your deceased Father admirably well, who was not only very well skill'd in his Art, but likewise a *He was an Engraver.*

very

very good Man. You and I must renew our Ancient Friendship, and henceforward your Interests shall be mine, and mine yours.

Lac. You do very well, *Lysimachus*; do not let him go: For I have seen Occasions, in which he maintain'd not only the Reputation of his Father, but that of his Country. (*a*) At the Defeat of *Delium* he retired along with me: And I can assure you, if all the rest had done their Duty, as he did, our City had been admirably well supported, and had not met with that great Shock.

Lys. This is a great Encomium, *Socrates*; and by whom is it given? By Persons that are worthy to be credited in all things, especially upon that Point for which they cry you up. I assure you, no Body can hear your Praises with more Pleasure than I do. I am infinitely glad that you have purchased such a Reputation, and I list my self in the Number of your greatest Well-wishers. And therefore pray come, without Ceremony, to see us; and live with us: Since you are of our Family you ought to do it. Let this Day be the Date of the renewing of our Ancient Friendship; and from henceforward be familiar with us and these Children, to the end that you and they may keep up our Friendship, as a Paternal Pledge. We hope you'll make that use of it; and for our Parts we will not suffer you to forget it. But to return to our Subject; what do you say? What think you of this Exercise of Arms? Does it deserve to be learned by young Men?

That is, *his Valour.*

Soc. Upon that Point, *Lysimachus*, I shall endeavour to give you the best Council I am Master of; and shall not fail to put all your Orders in Execution. But since I am the youngest, and less experienced than any of you, 'tis but just that I hear you speak first; that so, after I have heard you, I may give in

(*a*) In this Battle, *Socrates* sav'd *Xenophon*'s Life, who fell when his Horse was shot under him; and *Socrates* being on foot, took him upon his Back, and carried him several Miles.

my

my Sentiments if I differ from you, and back them with forcible Reasons. Why do not you speak then, *Nicias?* 'Tis your turn to speak first.

Nic. I do not refuse to tell my Thoughts. In my Mind, that Exercise is very proper for young People, and Merits their Application: For besides that, it diverts them from the Amusements that they commonly pursue, when they're idle; it inures 'em to labour, and of necessity renders them more vigorous and strong. There is no better Exercise; none that requires more strength and dexterity: There's none more suitable to a Person of Quality than this, and riding the great Horse, especially to those of our Profession: And in regard of the Wars we are already engaged in, and that are like to come upon us, we must reckon those only true and good Exercises that are performed with the Arms us'd in War; for they are of admirable use in Battles, whether set Battles in Rank and File, or single Attacks after the Ranks are broken; whether we pursue an Enemy that rallies from time to time, or upon a Retreat are put to it, to get clear of an obstinate Enemy, that pursues us with Sword in Hand. He who is acquainted with those Exercises, will never be afraid of one Man nor several together; but will still get off clear. Besides, these Exercises have this commendable Quality, that they inspire their Votaries with a true Passion for another more serious Exercise: for I suppose all those who give themselves to Fencing, breath nothing but the End they proposed in going to be taught, *viz.* Battles and Fights; and when they come to be engaged in these, are so full of Ambition and so fond of Glory, that they carefully instruct themselves in all that belongs to the Art of War, and make it their Business to rise by degrees to the highest Posts in the Army. For it is certain and manifest, that nothing is more desirable and more worthy of the Care of a good Man, than these different Posts of the Sword, and all the Functions of War, to which this Exercise of Arms leads, as a Means

A Panegyrick upon Fencing.

Means to the End. To all these Advantages, we shall add one more, which is not a small one. 'Tis that this Art of Fencing makes Men more valiant, and more venturous in Engagements : And if we reckon up every thing, there's another Advantage that is not to be despis'd, *viz.* that it gives Men a good Meen and a graceful Carriage, which in a publick Appearance renders them agreeable to their own Troops, and formidable to their Enemies. So that I am of Opinion, *Lysimachus*, that Children should learn those Exercises, and have given the Reasons I go upon. If *Laches* be of another Mind, I shall be glad to hear it.

Nicias's *Eulogy refus'd.*

Lach. Indeed, *Nicias*, he must be a bold Man, that says that any Science whatever is not worthy to be learn'd : For it is very commendable to know every thing, and if this Exercise of Arms is a Science, as its Teachers alledge, and as *Nicias* says, I own it ought to be taught. But if it is not a Science, and if the Fencing-Masters impose upon us by their Bravado's ; or if it is only an inconsiderable Science, to what purpose should we amuse our selves with it ?

The Example of the Lacedemonians *alone, overturns all that* Nicias *had said.*

They were the most warlike People of all the Grecians, *and yet had no Fencing Masters.*

I mention this, because I am perswaded, if it were a very considerable Science, it would never have escap'd the *Lacedemonians*, who spend their whole life-time in enquiring after such things, as may render them superior in War to their Enemies. Nay, supposing it had escaped the *Lacedemonians* ; these Fencing-Masters could not have been ignorant so long, that of all the Grecians, the *Lacedemonians* are the most curious in what relates to Arms ; and that Masters of any Reputation here, would make their Fortune there, much better than elsewhere ; just as Tragical Poets of any Note do here. For every one that has a Vein for Tragedies, comes straight hither with 'em, and does not travel from City to City to publish his Performances ; whereas those valiant Champions

A Satyrical Rub upon Athens, *for being as fond of Tragedies, as* Lacedemon *was of Arms.*

Champions who teach Fencing, look upon *Lacedemon* (*a*) as an inacceſſible Temple that they dare not approach; and ramble round about it teaching their Art to others, particularly to thoſe who own themſelves inferiour to all their Neighbours in what relates to War. In a word, *Lyſimachus*, I have ſeen a great many of thoſe Maſters engag'd in hot Actions, and I know perfectly what their Humour is; upon which 'tis eaſie to form a juſt eſtimate of their Merit. It ſeems Providence has purpoſely ſo order'd it, that none of that Profeſſion did ever acquire the leaſt Reputation in War. We ſee ſeveral of other Profeſſions, not only ſucceſsful in the way of their Buſineſs, but likewiſe famous in War. But theſe Men are unfortunate by a peculiar ſort of Fatality. For this ſame very *Steſileus*, who expos'd himſelf but now before this Crowd of Spectators, and ſpoke ſo Magnificently of himſelf. I ſay, I have ſeen this ſame Man make a far better ſhow againſt his Will upon a better Occaſion. When the Ship he was in attack'd a Merchant-Man, he fought with a Pike headed with a Sithe, that his Arms might be as remarkable as himſelf was among the Combatants. All the Proweſs he ſhew'd does ſcarce merit a relation: But the ſucceſs of this warlike Stratagem, in clapping a Sithe on the Head of a Pike, is worth our attention. While the Fellow was fencing with his new Arms, they were unhappily entangled in the Tackling of the Enemies Ship, and ſtuck there. He pull'd with all his force to get it clear, but could not obtain his End. While his Ship kept cloſe to the other, he follow'd it and kept his hold; but when the Enemies Ship ſteer'd off, and was going to hawl him in, he ſuffer'd his

A great Elogy for Lacedemon.

Fine Maſters indeed! Their Scholars are ſhort of thoſe who ſlight their Leſſons.

Fencing-Maſters decry'd in War.

(*a*) He compares *Lacedemon* to the Temple of the Furies, which none durſt approach; for they had ſuch a terrible Impreſſion of theſe Goddeſſes, that they durſt not either name 'em, or look upon 'em, or offer Addreſſes to them. Theſe Fencing-Maſters were equally afraid of *Lacedemon*. A noble Elegy!

Pike

Pike to ſlip by degrees through his Hands, till he had only hold of it by the ſmall end. The Enemy's Crew made Huzza's upon the pleaſant Accident: At laſt ſome Body having thrown a Stone that fell juſt at his Feet, he quit his beloved Arms, and the Enemy redoubled their Shouts, when they ſaw the armed Sickle hanging upon the Tackling of their Ship like a Trophy. It is poſſible, that, as *Nicias* ſays, it may be a very conſiderable and uſeful Science: But I tell you what I ſaw: So that, as I ſaid in the beginning, if it is a Science, it is an uſeleſs one; and if it is none, and if we are only inveigled by its fine Motto, then it does not deſerve our regard. In a word, thoſe who apply themſelves to that Art, are either Cowards or brave Men. If Cowards, they are the more inſolent, and their Cowardice is only the more expos'd. If brave, all the World has their Eyes upon 'em: And if they happen to be guilty of the leaſt falſe ſtep, they muſt bear a thouſand Jeſts and Railleries: For this is not an indifferent Profeſſion; it expoſes 'em to Envy at a furious rate; and if the Man that follows it, does not diſtinguiſh himſelf mightily by his Courage, he'll be ridicul'd without any poſſibility of avoiding it. Theſe are my Thoughts of that Exerciſe. It remains that you oblige *Socrates* to tell us his Mind.

Their Addreſs inſpires 'em with ſome aſſurance; but for want of Courage they can carry on nothing rigorouſly.

As we ſay that ſuch brave Ones are the Bullies of the School. This Notion of Cowards deſerves to be remark'd.

Lyſ. Pray do *Socrates*; for we want an Umpire to decide the Difference. Had *Nicias* and *Laches* been of one Opinion, we ſhould have ſpar'd you the Trouble: But you ſee they are directly oppoſite. So that now our buſineſs is to hear your Judgment, and ſee which of the two you ſide with.

Soc. How now, *Lyſimachus*, are you for following the greateſt Number then?

Lyſ. What can one do better?

Soc. And you too, *Meleſias?* Were you to chuſe Exerciſes to be learn'd by your Son, would you rather

rather be directed by the greateſt Number, than by one Man that has been well educated himſelf, and had excellent Maſters?

Mel. For my part, *Socrates*, I would be directed by the latter.

Soc. You'd be more influenc'd by his Opinion, than by that of us all four?

Mel. Perhaps I might.

Soc. Becauſe a wiſe Judgment ought to be form'd from Knowledge, and not from the Multitude? *'Tis Knowledge and not the Number that ought to determine us.*

Mel. Without doubt.

Soc. The firſt thing then, that we are to enquire into, is whether any of us is expert in the Thing we conſult about, or not. If any one be, we muſt refer our ſelves to him, and leave the others; if not, we muſt ſee for ſome ſuch Man elſewhere. For do you, *Meleſias* and *Lyſimachus*, imagine that this is a Buſineſs of ſmall Conſequence, and that you run but an ordinary Riſque? Do not you deceive your ſelves, the Matter in hand relates to the greateſt Good that is. All the Happineſs of Families depends upon the Education of Children: And Houſes riſe or ſink according as their Children are Vicious or Vertuous. *Of what Conſequence the Education of Children is.*

Mel. You ſay well.

Soc. So that one cannot be too Cautious and Prudent upon this Score.

Mel. Moſt certainly.

Soc. How ſhould we do then to try which of us Four is moſt expert and beſt skill'd in Exerciſes? Should not we preſently pitch upon him who learn'd 'em beſt and follow'd 'em moſt; and had the beſt Maſters?

Mel. So I think.

Soc. And before that, ſhould not we endeavour to know the Thing it ſelf that we would have our Children learn?

Mel. How do you ſay?

Soc. Perhaps you'll underſtand me better in this manner: Methinks, we did not at firſt agree upon

the nature of the Thing we are consulting about, in order to know which of us is most dexterous at it, and was taught by the most masterly Hand.

Nic. How do you mean, *Socrates*; are not we considering of Fencing, in order to know whether our Children ought to learn it, or not?

Soc. I do not say otherwise. But when a Man advises about a Remedy for the Eyes, and wants to know whether he should apply it or not; do you think this Consultation relates more to the Remedy than to the Eyes, to which 'tis to be applied?

Nic. It relates most to the Eyes.

Soc. And when a Man consults what Bit he should put upon his Horse, does not the Question relate more to the Horse than to the Bit?

Nic. Yes sure.

Soc. In one word, as often as a Man advises about a Thing with reference to another, (*a*) the direct Object of the Consultation is the Thing refer'd to, and not to that which is only minded for the sake of the other.

Nic. It is necessarily so.

Soc. Then we ought to examine well whether the Man we advise with is expert and skill'd in the Thing about which we advise.

Nic. That's certain.

Soc. At present we are consulting what our Children should learn: So that the Question turns upon the Children, and the Knowledge of their Souls is the Business.

Nic. 'Tis just so.

Soc. And by Consequence, the Question is, Whether there is any of us experienc'd in the Conduct of a Soul; who knows how to manage it, and has been taught that Art by the best Masters?

(*a*) For Instance, when we think of purging a sick Person, we consider of the Patient before we think of the Medicine: And having first discover'd the State of the Patient, then we think of a proper Medicine.

Lac. How, *Socrates*, did you never know any People that have become greater Proficients in some Sciences and Arts without any Master, than others with all the Masters that could be had?

Soc. Yes, *Laches*; I have known some: But tho' all that sort of Men should be proud of telling you that they are very Skilful, you would never intrust the least Affair to them, unless you saw 'em make, I do not say one, but several elaborate and well done Performances.

Nic. Right, *Socrates.*

Soc. Since *Lysimachus* and *Melesias* have call'd us to give our Advice of the Education of their Children; out of an ardent desire to form and dispose their Minds to Vertue: We are oblig'd, O *Nicias* and *Laches*, if we pretend to be endow'd with the Capacity that's necessary for it, to tell 'em what Masters we have had, who were very good Men, and after having instructed several Scholars, form'd and disposed our Minds to Honesty. And if any of us pretends to have had no Master, he must produce his Performances, and instance in some either among the *Athenians*, or among Foreigners, whether Free-men or Slaves, who have been benefited by his Precepts, according to the Testimony of all the World. If we can neither name our Masters nor shew our Works, we must send our Friends to see for Advice elsewhere, and not expose our selves to just Reproach upon a Point of that importance, by corrupting their Children. For my part, *Lysimachus* and *Melesias*, I own I never had a Master for that Science, notwithstanding that from my youth I was passionately in love with it: But I had not Money enough to reach the dear Fees of those Sophisters who had boasted that they were the only Men that could benefit me: And by my own Ingenuity I have not yet been able to find out the Art. If *Nicias* and *Laches* have compass'd it by themselves, or have learn'd it of Masters, I shall think it no wonder: For being richer than I, they

could afford to have Maſters; and being older than I, they may have learn'd it by themſelves. And upon that Account I account 'em admirably well qualified for inſtructing a young Gentleman : And beſides, if they had not been very well aſſur'd of their own Capacity, they would never have been ſo poſitive in determining what Exerciſes are uſeful and what are uſeleſs to the Youth. So that I ſubmit to them in all Things. What amazes me, is, that they are of two different Opinions. However, ſince *Laches* intreated you to detain me and oblige me to ſpeak; pray ſuffer me to intreat you in my turn, not to ſuffer *Laches* and *Nicias* to be gone, but to preſs 'em to make anſwer; by telling them that *Socrates* knows nothing of theſe Matters, and is uncapable to determine which of them has the better of it : For he had no Maſters, and could not find out the Art by himſelf. Wherefore *Nicias* and *Laches*, ſay you, pray tell us if ever you ſaw any excellent Man for the Education of Youth ? Did you learn this Art from any Body, or did you find it of your ſelves ? If you learn'd it, pray tell us who was your Maſter, and who they are that follow the ſame Profeſſion; to the end that if the Publick Affairs do not afford you ſo much leiſure, we may go to them, and by Preſents and Careſſes oblige them to take Care of our Children and yours, and to prevent their reflecting diſhonour upon their Anceſtors by their Vices. If you found out this Art by your own Ingenuity, pray cite thoſe you have inſtructed, who being Vicious before their coming to you, became Vertuous under your Care. If you are but yet beginning to teach, take Care that you do not make your firſt Eſſay upon little baſe Souls, but upon your own Children and thoſe of your beſt Friends. Tell us then what you can do, and what not. This *Lyſimachus*, is what I would have you to ask of them : Do not let them go without giving you an Anſwer.

Lyſ.

Lyſ. In my mind *Socrates* ſpeaks admirably well. Wherefore, my Friends, conſider of anſwering all theſe Queſtions: For you may aſſure your ſelves that in ſo doing you'll oblige me and *Meleſias* very much. I told you before that we call'd for your Advice, as fancying, that ſince you have Children as well as we, that will quickly be of that Age which requires a wiſe Education, you might have thought maturely upon it before now. So, if you are not buſie, pray diſcourſe the Matter with *Socrates*; for, as he ſaid very well, this is the moſt important Affair of our Life.

Nic. It ſeems, *Lyſimachus*, you have no knowledge of *Socrates*, otherwiſe than by his Father, and that you never frequented his Company: You never ſaw him, ſure, but in his Infancy in the Temples or Publick Aſſemblies, or when his Father brought him to your Houſe: For ſince he came to be a Man, it ſeems you never had any Correſpondence with him.

Lyſ. What ground do you go upon for that, *Nicias*?

A Character of Socrates: His Love for all Men.

Nic. I go upon this: That I perceive you are ignorant that *Socrates* looks upon every Body as his Neighbour; and that whoever converſes with him, he is as much oblig'd to him as if he were his Relation: Tho' at firſt he ſpeaks only of indifferent Things, yet at laſt he is oblig'd by the Thread of his Diſcourſe to give him an Account of the Conduct of his Life, and to tell him how he lives, and has liv'd. And when *Socrates* has once brought him that length, he does not part from him till he have ſounded him to the bottom, and got an account of all his good and evil Actions. I know it by Experience. So I ſee there's a neceſſity of paſſing that way, and I find that I my ſelf cannot get off. However, I am very glad of it; and do always take a ſingular Pleaſure in diſcourſing with him. For 'tis no great harm for a Man to be advertis'd of his Faults: And after that, he cannot but become more

wise and prudent, if he minds and loves the Admonition; and according to *Solon*'s Maxim, is willing to be instructed, whatever his Age be, and is not foolishly perswaded that old Age brings Wisdom along with it. So that it shall neither seem new, nor disagreeable to me, if *Socrates* puts me to a Trial: And indeed I was aware from the beginning, that since he was here, 'twould not be our Children, but our selves that would be examin'd. For my part I submit to him with all my Heart. It remains that *Laches* should tell his Sentiments.

Old Age does not bring Wisdom along with it.

Lac. My Sentiments are various. Sometimes I'm in one Humour and sometimes in another. Sometimes I love nothing so much as discoursing, and at other times I cannot abide it. When I meet with a Man that speaks well of Vertue or any Science, and find him a Man of Veracity and worthy of his Profession, I am charm'd with him, and take an unexpressible Pleasure in finding his Words and Actions all of a piece: Such a Man is to me the only excellent Musician that makes a perfect Harmony, not with the Harp or Musical Instruments, but with the Sum total of his Life. For all his Actions suit with his Words, not according to the (*a*) *Lydian*, *Phrygian*, or *Ionian* Tones, but according to the *Dorian*; which is the only one that deserves the name of *Grecian Harmony*. When such a Man speaks, I am overjoy'd and charm'd; and drink in his Words so greedily, that every Body perceives me to be fond of his Discourses. But a Man that acts the quite contra-

The only valuable Discourses.

A good man is the only excellent Musician.

(*a*) The *Grecians* had four Measures or Tones which they call'd Harmonies, and multiplied these by joyning the other several ways. The *Lydian* was doleful and proper for Lamentations, the *Phrygian* was vehement and fit to raise up the Passions, the *Ionian* effeminate and soft, the *Dorick* was Masculine, and so prefer'd by *Socrates* to all the rest. Accordingly *Aristotle* in the last Chapter of his *Politicks*, says, That all the World is agreed, that the *Dorick* was most manly and smooth, and a sort of *medium* between the others; upon which Account it was more proper and suitable for Children. *Plato* absolutely condemns the *Lydian* and *Ionian* in the Third Book of his *Rep.*

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ry, mortifies me most cruelly; and the more he seems to speak well, the more aversion I have to his Jargon. I am not yet acquainted with *Socrates* by his Words, but by his Actions I am; and think him worthy to speak upon any Subject, and discourse with all freedom. If he is such a Man as you represent him, I am willing to enter into a Conference with him. I shall be very glad if he'll take the Pains to examine me, and shall never be unwilling to learn: For I am of *Solon*'s Mind, that we ought to be learning in our old Age. I would only add a word to his Maxim, which I wish he had added, *viz.* That we should learn of good Men. In earnest, you must grant me this, That a Teacher ought to be a good Man, that I may not learn of him with reluctancy, and that my distaste may not pass for Stupidity and Indocility. For I do not matter it at all, if my Master be younger than I, or has not yet gain'd a Reputation, and the like. So, *Socrates*, if you'll examine and instruct me, you shall find me very docile and submissive. I have always had a good Opinion of you, since that day that you and I escap'd a considerable Danger, and you gave such Proof of your Vertue, as became a good Man. Tell me then, what you please: And let not my Age be any hindrance.

The finest Discourses, not back'd by suitable Actions, deserves nothing but contempt and hatred.

The only pleasurable Learning is from good Men.

He speaks this upon Socrates's Account, who was much younger than he.

Soc. At least we cannot complain, that you are not very ready to ask good Counsel and follow it.

Lys. This is our business; I call it ours, because it is upon our Account that you are engag'd in it. Wherefore, I beseech you, for the love of these Children, see in my stead what we ought to ask of *Nicias* and *Laches*, and joyn your Thoughts in Conference with theirs. As for me, my Memory is almost gone, by reason of my old Age: I forget most part of the Questions I design'd to ask, and a great part of what they said: I remember nothing of the Matter, when the principal Question is thus cross'd and carv'd by fresh Incidents. Discuss this Matter among your selves; I and *Melesias* shall

hear you; and after that, ſhall do as you direct us.

Soc. Nicias and *Laches*, we muſt obey *Lyſimachus* and *Meleſias*. Perhaps it will not be improper to diſcuſs the Queſtion we propos'd above, *viz.* Whether we had Maſters in this Art, or if we have form'd any Scholars and render'd 'em better Men than they were? But methinks there's a ſhorter way of compaſſing our End, and at the ſame time of going nearer to the ſource, (*a*) for if we have a certain knowledge of any thing, that being communicated to another renders him better, and have likewiſe the Secret of communicating it to him, 'tis plain not only that we know the thing it ſelf, but that we know what means are to be employ'd in acquiring it. Perhaps you do not underſtand me; but an Example will let you into the meaning. If we know certainly that Sight communicated to the Eyes renders them better, and are able to communicate it; it is certain that we know what the Sight is, and all that's to be done for procuring it. Whereas if we do not know what Seeing or Hearing is, our Advice will be to no purpoſe; we cannot pretend to be good Phyſicians either for the Eyes or the Ears, or to furniſh 'em with the means of Seeing or Hearing.

In curing a ſick Perſon, we muſt know the Remedy of the way of giving it.

Lyſ. You ſay well, *Socrates*.

Soc. Have not your two Friends, *Laches*, call'd you hither to adviſe with us, how Vertue may be made to grow in the Souls of their Children, in order to their Improvement?

Lac. 'Tis true.

Soc. Is it not neceſſary then, that firſt of all we ſhould know what Vertue is; for if we are ignorant

(*b*) This is an important and very uſeful Principle. *Socrates*'s Scope is, to make 'em ſenſible that Men may well know the Vices and Faults of one another, and the Vertues they all want to make 'em perfect, but do not know how to communicate that Vertue. God alone knows our Weakneſs and Miſery, and he alone can heal it.

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of that, how ſhould we be capable of preſcribing Means for acquiring it?

Lac. By no Means, *Socrates.*

Soc. Then 'tis preſum'd you know what it is.

Lac. Without doubt.

Soc. But when we know a thing, cannot we tell what it is?

Lac. Yes, ſure.

Soc. At preſent we ſhall not enter upon the Enquiry, What Vertue is in General: That would be too long and too perplex'd a Task, Let us content our ſelves with tracing one of its Branches, and try if we have all that's neceſſary for knowing that well. This will be a ſhorter and eaſier Enquiry.

Lac. Since you are of that mind, I am ſatisfied.

Soc. But what Branch of Vertue ſhall we pitch upon? Doubtleſs it muſt be that which ſeems to be the only End of Fencing; for the People alledge, that this Exerciſe tends directly to Valour.

Lac. Yes, that is the Plea.

Soc. Let's endeavour, *Laches*, in the firſt Place to form a nice Definition of Valour; and then we ſhall purſue the Means of communicating it to theſe Children, as much as is poſſible, both by Habit and by Study. Say then, What is Valour?

Lac. Indeed, *Socrates*, that Queſtion is not very hard. A valorous Man is one that ſtands to his Poſt in Battle, that never turns his back, and that repulſes the Enemy. *The firſt Definition of Valour.*

Soc. Very well, *Laches*; but perhaps 'tis my faulty Expreſſion that occaſion'd your giving an Anſwer remote from my Queſtion.

Lac. How do you mean, *Socrates?*

Soc. I'll tell you, if I can. A valiant Man is one that keeps his Poſt in the Army, and bravely attacks the Enemy.

Lac. That's what I ſay.

Soc

Laches's Definition is faulty.

Soc. So say I too. But as for him that fights the Enemy upon a flight, and without keeping his Post.

Lac. How, upon a Flight?

Soc. Yes, in Fleeing; as the *Scythians*, for Instance, who fight as fiercely upon a Retreat, as upon a Pursuit: And, as *Homer* says in Commendation of *Æneas*'s Horses, They were swifter than the Wind, in the Field of Battle, and knew how to escape and pursue an Enemy. And does not he commend *Æneas* for his skill in the Art of Fleeing when he calls them expert in Retreat?

In the Book of Iliads.

Laches defends his Definition by a Distinction.

Lac. That's very true, *Socrates*; for *Homer* in that Place speaks of Chariots. And as for the *Scythians*, you know they were Troops of Cavalry; for that was their way of Engagement with Horse; but our Grecian Infantry fights by standing their Ground, as I said but now.

Socrates refutes his Distinction.

Soc. Perhaps you'll except the *Lacedemonians*; for I have heard in the Battle of *Platæa*, when the *Lacedemonians* were engaged with the *Gerrophori*, who had made a Bulwark of their Bucklers, and kill'd many of their Men with their Arrows; the *Lacedemonians*, I say, on this occasion thought it not proper to keep their Post, but fled; and when the Persian Ranks were disorder'd in the Pursuit, rally'd and attack'd the Cavalry you speak of, and by that means came off with a Noble Victory.

These were Persian *Troops, armed with Bucklers of Willows.*

The Flight of the Lacedemonians *at* Platæa, *brought 'em the Victory.*

Lac. You say true.

Soc. And for that Reason, I told you but now that I occasioned your faulty Answer by putting the Question amiss. For I wanted to know what Valour is in a Man that's valiant not only in Cavalry, but in Infantry and all other sorts of War; that is, not only valiant in War, but in Dangers at Sea, in Diseases, in Poverty, in the Management of Publick Affairs; not only valorous in Grief, Sorrow, and Fears, but likewise in his Desires and Pleasures; a Man that knows how to make head against his Passions, whether by standing his Ground, or fleeing. For Valour extends to all these things.

The Extent of Valour.

Lac.

Lac. That's certain.

Soc. Then all these Men are valiant. One displays his Courage by opposing his Pleasures, another against his Sorrow: One controuls his Desires, and another his Fears: And upon all these Occasions a Man may be cowardly and mean-spirited.

Lac. Without question.

Soc. So I wanted to know of you, what each of these Contraries, Valour and Cowardice, is. To begin with Valour: Tell me, if you can, what is this Quality that is always the same upon all those different Occasions? Do not you understand me now? *The Definition must include all these different Occasions.*

Lac. Not yet, perfectly.

Soc. What I would say, is this. For instance, If I ask'd you what that Swiftness is, which extends it self to Running, Playing upon Instruments, Speaking, Learning, and a thousand other things. For we apply that Swiftness to the Actions of the Hands, Feet, Tongue, and Mind: These are the principal Subjects. Is it not so?

Lac. Yes.

Soc. If any one ask'd me, what this Swiftness is, that extends to all these different things? I would answer, *'Tis a Faculty that does much in a little space of Time.* For this Definition agrees to the Voice, to Running, and all the other things that the word can be applied to. *A Definition of Swiftness.*

Lac. Right, *Socrates*; the Definition is very good.

Soc. Define Valour then after the same manner. Tell me what Faculty this is, that is always the same in Pleasures, in Affliction, and in all the above-mention'd Cases; and that never changes either its Name or its Nature.

Lac. Since I must give a Definition reaching to all the different *Species* of that Vertue: It seems to me to be a Disposition of the Soul always ready to suffer any thing. *A second Definition of Valour.*

Soc. To answer my Question fully, your Definition must certainly be such. But this Definition methinks is defective: for I reckon you do not take all *A Fault in this Definition.*

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the Patience of the Soul to be Valour. I see plainly you place Valour in the number of fine things.

Lac. Yes, without doubt; and indeed the finest that is.

Soc. Accordingly this Patience of the Soul, when accompanied by Wisdom, is good and fine?

Lac. Most certainly.

Soc. And when Imprudence is its Companion, is it not quite contrary? Is it not then very bad and pernicious?

Lac. Without question.

Soc. Do you call a pernicious thing fine?

Lac. God forbid, *Socrates.*

Soc. Then you'll never call that sort of Patience by the Name of Valour, since 'tis not fine, and Valour is somewhat that's very fine?

Lac. You say right.

For an imprudent Patience is Folly and a forgetting of ones self.

Soc. Then, according to you, a wise and prudent Patience is Wisdom?

Lac. So I think.

Soc. Let's see whether this Patience is only prudent in some things, or in every thing whether small or great? For instance, A Man spends his Estate very patiently and prudently, with a firm Certainty that his Spending will one Day fetch him great Riches; Would you call this Man valiant and stout?

Lac. I would be very loth to do that, *Socrates.*

Soc. But a Physician has a Son or some other Patient lying ill of a great Inflammation in the Breast: this Son teazes him for something to eat. The Physician is so far from yielding to his Importunity, that he patiently bears his Complaints and his Anger; Would you call this Physician valiant and stout?

Socrates makes Laches fall into the common prejudice that an imprudent and indiscreet Temerity is Valor.

Lac. No more than the other.

Soc. But as for War. Here's a Man of that Disposition of Soul, we now speak of. He has a mind to fight; and his Prudence supporting his Courage, tells him he will quickly be reliev'd, and that his Enemies are the weaker Party, and that he has the advantage of the Ground. This brave Man, that is thus pru-

prudent, will you make him more valiant and couragious than his Enemy, who ſtands his Ground, notwithſtanding the Diſadvantages he lyes under, and that without theſe Reflections?

Lac. No, ſure; the laſt is the braveſt.

Soc. And, after all, the Courage of the laſt is far leſs prudent than that of the former.

Lac. That's true.

Soc. Then it follows from your Principle, that a good Horſe-man, that in a Engagement behaves himſelf bravely, as truſting to his dexterity of managing a Horſe, is leſs couragious than he who wants that advantage.

Lac. Yes, ſure.

Soc. You'll ſay the ſame of an Archer, a Slinger, and all the other Orders of Soldiery?

Lac. Without doubt.

Soc. And thoſe, who, without being acquainted with the Art of Diving, have the Courage to dive and are the firſt that throw their Heads into the Waters, are according to you, more bold and couragious than the expert divers?

Lac. Yes, ſure.

Soc. According to your Principles it muſt be ſo.

Lac. And theſe are my Principles.

Soc. But after all, thoſe artleſs and unexperienc'd Men, encounter Danger much more imprudently than thoſe who expoſe themſelves with the advantage of Art.

Lac. Yes, ſure.

Soc. But we concluded juſt now, that indiſcreet Boldneſs and imprudent Patience, are very ſcandalous and pernicious.

Lac. That's true.

Soc. And we look'd upon Valour to be a good and a fine thing.

Lac. I own it.

Soc. But now it is quite contrary: We give the Name of Valour to this indiſcreet Boldneſs, that we deſpiſe ſo much.

Lac.

Lac. I own it.

Soc. And do you think it is well done?

Lac. I am not such a Fool, *Socrates.*

The most perfect love, and the most worthy of Men, when their Actions and Words are of a piece

Soc. Thus, *Laches*, by your own Principles, you and I are not upon the Foot of the Dorick Tone. For our Actions do not agree with our Words. If one took a view of our Actions, I presume he would say we are Men of Courage: but if he heard our Words, he would quickly change his Sentiments.

Lac. You say right.

Soc. But do you think it fit we should continue in this Condition?

Lac. No, sure.

Soc. Are you willing we should act for one minute, conformably to the Definition we gave just now?

Lac. What Definition is that?

Soc. That true Courage, true Valour, is Patience: If you please then, let's shew our Patience, in carrying on our Enquiry, that so Valour may not laugh at us for pursuing her without Courage; since according to our Principles, Patience is Courage.

Lac. I am willing, *Socrates*, and shall not at all flinch, tho' I am a Novice in those Disputes. But I must own, I am out of humour and vex'd, that I cannot explain my Thoughts. For, methinks I conceive perfectly what Valour is; and I understand now that Idea does so balk me that I cannot explain it.

Soc. But, *Laches*, a good Huntsman ought always to run after the Beast he persues, and not to weary himself in runaing at every thing he sees.

Lac. I agree to it.

Soc. Are you willing we should call *Nicias* to hunt with us, to try if he'll have any better Fortune?

Lac. With all my Heart, why not?

Soc. Come then, *Nicias*, come and help your Friends, if you can, who are in a sad quandary, and know not what hand to turn to: You see what Condi-

Condition we are in; and how impossible it is for us to get clear of it. Pray, rescue us, by giving us to know what Valour is, and proving it.

Nic. I thought all along that you defin'd this Vertue amiss. How comes it to pass, *Socrates*, that you do not upon this Occasion make use of what I have heard you speak so often and so well?

Soc. What's that, *Nicias?*

Nic. I have often heard you say, that a Man is dexterous at the Things he knows, but very unhappy at what he does not know.

Soc. That's very true.

Nic. And by Consequence, if a valiant Man be good at any thing, he's good at what he knows.

Soc. Do you hear him *Laches?*

Lac. Yes, I hear him: But I do not well understand what he means.

Soc. But, methinks, I perceive his meaning. As I take it, he means that Valour is a Science.

Lac. What Science, *Socrates?*

Soc. Why do not you ask him?

Lac. I desire the same Favour of him.

Soc. *Nicias*, answer *Laches* a little, and tell him what Science Valour is in your Opinion; for 'tis neither the Science of playing upon the Flute, nor that of playing upon the Harp.

Nic. No, surely.

Soc. What is it then? And what is the Subject of it?

Lac. You ask him very well *Socrates*; let him tell us then what Science it is?

Nic. I say, *Laches*, that it is the * Science of

* *Nicias* himself knew not all the strength of this Definition, he understood only that Valour was the effect of Experience and Custom. For Example, Men who have run thro' many Dangers, are commonly more Valiant than those who had never seen any; for as they have already escap'd those Dangers, they believe that they may likewise overcome all others. This is the Sentiment of *Nicias*, but it is not that of *Socrates*, who from his Definition draws a Principle far more Excellent, as will be seen by what follows.

Things

A third Definition of Valour, which alone can give the true Idea of it. See the Remark.

Things that are terrible, and of thoſe that do not ſurpaſs our Strength, and in which one may ſhew a ſtedfaſtneſs, whether it be in War, or in the other Contingencies of Life.

Lac. A ſtrange Definition, *Socrates!*

Soc. Why do you think it ſo ſtrange?

Lac. Why, becauſe Science and Valour are two very different Things.

Soc. *Nicias* pretends they are not.

Lac. Yes, he pretends it, and therein he dotes.

Soc. Good God, let us endeavour to inſtruct him; Reproaches are not Reaſons.

Nic. He has no deſign to abuſe me, but he wiſhes that what I have ſaid may be of no weight, becauſe he himſelf is deceived all along.

Lac. It is the very truth, and I ſhall die of Grief, or make it appear that you have not ſpoke better than I. Without going any further, don't the Phyſicians know what there is that's dangerous in Diſeaſes? Do the moſt valiant Men know it better? Or do you call the Phyſicians valiant Men?

Nic. No, ſurely.

Lac. Neither do you give that Name to Labourers; yet they know what it is that's moſt terrible, in their Labour. It is the ſame with all other Tradeſmen, they all know very well what it is that is moſt terrible in their Profeſſion, and what it is that may give them Aſſurance and Confidence; but they are not the more valiant for that.

Soc. What ſay you, *Nicias*, of that Criticiſm of *Laches?* For my part I think there's ſomething in it.

Nic. It certainly has ſomething in it, but nothing of truth.

Soc. How ſo?

Nic. How? becauſe he thinks that Phyſicians know not any thing more of Diſeaſes, than to ſay that a Thing is healthful or unhealthful: 'Tis very certain that they know nothing more of it: For, in good earneſt, *Laches*, do you imagine that the Phyſician knows

knows whether his Patient has more reaſon to be afraid of Health or of Sickneſs? And don't you think that there are abundance of Sick to whom it would be more advantagious not to be cured than to be cured? Dare you ſay that it is always good to live, and that there are not abundance of People to whom it would be more Advantagious to die?

Valour is not only the knowledge of what is terrible or not terrible, but alſo of what will be ſo. A great Principle!

Lac. I am perſuaded that there are ſome People who would be more happy to die.

Nic. And do you think that the Things that ſeem terrible to thoſe who would willingly live, appear the ſame to thoſe who had rather die.

Lac. No, doubtleſs.

Nic. And who will you be judged by on theſe Occaſions? The Phyſicians? They don't in the leaſt ſee into it. People of other Profeſſions, they know nothing of the Matter. It belongs then only to thoſe who are skilful in the Science of terrible Things: And 'tis thoſe whom I call Valiant.

Soc. Laches, do you underſtand what *Nicias* ſays?

Lac. Yes, I underſtand that according to his reckoning there is none Valiant but Prophets. For who elſe but a Prophet can know if it be more advantagious to die than to live? And I would ask you *Nicias*, * Are you a Prophet? If you be not, farewell to your Valour.

Yes, we muſt be Prophets, we muſt foreſee the Evils to come.

Nic. How then? Do you think that it is the buſineſs of a Prophet to know himſelf in Things that are terrible, and in thoſe wherein he can ſhew ſtedfaſtneſs?

Lac. Without doubt; and whoſe Buſineſs is it elſe?

Nic. Whoſe? His of whom I ſpeak, the valiant Man; for the Buſineſs of a Prophet, is only to

* *Laches* jeers *Nicias* here in obſcure Terms, becauſe of his Reſpect to the Diviners; for as he was a very religious Man, he had a great Reſpect for all Diviners, and kept one always in his Houſe.

know the Signs of Things that are to happen, as of Deaths, Diſeaſes, Loſſes, Defeats and Victories, whither it be in War or in other Combats: And do you think, that it is more proper for him than for another Man to judge which of all thoſe Accidents are more or leſs advantagious to this Man or to that? Never had any Prophet the leaſt thought of ſuch a thing.

Lac. Truly, *Socrates*, I cannot comprehend his Meaning; for, according to his Account, there is neither Prophet, nor Phyſician, nor any other ſort of Men, to whom the Name of Valiant can be applicable. This valiant Perſon, of whom he has an Idea, muſt then be a God. But, to tell you my Thoughts, *Nicias* has not the Courage to confeſs, that he knows not what he ſays; he only quibbles and ſhifts to conceal his Confuſion. We could have done as much, you and I, if we had had nothing elſe in view but to hide the Contradictions we fall into. If we were before a Judge, this Conduct might perhaps be reaſonable. 'Tis a Piece of Cunning to intangle a bad Cauſe; but in Converſation, like ours, to what purpoſe is it to endeavour to triumph by vain Diſcourſe?

This valiant Man is not a [illegible] but he is animated and ſupported by God.

Soc. Certainly that is a very ill thing: But let us ſee if *Nicias* does not pretend to ſay ſomething to the purpoſe, and whether you don't injure him by accuſing him of talking meerly for talkings ſake. Let us deſire him to explain his thought to us more clearly; and, if we find that he has reaſon on his ſide, we will be of his mind; if not, we will endeavour to ſpeak better.

Lac. Ask him your ſelf, *Socrates*, if you pleaſe; I have ask'd Queſtions enough of him.

Soc. I will do it; I will argue with him for you and me too.

Lac. If you pleaſe.

Soc. Tell me, I pray you, *Nicias*, or rather tell us, for I ſpeak alſo for *Laches*, Do you maintain, that Valour is the knowledge of things that are terrible

rible and of things in which one may teſtifie ſome aſſurance and confidence?

Nic. Yes, I do maintain it.

Soc. You maintain alſo, that this Knowledge is not given to all ſorts of People, ſeeing it is not known neither to the Phyſicians nor to the Prophets, and that yet no body can be valiant without this Knowledge. Is not this what you ſaid? *It is not known to Phyſicians as Phyſicians, nor yet to Prophets as ſuch.*

Nic. Yes, doubtleſs.

Soc. Then we may apply the Proverb in this Caſe: *That it is not the ſame of every wild Sow, every wild Sow is not valiant and couragious.*

Nic. No, ſurely.

Soc. It is evident by this, *Nicias*, that you are fully perſwaded, that the wild * Sow of *Crommion* was not couragious, whatever the Ancients have ſaid of her. I do not tell you this in jeſt, but in good earneſt; he, who ſpeaks as you, muſt not of neceſſity admit of any Courage in Beaſts, or grant, that the Lions, Leopards, Boars, know many things which moſt Men are ignorant of, becauſe of their being too difficult. Beſides, he who maintains, that Valour is what you ſay it is, muſt alſo maintain, that Lions, Bulls, Harts, Foxes, are born equally valiant one with another.

Lac. By all that's ſacred, *Socrates*, you ſpeak to admiration. Tell us then truly, *Nicias*, do you believe, that Beaſts, which are generally reckon'd full of Courage, are more underſtanding than we, or dare you go againſt the common Opinion, and maintain, that they have not Courage?

Nic. I tell you in a word, *Laches*, that I don't call neither Beaſt nor Man, nor any thing whatever, that, through imprudence and ignorance, fears not

* The Aim of *Socrates* is to try *Nicias* and to ſhake him in his Opinion by making him fear that his Principle would hurt their Religion; for if the wild Sow of *Crommion* had not been valiant and couragious, *Theſeus* is not ſo great a Hero for having overcome her, nor *Hercules* for having defeated the Lion of *Nemea*.

the things that are terrible, valiant and couragious; but I call them fearleſs and ſenſleſs! Alas! Do you think, that I call all Children, who, through imprudence, fear no danger, valiant and couragious? In my Opinion, to be without fear, and to be valiant, are two very different things: There is nothing more rare than Valour accompanied with Prudence, and nothing more common than Boldneſs, Audaciouſneſs and Intrepidity accompanied with Imprudence: for it is the property of moſt Men and Women, of all Beaſts and Children. In a word, thoſe whom you and moſt People call Valiant, I call Raſh and Foolhardy, and I give the Name of Valiant only to thoſe who are Prudent and Wiſe; theſe only are the Perſons I mean.

For Nicias *was very prudent and very wiſe. See the Remark.*

Lac. Do you ſee, *Socrates*, * how he offers Incenſe to himſelf, as if he were the only valiant Man; for he ſtrives to rob all thoſe, who paſs for ſuch, of that Glory.

'Tis that Lamachus *who was General of the* Athenians *with* Nicias *and* Alcibiades *in the Expedition of* Sicily, *where he was killed.*

Nic. That is none of my deſign, *Laches*, do not you fret your ſelf, I know that you and *Lamachus* are prudent and wiſe if you be valiant. I ſay the ſame of many of our *Athenians.*

Lac. † Tho' I could anſwer you in your own Coin, yet I will not, leſt you ſhould accuſe me ‖ of being ill-natur'd and foul-mouth'd.

Soc. Don't ſay ſo. *Laches*, I ſee plainly you do not perceive that *Nicias* hath learned theſe fine

* Wiſdom and Prudence were the true Character of *Nicias*, who undertook nothing but where he ſaw at leaſt an apparent Safety, and who, by waiting for Opportunities to act ſafely, did often let them ſlip; which begot him the Character of a cowardly Man: however, he undertook things well and executed 'em better, performing his part always well.

† *Laches* ſpeaks like one that's a little touch'd, for he would ſay, that he could anſwer *Nicias* that he is not valiant, becauſe he is too prudent and too wiſe: As indeed the Poets themſelves taxed his Prudence with Cowardice.

‖ The *Greek* Copy ſays, *Leſt you ſhould take me for a Man of the Tribe of* Aixionides: For the People of that Tribe were much cry'd down for their railing Temper and ill Nature.

things

things of our Friend *Damon*, and that *Damon* is the intimate Friend of *Prodicus* the ableſt of all the Sophiſts for that kind of Diſtinctions.

Lac. Oh, *Socrates*, it becomes a Sophiſt very well to make Oſtentation of his vain Subtilties; but for a Man like *Nicias*, whom the *Athenians* have choſen to ſit at the Helm of the Republick . . . .

Soc. My dear *Laches*, it well becomes a Man who hath ſo great Affairs upon his Hands, to ſtudy to be more learned and more wiſe than others; wherefore I think that *Nicias* deſerves to be heard, and that we ought at leaſt to enquire into his Reaſons why he defines Valour thus.

Lac. Enquire then as much as you pleaſe, *Socrates.*

Soc. 'Tis what I am going to do; but don't think that I acquit you of it, and that you ſhall not aſſiſt me in ſome things: Liſten a little then, and take heed to what I am going to ſay.

Lac. I ſhall do ſo, ſince it pleaſes you.

Soc. That is ſo far well: Now come on, *Nicias*; pray you tell us, in reſuming the Matter from the beginning; Is it not true, that at firſt we conſidered Valour * as a part of Virtue?

Nic. 'Tis true.

Soc. Did not you anſwer, that Valour was certainly but one part, and that there were other parts, which all together were called by the Name of Virtue?

Nic. How could I ſay otherwiſe?

Soc. You ſay then as I do: for, beſides Valour, I acknowledge there are other parts of Virtue, as Temperance, Juſtice, and many others; don't you alſo acknowledge them?

Nic. Doubtleſs I do.

Soc. That's good, we are agreed upon this Point:

* *Socrates* would prove, that Virtue being one, he, who has not all the parts that compoſe it, cannot brag of being virtuous.

Let us go then to thoſe things which you call terrible; and wherein you ſay a Man may ſhew ſome Aſſurance and Confidence; let us examine them well, leſt it happen that you underſtand them one way and we another; we are going to tell you what we think of them. If you don't agree with us you will correct us. We believe the things which you call terrible are ſuch as inſpire People with Terror and Fear; and that thoſe wherein you ſay we may ſhew ſome Aſſurance are ſuch as do not inſpire us with that Fear: Now thoſe that cauſe Fear, are neither things that have already happened, nor things that actually happen, but ſuch as we expect; for Fear is only the Expectation of an Evil to come. Are not you of this Opinion, *Laches?*

Lac. Yes, yes perfectly.

Soc. This then is our Sentiment, *Nicias.* By thoſe things that are terrible, we underſtand the Evils to come; and by the things wherein one may ſhew ſome aſſurance, we underſtand thoſe things which are alſo to come, and which appear good, or, at leaſt, don't appear to be ill. Do you admit our Definition or not?

Nic. Yes, yes, I admit it.

Soc. Then it is the Knowledge of thoſe things which you call Valour?

Nic. Yes, it is.

Soc. Let us go to a third Point, and ſee if we can agree upon that too.

Nic. What is that?

Soc. You ſhall hear it preſently. We ſay, that is, *Laches* and I, that in all things * Science never differs from it ſelf; it is not one thing, as to things paſt,

* *Socrates* would make *Nicias* underſtand, that in defining Valour *to be the Knowledge of things that are terrible*, that is to ſay, of Evils to come, he has not been large enough in his Definition; for Knowledge extending it ſelf to what is paſt, what is preſent, and what is to come, Valour muſt have all that extent if it be truly a Science. Then We muſt ſay, that it is the Knowledge of all the Evil and of all the Good that hath

paſt, to know how they paſſed; another, as to the things preſent, to know how they are and how they happen; and another upon the things to come, to know how they will be and how they will fall out; but it is always the ſame: For example as to Health, Let the Time be what it will, Phiſick never differs from it ſelf, it is always the ſame Art of Phiſick that judges of it, and that ſees what has been, what is and what will be healthful or unhealthful. Husbandry in the ſame manner judges of what has come, of what is now come and of what will come. And, as to War, you can very well teſtifie, and will be believed, that the Art of a General extends it ſelf to all, to what is paſt, what is preſent and to what is to come; that he has no occaſion for the Art of Divination, and that on the contrary he has it at command, as knowing better than it, what happens and what ought to happen. Is not the Law it ſelf expreſs in that? For it commands not that the Diviner ſhall command the General, but that the General ſhall command the Diviner. Is not this what we ſay, *Laches?*

For if the Diviner commanded the General, he would then be General himſelf.

Lac. Yes certainly, *Socrates.*

Soc. And you, *Nicias*, do you alſo ſay as we do, and do you agree, that Knowledge, being always the ſame, judges equally of what is paſt, what is preſent, and what to come?

Nic. Yes, I ſay as you ſay; for I think it cannot be otherwiſe.

Soc. You ſay then, moſt excellent *Nicias*, that Valour is the Knowledge of things that are terrible, and of thoſe that are not ſo? Is not that what you ſay?

Nic. Yes.

Soc. Have not we agreed, that thoſe things that are terrible are Evils to come; and thoſe things that

hath been, that is, and that ſhall be; for Valour ought no leſs to judge of what has been, and of what is, than of what will be. But of what uſe is it? That *Socrates* will make plain by and by.

are not terrible, and in which we can ſhew ſome aſſurance, is ſome Good that we expect?

Nic. We are agreed upon it.

Soc. And that Knowledge does not extend it ſelf only to what is to come, but alſo to things preſent and to what is paſt.

Nic. I agree in that.

Soc. Then it is not true, that Valour is only the Knowledge of things that are terrible, and of thoſe that are not terrible; for it does not only know the Good and the Evil that is to come, but its Juriſdiction extends as far as that of other Sciences, and it alſo judges of what is paſt and of what is preſent, and, in a word, of all things whether they be near at hand or at a diſtance.

Nic. That ſeems to be true.

Soc. Then you have only defined to us the third part of Valour, but we deſir'd you to give us a full definition of it: At preſent it ſeems to me, that, according to your Principles, 'tis the Knowledge not only of things that are terrible and not terrible, * but alſo of almoſt all the Good and all the Evil at what diſtance ſoever they be from us before or after. Have you then changed your Sentiment, *Nicias?* what do you ſay?

Nic. It appears to me, that Valour has all the extent you ſay.

Soc. That being ſo, do you think that a valiant Man wants any part of Virtue, if it be true, that he knows all the Good and all the Evils that have been, that are, and that may be? and do you believe, that ſuch a Man can want Temperance, Juſtice, and Sanctity? he to whom alone it belongs to uſe a prudent Precaution againſt all the Evils that may

If he wanted any one of thoſe Qualities he would not be valiant.

* *Socrates* will have us underſtand, that Valour puts us in a condition to attract the Good and to avoid the Evil that may happen to us on the part of Man and on the part of God; for it may ſerve to correct what is paſt, to diſpoſe well of what is preſent, and to uſe wiſe Precautions againſt what is to come. It is ſo ſolid a Principle that nothing can ſhake it.

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happen to him on the part of Man and on the part of God, and to put himself in a condition to draw from thence all the Good that can be expected, seeing he knows how he ought to behave himself both towards Man and towards God.

Valour consists then in shunning the Evils, and procuring to himself the Good that may happen to us, not only on the part of Men but also on the part of God.

Nic. What you say now, *Socrates*, seems to have something in it.

Soc. Valour then is not a part of Virtue, but is Virtue in all its parts?

Nic. So it seems to me.

Soc. Yet we said, that it was but a part of it.

Nic. We did so.

Soc. And what we said then does not now appear to be true.

Nic. I own it.

Soc. And consequently, *Nicias*, we have not yet found out what Valour is?

Nic. * I am of your mind.

Lac. Yet I should have thought, my dear *Nicias*, by the Contempt you shew'd of me, when I was answering *Socrates*, that you would have found it out better than another, and I had great hopes, that, with the assistance of *Damon*'s high Wisdom, you would have accomplish'd it very well.

Nic. Cheer up, *Laches*, that is admirable. You think it nothing that you appeared very ignorant of what relates to Valour, provided I appear as ignorant as you; you regard nothing but that, and you believe your self to be no way blameable, when you have me for a Companion, in that Ignorance which

* *Nicias* does not comprehend, that which *Socrates* makes him almost touch with his Finger, that Virtue cannot be divided, and that every one of its parts is Virtue intire. Valour is not without Temperance, Sanctity and Justice, and there is not one of those without Valour. But how comes it about that *Nicias* and *Laches* do not understand this Language? 'Tis because they were us'd to the unhappy Distinctions of Sophists, who had filled their Minds with their false Idea's, and who had ruined Virtue by dividing it and cutting it in pieces. This will be explained more at large in the following Dialogue.

is so scandalous to Men of Quality: But that's the humour of Men, they never look to themselves, but always to others. For my part, I think I am answered indifferently well. If I am deceived in any thing, I don't pretend to be infallible, I shall undeceive my self, by taking Instructions, whether it be from *Damon*, whom you would so willingly ridicule, tho' you never saw, nor knew him; or from any others; and when I am well instructed, I will communicate my knowledge to you; for I am not envious, and you seem to me to have great need of Instruction.

In effect he answered better than Laches, *and came nearer the Mark.*

Lac. And for you, *Nicias*, if we may believe you, you'll suddenly be the eighth wise Man: In the mean time, for all this fine Reasoning, I advise *Lysimachus* & *Melesias* to send us and our good Councils for the Education of their Children, a going, and if they'll believe me, as I have just now said, they'll fix only upon *Socrates*; for, as for my part, if my Children were old enough, I would do so.

Nic. Oh! as for that I agree with you. If *Socrates* will take care of our Children, we need not look out for another Master, and I am ready to give him my Son *Niceratus*, if he will be so good as to take charge of him: But always, when I speak to him of that, he recommends me to other Masters and refuses me his Assistance. Try then *Lysimachus*, if you can have any more Power over him, and if he will have so much Complaisance for you.

Lys. It would be an Act of Justice: * Because, for my part, I would do for him what I would not do for many others. What do you say then, *Socrates?* will you suffer your self to be prevailed upon, and will you take charge of these Children to make them virtuous?

Soc. He must be a very strange and cruel Man that

* This Passage must not be translated as *des Serres* translated it, *I would give him more*. *Lysimachus* had no thoughts of speaking of a Salary: That would have too much offended *Socrates*, who did not teach for Money; nor does the Greek Expression bear more than I have said.

will

will not contribute to make Children as honeſt as they can be. For my part, if in the Converſation we have now had together, I had appeared more learned and the reſt more ignorant, I would have thought you had reaſon to chuſe me preferably to others: But you ſee very well, that we labour all under the ſame Uncertainty and Perplexity. Then why ſhould I be preferred? I think that neither one nor other of us deſerves preference: And, if it be ſo, conſider if I am not going to give you good Advice: I am of opinion (we are alone, and we will not diſcover our ſelves) I am of opinion, that we ſhould all ſeek the beſt Maſter, firſt for our ſelves, and then for theſe Children, and for that end not to ſpare Expences, nor any thing elſe in the World: for I ſhall never adviſe our remaining in the ſtate wherein we now are. If any body deride us for going ſtill to School at theſe Years, we will defend our ſelves by the Authority of *Homer*, who ſays in ſome place, *That 'tis very bad for the Poor to be ſhame-faced.* And thus, by laughing at all they can ſay, we ſhall take care of our ſelves and of theſe Children.

In the 17th Book of his Odyſſ.

Lyſ. That Council, *Socrates*, pleaſes me infinitely well; and, for my part, the older I am, the more deſire I ſhall have to inſtruct my ſelf at the ſame time with our Children. Do then as you have ſaid, come to Morrow-morning early to my Houſe; do not fail therein, I pray you, that we may adviſe how to put in practice what we have reſolved upon. 'Tis time that this Converſation ſhould break up.

Soc. I will not fail therein, *Lyſimachus*, I will be with you to Morrow-morning very early, if it pleaſe God.

THE

THE INTRODUCTION TO *PROTAGORAS.*

AFter that *Plato* had, in the foregoing Dialogue, giv'n, as it were, a Specimen of the falſe Notions that prevail'd in his Time, and had infected the chief Perſons of the Republick, here he diſcovers their Authors, and attacks them with abundance of force. He therefore introduces *Socrates* diſputing with *Protagoras*, who was the moſt conſiderable of all the Sophiſts, and the Perſon who, by the Art of poyſoning Mens Minds, had acquired the greateſt Reputation, and moſt Riches.

At firſt he ſhews, with a natural Simplicity, the Veneration Men had throughout all *Greece* for thoſe Impoſtors. They were followed where-ever they went, and they no ſooner arrived in any City but the News of it was ſpread abroad all over; People flock'd to them with all poſſible eagerneſs, and their Houſes were filled betimes in the Morning. Men that were ſo followed could not be without ſome ſort of Merit, and particularly in ſuch a diſcerning Age as that. 'Tis alſo evident, that *Protagoras* was a Man of great Wit, and expreſs'd himſelf with wonderful eaſe. What is it thoſe two Qualities could not do, eſpecially when ſupported by a deal of Preſumption, which rarely fails to attend them? Inſtances of it are ſeen daily, ſo that it is needleſs to cite em. Who is it that goes to examine whether thoſe

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Doctors vent falſe Maxims? Who is it that is able to diſtinguiſh the falſe Gloſs of Opinion from the true Light of Knowledge? They ſpeak agreeably; they flatter our Paſſions and Prejudices; they promiſe us Knowledge and Virtue, and fill us with an high Conceit of our ſelves. What needs there more to make them be followed?

This was the Profeſſion of the Sophiſts. As nothing is ſo oppoſite to that Spirit of Error as true Philoſophy, *Socrates* was a mortal Enemy to thoſe falſe Teachers, and *Plato*, who trod in his Footſteps, could not vex them worſe than by preſerving the Memory of all the Diſputes that that wiſe Man had with them on ſeveral Occaſions, and of all the Banters he put upon them. This is what he does in ſeveral Dialogues, as the *Sophiſt*, *Euthydeme*, *Gorgias*, *Hippias*, and *Protagoras*.

I have put this laſt after *Laches*, becauſe it is a natural Continuation of it; for here is examined that famous Queſtion, If Virtue can be taught? and what Valour is, properly ſpeaking.

Nothing is more natural than the Plan of that Dialogue, and nothing more ſolid than the Manner in which it is performed.

A young Man become fond of the Sophiſts, goes to *Socrates* before break of Day, to beg of him to conduct him to *Protagoras*, who was juſt arrived at *Athens*. *Socrates* agrees. They go to the Houſe of *Callias*, where he lodged; and *Callias*, was one of the Chiefs of the Republick.

They find *Protagoras* walking in the midſt of a Crowd of *Athenians* and Foreigners, who liſtened to him as to an Oracle. *Prodicus* of *Ceos* and *Hippias* of *Elée*, two of the greateſt Sophiſts of the Age, were alſo there. And therefore the Victory which *Socrates* obtains in this famous Diſpute, ought to be lookt upon as the defeat of all the Party of the Sophiſts, who aſſiſted therein by their Leaders.

At first *Protagoras* seems to be an admirable Man; to prove that Vertue can be taught, he tells a very ingenious Story, and it must be confessed, that he gives his Opinion the most specious Colours that could be, he omits nothing that can be said, and what he says is every Day repeated by People who are far from thinking themselves to be Sophists.

Socrates confutes him with a dexterity that cannot be sufficiently praised; and by his way of treating them he teaches us, that at all times, when one has to do with that sort of People, the true Secret, to get the depth of them, is not to suffer them to speak so much as they would, and to make their chimerical Systems; for they avoid and shift off all your Arguments, and escape from you at last by their long Discourses. You must then oblige them to answer positively, and without rambling, to all you ask them: with this Precaution the Dispute will soon be at an end. That very Man who when suffered to Harangue and make Orations upon any thing has many times confounded every Body, seems to be Weakness it self when he is kept close and confined to the Limits of a regular Dispute. In short, 'tis seen that *Protagoras* has nothing but some confused Notions, that which he hath scrap'd up by his undigested Reading, and that instead of Knowledge he has nothing but a monstrous Heap of Opinions which contradict and destroy one another when they are sounded to the bottom and compared together.

The Aim of *Socrates*, in this Dialogue, is not to confound and triumph over the Sophists, he has a more noble prospect; he would cure the *Athenians* of affecting them so much, and teach important Truths, the Ignorance of which is the only Source of all the Evils that happen to Men, not only in this Life but also in that which is to come.

The first Truth is, That there is nothing more dangerous than to submit our selves to all sorts of Teachers, and that it is not the same with Sciences which nourish the Soul, as with Food that nou-

rishes

riſhes the Body. The latter may be bought by every one; for, after they have bought it, they may carry it home in Veſſels of ſmall value, and, before they uſe it, they have time to adviſe with thoſe who know whether it be good or bad, and can teach them how to uſe it: Whereas if one buy Knowledge of the firſt that comes, he expoſes himſelf to very great danger; for in buying it he has no other Veſſel to put it into but the Soul it ſelf, which always ſavours of that which is put into it, and which, from the very Minute that it receives the Doctrin, is cured or poyſoned for ever, unleſs ſome good Phyſician be found to reſtore it to its former ſtate, which is very hard to do.

The ſecond Truth is, That thoſe falſe Teachers, by teaching that Virtue is compoſed of different Parts which have no dependance upon one another, do entirely deſtroy it, and corrupt the Mind and the Heart of their Diſciples; for they bring them to vain Aſſurance, that they may have ſome Parts of Virtue without having the reſt, and be, for example, temperate without being juſt; juſt without being temperate or pious, and valiant tho' impious; and thereby put them out of condition of ever becoming virtuous. To divide Virtue thus, and to tear it, if we may venture to ſay ſo, to pieces, is abſolutely to annihilate it and deſtroy it.

Virtue is one in its Principle and Object; it is indiviſible and eternal as they are, and all its Acts depend upon it ſelf; tho' each of them have certain diſtinguiſhing Characters, yet they are inſeperable and indiviſible; they always hold together by ſome common tye; they can neither be limited nor momentary, but are all eternal as Virtue that produceth them, and as the Soul whereof they are the Life: In a word, Virtue is entire in every Act, and no Act of Virtue periſhes. For all that periſhes is not Virtue. A Demonſtration of this might be made: Where the Spirit of God is [illegible] Virtue; and where the Spirit of God is, there Virtue is neceſſarily

ſarily with all its Parts, and by conſequence a juſt Man is temperate and pious; a temperate Man is valiant and juſt; and he who is valiant is neither impious, debauched, nor unjuſt. Theſe are natural and inconteſtable Truths in ſpight of the Illuſions of our Prejudices.

The third Truth that *Socrates* would teach is, That it does not belong to every body to explain the Poets, and that the Sophiſts, who boaſted of great learning in that, could do nothing but ſpoil the fineſt Paſſages of the Poets, and thoſe that contained the ſoundeſt Theology and the greateſt Maxims of Morality. Here is found a ſmall Diſſertation upon a Paſſage of *Simonides*, who, in one of his Poems, which Time has robb'd us of, quarelled with that famous Sentence of *Pittacus*, *It is a difficult thing to be virtuous*. *Simonides* finds fault with that; he would have had him ſay, it is a difficult thing to become virtuous, and at the ſame time that it is not impoſſible, but that it is abſolutely impoſſible to be ſo always; for there is no Man upon Earth who is innocent and juſt all his Life-time, and we muſt not hope to find any ſuch. God alone is unchangeable and conſtant in the perfection of Virtue, and thoſe whom he ſupports and favours. This Theology, which is ſo agreeable to the Chriſtian Doctrine, pleaſes *Socrates*, and 'tis he himſelf who draws pure Light from out of the middle of the Darkneſs wherein thoſe Sophiſts had wrapt it up, by their bad Criticiſms and falſe Explications. We may thereby ſee what profound Judgment a Man muſt have, to enable him to explain the Poets with ſucceſs, that is to ſay for the publick good.

This Paſſage of *Simonides* leads *Socrates* to touch upon a fifth Truth, which is this, That in order to become good one muſt have been wicked, ſo to become wicked one muſt have been good. For no body can be called perverſe but he who from a good Man is become wicked. This Maxime does not appear at firſt to be what it really is: It is very profound and draws

Perverſus nondicitur niſi qui depravatus à recto eſt. *S. Hierom. Eccl. Chap. 1.*

draws into the knowledge of this first Truth, which is one of the solid Foundations of Platonick Philosophy, that Men were created perfect, and that they have fallen from that perfection by the unhappy use they made of their liberty. Therefore we must not expect a perfect Man in this World: and, as *Simonides* did, we must, with all ourt Heart, love and praise those who have fewest Failings, and who commit nothing that is shameful.

From this Sentiment of *Simonides*, *Socrates* also draws the Explication of this sixth Truth, That the Injustice of Men ought not to obliterate in us those certain Sentiments which Nature has ingraven in our Heart, and which this Poet calls by the Name of *Necessity*, because we must absolutely submit unto and obey them, or cease to be Men. For example, all the Causes of Complaint that an ill-humoured Father and Mother, an unjust Country, or a cruel Master can give us, will never justifie our Aversion to them, nor authorise a Spirit of Disobedience, Vengeance or Revolt. Let them treat us never so ill, we ought to love them, praise them, serve them, *&c.* And upon this Subject *Socrates* does, with an Eloquence, that may be called Christian, shew the difference there is in those Occasions between the Conduct of a good and a bad Man.

These great Truths which *Socrates* draws from the Poem of *Simonides*, do not hinder him from acknowledging, that Philosophers, who treat of difficult and important Questions, ought to have recourse to the Poets, and to change the Dispute into a Dissertation upon the Sense that ought to be given to a Verse; for we cannot address our selves to them to demand the reason of what they say. The most Ignorant will dispute with the most Learned even to the end of Time; for what will you do to convince him? his Wilfulness and Ignorance are much stronger than your Reasons. And if you dispute with a learned Man, he will not always have the Courage to confess that he is in the wrong: private Interest, or

Jealousie and Vanity, too frequent Companions of that sort of Knowledge, will hinder him from submitting to the clearest of Truths, even tho' he himself be secretly convinced of them: Where then will be the end of the Dispute? The surest way is to leave the Poets there, and to press your Man upon his own Principles, for which he is obliged to give a Reason.

After this Precaution *Socrates*, to decide the Question that is the Subject of the Dispute, would have it agreed on what Knowledge properly is, and would have it determined if it be the Slave of the Passions, as People fansie it to be; or, if it be strong enough to govern Men surely: And 'tis in this also that *Socrates* appears to be a divine Man, for he makes it appear that Knowledge is the strongest thing in the World, that it alone can put Man in a state never to be overcome by his Passions, and that it alone will always deliver him from the greatest Dangers, and will make him triumph over all the Powers of the Earth, that shall arm themselves to force him to commit any thing contrary to the light of this Science. This agrees exactly with those admirable Words of our Lord spoken to the Jews, *Ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth shall make you free.* *Socrates* might have drawn this great Notion from the Words of *Solomon*, who says, that *the knowledge of Wisdom will give Life to him that has it.* For by Knowledge *Socrates* means the Knowledge of God, and of the Truth. Knowledge, which is the Source of all Vertues, and which makes Temperance, Justice, Valour, Sanctity, Strength, *&c.* The Propositon of *Socrates*, applied to other Sciences, would be perfectly ridiculous.

Et cognoscetis veritatem, & veritas liberabit vos, S. *John* 8. 32.

Scientia sapientiæ vivificabit habentem, *Eccles.* 7.

The cause of Vertue being known, so is also that of Vice, by reason they are Contraries. 'Tis therefore Ignorance that occasions Vice: From whence it follows by necessary Consequence, that those who commit Wickedness, do it whether they will or not.

Most

Moſt Men will not agree to this Principle; on the contrary, they maintain that we commit Evil when we know it, and that it depends upon our ſelves to ſhun it, and that we refuſe to do Good, with an intire Knowledge and with a full Power to follow it. And when they are asked the Reaſon of this ſtrange Conduct, they ſay that it is becauſe Man is enſlav'd by his ſenſual Pleaſures.

'Tis therefore proper to enquire into this vulgar and ill underſtood Reaſon; for when once that is well clear'd up, it will be evidently known what Vertue is, the reſemblance that Valour has with all the other Parts of that Vertue, will appear, and it will be agreed that this Principle of *Socrates* is ſo certain a Truth, that even thoſe who think themſelves the furtheſt from it, and that contradict it moſt, comply therewith without perceiving it, and allow it, contrary to their Deſign, in terms of which they know not the Senſe and Force.

Theſe are the indiſputable Maxims that *Socrates* eſtabliſhes, and which are neceſſary for the deciſion of the Queſtion.

Pleaſure is a Good, and Grief is an Evil. Pleaſure which leads to Grief is an Evil, and Grief which leads to Pleaſure is a Good.

There is no Body but who ſeeks after Good, and flees from Evil.

Theſe Principles being ſuppoſed, when 'tis ſaid a Man knowing Evil, will notwithſtanding commit it; and that knowing Good, he doth not ceaſe to flee from it, becauſe he is enſlav'd by his ſenſual Pleaſure, it is not meant there of Pleaſure which leads to Grief, for that is an Evil; neither is it meant of Grief which leads to Pleaſure, for no Body commits Evil for the ſake of Grief: It is ſpoke of Pleaſure ſynonymous of Good. Which is as much as to ſay, that this Man ſhuns Good and follows Evil becauſe he is thereunto inclin'd by Good; which every Body will own to be ridiculous.

But why is not the Good that inclines us capable to ſurmount the Evil? And why are the Evils the ſtrongeſt, even when Goodneſs inclines us? There is a manifeſt Contradiction there. Some will ſay it is becauſe the Evils are greater and more numerous than the Good. But this is ſtill more ridiculous, for from thence it will follow, that to be overcome by the Good, is to chuſe the greateſt Evils in room of the leaſt Good.

From whence comes ſo ſtrange a Choice? It can proceed only from this, that we cannot meaſure the greatneſs of the Good and of the Evil, and cannot diſtinguiſh the one from the other. Then we do not deceive our ſelves but for want of Knowledge; that is to ſay, through Ignorance: And this is what *Socrates* deſigns to prove. Therefore 'tis Knowledge that brings forth Temperance, Juſtice, Sanctity, Valour, Strength, *&c.* Or, rather, all thoſe Vertues are nothing but Knowledge it ſelf; and conſequently Knowledge, far from being overcome by the Paſſions, is on the other hand able alone to triumph over them; always Miſtreſs where ever it is: Knowledge alone can deliver us, and Ignorance alone can deſtroy us. This Doctrine is altogether conſo-
Rom. 1. 28. nant to what the Chriſtian Religion teaches us, *That Men not being willing to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind. And*
2 Theſſ. 2. 11. *God ſhall ſend them a Spirit of Error.*

But how comes it that *Socrates* aſſerting that Vertue is a Science, maintains at the ſame time that it can't be taught? For it is certain that all Sciences can be taught. How then doth *Socrates* agree with himſelf? This Contradiction is not ſo difficult to reconcile as that of *Protagoras*, who would have Vertue to be quite another thing than Science, and who notwithſtanding pretends that it may be taught. There are ſome Sciences which Men teach; but there is one that Men do not teach, and that can be learnt from no other but God. This is what *Socrates* would have us to underſtand, and what thoſe

thoſe falſe Teachers, who are accuſtomed to make ill uſe of human Sciences, could not perceive.

Since Science is Vertue, Valour can be nothing but Science; and conſequently, all Boldneſs, that is not accompanied with Prudence, can't be call'd Valour; for, on the contrary, it is Ignorance. Valour is the Science of Things that are terrible; that is to ſay, that of two Things that are terrible, it induceth us to chuſe that which is the leaſt, and to chuſe it even with the hazard of our Life; as we have ſeen in *Laches*.

I ſhall not enter upon the particular Beauties of this Dialogue, which conſiſt in the variety, and in the livelineſs of the Characters; in the Mirth and pleaſant Humours of *Socrates*, in the Simplicity and Nobleneſs of the Narratives, and in the Knowledge of Antiquity therein diſcovered; thoſe Beauties are perceptible enough.

But I can't but relate a Paſſage here which ſeems to me very remarkable, and which *Socrates* only touches *en paſſant*, without inſiſting upon it, as finding it too Sublime for thoſe with whom he convers'd. It is when he ſays, *That even though the Pleaſures of the World were not attended by any kind of Evil in this Life, yet they would be no leſs bad, becauſe they cauſe Men to rejoyce; and to rejoyce in Vice, is the moſt deplorable of all States, and the Puniſhment of Sin.*

We muſt not finiſh this Argument without ſpeaking of the Date of this Dialogue, as to which *Atheneus* accuſeth *Plato* to have committed very conſiderable Faults in Chronology. The whole ſtrength of his Criticiſm conſiſts in this. *Plato* tells us that this Diſpute of *Socrates* againſt *Protagoras* happen'd the Year after the Poet *Pherecrates* his Play, call'd, *The Savages*, was acted. This Play was acted in the time of the *Archon Ariſtion*, in the 4th Year of the 89th Olympiad. The true Time then of this Diſpute, according to *Plato*, is the Year after; that is to ſay, the firſt Year of the 90th Olympiad, in

the time of the *Archon Aſtyphilus*. Yet here are two things that contradict this Date.

The firſt is, That by a Paſſage in a Play of *Eupolis*'s, which was acted a Year before that of *Pherecrates*, it appears that *Protagoras* was then at *Athens*: Now *Plato* ſays poſitively, that in the time of this Diſpute, that is to ſay, the firſt Year of the 90th Olympiad, *Protagoras* arrived at *Athens* but three Days before.

The ſecond is, That *Hippias d' Eleis*, was preſent at that Diſpute, which could not be; for the Truce which the *Athenians* had concluded with the *Lacedemonians* being expired, no *Peloponeſian* could be at *Athens* at that time.

I ſhould not have reviv'd this Cenſure, if *Caſaubon*, that wiſe and judicious Critick, had not been ſo ſtruck with it as to write, that he did not ſee what could be anſwered in juſtification of *Plato*, whereas what he anſwer'd is not hard to find. It will quickly appear, that the Objections of *Athenæus* ſerve only to fix the Time of this Diſpute the more, as *Plato* has obſerv'd.

Thucid. l. 5. We know for certain, that the *Athenians* made a Peace with the *Lacedemonians* for fifty Years, in the time of the *Archon Alcæus*, the third Year of the 89th Olympiad. It is true, that this Treaty was not faithfully obſerved on either ſide; but it is alſo true, that this ill-cemented Peace laſted ſix Years and ten Months, without coming to an open Rupture. Then *Hippias d' Eleas* might be at *Athens* two Years after this Treaty, which laſted five Years longer, after theſe two Years were expired. So much for the laſt Objection.

The firſt is no better founded: Let us ſee what *Eupolis* ſays. Protagoras *of* Teos *is within there*. He ſays nothing but that; and it may be obſerved at firſt ſight, that he is deceived as to the Country of *Protagoras*; he aſſures us, that he is of *Teos*; and he was of *Abdera*. This Remark will be of uſe to us.

I ſay then, that *Atheneus*, inſtead of imploying this Verſe of *Eupolis* to contradict *Plato*, ought rather to have made uſe of the Paſſage of *Plato* to underſtand the ſaid Verſe of *Eupolis*. The Poet and the Philoſopher are in the right, and *Atheneus* is the only Perſon that is in the wrong, *Protagoras* had made two Journeys to *Athens*. *Plato* ſpeaks of the ſecond, and the Verſe of *Eupolis* ought to be underſtood of the firſt: For tho' *Protagoras* was not at *Athens* when the Play was acted in the time of the *Archon Alcæus*, it was enough that he had been there: The Poets have the priviledge to bring the Times nearer and to take notice of things that are paſt as if they were preſent; beſides, he might be there when the Poet compoſed it. Thus the Verſe of *Eupolis* ſerves on the one hand for a Commentary to what *Hipocrates* ſays in this Dialogue: Socrates, *I come to pray you to ſpeak for me to* Protagoras; *for, beſides that, I am too young, I never ſaw, nor knew him, I was but a Child when he made his firſt Journy.*

And, on the other hand, this Paſſage of *Plato* ſerves to excuſe the Ignorance of *Eupolis* about the Country of *Protagoras*; for *Eupolis* might very well be ignorant of it at this firſt Journy, that Sophiſt not being then very well known, whereas it would not have been pardonable in him to have been ignorant of it at the ſecond.

This Fault of *Atheneus* is leſs ſurpriſing than that of *Caſaubon*, who follow'd him, and who in explaining his Reaſons commits another more conſiderable Miſtake, whileſt he aſſures us that *Thucidides* does not ſpeak of the one Year's Truce that was made between the *Athenians* and the *Lacedemonians* under the *Archon Iſarchus*, the firſt Year of the 89th Olympiad, at the end of the eighth Year of the War and two Years before the Treaty of Peace that has been ſpoke of; for it is expreſly ſet down in the fourth Book, and the Treaty is there related

He sets down the end of the eighth Year of the War, the 14th Day of the Month Elapheboiion (February) *and the beginning of the Spring.*

ted all at length, with the Date of the Year, of the Month, of the Day and of the Seaſon.

The Wranglings of *Atheneus* ſerve only to juſtifie *Plato*'s Exactneſs, and to make it appear that this Dialogue is beyond the reach of all Criticiſm; for if this Cenſurer had found any thing elſe to find fault with, the Envy with which he was animated againſt this Philoſopher would not have ſuffered him to have forgot it.

According to *Diogenes Laertius*, this Dialogue is ἐνδεικτικὸς, A Dialogue of Accuſation, a Satyrique Dialogue. One may ſay, that it is alſo ἀνατρεπτικὸς, deſtructive. But thoſe Names mark only the Turn and the Manner of the Dialogue. Its true Character is Logical and Moral.

PRO-

PROTAGORAS:

OR,

The SOPHISTS.

A Friend of Socrates.
Socrates.

Socrates * FRom whence come you, *Socrates*? But Friend. ought one to ask it, 'tis from your uſual Chaſe. You come from running after the handſome *Alcibiades*. I confeſs, that I alſo pleas'd my ſelf the other Day with looking upon him; he ſeem'd to me to be very fine and comely, tho' he be already a Man; for we may ſay it here, between us, he is not now in his Youth, and his Beard caſts a Shadow already upon his Chin.

It was obſerved that Socrates *followed* Alcibiades *every where, to prevent his corrupting himſelf.*

Soc. What's that to the purpoſe? Do you think that † *Homer* was much in the wrong, in ſaying that the Age of a young Man, who begins to have a Beard, is moſt agreeable? That is, juſt the Age of *Alcibiades*.

* Enquiry is made why *Plato* does not name this Friend of *Socrates*, and 'tis what will never be found out. It can only be gueſſed at. Perhaps *Plato* was afraid of expoſing the Friend of *Socrates* to the reſentment of the Sophiſts, who were in great credit at *Athens*, and who were revengeful; or that the part which this Friend acts here, not being conſiderable, it was not worth while to name him.

† This Paſſage of *Homer* is in the tenth Book of his *Odyſſea*, where that Poet ſpeaks of *Mercury*, who takes upon him the ſhape of a young Man that begins to have a Beard. Thus *Socrates* compares *Alcibiades* to that God.

Soc.

Soc. *Friend.* You juſt come from him then; how are you in his Favour?

Soc. I am very well with him; I perceived this very Day, that I was more in his favour than uſual, for he ſaid a thouſand things in my favour and always took my part: I have but juſt parted from him. And I'll tell you a thing that may ſeem very ſtrange to you, which is, that whilſt he was preſent I ſaw him not, and did not ſo much as think of him.

Soc. *Friend.* What happen'd to you both then, that you neither ſaw him nor thought of him? Is it poſſible that you have met with ſome finer young Man in the City than *Alcibiades?* I can't believe any thing of it.

Soc. It is ev'n ſo.

Soc. *Friend.* In good earneſt? Is he an *Athenian*, or a Stranger?

Soc. He is a Stranger.

Soc. *Friend.* Whence comes he then?

Soc. From *Abdera.*

Soc. *Friend.* And did you think him ſo fine, that he hath effaced the Comelineſs of *Alcibiades?*

Wiſdom is more amiable than Beauty.

Soc. The greateſt Beauty is not to be laid in the Ballance with great Wiſdom.

Soc. *Friend.* You have juſt now come from a wiſe Man then?

Soc. Yes, a wiſe Man; nay, a very wiſe Man, at leaſt if you look upon *Protagoras* to be the wiſeſt of Men now living.

Soc. Fr. What do you tell me? Is *Protagoras* in this City?

Soc. Yes: He has been here theſe three Days.

Soc. Fr. And you have juſt now parted from him?

Soc. Yes, I have juſt now parted from him, after a very long Converſation.

Soc. Fr. Alas! will you not relate that Converſation to us, if you ben't in haſte? ſit down, I pray you, in that young Man's Place, who will willingly give it you.

Soc.

Soc. I will do it with all my Heart ; and ſhall be obliged to you, if you will give ear to it.

Soc. Fr. We ſhall be much more obliged to you, if you will relate it to us.

Soc. The Obligation then will be reciprocal. Your Buſineſs is only to hear me. This Morning while it was yet dark *Hippocrates*, the Son of *Apollodorus* and *Phaſon*'s Brother, knock'd very hard at my Gate with his Cane ; it was no ſooner open'd to him, but he came directly to my Chamber, crying with a loud Voice, *Socrates* are you aſleep? Knowing his Voice, I ſaid, what *Hippocrates*! what News do you bring me? Very good News, ſays he. God grant it, reply'd I. But what News is it then, that you come ſo early? *Protagoras* is in Town, ſays he. I reply'd, he has been here theſe two Days. Did you not hear it till now? I heard it but this Night ; and having ſaid this, he drew near my Bed, and feeling with his Cane, ſat down at my Feet, and went on in this manner. I returned laſt Night very late from the Village of *Doinoe*, where I went to take my Slave *Satyrus* again, who had run away : I was reſolved to come and tell you that I was going in ſearch of him, but ſome other thing put it out of my mind. After I had return'd, ſupp'd and was going to Bed, my Brother came to tell me that *Protagoras* was come to Town : At firſt my Thoughts were to come to acquaint you with this good News ; but conſidering that the Night was already too far advanced, I went to Bed, and after a ſmall ſlumber, which refreſhed me a little after my Fatigue, I aroſe and came running hither. I, who knew *Hippocrates* to be a Man of Courage, perceiving him all amazed, asked him, What the Matter was? Has *Protagoras* done you any Injury? Yes certainly, anſwered he, laughing ; he has done me an Injury that I will not forgive him, that is, that he is wiſe, and does not make me ſo. Oh! ſaid I to him, if you will give him good Money, and if you can oblige him to receive you for his Diſciple, he will alſo make you wiſe.

I

I wish to God, says he, that were all; I would not leave my self a Half-penny, and I would also drain my Friends Purses. 'Tis only that that brings me hither: I come to pray you to speak to him for me; for besides that, I am too young, I never saw him nor knew him: I was but a Child, when he came hither first, but I hear every body speak very well of him, and they assure me that he is the most eloquent of Men. Let's go to him, before he goes abroad. I am told he lodges with * *Callias*, Son of *Hipponicus*. Let us go thither I conjure you. 'Tis too early, said I to him; but let us walk in our Court; where we will argue till Day-light, then we will go: I assure you we shall not miss him, for he seldom goes abroad. Then we went down into the Court, and while we were walking there, I had a mind to find out what *Hippocrates*'s Design was. To this end I said to him, Well, *Hippocrates*, you are going to *Protagoras* to offer him Money, that he may teach you something: What sort of Man do you take him to be, and what sort of Man would you have him to make you? If you should go to the great Physician of *Cos*, who is your name-sake, and a Descendant of *Æsculapius*, and should offer him Mony, if any Body should ask you, *Hippocrates*, to what sort of Man do you pretend to give that Money, and what would you become by means of this Money? what would you answer? I would answer, That I give it to a Physician, and that I would be made a Physician.

And if you should go to *Polycletus* of *Argos* or to *Phidias* to give them Money to learn something of them, and any one should ask you the very same Question, to whom do you give that Money, and what would you be? what would you answer?

I would answer, says he, that I give it to a Statuary and that I would be a Statuary.

* *Callias* was one of the first Citizens of *Athens*: His Father *Hipponicus* had been General of the *Athenians* with *Nicias* at the Battle of *Tanagre*.

That

That is very well. Now then we are going, you and I to *Protagoras*, with a Disposition to give him, all that he shall ask for your Instruction, if all that we have will satisfie him for it, or be enough to tempt him; and if it be not enough, we are also ready to make use of the Credit of our Friends. If any one perceiving his extraordinary eagerness should ask us, *Socrates* and *Hippocrates*, tell me, in giving so much Money to *Protagoras*, to what sort of a Man do you think you give it? what should we answer him? what other Denomination has *Protagoras* that we know of? we know that *Phidias* has that of Statuary and *Homer* that of Poet: How shall we call *Protogoras* to describe him by his Profession?

Protagoras is call'd a Sophist, *Socrates*.

Well then, said I, we are going to give our Money to a Sophist.

Yes, certainly.

And if the same Person should continue to ask you, what do you design to become, with *Protagoras*?

At these Words my Man blushing, for it was then light enough to let me see what Alteration there was in his Countenance: If we will follow our Principle, says he, it is evident that I would become a Sophist.

How, by all that's good, said I to him, would you not be asham'd to give your self out to be a Sophist among the Greeks?

I swear to you, *Socrates*, seeing I must tell you the truth, I should be ashamed of it.

Ha! I understand you, my dear *Hippocrates*; your design then is not to go to the School of *Protagoras*, but as you went to that of a Grammarian, Music-Master, or Master of Exercises: For you went not to all those Masters to learn the depth of their Art and to make profession thereof; but you went thither only to exercise your self, and to learn that which a Gentleman and a Man that would live in the World ought necessarily to know.

You

You are in the right, said he; that's exactly the use that I would make of *Protagoras.*

But, said I, do you know what you are going to do?

As to what?

You are going to trust a Sophist with your Understanding; and I dare lay you a Wager, that you do not know what a Sophist is; and, since it is so, you know not then with whom you are going to trust that which is most valuable to you, and you know not whether you put it into good or bad hands?

Why? I believe I know very well what a Sophist is.

Tell me then, what is it?

A Sophist, as his very Name testifies, is a learned Man, who knows a thousand good things.

We may say the same thing of a Painter or an Architect. They are also learned Men who know a great many good things: But if any body should ask us wherein are they learn'd? we should certainly answer them, that 'tis in what regards drawing of Pictures and building of Houses. If any one should ask us in like manner, wherein is a Sophist learned? what should we answer? What is the Art positively that he makes profession of? and what should we say it is?

We should say, that his Profession is to make Men Eloquent.

Perhaps we might speak true in so saying; that is something, but it is not all; your Answer occasions another Question, to wit, In what it is that a Sophist renders a Man eloquent? For a player upon the Lute, does not he also render his Disciple eloquent in that which regards the Lute?

A Master of the Lute speaks better of the Lute than the most eloquent Man in the World.

That is certain.

In what is it then that a Sophist renders a Man eloquent, is it not in that which he knows?

Without doubt.

What is it that he knows then and teaches others?

In

In truth, *Socrates*, I cannot tell.

How then? said I to him, taking the advantage of this Confession; alas! don't you perceive to what frightful Dangers you are going to expose your self? If you had occasion to put your Body into the Hands of a Physician whom you know not, and who might as well destroy it as cure it, would not you look to it more than once? Would you not call your Friends and Relations to consult with them? And would you not take more than one Day to resolve on the Matter? You esteem your Soul infinitely above your Body, and you are perswaded that on it depends your Happiness or Unhappiness, according as it is well or ill disposed; and, notwithstanding its Welfare is now at stake, you neither ask Advice of your Father, nor Brother, nor of any of us who are your Friends; you don't take so much as one Moment to deliberate whether you ought to entrust it with this Stranger who is just now arrived; but having heard of his arrival very late at Night, you come next Morning, before break of Day, to put it into his Hands without considering on it, and are ready not only to imploy all your own Riches for that purpose, but also those of your Friends. You have resolved upon it, you must deliver up your self to *Protagoras*, whom you know not, as you your self confess, and with whom you have never spoke: You call him only a Sophist, and, without knowing what a Sophist is, you throw your self into his Hands.

Nothing is more dangerous than to give our selves up to Teachers of all sorts.

All that you say, *Socrates*, is very true; you are in the right.

Don't you find, *Hippocrates*, that the Sophist is but a wholesale Merchant and a Retailer of those Things wherewith the Soul is nourished?

The Sophist is but a Merchant.

So it seems to me, *Socrates*, said he; but what are the Things wherewith the Soul is nourished?

Sciences, I answered him. But, my dear Friend, we must be very careful that the Sophist, by boasting too much of his Merchandize, do not deceive us, as those People do who sell all that is necessary for the

the Nouriſhment of the Body: For the latter, without knowing whether the Proviſions which they ſell be good or bad, commend them exceſſively, that they may ſell them the better; and thoſe who buy them know them no better than they, unleſs it be ſome Phyſician * or Maſter of Exerciſe. It is the ſame with thoſe Merchants who go into the Cities to ſell Sciences to thoſe who have a mind to them; they praiſe indifferently all that they ſell. It may very well be, that moſt of them know not if what they ſell is good or bad for the Soul: But all thoſe who buy any thing of them are certainly ignorant as to that Matter, unleſs they meet with ſome Perſon who is a good Phyſician for the Soul. If you are skill'd in that Matter, and know what is Good or Bad, you may certainly buy Sciences of *Protagoras* and of all the other Sophiſts; but if you are not skill'd therein, have a care, my dear *Hippocrates*, that when you go there you don't make a very bad Market, and hazard that which is deareſt to you in the World; for the riſque we run in buying Sciences is far greater than that which we run in buying Proviſions for Nouriſhment: After we have bought the laſt, they may be carried home in Veſſels which they can't ſpoil; and before uſing them we have time to conſult and to call to our aſſiſtance thoſe who know what we ought to eat and drink and what not, the quantity we may take and the time when, inſomuch that the danger is not very great: But it is not the ſame with Sciences, we can't put them into any other Veſſel but the Soul, as ſoon as

He who knows ſound Doctrine and is a good Phyſician of the Soul, may hear all ſorts of Teachers.

The buying of Proviſions for the Soul is more dangerous than that of Proviſions for the Mouth.

* In *Hippocrates* time and a little before, the Phyſicians, having neglected the Study of *Diet*, which requires an exact Knowledge of every Thing in Nature, the Maſters of Exerciſe laid hold on it as on a deſerted Eſtate, and took upon themſelves to order their Diſciples ſuch Diet as was agreeable to them in regard to their Temperament and Exerciſes. *Hippocrates* began to put himſelf again in poſſeſſion of it, and by degrees the Phyſicians regained the places of Exerciſe. There were but few Maſters of Exerciſe who kept it up in the time of *Plato*. Moſt of them had hired Phyſicians, *&c.*

the

the Bargain is made it must of necessity be carried away, and that too in the Soul it self; and we must withdraw with it, being either enriched or ruined for the rest of our Days. Let us therefore consult People of greater Age and Experience than our selves upon this Subject; for we are too young to determine such an important Affair: But let us go on however, seeing we are in the way; we shall hear what *Protagoras* will say, and, after having heard him, we will communicate it to others: Doubtless *Protagoras* is not there all alone, we shall find *Hippias* of *Eleas* with him, and I believe we shall also find *Prodicus de Ceos* and many others besides, all of 'em wise Men and of great insight into things.

This Resolution being taken, we go on. When we came to the Gate, we stopt to conclude a small Dispute we had had by the way: This continued a short time. I believe the Porter, who is an old Eunuch, heard us, and that the Number of Sophists that came thither constantly, had put him in an ill Humour against all those who came near the House. We had no sooner knockt, but opening the Gate and seeing us, 'Ah, ah, (said he) here are more of our 'Sophists, he is not at leasure. And taking the Gate with both his Hands, he shut it in our Teeth with all his Force. We knock again, and he answers us through the Door, 'Did not you under-'stand me? Have not I already told you that my 'Master will see no Body?

My Friend, said I, we don't come here to interrupt *Callias*, we are no Sophists; you may open without fear; We come to see *Protagoras*: For all this, it was with much ado, that he opened to us. When we entered, we found *Protagoras* walking before the Portal, and with him on one side *Callias*, the Son of *Hipponicus*, and his Brother by the Mother, *Paralus*, the Son of *Pericles*, and *Charmides*, the Son of *Glaucon*; and on the other were *Xanthippus*, the other Son of *Pericles*, *Philippides*, the Son of *Philomelus*, and *Antimoerus* of *Sicily*, the most famous

Disciple of *Protagoras*, and who aspires to be a Sophist. After them marched a Troop of People most of which seemed to be Strangers that *Protagoras* brings always with him from all the Cities through which he passes, and whom he attracts by the sweetness of his Voice, like another *Orpheus*. There were also some *Athenians* amongst them. When I perceived this fine Troop, I took great pleasure to see with what Discretion and respect they marched always behind, being very careful not to be before *Protagoras*. As soon as *Protagoras* turned with his Company, this Troop opened to the Right and Left, with a Religious Silence to make way for him to pass through, and after he had past began to follow him.

Next to him, * to make use of the Expression of *Homer*, I *consulted Hippias* of *Eleas*, who was seated upon the other side of the Portal, on an elevated Seat, and near him, upon the Steps, I observed *Eryximachus* the Son of *Acumenus*, *Phedras* of *Myrrhinuse*, *Andron* the Son of *Androtion*, and some strangers of *Eleas* mixed with the rest. They seem'd to propose some Questions of Physick and Astronomy to *Hippias*, who answered all their Doubts. I also saw *Tantalus* there. *Prodicus de Ceos* was also there, but in a little Chamber, which was usually *Hipponicus*'s Office, and which *Callias*, because of the Number of People that were come to his House, had given to those strangers, after having fitted it up for them. *Prodicus* then was still abed, wrapt up in Skins and Coverings, and *Pausanias* of *Cerame* was seated by his Bed-side, and with him a young Man, who seem'd to me to be of noble Birth and the comelieſt Person in the World. I think I heard *Pausanias* call

Myrrhinuse *a Town of* Attica.

Ceramis *or* Cerame, *a Burrough of* Attica.

* This word was taken from the 11th Book of the Odysses of *Homer*, where *Ulysses* descended to Hell and saw the Ghosts of the dead. By this word alone *Socrates* means that these Sophists are not Men, but Shadows, and vain Phantoms, εἴδωλα. This oblig'd me to make use of this word, *J'ay avisé*, *I consulted*: Which is somewhat old, but better and more usual.

him

him *Agathon*, and am much deceived if he be not in love with him. There were also the two *Adimantes*, the one the Son of *Cephis* and the other the Son of *Leucolophides*, and some other young People. Being without, I could not hear the Subject of their Discourse, altho' I wished passionately to hear *Prodicus*, for he appears to me to be a very wise, or rather a divine Man: But he has so big a Voice that it caused a sort of Eccho in the Chamber, which hinder'd me from understanding distinctly what he said. We had been in but a Moment, when after us came *Alcibiades* the comely, as you used to call him, and *Critias* the Son of *Calaischrus*.

After we had been there a short time and considered a little what pass'd we went out to joyn *Protagoras*. In accosting him, *Protagoras*, said I to him, *Hippocrates* and I are come here to see you.

Would you speak to me in private, said he, or in public?

When I have told you what brings us hither, answered I, you your self shall judge which will be most convenient.

What is it then, said he, that hath brought you?

Hippocrates, whom you see there, replied I, is the Son of *Apollodorus*, of one of the greatest and richest Families of *Athens*, and as nobly born as any young Man of his Age; he designs to make himself illustrious in his Country, and to acquire Reputation; and he is perswaded that to succeed therein, he has need of your help for some time. See then whether you will entertain us upon this Subject, in private or in public.

That is very well done, *Socrates*, to use this Precaution towards me; for a stranger, who goes to the greatest Cities, and perswades young People of the greatest Quality to leave their Fellow-Citizens, Parents, or others young and old, and only to adhere to him, that they may become more able Men by his Conversation, cannot make use of too much Precaution: for it is a very nice Art, much exposed

The Vanity of the Sophist.

to the Darts of Envy and which attracts much Hatred and many Snares. For my part I maintain, that the Art of Sophistry is very ancient, but those who professed it at first, to hide what it has odious or suspected, have sought to cover it, some with the Vail of Poetry, as *Homer*, *Hesiod* and *Simonides*; others with the Vail of Purifications and Prophecies, as *Orpheus* and *Museus*; some have disguized it under the Name of Gymnastique, as *Iccus* of *Tarentum*, and as one of the greatest Sophists that ever was, does now at this time, I mean *Herodicus de Selymbra* in *Thrace*, originally from *Megara*; and others have conceal'd it under the specious Pretext of Musick, as your *Agathocles*, a great Sophist, if ever there was any, *Pythoclides* of *Ceos*, and an infinite number of others.

The usual Folly of all the Sophists, they would have their Art, Profession, &c. to be very ancient.

All those People, as I tell you, to shelter themselves from Envy, have sought after Sally-ports to withdraw themselves out of Trouble in time of need. And in that I am in nowise of their Opinion, being perswaded that they have not done what they intended to. For it is impossible that they can hide themselves long from the Eyes of those who have the chief Authority in Cities, they will at last discover your Subtleties. It is very true, that the People do not usually perceive them, but that does not save you, for they are always of the Sentiment of their Superiors and speak only by their Mouth. Besides, there is nothing more ridiculous than to be surprized like a Fool when one would hide himself; that does nothing but procure you still a greater number of Enemies and renders you more suspected; for then you are suspected to be a dissembler and crafty in all things. For my part, I take the opposite way; I am downright; I make an open profession of teaching Men; and I declare my self a Sophist. The best Cunning of all is, to have none: I had rather show my self than be discovered: With this Frankness I fail not to take all other necessary Precautions; insomuch that, thanks be to God, no Misfortune has befall'n me as yet, tho' I proclaim, that I am a Sophist

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and tho' I have practis'd that Art for a great many Years; for by my Age, I should be the Father of all of you, be as great as you please: So that nothing can be more agreeable to me, if you are enclined to it, than to speak to you in the presence of all those that are in the House.

I immediately knew his drift, and saw that he sought for nothing but to value himself before *Prodicus* and *Hippias*, and to make an improvement of our having addressed our selves to him, as being inamour'd on his Wisdom. Then I said to him, to oblige him, But must not *Prodicus* and *Hippias* be call'd, that they may hear us? Yes certainly, said *Protagoras*; who desired no better. And *Callias*, catching the Ball upon the rebound, Shall we, said he, prepare Seats for you, that you may speak more at your ease? That seem'd to us to be a very good thought, and at the same time, being impatient to hear such able Men discourse, we set all Hands to work to disfurnish the House of *Hippias*, and to pull all the Chairs out of it. This was no sooner done but *Callias* and *Alcibiades* return'd, bringing with them *Prodicus*, whom they had made to rise, and all those that were with him. When we were all seated, *Protagoras*, addressing his Discourse to me, said, *Socrates*, Now you may tell me, before all this good Company, what you had already begun to say to me for this young Man.

Protagoras, said I, I shall pass no other Compliment upon you here than what I have already done, and I shall tell you plainly why we are come hither. *Hippocrates* there has an earnest desire to enjoy your Conversation, and he would willingly know what advantages he shall reap from it. That is all we have to say to you.

Then *Protagoras*, turning towards *Hippocrates*, My dear Child, said he, the advantages which you shall reap from being with me, are, that from the first Day of this Correspondence you shall return at Night more learn'd than you were that Morning you came;

the next Day the same, and every Day you shall find that you shall have made some new progress.

But, *Protagoras*, says I, there is nothing extraordinary in this, and what is not very common; for you your self, how old and learned so ever you be, if any Body teach you what you knew not, you will also become more knowing than you were. Alas! that is not what we demand. But suppose *Hippocrates* should all of a sudden change his Mind, and that he takes a fancy to apply himself to that young Painter who is lately arrived in this City, to *Zeuxippus d'Heracleus*; he addresses himself to him as he does now to you; that Painter promiseth the same things as you have done, that every Day he shall become more learn'd and make new progress. If *Hippocrates* asks him, wherein shall I make so great a progress? will not *Zeuxippus* answer him, that he will make a progress in Painting?

We must not strive simply to learn but to learn something that's good.

Suppose he should have a mind to join himself in the same manner to *Orthagoras* the *Theban*, and that after having heard the same things from his Mouth, as he has heard from yours, he should ask him the same Question, wherein should he become every Day more learned? Will not *Orthagoras* answer him, that 'tis in the Art of Playing upon the Flute? The Matter being so, I pray you, *Protagoras*, to answer us likewise as positively. You tell us, that if *Hippocrates* join himself to you, from the first Day, he will return more learned, the next Day still more, and every Day after make new progresses, and so on all the Days of his Life. But explain to us wherein it is he will be so learned, and the Advantages he shall reap from this Learning.

You have reason, *Socrates*, said *Protagoras*; that's a very pertinent Question, and I dearly love to answer those who put such sort of Questions to me. I tell you then that *Hippocrates* needs not fear, with me, any of those Inconveniences which would infallibly happen to him, with all our Sophists; for all the other Sophists do notably prejudice young People,

The Sophist always despises all all those of his Profession.

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in forcing them, by their fine Diſcourſes, in ſpight of their averſion to them, to learn Arts which they care not for, and which they would in no wiſe learn, as Arithmetick, Aſtronomy, Geometry, Muſick, and in ſaying, that he look'd upon *Hippias*, deſigning as it were to point him out: whereas with me a young Man will learn nothing but the Science for which he has addreſſed himſelf to me; and that Science is nothing elſe but Prudence, which teaches one to govern his Houſe well, and which, as to things that regard the Republick, renders us capable of ſaying and doing all that is moſt advantagious for it.

See, ſaid I to him, if I conceive you aright: It ſeems to me, that you would ſpeak of Politicks, and that you pretend to be able to make Men good Citizens?

It is ſo, ſaid he, that is the thing that I boaſt of.

In truth, ſaid I to him, *Protagoras*, that's a wonderful Science you have, if it be true that you have it, for I ſhall not ſcruple to tell you freely what I think. I have hitherto thought, that it was a thing that could not be taught; but ſince you ſay, that you teach it, how can we but believe you? In the mean time it is juſt, that I ſhould give you the Reaſons why I believe it cannot be taught, and that one Man cannot communicate that Science to another. I am perſwaded, as are all the *Greeks*, that the *Athenians* are very wiſe. * I ſee in all our Aſſemblies, that when the City is obliged to undertake ſome new Buildings, they call all the Architects before them to ask their Advice; that when they deſign to build Ships, they ſend for the Carpenters that work in their Arſenals; and that they do the ſame in all other things that are capable to be taught and

* The firſt reaſon of *Socrates* founded upon the Practice of all Men. Upon Things that can be taught, they ask Advice only of thoſe who have learnt them; but upon Virtue they adviſe with every Body; a certain Mark that they are perſwaded that Virtue is not acquired.

learn'd; and if any body else, who is not of the Profession, take upon him to give Advice, tho' he be never so fine, rich and noble, yet they don't so much as give ear to him; but they laugh at him, hiss him, and make a terrible noise, till such time as he retires, or is carried out by the Officers, by Order of the Senate. This is the Manner of the City's Conduct in all Things that depend upon Art.

But when they deliberate upon those Things that relate to the Government of the Republick then every Body is heard alike. You see the Mason, Locksmith, Shooe-maker, Merchant, the Sea-man, the Poor, Rich, Noble, the Waggoner, *&c.* rise up to give their Advice, and no Body takes it ill; there is no Noise made then, as in other Occasions, and none of them is reproached for Intruding to give his Advice in Things he had never learned and in which he had not had a Master; an evident Demonstration, that the *Athenians* do all believe that that cannot be taught. And this is what is not only seen in the general Affairs relating to the Republick, but also in private Affairs and in all Families; for the wisest and the ablest of our Citizens can't communicate their Wisdom and Ability to others.

Without going further, *Pericles* has carefully caused his two Sons, who are there to learn all that Masters could teach them; but as to Wisdom he does not teach them that; he does not send them to other Masters, * but they feed in common in all Pastures, like Beasts consecrated to God, that wander without

* This Passage, which is very fine, had not been intelligible, if I had translated it *verbatim*; for the *Greek* says all this in one Word, ὥσπερ ἄφετοι. It was therefore requisite to explain the Figure which is excellent. *Socrates* compares Men to those Beasts which the Ancients consecrated sometimes to the Gods. As those Beasts had no Herds but those Gods themselves, so it is the same with Men, chiefly as to what relates to Virtue. Not only God, to whom they are consecrated by their Birth, can conduct them to the pure Springs, healthful Waters and fat Pastures. It is the same Notion as *David* had in *Psalm* 22. *In loco pascuæ ibi me collocavit.*

a Herd, to see if of themselves they can light by good Fortune upon those healthful Herbs, which are Wisdom and Virtue. 'Tis true, that the same *Pericles*, being Tutor to *Alcibiades* and *Clinias*, seperated them, lest the latter, as being much younger, should be corrupted by his Brother *Alcibiades*; and placed *Clinias* with *Ariphron*, to the end that that wise Man might take care to bring him up and instruct him. But what was the Issue of it? *Clinias* had not been six Months there, before *Ariphron*, not knowing what to do with him, returned him to *Pericles*.

I could quote you an infinite Number of others who, tho' they were very virtuous and learned, yet they could never make their own Children nor those of others the better People for all that. And, when I think of all those Examples, I confess, *Protagoras*, that I continue of this Sentiment, * that Virtue can't be taught: But at the same time, when I hear you speak as you do, it makes me waver, and I begin to believe, that what you say is true, being perswaded, that you have great Experience, that you have learned much of others, and that you have found out many Things your self that we are ignorant of. If therefore you can plainly demonstrate to us, that Virtue is of a nature to be taught, don't conceal so great a Treasure from us: But I conjure you to communicate it to us.

Well, said he, I will not conceal it from you, but chuse: Shall I, as an old Man, who speak to young People, demonstrate it to you † by way of a Fable, or shall I do it by a plain and coherent Discourse.

* It is an uncontrovertible Truth; For who is it that can correct him whom God hath abandoned, because of his Vices? Who can make that straight which he hath made crooked?

† Fables were the strength of the Sophists. It was by them that Natural Religion, if we may say so, was supplanted; and that *Paganism*, which is the Corruption thereof, was introduced in its room: wherefore St. *Paul* exhorts the Faithful with so much care to avoid Fables. When a Man refuses to hearken to the Truth, he, in course, gives ear to Fables.

At

At these Words most of those who were present cried out, that he was the Master, and that the Choice was left to him.

Since it is so, said he, I believe, that a Fable will be most agreeable.

* There was a time when the Gods were alone, before there were either Beasts or Men. When the time appointed for the creation of these last came, the Gods form'd them in the Earth, by mixing the Earth, the Fire and the other two Elements, whereof they are composed, together. But, before they brought them to the light, they ordered † *Prometheus* and *Epimetheus* to adorn them and to distribute to them all Qualities convenient. *Epimetheus* begg'd of *Prometheus* to suffer him to make this distribution; which *Prometheus* consented to.

Behold then *Epimetheus* in his Office. He gives to some Strength without Swiftness, and to others Swiftness without Strength. To these he gives Natural Arms and denies them to others, but at the same time gives them other Means to preserve and defend themselves; he assigns Caves and Holes in the Rocks for the retreat of those to which he gives but small Body, or otherwise, by giving them Wings, he shews them their safety is in the Air. He makes those, to whom he has allotted Bulk, understand that that Bulk is sufficient for their preservation. Thus he finished his Distribution with the greatest Equality he possibly could, taking particular Care

* In this Fable, which is very ingenious, are trac'd great Foot-steps of Truth; as, that God was from everlasting before the Creation of Man; that there was a Time destin'd by Providence for that Creation; and that Man was created of the Earth, in which were hid the Seeds of all Creatures.

† By *Prometheus*, is here meant the Superiour Angels; to whom some think God recommended the Care of Man in the Creation; tho' they act solely by his Spirit; for they only execute his Orders. And, by *Epimetheus*, are meant the Elementary Virtues, which can give nothing but what they have received, and which go astray when they are not led and guided by the Spirit that created them.

that

that none of those Kinds could be extirpated by the other.

After having provided them with Means to defend themselves from the Outrage of each other, he took care to provide them against the Injuries of the Air and against the Rigour of the Season: For this purpose he cloathed them with thick Hair and very close Skins, able to defend them against the Winter-frosts and the Summer-heats, and which, when they have occasion to sleep, serve them instead of a Quilt to lye upon and of a Covering over them; he provides their Feet with a very firm and thick Hoof and with a very hard Skin.

That being done, he assigns to each of them their Food, *viz.* to one Herbs, to another the Fruits of the Trees; to some Roots, and there was one kind which he permitted to feed upon the Flesh of other Creatures: But lest that kind should come at last to destroy the others, he made it less fruitful and made those that were to nourish them extraordinary fruitful. But as *Epimetheus* was not very wise and prudent, he did not take notice that he had imployed all his Qualities to the use of irrational Creatures, and that Man was still wanting to be provided for; he therefore knew not on what side to turn himself, when *Prometheus* came to see what Partition he had made. He saw all the Creatures perfectly well provided for; but found Man * quite naked, without either Weapons, Shooes or Covering.

The Flesh-eating Creatures less fruitful than the other, and why.

Epimetheus *being left to himself, and not being guided by* Prometheus, *knows not what he does.*

The Day appointed to take Man out of the Bosom of the Earth and to bring him to the Light of the Sun, being come, *Prometheus* therefore knew not what to do to make Man capable of preserving himself. At last he made use of this Expe-

* *Epimetheus* had given him all that he could give; for Man ought to furnish himself with all things necessary for his preservation, only from Reason.

dient:

dient: *He robb'd *Vulcan* and *Minerva* of their Wisdom relating to Arts; he also stole the Fire; for without Fire this Wisdom could not be possessed; it would have been quite useless; and he presented them to Man. After this Manner Man received † Wisdom sufficient to preserve his Life; but he did not receive the Wisdom which relates to Politicks: ‖ for *Jupiter* had it, and *Prometheus* had not yet the liberty to enter into ∴ that Sacred Mansion of this Master of the Gods. The Way to it was defended by ∴ terrible Guards: But, as I just now told you,

* *Vulcan* and *Minerva* are the two Causes of Arts. *Vulcan* (the Fire) furnishes the Instruments and the Operation, and *Minerva* (the Spirit) gives the Design and the Knowledge by the Imagination, which is as it were a Ray that she sends from above; for Arts are only Imitations of the Spirit and of the Understanding, and they only give the Form and adorn the Matter upon which they act. *Procl.*

† According to this Fable, the Knowledge of Arts preceded Politick and Moral Virtues in the Soul of Man; and there is no body who knows not the falsity of this Tradition.

‖ Yes; but *Jupiter*, the Sovereign of the Gods, had adorned the Soul of Man therewith from the very Minute of his Creation. It is true, that this first Man lost it very soon by his Fall, and that his Posterity had need of a *Mercury*, that is to say, a Minister of God to bring it back to them. Politick Wisdom is with *Jupiter*, as *Proclus* says, because God by the most wise Laws which he had established for the Government of the World, hath given the most perfect Model of the most excellent Polititian.

∴ This Mansion of *Jupiter* is call'd here by a word which signifies *Fortress*, and by which the ancient Theologues, says *Proclus*, understood the upper Region of the Heaven and the *Primum Mobile*; from whence they conceived, that God gave Motion to all Things, and communicated his Light and his fruitful Irradiations to the inferiour Gods for the creation of Beings, without being subject to any Cause. And 'tis of this Fortress that *Homer* would speak, when he says, that *Jupiter* keeps himself at a distance upon the highest Pinacle of the Heavens.

∴ Those terrible Guards which defend the Way to this Fortress of *Jupiter*, serve, according to *Proclus*, to point forth the Immutability of his Decrees and his Indefatigable Watchfulness for the Support of that Order which he has established. We may also say, that those Guards are to let us know, that

you, he slipt into the common Room, where *Vulcan* and *Minerva* were at work, and having robb'd that God of his Art which is practised by Fire, and this Goddess of hers which relates to the Design and Conduct of the Works, he gave them to Man, who by this Means found himself in a condition to provide all things necessary for Life. 'Tis said, that *Prometheus* was afterwards punished for this Robbery, which he committed only to repair the Default of *Epimetheus*.

When Man had received such Shares of all those Divine Advantages, he was the only one of all the Creatures, who, because of his Kindred, that linked him to the Divine Being, thought that there were Gods, who raised Altars and erected Statues to them; he also settled a Language and gave Names to all Things: he built himself Houses, made himself Cloaths, Shooes, Beds, procur'd himself Food out of the Bowels of the Earth.

Man, the only one of all the Creatures, that has knowledge of God, whom he honours and serves: and this Knowledge came to him from his first being.

As Moses *says, and the Name that* Adam *gave to every one of the Creatures, was its true Name.*

Notwithstanding all those Helps that Men had from their very Birth, yet they liv'd dispersed; for there was yet no City. Therefore they were miserably devoured by the Beasts, as being every where much feebler than they. The Arts they had were a sufficient Help for them to nourish themselves, but very insufficient for defence against Enemies and to make War with them; for they had not as yet any knowledge of Politicks, whereof the Art of War is

that all the Celestial Spirits cannot enter into the Secrets of Providence, but in so far as God has a mind to call them thereunto by his Goodness. Wherefore *Jupiter* says in *Homer*, that the other Gods cannot enter into his Councils, and that they can know nothing, but what he pleases to communicate to them. Those Guards may also have been feign'd from the Cherubims that God placed at the entrance of the Terrestrial Paradise, and who defended the same with a flaming Sword.

In the first Book of his Iliads.

one part. * They therefore thought only of gathering themselves together, for their Preservation and of Building of Cities. But they were no sooner together than they did one another more Mischiefs, by their Injustice, than the Beasts had formerly done them by their Cruelty. And those Injustices proceeded only from this, that they had not yet any Idea of Politicks. Therefore they were soon obliged to separate themselves; and were again exposed to the Fury of the Beasts.

Jupiter, being moved with Compassion and also fearing that the Race of Man would be soon extirpated † sent *Mercury* with Orders to carry Shame and Justice to Men, to the end that they might Adorn their Cities and Confirm the Bonds of their Amity.

Mercury, having received this Order, asked *Jupiter*, how he should do to communicate unto Men Shame and Justice, and if he should distribute them as *Prometheus* had distributed the Arts. For, added he, the Arts were distributed thus: For example, He who has the Art of Physick given him, is able alone to serve many particular Persons. It is the same also with all other Artists. Will it therefore be enough if I follow the same Method, and if I give Shame and Justice to a small Number of People? Or shall I distribute them indifferently to all? To all without doubt, replied *Jupiter*, they must all

* This is a Principle which the Ungodly would turn to their advantage, in maintaining that the Society of Men had no other Motive but their preservation. That is most false. Men were united long before they thought of building Cities. God had planted in their Hearts the Seeds of Love and of Charity for one another, and this Seed was nourished and augmented by Religion; the Motive of Preservation was only a more remote Motive, which even necessarily supposes a precedent good Will.

† The Ancients therefore knew this Truth, that God could make use of the Ministry of a God, or of an Angel, to acquaint Men with his Will, to cure their VVeaknesses and to communicate Virtues to them.

have

have them: For if they are communicated only to a small Number, as other Arts are, there will never be either Societies or Cities. Moreover, thou shalt publish this Law in my Name, that every Man, who has not Shame and Justice, shall be cut off as the the Plague of Cities.

This is the reason, *Socrates*, why, when the *Athenians* and other People consult about Affairs relating to Arts, they listen only to the Council of a small Number, that is to say, of Artists. And if any others, who are not of the Profession, take upon them to give their Advice, they do not allow him, as you have very well observed, and as indeed it is but reasonable. But when they treat of Affairs relating only to Policy, as this Policy ought always to run upon Justice and Temperance, then they hear every Body, and that with very good reason; for every Body is obliged to have those Virtues, otherwise there can be no Cities. That is the only reason of this difference which you have so well argued against.

Yes, he is oblig'd to have them, but, after having lost them, Men can't restore them.

And, that you may not think that I deceive you, when I say, that all Men are truly perswaded that every Person has a sufficient Knowledge of Justice and of all other Politick Virtues, I will give you a Proof which will not suffer you to doubt it; to wit, that in other Arts, as you have very well observed, if any one should brag, that he excells therein, and that a Man, for example, should boast, * that he is an excellent player upon the Flute, without knowing any thing of it, every Body hisses at him, and his Friends make him retire as a Man who has lost his Wits. On the other hand, when we see a Man, who, as to Justice and other Politick Virtues, says before every Body, and testifies against himself, that he is

Every one had it, but they have lost it; but this the Sophist did not know.

* It is a false reasoning of the Sophist. We plainly see when a Man knows not how to play upon the Flute; but it is not so easily seen whether a Man be Just or only counterfeits Justice.

nei-

neither juſt nor virtuous, tho' in all other occaſions, there is nothing more commendable than to tell the truth, and that it is a Mark of Shamefacedneſs; at the ſame time it is taken in this Caſe for a ſign of Folly, and the reaſon of it is ſaid to be, that all Men are obliged to alledge they are juſt, even tho' they be not; and that he, who at leaſt cannot counterfeit a juſt Man, is a perfect Fool, ſeeing there is no Perſon who is not obliged to participate of that Vertue, or otherwiſe he muſt ceaſe to be a Man. You ſee then, that it is with good reaſon every Body is heard ſpeak when Politicks are talked of, becauſe every one is perſwaded, that there is no Man who has not ſome ſhare of it.

Now that the World is perſwaded, that thoſe Virtues are neither the Preſent of Nature, nor an Effect of Chance, but the Fruit of Reflections and of Precepts, is what I am now going to demonſtrate to you.

* You ſee that no Body blames us for the Faults and Vices, which we are perſwaded are natural to us, or which come to us by chance, no Body admoniſhes us, no Body reforms us, and, in a word, no Body chaſtiſes us to make us otherwiſe than we are. On the contrary, they pity us. For who would be ſo mad as to undertake to reprehend a Man who is a Cripple, one ey'd, deform'd, or a Dwarf for being ſo? Is not every one perſwaded, that thoſe Defects of the Body, as well as its Beauties, are the Work of Nature, or an Effect of Fortune, which often changes what Nature has made? It is not the ſame as to other things which are certainly known to be the

* This way of Argument, how ſpecious ſoever, is falſe. It is impoſſible for a *Man* to alter ſome Defects in his Body; but there are certain Defects of the Soul that are changed by natural Light which is not wholly extinguiſhed in us. *Man* is not changed *radically*, if we may be allowed to ſpeak ſo; but he is brought to obey Reaſon to a certain point, or to put a reſtraint upon himſelf in obeying the Law, which is ſufficient for civil Society, but this is far from being virtuous.

Fruit

Fruit of Application and Study; when any Body is found who has them not, or who has Vices opposite to those Vertues which he ought to have, then we are really angry with him; he is admonished; he is reprimanded; and he is chastised; among these Vices are Injustice, Impiety, and, in a word, all that is opposite to Politick and Civil Vertues. As all those Vertues are to be acquired by Study and Labour, this makes every one exclaim against those who have neglected to learn them.

If God does not concurr with and bless the Labours of Men, they can't be acquired, but they may be counterfeited.

This is so true, *Socrates*, that if you will take the pains only to examine what that one word is, *to punish the Wicked*, what force it bears, and what end is proposed by this Punishment; that alone is sufficient to perswade you of this Truth, that Vertue may be acquired. * For no Body punishes a Miscreant meerly because he has been wicked, unless it be some Savage Beast, who punishes 'em to satisfie his own Cruelty. But he who punishes with Reason, does not do it for by-past Faults, for it is impossible to hinder what has been done from being done; but for Faults that are to come, to the end that the guilty may not relapse, and that others may take example by their Punishment. And every Man, who has this for his End, must of necessity be perswaded, that Vertue may be taught. For he punishes only for the future. Now it is plain, that all Men, who

Another false Principle: See the Remark.

Not at all; he is strongly perswaded that Men may put a force upon themselves and obey the Law.

* All that *Protagoras* says here is false. There are two things to be considered in the punishment of the wicked; the punishment of the Sin, which is a satisfaction to Divine Justice, whereof the Justice of Men is only the Eccho, if we may be allow'd so to speak. Judges, as Stewards or Dispensers of the Divine Power, take away the Life, or inflict other punishments on the wicked, to the end that Sin may be punished. And, as Heads of the Government, who do all for the good of the State, they order that this punishment shall be executed publickly, that every one may take warning; for the Fool himself becomes more wise when the wicked Man is punished: *Pestilente flagellato stultus sapientior erit*, Prov. 19. 25.

punish the Wicked, whether it be in private or in publick, do it only for this End; and your *Athenians* do it as well as others. From whence it follows, by a most just and necessary Consequence, that your *Athenians* are perswaded as well as other People, that Vertue may be acquired and taught. Thus it is with a great deal of reason, that your *Athenians* give ear in their Councils to a Mason, a Smith, a Shooe-maker, *&c.* and that they are perswaded, that Vertue may be taught: Methinks this is sufficiently proved.

The only Scruple that remains is, that which you make about great Men; for you ask whence it comes that great Men teach their Children in their Infancy, all that can be taught by Masters, and make them very learned in all those Arts, and that they neglect to teach them their proper Vertues, which at the same time cause all their Grandeur and their true Character. To answer you that, *Socrates*, I shall have no further recourse to Fables as before, but shall give you very plain Reasons.

Another false Principle. See the Remarks.

* Don't you believe, that there is one thing above all, to which all Men are equally obliged, or otherwise there can be neither Society nor City? The Solution of your Difficulty depends upon this one only Point alone; for if this only thing exists, and that it be neither the Art of a Carpenter, nor that of a Smith, nor that of a Potter, but that it is Justice, Temperance and Holiness, and, in a word, all that

* This is another false Argument of the Sophist. It is certain, that Vertue exists; that all Men are obliged to partake of it, and that God has given them Vertue. But it is also certain, that they have lost it by the ill use they made of their Free-will, and that they can't recover it but by the help of God. Education, which is a Means to assist Nature, is of no efficacy, unless God give a Blessing to it: It may curb the wicked for some time, by reviving some Sparks of their almost dead Reason and by frightning them with the punishments of Vice, and it is here that it usually terminates; but that alone will never infuse Vertue. Man plants and Man waters, but 'tis God who giveth the encrease.

is comprehended under the Name of Vertue, if that thing exists and that all Men are obliged to partake thereof, insomuch that every particular Person, who would instruct himself or do any other thing, is obliged to guide himself by its Rules, or to renounce all that it desires; that all those who will not partake thereof, Men, Women, and Children, must be reproved, reprehended, and chastized, till Instructions or Punishments reform them; and that those who will not be reform'd, must either be punished with Death or Banished; if it be so, as you can't doubt of it, and that notwithstanding this, those great Men, of whom you speak, should teach their Children all other things, and should neglect to teach them this only thing, I mean Virtue; it must then be * a Miracle if those Children, so much neglected, become People of Worth and good Citizens. I have already proved to you, that every Body is perswaded that Virtue may be taught in Publick and Private. Since it may be taught, do you think that Fathers teach their Children all the things that they may be securely ignorant of, without incurring either the Pain of Death, or the least Penalty; and that they neglect to teach them those things the Ignorance whereof is usually attended by Death, Prison, Exile, Confiscation of Goods, and, in a word, by the utter ruine of Families? For this is the thing that happens to those who are not brought up vertuously. Is there not a greater likelihood that they will imploy all their Pains and all their Application to teach them that which is so important and so necessary? Yes, without doubt, *Socrates*, and we ought to think, that those Fathers, taking their Children in their younger Years, that is to say, as soon as those Children are capable of understanding what is said to them, never cease all their

It is rather the part of those who have not been brought up to it, to counterfeit the same.

* Yes, without doubt, it is a Miracle; for we are naturally so corrupt, that God must intervene to restore the Soul to the State which it has lost. This Sophist thinks he says something that's absurd and impossible, but at the same time speaks a very great truth.

Life time to teach and reprehend them, and not only the Fathers, but alſo the Mothers, Nurſes, and Præceptors: They all chiefly indeavour to make Children honeſt and virtuous, * by letting them ſee upon every Thing they do and upon every Word they ſpeak, that ſuch a Thing is juſt, and ſuch a Thing is unjuſt; that this is handſom, and that unhandſom; that this is holy and that impious; that we muſt do this, and ſhun that. If Children voluntarily obey theſe Precepts, they are rewarded and praiſed; and, if they don't obey them, they are threatned and chaſtized; they are propt up and ſet right, like Trees that bend and become crooked.

When they are ſent to School, it is earneſtly recommended to their Maſters not to apply themſelves ſo much to teach them to read well and to play well upon Inſtruments, as to teach them Honeſty and Modeſty. Therefore thoſe Maſters take very great care of it. When they can read and underſtand what they read, inſtead of giving them Precepts by word of Mouth, they make them read the beſt Poets, and oblige them to get them by heart. There they find excellent Precepts for Virtue, and Recitals which contain the Praiſes of the greateſt Men of Antiquity, to the end that thoſe Children, being inflam'd with a noble Emulation, may imitate and endeavour to reſemble them.

The Maſters of Muſick, and thoſe who teach 'em to play upon Inſtruments, take the ſame Pains, they train up young People to Modeſty, and take particular care that they do nothing unhandſom.

When they underſtand Muſick and can play well upon Inſtruments, they put into their Hands the Poems of the Lyrique Poets, which they make them ſing and play upon the Harp, to the end that thoſe Numbers and that Harmony may inſinuate them-

* All this Education did then only tend, and does no more now, for the moſt part, but to accuſtom Children to obey the Laws of Honour, Decency and Juſtice *a la mode*, and to govern themſelves in all things not by Principles of Religion, but by Maxims of Policy. Is that to teach Virtue?

ſelves

ſelves into their Souls, whileſt they are yet tender and that being thereby rendred more ſoft, tractable, polite, and, if we may ſay ſo, more harmonious and more agreeable, they may be more capable of ſpeaking well and doing well: for the whole Life of Man has need of * Number and Harmony.

Not being ſatisfied with thoſe Means, they ſend them alſo to Maſters of Exerciſe, to the end that having a ſound and robuſt Body, they may the better execute the Orders of a Maſculine and ſound Spirit, and that the Weakneſs of their Conſtitution may not oblige them to refuſe to ſerve their Country, whether it be in War, or in other Functions; and thoſe who ſend their Children moſt to Maſters, are ſuch as are beſt able to do it, that is to ſay, the richeſt, inſomuch that the Children of the richeſt begin their Exerciſes the earlieſt and continue them the longeſt; for they go thither in their tender Years, and don't ceaſe going till after they are Men.

By this reaſon the Children of the richeſt ought to be the moſt virtuous.

But the Laws neither change the Mind nor Manners.

They have no ſooner quitted thoſe Maſters, but their Country obliges them to learn the Laws, and to live according to the Rules they preſcribe, to the end that they may do all things by Reaſon, and nothing out of Conceit and Fancy. And, as Writing-maſters give their Scholars, who have not as yet learn'd, a Rule under their Paper, that in copying their Examples, they may always follow the Lines that are traced out; ſo the Country gives Laws to Men that were invented and eſtabliſhed by the ancient Legiſlators. It forceth them to govern and to ſubmit to be governed according to their Laws; and if any one goes aſtray it puniſheth him; and this Puniſhment is called with you, as in many other Places, by a Word which properly ſignifies *to reform*; as Juſtice reforming thoſe who turn aſide from the Rule which ought to guide them.

* Yes, but it is of ſuch Numbers and Harmony as Men don't teach: the Harmony which they teach oftentimes ſerves only to render them more unfit for the other.

After so much Pains taken, both in publick and private, to inspire Virtue, are you amazed, *Socrates*, and can you have the least doubt that Virtue may be taught? This should be so far from surprizing you, that you ought, on the other hand, to be very much surprized if the contrary should be true.

But you will say, how comes it to pass, that many of the greatest Mens Children become the most dishonest People of the World? Here's a very plain Reason, that has nothing amazing in it, if what I have already supposed be firm and unshaken; that is to say, if it be true, * that every Man is indispensably obliged to have Virtue, to the end that Societies and Cities may subsist. If that be so, as without doubt it is, choose among all the other Sciences or Professions that Men are imploy'd in, which you shall think fit, and you shall see what I would be at.

Another false reasoning. See the Remarks.

Let us suppose, for example, That this City could not subsist, unless we were all Players on the Flute: † Is it not certain, that we should all addict our selves to the Flute, that both in publick and private we would teach one another to play upon it; that we would reprehend and chastize those who should neglect to play, and that we would no more make that Science a Mystery to them, than we do that of Justice and Law? For does any Body refuse to teach another Justice? And does any Body keep that Science secret, as is practiced in other Arts? No, certainly. And the reason of it is this, That the Virtue

* He is obliged to have Virtue, and God hath given him a Light capable to guide him to the true Fountain; but Societies and Cities don't examine if he be truly virtuous; it is enough for them that he counterfeits it, and that he lives as if he were so. The Sophist argues always upon a false Principle.

† This Sophist always mistakes himself. It is not the same with Virtue as with other Arts; a Man is an able Artist tho' he has not acquired the highest perfection in Art; but a Man is not virtuous, unless he has all Virtue; for if one part of it be wanting all is wanting. *Protagoras* is going immediately to fall into a manifest Contradiction.

and

and Juſtice of every particular Man is uſeful to the whole Body. That's the reaſon why every Body is always ready to teach his Neighbour all that concerns Law and Juſtice. If it were the ſame in the Art of Playing on the Flute, and that we were all equally ready to teach others, without any reſerve, what we know of it, do you think, *Socrates*, that the Children of the moſt excellent Players upon the Flute, would always become more perfect in that Art than the Children of the worſt Players? I am perſwaded you believe nothing of it. * The Children who would be found to be the moſt happily born for that Art, would be thoſe who ſhould make the greateſt progreſs therein, and who ſhould render themſelves the moſt famous for it, the reſt would fatigue themſelves in vain and would never gain any Name on it, as we daily ſee the Son of an excellent Player upon the Flute to be but an indifferent Scholar; and, on the other hand, the Son of a Blockhead to become a very able Muſician: But in general they are all good enough, † if you compare them with the ignorant and with thoſe who never handled a Flute. We muſt hold it for certain, that it is the ſame in the preſent caſe; ſuch an one as would appear to you now to be the moſt unjuſt of all thoſe

* *Protagoras* contradicts himſelf by this Argument; for if none but thoſe who are happily born acquire the perfection of Arts, and that Men can't change an unhappy Birth, it follows from this Principle, that Men cannot even teach the perfection of Arts; and it is a certain truth. How could they inſpire us with Virtue then? for we muſt be as happily born for Virtue. What is it then to be happily born? is it to have our Reaſon leſs chang'd and corrupted? In this ſtate Education cultivates the natural Seed which God hath ſow'd in our Souls, and God, by his Bleſſing, makes them grow and brings them to their perfect Maturity. Then 'tis neither Nature alone that procures Virtue, nor Labour alone, nor both together, 'tis God alone; for 'tis he who corrects our depraved Nature and bleſſeth our Labour.

† One may be comparatively able in Arts, but not ſo in Virtue. We may be leſs wicked than others, but that does not make us virtuous.

who are brought up in the knowledge of the Laws and in civil Society, would be a very juſt Man and even able to teach Juſtice, if you ſhould compare him with People who have neither Education, Law, Tribunals, nor Judges, who are not forced by any neceſſity to apply themſelves to Virtue; and who, in a word, would reſemble * thoſe Savages which *Pherecrates* cauſed to be acted laſt Year, at the † Country-feaſts of *Bacchus*. Believe me, if you were among Men, like thoſe Miſanthropes that that Poet introduces, you would think your ſelf very happy to fall into the Hands of an ‖ *Euribates* and a *Phrynondas*, and you would ſigh after the Wickedneſs of our People, againſt which you declaim ſo much now. But your Diſtemper comes only from too much eaſe: becauſe every Body teaches Virtue as they can, and you are pleaſed to cry out and to ſay, that there is not ſo much as one Maſter that teacheth it. It is juſt as if you ſhould ſeek in *Greece* for a Maſter who teacheth the Greek tongue, you will find none: Why? Becauſe every Body teacheth it. Indeed if you ſeek for one who can teach Tradeſmens Sons the Trade of their Fathers with the ſame Capacity as their Fathers themſelves or ſworn Maſters can perform it, I confeſs, *Socrates*, that ſuch a Ma-

* The Poet *Pherecrates* had acted a Play, whereof the Title was ἄγριοι, *The Savages*. And there is ſome appearance, that he repreſented therein the unhappy Life that the firſt Men led before they were united by Society; and his aim was, to let the *Greeks* ſee that there was no Happineſs for them, but to be well united, and faithfully to execute the Treaty of Peace, which had ſo lately terminated a long and fatal War.

† At the Country-feaſts of *Bacchus*. He ſays the Country-feaſts, becauſe there were other Feaſts of *Bacchus*, that were celebrated in the City the beginning of the Spring, and the Country-feaſts were celebrated the latter end of Autumn in the Fields.

‖ *Euribates* and *Phrynondas* were two notorious Profligates, who had given occaſion for the Proverbs, *An Action of* Euribates, *to do the Actions of* Euribates, *'tis another* Phrynondas. Here the Sophiſt complies to Reaſon. It is without all doubt that Men can teach Men the Virtue that thoſe People had,

ſter

ſter would not eaſily be found; but there is nothing more eaſie than to find one who can teach the Ignorant. It is the ſame with Virtue and all other Things. And how little ſoever the advantage be that another Man has over us, to puſh us forward and to make us advance in the way of Virtue, it is always a very conſiderable thing, and for which we ought to think our ſelves very happy. Now I am certainly one of thoſe who have all the neceſſary Qualities for that; for I know better than any other Perſon in the World, all that muſt be done to become perfectly an honeſt Man: and I can ſay, that I do not rob them of the Money which I take; nay, I deſerve more, even in the Opinion of my Scholars. Wherefore this is the Bargain that I uſually make: When any Body has learned of me, if he will, he pays me what others uſed to give me; if not, he may go into a Temple, and, after having ſworn that what I have taught him is worth ſo much, depoſit the Sum which he deſigns for me. *Socrates*, This is the Fable and the ſimple Reaſons I have thought fit to make uſe of to prove to you, that Virtue may be taught, and that the *Athenians* are all perſwaded of it; and to let you ſee, that we muſt not be aſtoniſhed if the Children of the greateſt Men are commonly very little worth, and if thoſe of the ignorant and of the pooreſt ſucceed better, ſince we even ſee that the Sons of *Polycletus*, who are of the ſame Age with *Xantippus* and *Paralus*, are nothing, if compared with their Father, and ſo of many other Children of our greateſt Maſters. But for thoſe whom I juſt now nam'd, it is not time to judge them, there is ſtill hopes, and their Youth is a Refuge for them.

But Virtue is not the Buſineſs of the Ignorant.

Obſerve the Pride of the Sophiſt.

This long and fine Diſcourſe being pronounced with much Oſtentation and Pride, *Protagoras* held his Tongue, and I, after having been a long time put to a ſtand, as a Man charm'd and raviſh'd, I lookt upon him as if he ought to ſpeak on ſtill, and to tell me things that I very impatiently expected: But ſeeing that he had actually done, and having at laſt

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reſumed Courage with much difficulty, I turned towards *Hippocrates*. In truth, *Hippocrates*, ſaid I to him, I cannot expreſs how much I am indebted to you, for having obliged me to come hither; for I would not for all the World not have heard *Protagoras*: hitherto I believed, that it was nowiſe by the help and care of Men, that we became honeſt People: but now I am perſwaded that it is a thing purely humane. There is only one ſmall Difficulty remaining, which *Protagoras*, who has juſt now demonſtrated ſuch fine things, will eaſily reſolve. If we ſhould conſult ſome of our great Orators upon thoſe Matters, perhaps they would entertain us with ſuch like Diſcourſes, * and that we ſhould believe we heard a *Pericles*, or ſome of thoſe who have been the moſt Eloquent; and, after that, if we ſhould make objection to them, they would not know what to ſay nor what to anſwer, but be as mute as a Book. But tho' one ſhould ask them never ſo little upon what they might have already ſaid, they would never end, and would do as a Braſs Kettle, which, being once ſtruck, keeps its ſound a long time, unleſs one puts his Hand upon it and ſtops it; for that's juſt what our Orators do, ſo ſoon as they are touched they reſound without end. It is not the ſame with *Protagoras*, for he is not only very capable of holding long and fine Diſcourſes, as he has juſt now made it appear, but alſo of anſwering preciſely and in few Words, to the Queſtions that are asked him, and can ſtart others, and wait for and receive the Anſwers as he ought, which few People are able to do.

He reproaches all thoſe great Orators, that they were a little tainted by the Commerce they had with the Sophiſts.

Now then, *Protagoras*, ſaid I to him, there wants but a ſmall thing to content me upon the whole, and I ſhall be fully ſatisfied when you ſhall have

* This is a difficult Paſſage, if we have no regard to the time; that is to ſay, if we do not obſerve the Date of the Dialogue. It is that which deceived *Henry Stephens*, who tranſlated it as if *Pericles* were ſtill alive, whereas he had been dead eight or nine Years.

had

had the goodneſs to anſwer it. You ſay, that Virtue can be taught, and if I may believe any Body in the World upon that, 'tis you. * But I pray you to remove the Scruple which you have left in my Mind: You have ſaid, that *Jupiter* ſent Shame and Juſtice to Men; and in your whole Diſcourſe you have ſpoke of Juſtice, Temperance and Sanctity, as if Virtue were one only thing which includeth all thoſe Qualities. Explain it to me then exactly, if Virtue be one, and if Juſtice, Temperance, Sanctity, are only its Parts, or if all thoſe Qualities which I have now named be only different Names of one and the ſame thing. This is what I further deſire of you.

The Sophiſt acknowledges, that Virtue is one, but that it is compoſed of different parts.

There is nothing more eaſie, *Socrates*, than to ſatisfie you in that point: For Virtue is one thing, and thoſe are its Parts.

But, ſaid I to him, are thoſe its Parts, as the Mouth, Noſe, Ears and Eyes are the Parts of the Face? Or are they Parts like Parts of Gold, that are all of the ſame Nature as the Maſs, and differ from each other only in Quantity?

They are without doubt parts of it, as the Mouth and the Noſe are parts of the Face.

But, ſaid I, do Men acquire, ſome one part of this Virtue, and others another? Or is there a neceſſity that he who acquires one muſt acquire all?

By no means anſwered he. † For you ſee every Day People who are valiant and unjuſt, and others who are juſt without being wiſe.

For

* *Socrates* does not trouble himſelf to anſwer all the Sophiſms of *Protagoras*, which are too groſs; but he goes at once to the main point of the Queſtion, which conſiſts to know the Nature of Virtue; for Virtue being well known, it will be clearly ſeen, that it is not poſſible for Men to teach it.

† That's the Poiſon of this Doctrine, which is but too much ſpread abroad to this Day. Some fancy, that Virtue may be divided, ſo as a Man may have ſome of its parts without having the reſt; which is contrary to all the Light of Reaſon, as has been explained in the Argument. It was in oppoſition

to

For Valour and Wisdom are only parts of Virtue.

Assuredly, said he, and Wisdom is the greatest of its parts.

And is every one of its parts different from another?

Without doubt.

And every one has its Properties: As in the parts of the Face the Eyes are not of the same use with the Ears, and have different Properties and Faculties, and so of all the other parts, they are all different and don't resemble each other neither in Form nor Quality. Is it the same of the parts of Virtue; does not one of them in no wise resemble another? and do they absolutely differ in themselves and in their Faculties? It is evident, that they do not resemble each other at all, if it be the same of them as of the Example which we have made use of.

Socrates, that is very certain and the Example is just.

Then, said I to him, Virtue has no other of its parts which resemble Knowledge, Justice, Valour, Temperance nor Sanctity.

No without Doubt.

Come then, Let you and I see and examine to the bottom the Nature of every one of its parts. Let us begin with Justice: Is it any thing or nothing? For my part, I find it is something; what do you think?

I also think it to be something.

Socrates is going to prove, that Justice and Sanctity are but one and the same thing.

If then any Body should apply himself to you and me, and should say to us, *Protagoras* and *Socrates*, explain to me, I pray you, what is that which you just now call'd *Justice*; is it something that is just or unjust?

to this very Error that *Solomon* wrote in the *Ecclesiastes*, Ch. 9. *He who sinneth in one thing shall lose much Riches.* For it is one of the Explanations that St. *Hierome* gives to this Passage, *That one only Sin causeth many former good Works to perish, and that all Virtues accompany one another, insomuch that he who has one has all; and he who sins in one thing is subject to all Vices without exception.*

I ſhould anſwer him off-hand, that it is ſomething that is juſt; would not you anſwer the ſame?

Yes certainly.

Juſtice conſiſts then, he would ſay, according to you, in being juſt?

We would ſay yes; is it not ſo?

Without doubt, *Socrates.*

And if he ſhould ask us after that, Don't you alſo ſay, that there is a Sanctity? ſhould not we anſwer him in the ſame manner, that there is?

Aſſuredly.

You maintain, he'd reply, that it is ſomething; what is it then? is it to be holy or to be prophane? For my part, I confeſs, *Protagoras*, that at this Queſtion I ſhould be all in a paſſion, and ſhould ſay to the Man, Speak Senſe, I pray you; What is there that can be holy, if Sanctity it ſelf be not holy? Would not you anſwer thus?

Yes indeed, *Socrates.*

If after that, the Man ſhould continue to queſtion us, and ſhould ſay, But what did you ſay a Minute ago? have I miſunderſtood you? It ſeemed to me, that you ſaid the parts of Virtue were all different, and that one was never like another. For my part, I ſhould anſwer him, You have reaſon to alledge, that that was ſaid; but if you think it was I who ſaid it, you miſunderſtood me; for it is *Protogoras* who affirmed it, I only ask'd the Queſtion: doubtleſs he would not fail to apply himſelf to you, *Protagoras*; he would ſay, Do you agree to what *Socrates* ſays? Is it you alone that aſſure me, that none of the parts of Virtue are like to one another? Is that your Opinion? What would you anſwer him, *Protagoras?*

I ſhould be forced to confeſs it, *Socrates.*

And, after this Confeſſion, what could we anſwer him, if he ſhould continue his Queſtions and tell us, According to you then Sanctity is neither a juſt thing, nor Juſtice a holy thing; but Juſtice is prophane and Sanctity is unjuſt. Is then the juſt Man pro-

For that muſt of neceſſity be, if the parts of Virtue were unlike.

prophane and impious? what should we answer him, *Protagoras?* I confess, that for my part, I should answer him, that I maintain Justice to be holy, and Sanctity to be just; and, if you your self did not prevent me, I should answer for you, that you are perswaded, that Justice is the same thing with Sanctity, or at least a thing very like it, and that Sanctity is the same thing with Justice, or very like it. See then if you would hinder me to answer so for you, or if you would confess it to me.

I should not confess it to you, *Socrates*; for that does not seem to me to be true at the bottom, and we ought not to grant so easily, that Justice is Holiness, and that Sanctity is Justice: There is some difference between them; But what will you make of that? If you will, I consent that Justice is Holy, and that Sanctity is Just.

How, *if I will*, said I to him, I have nothing to do with that, it is not as *I will* that is in question, it is You or I, it is our Perswasion and our Principle, and, if we refute one another, that *if*, which does nothing but darken the Truth and render Proofs useless, must be removed.

For to argue against Suppositions, is to argue against a Chimera.

However, we may say, answered he, that Justice resembles Sanctity in something; for one thing always resembles another in some sort; White it self has in some measure a resemblance to Black, Hard to Soft, and so of all other Things which seem to be the most contrary to each other. Those very parts which we have agreed have each different Properties and Faculties, and that one is not like the other, I mean the parts of the Face; if you look to them narrowly, you will find, that they resemble each other a little, and that they are in some measure one like another: and, after this manner, you may very well prove, if you will, that all things are like one another. But, however, it is not just to call

A sorry Evasion of the Sophist, who will establish between the parts of Virtue, a remote and almost insensible resemblance, that he may not acknowledge that which is very near, very natural and very sensible.

call things alike, that have but a ſmall reſemblance to each other, as it is not juſt neither to call thoſe things unlike that differ but a very little from each other: As a light reſemblance does not render things alike, to ſpeak properly, ſo a ſmall difference does not make them unlike.

Being amazed at this Diſcourſe of the Sophiſt, I ask him, Does then the juſt and holy ſeem to you to have only a light reſemblance to each other?

That reſemblance, *Socrates*, is not ſo ſmall as I have ſaid, but at the ſame time it is not ſo great as you ſay.

Well, ſaid I to him, ſince you ſeem to me to be in ſo ill an Humour againſt this Sanctity and Juſtice, let us leave them there, and let us take ſome other Subject. * What do you think of Folly, is it not entirely contrary to Wiſdom?

It ſeems ſo to me.

When Men have govern'd themſelves well and and profitably, don't they ſeem to you to be more temperate and more moderate than when they do the contrary?

Without contradiction.

Are they not then govern'd by Moderation?

It cannot be otherwiſe.

And thoſe who have no good government over themſelves, don't they act fooliſhly, and are in no wiſe moderate in their Conduct?

I agree with you in that.

Therefore is not acting fooliſhly contrary to acting moderately?

It is agreed.

That which is done fooliſhly, does it not come from Folly; and does not that which is done diſcreetly proceed from Moderation?

* *Socrates* is going to prove, that Temperance and Moderation are the ſame thing with Wiſdom, ſeeing they are contrary to Folly; for one Contrary can have but one Contrary! And thus Temperance, Moderation and Wiſdom are the ſimilar parts of Virtue. And conſequently, *&c.*

That

That is true.

Is not that which proceeds from Force, ſtrong; and that which proceeds from Weakneſs, feeble?

Certainly.

Is it not from Swiftneſs that a thing is ſwift, and from Slowneſs that a thing is ſlow?

Without doubt.

And all that is done the ſame, is it not done by the ſame, and is not the contrary done by the contrary?

Yes, doubtleſs.

Oh! let us ſee then, ſaid I, Is there not ſomething that is called Beauty?

Yes.

This Beauty, has it any other Contrary than Uglineſs?

No.

Is there not ſomething that is called Good?

Yes.

This Good, has it any other contrary than Evil?

No, it has no other.

Is there not in the Voice a Sound which is called Acute.

Yes.

And that Shrill, has it any other Contrary than Grave?

No.

Every Contrary then has but one Contrary, and there are no more?

I confeſs it.

Let us ſee then; let us make a Recital of the Things wherein we are agreed. We have agreed,

1. That every Contrary has but one only Contrary.

2. That Contraries are made by Contraries.

3. That that which is done fooliſhly is done after a quite contrary manner to that which is done diſcreetly.

4. That that which is done diſcreetly proceeds from Moderation, and that which is done fooliſhly proceeds from Folly. 'Tis

'Tis agreed.

That therefore which is done a contrary way ought to be done by the Contrary; that which is done discreetly is done by Moderation, and that which is done foolishly is done by Folly, of a contrary Way and always by Contraries.

For Contraries always produce Contraries, as the same produce the same.

Certainly.

Is not Moderation then contrary to Folly?

So it seems to me.

You remember however, that you agreed just now, that Wisdom was contrary to Folly.

I confess it.

And that one Contrary had but one Contrary.

That is true.

From which then of those two Principles shall we recede, my dear *Protagoras?* shall it be from this, That one Contrary has but one Contrary? or from that which we asserted just now, That Wisdom is some other thing than Temperance or Modesty; That each of them are parts of Virtue, and that as they are different, they are also unlike, both by their Nature and Effects, as the parts of the Face? which of those two Principles shall we renounce? for they don't agree well, and they make a horrible Discord. Ah, how is it possible they should agree, if there be a necessity that one Contrary must have but one only contrary, and can't have more, and that it be found in the mean time, that Folly has two Contraries, which are Wisdom and Temperance. Does it not appear so to you, *Protagoras?* He has agreed to it whether he will or not.

Wisdom and Temperance then must of all necessity be but one and the same thing, as we found just now, that Justice and Sanctity were a little while ago. But don't let us weary our selves, my dear *Protagoras*, and let us examine the rest. I ask you, A Man, who does an unjust thing, is he prudent in being unjust?

For the Vulgar believe, that there are many Injustices which are prudent while they are profitable.

For my part, *Socrates*, said he, I should be asham'd to confess it. However it is the Opinion of the People.

Well, would you have me apply my self to the People, or shall I speak to you?

I beg it of you, said he, direct your self only to the People.

That's equal to me, said I, provided you answer me. For it imports me nothing that you think that or that; I examine only the Opinion: But it may very well be that in examining the Opinion, 'tis my self when I examine, and sometimes also the Person who Answers me.

Upon that *Protagoras* made some scruple, disdaining to be thus questioned, and saying, that the Matter was thorny. But at last he took his part and resolved to answer me. Then I said to him, *Protagoras*, Answer, I pray you, to my first Question. Do you think any of those who act Injustice are prudent?

I think there are some, said he.

Is not to be prudent, to be wise?

Yes.

Is not to be wise, to have right Aims, and to take the best part even in Injustice it self?

I grant it.

But do the Unjust take the right side when they succeed well or when their Success is nought?

When they succeed well.

You affirm then, that there are certain good things.

Certainly.

Then do you call those things that are profitable to Men, good?

The Sophist is very angry that Socrates *should have forc'd from him this Confession that he calls that which is profitable good.*

Yes, by *Jupiter*; and frequently I don't stick to call those which are not profitable to Men, also good.

The Tone in which he spoke to me, made me know, that he was exasperated, in a great Disorder, and ready to be transported with Anger; seeing him in this Condition, I had a mind to make the best of him:

him: Therefore I asked him with greater Precaution and Discretion; *Protagoras*, said I to him, Do you call good, those things that are not profitable to any Man, or those that are no ways profitable?

Not at all, *Socrates*. For I know many that are absolutely useless to Men, as certain Drinks, certain Foods, certain Medicines, and a thousand others of the same nature; and I know others that are useful to them. There are some that are indifferent to Men and excellent good for Horses. Some are only useful to Cattle, others only to Dogs. Such a thing is of no use to Animals, and very good for Trees. Moreover, that which is good for the Root is often bad for the Twigs, which you should make to dye if you should cover them with it. Without going further, Oil is the greatest Enemy to all Plants and to the Skin of all Cattle, and it is very good for the Skin of Man. It is so true, that that which is called good, is various; for Oil it self, which I speak of, is good for the exterior parts of Man, and very bad for the interiour. For that reason the Physicians absolutely forbid the sick to eat it, or at least give them but very little and only enough to correct the bad Smell of certain things which they make them take.

Protagoras *smells what Socrates would be at, and, to evade being caught by him, he throws himself into all these Distinctions, where, in commenting upon an impertinent Science, he puts off the chief Question.*

Protagoras, having thus spoken, all the Company clapt their Hands, as if he had said Wonders: And I said to him, *Protagoras*, I am a Man naturally very forgetful, and, if any Body makes long Discourses to me, I immediately forget the Subject of the Dispute. Therefore, as if I were something deaf, and you had a mind to discourse with me, you would resolve to speak a little louder to me than to others, even so I desire you to accommodate your self to this Fault that I have. And since you have to do with a Man whose Memory is very short, shorten your Answers, if you intend that I should follow you.

How would ye have me abridge my Anſwers? Would you have me make them ſhorter than they ought to be.

No, ſaid I.

Then is it as ſhort as it muſt be?

It is.

But who ſhall be judge of it, and to what meaſure ſhall we cut it, muſt it be mine or yours?

I have always heard *Protagoras*, that you were a very capable Man, and that you could make others capable of making as long and as ſhort Diſcourſes upon all ſorts of Subjects as one pleas'd, and as no body enlargeth ſo much as you when you think fit, ſo no body can explain himſelf in fewer words. If then you have a mind that I ſhould enjoy your Converſation, make uſe of the latter with me; few words I conjure you.

Socrates, ſaid he, I have had to do with many People in my Life, and even with the moſt renowned; you cannot but have heard of my Diſputes, but if I had done, what you would have me to do now, and if I had ſuffered my Diſcourſes to be cut ſhort by my Antagoniſts, I ſhould never have obtained ſo great Advantages over them, and the name of *Protagoras* would never have been ſo famous among the *Greeks*.

By this Anſwer I found that this manner of Anſwering preciſely to queſtions did not pleaſe him, and that he would never ſubmit to be queſtioned. Seeing then that I could no longer be of that Converſation, *Protagoras*, ſaid I to him, I do not preſs you to diſpute with me whether you will or not, and to follow a method that is diſagreable to you; but if you have a mind to ſpeak to me 'tis your part to proportion your ſelf to me, and to ſpeak ſo as that I may be able to follow you: For as all the World ſays, and as you your ſelf ſay, it is equal to you to make long or ſhort Diſcourſes. You are very learned, there is nothing to ſay againſt that. For my part it is impoſſible for me to follow

Diſcour-

Discourses that are so long winded. I wish I were capable of it, but no Man makes himself. And seeing that is indifferent to you, you ought to have that complaisance for me, to the end that our Conversation may continue. At present, seeing you have it not, and that I have not time to hear you so prolixly, for I must be going, farewell, I am just going, what Pleasure soever I might have without doubt taken in your curious Dissertations. At the same time I rose, as having a mind to retire, but *Callias* taking me with one hand by the Arm, and with the other holding me by the Cloak, we will not suffer you to go, *Socrates*, said he, for if you go all is done, there will be no more Conversation. I conjure you then in the name of God to stay, for there is nothing that I would so willingly hear as your Dispute: I beg it of you, do us this Favour.

I answered him standing as I was ready to go, Son of *Hipponicus* I have always admir'd the love you have for Sciences, I admire it still now, and I commend you for it. Truely I would with all my Heart do you the Favour you ask of me if you demanded a thing that was possible. But as if you should command me to run a Race with *Crison d'Himere* or some of those who run the Race six times together, or with some Courier, I would say, *Callias*, I should demand nothing more than to have all the swiftness necessary; I could wish it as much as you, but that is impossible. If you would see us run, *Crison* and me, you must obtain of him that he will proportion himself to my weakness, for I cannot go very swift, and it lies on him to go slowly. I tell you the same on this Occasion, if you have a mind to hear *Protagoras* and me desire him to answer me in few words as he had begun to do: For otherwise what sort of Conversation will it be? I have hitherto heard Men say and always believed it, that to converse with one's Friends, and to make Harangues were two very different things.

This Crison d'Himere *had the price of the race of a furlong three times successively.*

Callias favours a little of the Commerce he had with the Sophists lodged with him. He loves long discourses.

Nevertheleſs, *Socrates*, ſaid *Callias* to me, me thinks that *Protagoras* demands a very juſt thing, ſeeing he deſires only to be permitted to ſpeak as much as he ſhall think fit, and that you may have the ſame Liberty; the Condition is equal.

You are deceived *Callias*, ſaid *Alcibiades*, that is not at all equal. For *Socrates* confeſſeth that he has not that abundance, that affluence of Words; and he yields that Advantage to *Protagoras*. But as for the Art of Diſpute, and to know how to queſtion and anſwer well, I ſhall be much ſurprized if he yields it either to *Protagoras*, or any body elſe whoſoever. Let *Protagoras* then confeſs, in his turn with the ſame Ingenuity, that he is more weak in that Point than *Socrates*, that will be enough; but if he brags that he will oppoſe him, then let him enter the Liſt with equal Arms, that is to ſay, by queſtioning, and being queſtioned without enlarging without end, and without deviating upon every queſtion on purpoſe to imbroil the Diſcourſe, to ſhun the giving of an Anſwer and to make the Auditor loſe the State of the Queſtion. For as for *Socrates*, I will be ſecurity for him that he will forget nothing; he jeers us when he ſays he is forgetful. So it ſeems to me that his Demand is the more reaſonable, for every one muſt ſpeak and tell his Sentiments in all Diſputes.

That's exactly the character of Alcibiades *he fancies that* Socrates *diſputes only through Vanity, and that if* Protagoras *ſhould acknowledge himſelf inferior,* Socrates *would pretend to no more.*

At theſe Words of *Alcibiades*, *Critias* directing his Diſcourſe to *Prodicus* and *Hippias* ſaid, me thinks, my Friends, that *Callias* has declared himſelf openly for *Protagoras*; and that *Alcibiades* is an Opiniator, who ſtrives to diſpute, and to exaſperate Mens Spirits. As for us, let us not fall out with one another in taking part ſome with *Protagoras* and others with *Socrates*: Let us rather join our Prayers to obtain of them, not to part in ſo fair a way, but to continue ſuch an agreeable Converſation.

The Duty of thoſe who are preſent at a Diſpute.

You ſpeak extraordinary well, *Critias* ſaid *Prodicus*, all thoſe who are preſent at a diſpute, ought to be neuters, but not indifferent, for theſe two things

things ought not to be confounded; to be neuter is to give to each partly all the Attention which he requires; and not to be indifferent is when one reserves his Vote for him who is in the right. For my part if you would follow my Advice, *Protagoras* and you, *Socrates*, here is a thing wherein I would willingly have you agree between you, that is to dispute and not to quarrel; for Friends dispute between themselves for their better Instruction, and Enemies quarrel to destroy one another. By this means this Conversation would be very agreeable and very profitable to us all. First the Fruit which on your side you would reap there from, would be, I don't say our Praises, but our Esteem: Now Esteem is a sincere Homage, which causes a Soul to to be truly touched and perswaded, whereas praise is frequently, but a vain and deceiving Sound, which the Mouth pronounces contrary to the proper Sentiments of the Heart. And we, the Auditors should get thereby, not that which is called * a certain Pleasure, but a real and sensible Satisfaction. For Satisfaction is the contentment of the Spirit, which is instructed, and which acquires Wisdom and Prudence, whereas Pleasure is only, properly speaking, the tickling of the Senses.

The difference between Esteem and Praise.

Most of the Auditors highly applauded this Discourse of *Prodicus*, and the wise *Hippias* afterwards beginning said: My Friends I look upon you all so many as are here, as Kinsmen, Friends, and Citizens of one and the same City, not by Law but by Nature; † for by Nature every thing is tyed

* By this Passage it appears that the *Greeks* made some difference between εὐφραίνεσθαι & ἥδεσθαι, that by the first they meant the delights of the Spirit and by the other the pleasures of the Body. That was not always exactly observed: But at the bottom these Words are determined to this Sense by their Root.

† For the Law establishes several Corporations that are contrary one to another, whereas Nature unites all that are of the same kind. Therefore there is a principle of Union in Humane Nature.

to its like. But the Law, which is a Tyrant over Men, forceth and layeth violent hands upon Nature on many Occasions. It would be a very shameful thing, if we, who know the Nature of Things perfectly, and who pass for the ablest among the *Greeks*, should be come into *Athens*, which for Sciences ought to be look'd upon as the august Prytanneum of *Greece*, and should be assembled in the greatest and richest House of the City, to do nothing there worthy of our Reputation, and to spend our Time in wrangling and contesting about Trifles, like the most ignorant of Men. I conjure you then *Protagoras* and *Socrates*, and I advise you, as if we were here your Arbitrators, to regulate you, to pitch upon a Temperament and a Medium. You *Socrates*, don't you stick too rigorously to the plain and concise Method of a Dialogue, unless *Protagoras* will acquiesce therewith. Leave him some Liberty, and slacken the Reins to his Discourse, that it may appear more magnificent and sublime to us. And you, *Protagoras*, don't swell the Sails of your Eloquence, so as to carry you into the High-Sea, and to make you lose the sight of the Shoar. There is a Medium between those two Extremities. Therefore if you will give Ear to me, you shall chuse a Moderator, a President who shall oblige you both to keep within Bounds.

This Expedient pleas'd all the Company. *Callias* told me again, that he would not suffer me to go, and they press'd me to name the President my self: I declin'd it, saying it would be a shame for us to take a Moderator of our Discourses. For, said I, he whom we shall chuse shall be, either our Inferior or our Equal. If he be our Inferior, it is not just that the most uncapable should give Laws to the most learned; and if he be our equal, he will think as well as we, and that choice will become altogether useless.

But, it will be said, you shall name who is more learned than you; it is easie to say so, but in truth

truth I don't think it possible to find a more able Man than *Protagoras*; and if you should chuse one who is not so able as he, and whom you pretend however to be more able, you your selves see what distaste you give to a Man of that Merit, in subjecting him to such a Moderator. For, as for my part, that in no ways concerns me, it is not my Interest that makes me speak, I am ready to renew our Conversation to satisfie you. That if *Protagoras* will not Answer let him Question; I will answer, and at the same time shall endeavour to shew him the manner how I think every Man who is questioned ought to answer. When I have answered him as often as he shall have thought fit to question me, he will give me leave to question him in my turn, and he will answer me after the same manner. That if he scruples to answer me, then you and I will join to beg that favour of him which you desire of me at present, which is not to break the Conversation, and there is no necessity to name a Moderator for that; instead of one we shall have many, for you shall all be so.

Every Body said that this was what ought to be done. *Protagoras* was not much for it; but in fine, he was obliged to submit, and to promise that he would Question first, and that when he should be weary of questioning, he should permit me to do it in my turn, and should answer in his turn precisely to the Question without roaming.

Then he began after this manner.

* Methinks *Socrates*, that the best part of Erudition, consists in being very well versed in reading the Poets. That is to say, to understand all they say so well as to be able to distinguish what is well said and what is ill said; to give Reasons for it,

* The *Sophists* boasted that they understood all the Poets perfectly well, and we are going to see the difference in that point between a *Sophist* and a Man who is truly learned.

and

and make every Body ſenſible of it. Don't fear that I am going to remove my ſelf far of from the Subject of our Diſpute, my Queſtion ſhall run upon Virtue. All the difference there ſhall be therein, is that I ſhall tranſport you into the Country of Poetry. *Simonides* ſays in ſome place, directing his Diſcourſe to *Scopas*, the Son of *Creon* the *Theſſalonian:* 'It is very difficult to become truly Virtu-'ous, and to be in Virtue as a Cube, that is to ſay, 'that neither our Carriage, our Actions, nor our 'Thoughts ſhall ſhake us, and ſhall never draw us 'from that ſtate of our Mind; and that they ſhall 'neither deſerve the leaſt reproach nor the leaſt 'blame. Do you remember that Paſſage, or ſhall I relate it to you?

There is no need, ſaid I, I remember it, and have ſtudied it with great pains.

You are in the right; but do you think that Piece is well or ill done?

It ſeems to me to be perfectly well done, and is of very great Senſe.

But would you call that Piece well done, if the Poet contradicts himſelf in it?

No, without doubt,

Oh! ſaid he, another time examine Things better, and look into them more narrowly.

As for that, my dear *Protagoras*, ſaid I, I believe I have ſufficiently examin'd it.

Since you have ſo well examin'd it, you know then, that he ſays in the ſequel: 'The ſaying of '*Pittacus* does not pleaſe me at all, tho' *Pittacus* 'was one of the Sages. For he ſays that it is dif-'ficult to become Virtuous. Do you comprehend that the ſame Man ſaid this after what he had ſaid but a little before?

Yes I do.

And do you find that thoſe two Paſſages agree?

Yes, *Protagoras*, ſaid I, and at the ſame time, leaſt he ſhould go upon ſome other Thing, I asked him, Don't you find that they agree?

How

How ſhould I find that a Man agrees with himſelf when he blows cold and hot? At firſt he fixes this Principle, *That it is difficult to become Virtuous.* And a minute after he forgets that fine Principle; and in relating the ſame Motto ſpoke in his own ſenſe by *Pittacus*, *That it is very difficult to become Virtuous*; he blames him, and ſays in plain terms, that that Sentiment does not pleaſe him in any wiſe, and yet it is his own. Thus when he condemns an Author, who ſays nothing but what he had ſaid himſelf, he manifeſtly cuts his own Throat, and he muſt of neceſſity ſpeak ill either there or here.

He had no ſooner ſpoke, but a great Noiſe was raiſed, and the Auditors fell a praiſing of him. As for me, I confeſs it, like a Fencer who had receiv'd a great blow, I was ſo ſtunn'd that I neither ſaw nor heard, and my Brains turn'd as well with the Noiſe they made, as with what I had heard him ſay. In fine, for I muſt tell you the Truth, to gain time to dive into the meaning of the Poet, I turn'd my ſelf toward *Prodicus*, and directing my Diſcourſe to him; *Prodicus*, ſaid I to him, *Simonides* is your Country-man; 'tis therefore juſt that you ſhould come to his Aſſiſtance, and I call you to it, as *Homer* feigns that the *Scamandre* being vigorouſly preſſed upon by *Achilles*, calls *Simois* to his Succour, in ſaying to him:

For Prodicus was a Native of Ceos as well as Simonides.

Let you and I repel this terrible Enemy.

I ſay the ſame to you, let us take care leaſt *Simonides* be turn'd topſie turvy by *Protagoras*. The defence of this Poet depends on your Ability which makes you to diſtinguiſh ſo ſubtilly between * *Will* and *Deſire*, as two very different things. It is that ſame Ability which has furniſhed you with ſo

* Diſtinctions were the ſtrength of the *Sophiſts*. *Socrates* is going to put *Prodicus* upon it to make ſome, and whileſt he guides him *Prodicus* ſpeaks to a miracle; but ſo ſoon as he has laid a Snare for him, the *Sophiſt* fails not to fall into it.

many

many fine things that you just now taught us. See then if you will be of my Opinion, for it does not at all appear to me that *Simonides* contradicts himself. But tell me first I pray what you think of it. Do you think, that to be, and to become, are one and the same thing, or two different things?

A fine Question! two very different Things; assuredly, answered *Prodicus*.

In the first Verse then, *Simonides* declares his Thought, in saying, *That it is very difficult to become truly Virtuous.*

You say true, *Socrates*.

And he blames *Pittacus*, not, as *Protagoras* thinks, for having said the same thing as he, but for having said something very different from it. In effect, *Pittacus* has not said as *Simonides* did, *That it is difficult to become Virtuous*, but *to be Virtuous*. Now my dear *Protagoras*, *to be* and *to become*, are not the same thing even in the Judgment of *Prodicus*. And if they be not the same thing, *Simonides* does in no wise contradict himself. Perhaps that *Prodicus* himself and many others, entring into *Simonides* Thought, might say with *Hesiod*, *That it is very difficult to become Virtuous:* For the Gods have placed Labour before Virtue, but when a Man is come to the Pinnacle of the Mountain where it dwells, then tho' it be very difficult, it is easie to possess it.

For to be *denotes a fixed state, and* to become *denotes an alteration, or a going from one state to another.*

'Tis a Passage of Hesiod *in his Poem of Works, v.* 287.

Prodicus having heard me speak thus, praised me extreamly. But *Protagoras* answering, said, *Socrates* your Explication is still more Vicious than the Text, and the Remedy worse than the Disease.

Then I have done very ill according to your reckoning, *Protagoras*, answer'd I; and I am a pleasant Phisician indeed, seeing that in designing to cure a Distemper, I make it to grow worse.

It is just as I tell you, *Socrates*.

How so?

The Poet, said he, would be Impertinent and Ignorant, if he had spoke of Virtue as of a thing which

which is vile, despicable and naughty, * that it is easie to possess it, for every body agrees that it is very difficult.

Being amaz'd at this Quibble; in truth, said I, *Protagoras*, we are very happy that *Prodicus* is present at our Dispute. For I fancy that you are very well perswaded that the Science of *Prodicus* is one of the Divine Sciences, that you call those of the ancient Times, and which is not only as old as *Simonides*, but also much more ancient. You are certainly very able in many other Sciences; but as for that you seem to me to be but little instructed in it. For my part, I may say that I have some tincture of it, because I am one of *Prodicus*'s Disciples. † Methinks that you don't comprehend that *Simonides* does not give the word *difficult* the sense which you give it. Perhaps it is with that word ‖ as with those of *dreadful*, *terrible*. At all times when I make use of them in a good part, and

This is founded upon what Protagoras *said at the beginning, in speaking of the Antiquity of the Sophists.*

* *Protagoras* changes sides here, according to the good Custom of the Sophists; and instead of demonstrating the pretended Contradiction of *Simonides*, he throws himself upon *Hesiod*, who says, that it is easie to possess Virtue; and in that he puts a very ridiculous Quibble upon him. This the Character of the Sophists. They were very Ignorant at the bottom; but with some reading, which had spoiled their Minds, and which they supported with abundance of Impudence, they made themselves to be admired by Fools.

† At all times, when a word seems to signifie something contrary to the design of the Poet, all the different Significations that that word can have in the Passage in Question ought to be examin'd into. This Maxim is extraordinary good, and of very great use in Criticism, as *Aristotle* hath very well observed. *Socrates* makes use of it here in appearance to defend *Simonides*, and in effect to make those Sophists perfectly ridiculous.

‖ *Socrates* cunningly makes the Impertinence of those Sophists appear here, in the Criticism which they made upon words: For example, upon the word Δεινὸς, they would not have it used in a good Sense, because it was never used but in speaking of Things that are bad, as Poverty, Prison, Sickness. But these Sophists ought to have observed this difference, that this word is always truly taken in an ill Sense, when

and say, for example, to praise you, Protagoras *is a terrible Man*, *Prodicus* is always at me for it, and asks me if I be not asham'd to call that which is laudable, terrible; for, says he, that word is always taken in all Sense. This is so true, that you shall find no Body who says, *terrible Riches*, *terrible Peace*, *terrible Health*: But every Body says, *a terrible Sickness*, *a terrible War*, *a terrible Poverty*, that word always denoting Evil but never Good. How do you know but that * perhaps by this Epithete *difficult*, *Simonides* and all the Inhabitants of the Isle of *Ceos* have a mind to express something that is bad, vexatious, or other thing which we don't understand. Let us ask *Prodicus*. For it is reasonable to ask him the Explication of the Terms which *Simonides* made use of. Tell us then, *Prodicus*, what would *Simonides* say by that word *difficult*.

He would say *bad*.

Behold then, said I, my dear *Prodicus*, why *Simonides* blames *Pittacus* for having said that it *is*

when applied to inanimate Things, but that it may be taken in a good Sense when applied to Persons. *Homer*, who understood and wrote his Language better than all those Sophists, has more than once joined δεινὸς with αἰδοῖος, *venerable*. As in the beginning of the 8th Book of the Odysses, in speaking of *Ulysses*; for δεινὸς, as our word *terrible*, signifies often, astonishing, extraordinary, and which attracts consideration, respect.

* The Snare which *Socrates* lays here for those Sophists would be too plain, if the word χαλεπὸς *difficult*, did never signifie *bad*, *vexatious*, but it is taken in this last Sense by all the Poets. *Homer* himself has used it in that Sense, as in the beginning of that fine Ode of *Anacreon*, χαλεπὸν τὸ μὴ φιλῆσαι. *It is a vexatious thing not to love.* 'Tis that which deceives *Prodicus*, whose Ignorance he makes to appear in going about to persuade him, that perhaps it was the Inhabitants of the Isle of *Ceos*, who used that word in that Sense. *Prodicus* being deceived, would value himself upon this Remark, and acting the great Critick, he says that *Simonides* reproaches *Pittacus* who was a Man of *Lesbos*, whose Language was gross and barbarous, for having used that word ignorantly. *Protagoras* is a little more cunning.

difficult

difficult to be Virtuous, imagining, without doubt, that he meant thereby that it is a bad thing to have Virtue.

Do you think, *Socrates*, anſwer'd *Prodicus*, that *Simonides* meant any other thing, and that his aim was not to upbraid *Pittacus*, who neither knew the force nor the differencc of Terms, but * ſpoke coarſly, like a Man born at *Lesbos*, and accuſtomed to barbarous Language?

Protagoras, do you underſtand what *Prodicus* ſays, and have you any thing to anſwer?

I am very far from your Opinion, *Prodicus*, ſaid *Protagoras*; and I take it for a Truth that *Simonides* underſtood nothing more by that word *difficult*, than what we all underſtand, and that he meant not that that was bad but that it was not eaſie, and that it muſt be acquir'd with much Pains and Labour.

To tell you the Truth, *Protagoras*, I doubt not in the leaſt but that *Prodicus* knows very well what *Simonides* meaning is. But he plays upon you a little, and lays a Snare for you to ſee if you will fall into it, or if you have the Cunning to avoid it, and to maintain your Opinion. For here is an indiſputable Proof that *Simonides* does not call *difficult* that which is bad, becauſe he adds immediately after, *And God alone poſſeſſes that precious Treaſure.* For if he had meant that 'tis a bad thing to be Virtuous, he would never have added that God alone has Virtue, he would have been very wary of making ſo bad a Preſent to the Divinity alone. If he had done it, *Prodicus*, far † from calling *Simonides* a Divine Man, would not fail to call him

* The Language of the *Lesbians* barbarous. The Rudeneſs of Language uſually accompanies Clowniſhneſs of Manners.

† Here is a very ſmall fault; yet it fails not to corrupt the Text extreamly, and to alter the Senſe of it. To follow the Letter, we ſhould have render'd it, *very far from calling him a Man*

him a Blaſphemer and a Profligate. But ſince you are ſomething curious to know if I be well vers'd in that which you call the reading of the Poets, I am going to tell you the meaning of that ſmall Poem of *Simonides*; or if you had rather explain it to me, I ſhall willingly hearken to you.

Protagoras hearing me ſay ſo, fail'd not to take me at my word, and *Prodicus* and *Hippias*, with the reſt, beſought me not to defer giving them that Satisfaction.

I am going, ſaid I, to endeavour to explain to you my Sentiments upon that Piece of *Simonides*. You muſt know then, that Philoſophy is very ancient among the Greeks, * particularly in *Creete* and *Lacedemon*. There are more Sophiſts there then in all the World beſide; but they conceal themſelves, and make as if they were ſimple and ignorant People, juſt like the Sophiſts you ſpoke of, that it may not be diſcover'd that they ſurpaſs all the Greeks in Learning and Science, and that they may be only look'd upon as brave Men who

a Man of Ceos; for the Greek ſays, ἢ ἀνδρὸς κεῖον, *and not in the leaſt a Man of* Ceos. But there is no Body but will agree that it ought to be read ἢ ἀνδρὸς θεῖον, *and not in the leaſt a Divine Man*, for *Simonides* was call'd ſo. What ſenſe would a *Man of* Ceos bear in oppoſition to Blaſphemer and Profligate? That was never heard of before. But 'twill be ſaid, the Piety of the Men of *Ceos* might be ſo recommended and ſo famous; that perhaps they might ſay *a Man of* Ceos, for a pious Man. It was quite contrary. The Inhabitants of the Iſle of *Ceos* were an impious People, witneſs the Law they made to put to death all the old Men above Sixty Years of Age; and that when they were beſieged by the *Athenians*, they put to death all thoſe who were not able to bear Arms, which ſtruck the *Athenians* with ſo much Horrour, that they raiſed the Siege to ſtop the Current of ſuch horrible Impiety.

* He put *Creete* with *Lacedemon*, becauſe *Lycurgus* had brought back from *Creete* to *Lacedemon* many of the Laws that were made by *Minos*, and had drawn from thence the Idea of the Government which he had eſtabliſh'd. See the Remarks of *Plutarch* upon the Life of *Lycurgus*, Tom. 1. p. 199.

are

are superior to others by their Courage and contempt of Death. * For they are persuaded that if they were known, for what they are, every Body would apply themselves to that Study, and the Art would be no longer valued. Thus by concealing their Ability, they deceive thro' all the Towns of *Greece*, those who affect to follow the *Lacedemonian* way of living. The most part, in imitation of them, cut their Ears, have only a Cord for their Girdle, use the hardest Exercises, and wear their Cloaths so short that they don't cover half their Body. For they persuade themselves that 'tis by those Austerities that the *Lacedemonians* have made themselves Masters of *Greece:* And the *Lacedemonians* are so jealous of the Science of their Sophists, that when they have a mind to discourse with them freely, and are weary of seeing them in secret and by stealth, † they turn out all those Apes that counterfeit them; that is to say, all those Strangers they find in their Towns, and then discourse with those Sophists without admitting any Stranger to those Conversations. Neither do they suffer their young People to travel into other Towns, for fear they should forget what they have learn'd: And the same thing is done in *Creete*. Among those great Teachers there are not only Men, but also Women: And a certain mark that I tell you the Truth, and that the *Lacedemonians* are perfectly well instructed in Philosophy and Learning, is, that if any Body will discourse with the most pitiful Fellow of the *Lacedemonians*, he will at first

The folly of most of the Towns of Greece which affected to imitate the austere Life of the Lacedemonians.

For the Women were educated as the Men.

* This Passage favours and supports what *Thucidides* wrote, That *Lycurgus* banished all Foreigners, for fear they should imitate his Policy, and learn to love Virtue: And 'tis for this that *Plutarch* thought he ought to justifie him. See the Life of *Lycurgus*, p. 243.

† *Lycurgus* shut up the Gates of *Sparta* against all Strangers, whose Curiosity only drove them thither, and came not for any Advantage or Profit; he also forbid Travelling. *Plutarch* gives very fine Reasons for it, *p.* 248.

They accustom'd their Children to make quick and sharp Repartees, and to wrap up abundance of Sense in a few words.

take him for an Idiot; but in the sequel of the Conversation, that Idiot will find means pertinently to place a short and quick Repartee, and full of Sense and Strength, which he will shoot like an Arrow out of a Bow. Insomuch that he who had so bad an Opinion of him, will find himself but a Child in comparison to him. Also abundance of People in our Age, and the Ages past, have conceived that to *Laconize*, is more to study Philosophy than to work, being well persuaded, and justly, that it belongs only to a Man who is well instructed and well educated to speak such fine Sentences. Of this number were *Thales* of *Miletum*, *Pittacus* of *Mitylene*, *Bias* of *Priene*, our *Solon*, *Cleobulus* of *Lyndc*, *Myson* of *Chen*, a Town of *Laconia*, and *Chilon* of *Lacedemon*. All those Sages were zealous Followers of the *Lacedemonian* Learning, as appears still by some of their good Sentences that have been preserved. Being one day all together, they consecrated to *Apollo*, as the first Fruits of their Wisdom, those two Sentences which are in every Body's Mouth, and caused them to be wrote in Letters of Gold upon the Portal of the Temples of *Delphos: Know thy self*, and *Know nothing too much.*

Why is it that I relate to you those Pieces of Antiquity? It is to let you see the Way and Character of the Philosophy of the Ancients was a certain Laconick Brevity. Now one of the best Sentences that was attributed to *Pittacus*, and that the Sages most boasted of, is deservedly this, *It is difficult to become Virtuous. Simonides* then, as Emulating *Pittacus* in that carreer of Wisdom, conceived that if he could overthrow this fine Sentence, and triumph over it as over a Champion of Reputation, who had carried away the Acclamations of every Body, he would thereby acquire an immortal Renown. It is then this Sentence he only carps at, and 'tis with a design to destroy it, that he hath composed this whole Poem, at least I believe it so; let us examine

amine him together, to see if I be in the right.

First, the beginning of this Poem would be senseless, if to express only, *That it is difficult to become Virtuous*, the Poet should say, *It is difficult, I confess, to become Virtuous*; for that word, *I confess*, is added without any sort of Reason, unless we suppose that *Simonides* had considered the Sentence of *Pittacus* to quarrel with it. *Pittacus* having said, *That it is difficult to be Virtuous. Simonides* opposeth that, and corrects that Principle in saying, *That it is difficult to become Virtuous, and that that is truly difficult.* For observe well, that he does not say that it is difficult to become *truly Virtuous*; as if among the Virtuous there might be some who were truly Virtuous, and others who were Virtuous without being truly so; that would be the Discourse of a Fool, and not of a wise Man, as *Simonides*. Therefore there must needs be a Transposition in this Verse, and the word *truly* must be transpos'd and put out of its place to answer *Pittacus*. For 'tis as if there was a kind of Dialogue there between *Simonides* and *Pittacus*. The latter says immediately, *My Friends, it is difficult to be Virtuous:* And *Simonides* answers; *Pittacus, you advance a false Principle there, for it is not difficult to be Virtuous, it is yet worse: But it is difficult, I confess, to become Virtuous, so as not to be shaken, and to be firm in Virtue as a Cube on its Basis; and that neither our Carriage, our Thoughts, nor our Actions, can draw upon us the least reproach or blame; that it is truly difficult.* At this rate 'tis plain that he has Reason to put this word, *I confess*, there. And that the word *truly* is very well placed at the end. The whole sequel of the Poem proves that this is the true Sense; and it would be easie to make it appear that all its parts agree together, that they are perfectly well composed, and that all possible Grace and Elegance is found in them, with abundance of Strength and Sense; but that would carry

us too far to run it all over, let us content our ſelves to examine the Idea of the Poem in General, and the Aim of the Poet, to make it appear that he only propoſes to himſelf by all that Poem, to refute that Sentence of *Pittacus.*

This is ſo true, that a little after, as if it were to give a Reaſon for what he had ſaid, *That to become Virtuous is a thing truly difficult*; he adds, *However that it is poſſible for ſome time*; *but after one is become ſo, to perſiſt in that State, and to be Virtuous, as you ſay,* Pittacus, *that's impoſſible and above the Strength of Man: This happy Privilege is only for God alone, and it is not humanly poſſible for a Man not to become wicked when an inſurmountable Calamity falls upon his Head.*

He is going to prove that in all things Vice ſuppoſes a State of Virtue which preceded. A very remarkable Truth.

But what ſort of People are they that inſupportable Calamities afflict, ſo as that they are no longer themſelves? For example, among thoſe who ſit at the Helm of a Ship? It is evident that they are not the Ignorant and the Idiots; for the Ignorant are caſt down even in a Calm. As one does not throw to the Ground a Man that is lying upon it but one that is ſtanding upright; ſo Calamities only deject and change an able Man, and they never change one who is Ignorant. A terrible Tempeſt which turns the Sea topſie turvy all of a ſudden, aſtoniſhes and overcomes a Pilot; irregular and ſtormy Seaſons aſtoniſh and overcome the Husbandman; a wiſe Phiſician is confounded by Accidents, that he could not foreſee with all his Art of Phiſick; in a word, 'tis the Good that happen to become Wicked, as another Poet teſtifies in this Verſe, *The Good are ſometimes Good and ſometimes Wicked.*

But it never happens to the Wicked to become Wicked, he is always ſo. It is only the Learned, the Good, and the Wiſe, to whom it happens to be Wicked when a frightful and ſudden Calamity overthrows them. And it is humanly impoſſible that it can be otherwiſe. And you, *Pittacus*, you ſay,

That

That it is difficult to be Good; say rather, *That it is difficult to become so*, and that yet it is possible; but to persist in that State, is what is impossible; for you must agree that every Man who does Good is good, and that every Man who does ill is wicked. What is it then to do Good, for example, in Learning, and who is the Man that you call Good in that? Is it not he who has Knowledge and who is Learned? What is it that makes a good Physician? Is it not the Knowledge to cure or to comfort the Sick? And is not that which makes an ill Physician his want of skill to cure? Whom then shall we call a bad Physician? Is it not evident that a Man must in the first place be a Physician, before we can give him that Name, and that in the second place he must be a good Physician, for it is only the good who is capable of becoming a bad Physician? In effect we who are ignorant in Physick though we should commit Faults in that Art, yet we should never become bad Physicians, seeing we are not Physicians our selves.

He that does not know what Architecture is, can never properly be what is called a bad Architect, for he is no Architect at all: And so in all other Arts. Every Man then, who is no Physician what ever faults he commits in acting the Physician, is not however in a strict Sense a bad Physician. It is the same of the Virtuous Man, he may become Vicious, without Contest, whether it be by Age, Labour, Sickness, or by any other Accident; but he can't become Vitious unless he was Virtuous before. Therefore the only Scope of the Poet in this Work, is to make it appear that it is not possible to be, and to persevere always in that State; but that it is possible to become Virtuous, as it is possible to become Vicious. The Virtuous are absolutely those whom the Gods love and favour. Now the Sequel of the Poem makes it plainly appears that all this is said against *Pittacus*. For he adds: 'Where-'fore I shall not fateague my self to seek that

This Principle of Socrates tends naturally to this truth that all Men being born corrupt were virtuous in their Original.

'which is impoſſible to find, and I ſhall not con-
'ſume my Life in flattering my ſelf with the vain
'Hopes of ſeeing a Man without Blame, and in-
'tirely innocent amongſt us Mortals who live upon
'what the Earth preſents to us. If I were happy
'enough to find him, I ſhould quickly tell it you.
And in all his Poem he carps ſo much at this Sen-
tence of *Pittacus*, that he ſays a little after. 'For
'my part, every Man who does not a ſhameful
'Action, voluntarily I praiſe him, I love him. I do
'not ſpeak of Neceſſity, that is ſtronger than the
'Gods themſelves, all this is alſo ſpoke againſt *Pit-
tacus*. In effect *Simonides* was too well taught to
refer this *Voluntarily* to him, who commits ſhame-
ful Actions, as if there were People who did ill
Voluntarily. For I am perſwaded that of all the
Philoſophers there is not one to be found who ſays
that there are Men who ſin Voluntarily. They all
know that thoſe who commit Crimes, commit them
whether they will or not. Therefore *Simonides* does
not ſay that he will praiſe him who does not com-
mit Crimes Voluntarily; but this *Voluntarily* has
reference himſelf. He ſays that he will praiſe him
Voluntarily and with all his Heart: For he was
perſwaded that it frequently happens that an honeſt
and a good Man is forced to love and to praiſe cer-
tain People. For Example, a Man has a very un-
reaſonable Father and Mother, an unjuſt and cruel
Country, or ſome other ſuch like thing. If that
happens to a wicked Man, what does he? Firſt
he is very glad of it, and afterwards his chief care
is to complain publickly and to make the ill Hu-
mour of his Father and Mother and the Injuſtice of
his Country known every where in order thereby to
free himſelf from the juſt Reproaches that might
be made againſt him for the little care he has of
them and for having abandoned them; and under
this very Notion he multiplies the Subjects of his
Complaint, and adds a voluntary Hatred to that
forced Enmity. The Conduct of an honeſt Man if

far

We muſt not hope to find an innocent Man upon Earth without ſin, non eſt homo juſtus in terra. *Eccleſ.* 7. 21.

There was never a Philoſopher who durſt aſſert that Men ſinned voluntarily.

There are certain People that we ought always to praiſe and love whatever miſchief they do us. All that Socrates *ſays here is wonderful.*

far different in such Occasions: His sole care is to hide and to cover the Faults of his Father and Country; far from complaining of them, he hath so much command of himself as always to speak well of them. That if any crying Injustice hath forced him to be angry with them, he himself is their Mediator to himself, he argues with himself for them, and tells to himself all the Reasons they can bring to appease him and to bring him back to his Duty; and he is never at peace with himself till that being Master of his Resentment, he has restored them his Love and praised them as before. I am perswaded that *Simonides* himself * has frequently found himself under an Obligation to praise a Tyrant, or some other considerable Person. He has done it † but he did it in spight of himself. This then is the Language he speaks to *Pittacus*. 'When I blame you *Pittacus*, it is not because I 'am naturally inclined to blame, on the contrary, 'it suffices me that a Man is not wicked and use-'ful to no good purpose, no body shall ever see me 'quarrel with any Person, who may be of any 'use to his Country. I do not love to find fault, 'for the Race of Fools is so numerous that if any 'Man should take upon him to reprehend them he 'should never have done. We must take all that 'for good and fine, wherein we find no shameful mix-'ture, or scandalous Blot. When he says, We 'must take all that for Good, *&c.* It is not the same as if he said, 'We must take all that for 'white wherein we find no mixture of black, for that would be altogether ridiculous. But he would

* He speaks this, because *Simonides* had kept a very good correspondence with *Pausanias* King of *Lacedemon*, who gained the Battle of *Platees*, and with *Hiero* the wisest of all the Ancient *Tyrants*.

† That is to say, that he did it in obedience to the Law of Nature, confirmed by the written Law, and which he called by the Name of Necessity.

have them to understand that he contents himself with a Mediocrity, and that he reprehends and blames nothing wherein this Mediocrity is found. For we must not hope to meet with perfection in this World. 'Wherefore, saith he, I don't look 'for a Man who is altogether innocent among all 'those who are nourished by the product of the 'Earth. Were I happy enough to find him, I should 'not hide him from you, but should quickly shew 'him to you. Till then, I shall praise no Man as 'being perfect. It sufficeth me that a Man be in 'this laudable Mediocrity, and that he do no ill. 'Those are the People whom I love and praise. And as he speaks to *Pittacus* who is of *Mitylene*, he speaks in the Language of the *Mitylenes*, *Voluntarily I praise them and I love them.* This Word *Voluntarily* has no reference to what precedes, but to what follows. He means that he praises those People of his own accord, whereas there are others whom he praises of Necessity. 'Thus then, *Pittacus*, continues he, if you had kept your self in 'that Mediocrity, and told us things that were probable, I should never have reprehended you; but 'in lieu thereof you impose upon us, for Truths, 'Principles that are manifestly false, and which is 'worse, about very essential Things; wherefore I 'contradict you. Behold, my dear *Prodicus* and my dear *Protagoras*, what in my Opinion is the meaning and the Scope of this Poem of *Simonides*.

Then *Hippias* answering said, Indeed *Socrates* you have perfectly well explained the hidden meaning of that Poem: I have also a short Speech to make to you to confirm your Explication. If you please I will communicate my Discoveries to you.

That is very well, said *Alcibiades*, interrupting him, but it must be another time. At present it is reasonable that *Protagoras* and *Socrates* make an end of their Dispute, and that they stand to the Treaty they have made. If *Protagoras* inclines still to

Questi-

Queſtion, *Socrates* muſt anſwer; and if he has a mind to anſwer in his turn, *Socrates* muſt queſtion. I leave it to *Protagoras*'s Choice, ſaid I, let him ſee which is moſt agreeable to him. But if he would be adviſed by me, we ſhould leave off the Poets and Poetry. I confeſs, *Protagoras*, that I ſhould be wonderfully well pleaſed to dive with you into the depth of the firſt Queſtion I propoſed, for in converſing thus of Poetry, we do as the ignorant and common People, when they feaſt one another, * for not being able to diſcourſe among themſelves of fine things, and to maintain Converſation, they are ſilent, and borrow Voices to entertain one another; they hire at a great charge Singers and Players upon Flutes to ſupply their Ignorance and Clowniſhneſs. Whereas when honeſt Men who have been well Educated and Inſtructed, eat together, they don't ſend for Singers Dancers and Players on the Flute; they find no trouble to entertain one another without all thoſe Fopperies and vain Amuſements that are only pardonable in Children: But they ſpeak and hear one another reciprocally with Decency and good Behaviour, even when they excite one another, the moſt to drink, and they prefer the Harmony of their Diſcourſe to all Voices and Flutes. It ought to be the ſame in this kind of Converſation, eſpecially when it is between ſuch People as moſt of thoſe who are here value themſelves to be; they have no occaſion for ſtrange Voices, nor for Poets, of whom they cannot ask a reaſon for what they ſay, and to whom moſt of thoſe who cite them attribute ſome one Senſe, ſome another, without being ever able to convince one another or to come to an agreement. That's the reaſon why able Men ought to let alone thoſe Diſſertations upon the Poets

Good Converſation preferable to the moſt excellent Muſick.

* The Muſicians and Players upon Inſtruments were introduced to Feaſts by clowniſh People who were incapable of entertaining themſelves. Does not the Violent Paſſion that is obſerved now a days for Muſick proceed from the ſame defect? Perhaps we ſing only becauſe we cannot diſcourſe.

and

and to entertain themſelves together, in ſounding and examining one another by their Diſcourſe, to give a Proof of the Progreſs they have made in the Study of Wiſdom. That's the example which methinks you and I ought rather to follow. Letting the Bets alone then, let us Diſcourſe together, or if I may ſay ſo, let us fence together to ſee how far we are in the right. If you have a mind to queſtion me, I am ready to anſwer you; if not, give me leave to propoſe the Queſtion to you, and let us indeavour to bring the Inquiry which we have interrupted, to a happy iſſue.

When I had ſpoke thus, *Protagoras* knew not which Part to take, and made no anſwer. Wherefore *Alcibiades* turning towards *Callias*, ſaid he, that *Protagoras* does well in not declaring what he will do, whether he will Anſwer or Propound.

No, without doubt, ſaid *Callias*; let him enter the Liſt then, or elſe let him tell why he will not, that we may know his Reaſons, and that thereupon *Socrates* may diſpute with ſome other, or that ſome one of the Company may diſpute with the firſt who ſhall offer himſelf.

Then *Protagoras* being aſham'd, as I thought, to hear *Alcibiades* talk ſo, and to ſee himſelf ſollicited by *Callias*, and almoſt by all thoſe who were preſent, at laſt, reſolved with much difficulty, to enter into Diſpute, and deſired me to propoſe Queſtions to him.

Preſently I began to ſay to him, *Protagoras*, do not think that I will converſe with you upon any other deſign than to ſearch into the bottom of ſome Matters whereof I ſtill daily doubt; for I am perſuaded that *Homer* hath very well ſaid, *Two Men who go together ſee things beſt, for one ſees what the other ſees not.* In effect, we poor Mortals, all of us whatever, when we are together, we have a greater Felicity for all that we have a mind to ſay, do, or think; whereas one Man alone, tho' never ſo able and witty, ſeeks always ſome Body to communicate his Thoughts, and to conform himſelf

In the tenth Book of his Iliads.

'till

'till such time as he has found what he sought. Behold also why I converse more willingly with you than with another, being very well persuaded that you have better examin'd than another Man all the Matters that an honest Man ought in duty to search into the bottom of, and particularly all that relates to Virtue. Alas! to whom could one address himself rather than to you? First you value your self on being a very honest Man; and besides that, you have an Advantage that most honest Men have not, that is, that being Virtuous you can also make those Virtuous who frequent your Company: You are so sure of doing it, and rely so much upon your Wisdom, that whereas the other Sophists hide and disguise their Art, you make publick Profession of it, by posting it up, if I may say so, in all the Cities of *Greece*, that you are a Sophist; you give your self out publickly to be a Master in the Sciences and in Virtue; and you are the first who have set a value upon your self, and put a price upon your Precepts: Why then should we not call you to the Examination of Things that we enquire after, and that you know so well? Why should not we be impatient to ask you Questions, and to communicate our Doubts to you? For my part, I can't refrain it, and I die with Desire that you would make me remember the Things that I have already asked you, and that you would explain to me those which I have still to ask.

The first Question I ask'd you, if I remember it well, is, if Science, Temperance, Valour, Justice, and Sanctity; I say, if these five Names are applicable to one only and the same Subject, or if every one of those denotes a particular Essence, a Thing which has its distinct Properties, and is different from the other four. You answer'd me, that these Names were not applicable to one only and the same Subject, but that each of them served to denote a Thing separate and distinct, and that they were all parts of Virtue, not similar parts as those

of

of Gold, all which reſemble the whole Maſs whereof they are parts, but diſſimilar parts, as the parts of the Face which are all parts of it without any reſemblance to each other and without reſembling the whole, whereof they are parts, and which have every one their different Properties and Functions. Tell me then if you are ſtill of this Opinion; and if you have alter'd it, explain your Thoughts to me; for if you have changed your Opinion, I will not hold you to the rigour, but leave you an entire Liberty to gainſay your ſelf; and ſhall not in the leaſt be ſurpriz'd that you have broached thoſe Principles at firſt, as it were to try me.

But I tell you moſt ſeriouſly, *Socrates*, anſwer'd *Protagoras*, that thoſe five Qualities which you have named, are parts of Virtue. To tell you the Truth, there are four of them which have ſome reſemblance to each other: But Valour is very different from all the reſt, and by this you ſhall eaſily know that I tell you the Truth; you ſhall find an infinite number of People who are very injuſt, very impious, very debauched, and very ignorant; yet at the ſame time they are valiant to Admiration.

Socrates is going to prove that Valour cannot be without Knowledge, and that conſequently Valour is inconſiſtent with Imprudence and Ignorance.

I ſtop you there, ſaid I, for I muſt examine what you have advanced. Do you call thoſe who are bad, Valiant? Is that your meaning?

Yes, and thoſe who go headlong where others fear to go.

Let us ſee then, my dear *Protagoras*, don't you call Virtue a fine Thing? And don't you boaſt of teaching it as ſomething that is fine?

Yes, and as ſomething that is very fine, otherwiſe I have loſt my Judgment.

But is that Virtue fine in part and ugly in part, or is it altogether fine?

It is altogether fine, and that very fine.

Don't you find ſome People who throw themſelves headlong into Wells and deep Waters?

Yes,

Yes, our Divers.

Do they do it becauſe it is a Trade they are accuſtomed to and expert in, or for ſome other reaſon?

Becauſe it is a Trade they are expert at.

Who are thoſe who fight well on Horſe-back? Are they ſuch as know how to manage a Horſe well, or thoſe who cannot?

Doubtleſs thoſe who can manage a Horſe.

Is it not the ſame with thoſe who fight with a Buckler?

Yes certainly, and in all other things the ſame, thoſe who are expert in them are more brave and couragious than thoſe who are not, and the ſame Troops after having been well diſciplin'd and inured to War, are far different from what they were before they had learn'd any thing.

But, ſaid I, you have ſeen People who without having learn'd any thing of what you ſay, are notwithſtanding very Brave, and very Couragious upon all Occaſions?

Yes certainly, I have ſeen ſome, and thoſe moſt Brave.

Don't you call thoſe People who are ſo brave and ſo bold, valiant Men?

You don't conſider, *Socrates*, what you ſay; then Valour would be an ugly and ſhameful thing, for thoſe Men are Fools.

But I ſay, have not you call'd bold Men valiant Men?

Yes ſo far.

And nevertheleſs now thoſe bold Men ſeem to you to be Fools, and not valiant; and juſt now quite contrary you thought the moſt learned and the moſt wiſe to be the moſt Bold. If they are the moſt bold, then according to your Principles, they are the moſt Valiant; and conſequently Science is the ſame thing as Valour.

You don't well remember *Socrates* what I anſwered to; you demand if valiant Men were bold, I anſwered

swered yes. But you did not at all ask me if bold Men were Valiant; for if you had, I should have brought a distinction, and have told you that they are not all so. Hitherto my Principle, that the Valiant are bold, remains in its full Strength, and you have not been able to convict it of any falshood. You make it appear very well that the same Persons are more bold when they are instructed and well trained up, than before they had learn'd any thing, and that disciplin'd Troops are more bold than those that are not disciplin'd; and from thence you are pleased to conclude that Valour and Science are but one and the same thing. By this fine way of Arguing, you will also find that Strength and Science are but one and the same thing. For first you'l ask me after your usual way of Gradation. * Are the strong Puissant? I should answer you yes. Then you'd add, are those who have learn'd to wrestle more puissant than those who have not learn'd? And the same Wrestler, is he not more puissant after having learned, than he was before he knew any thing of that Exercise? I should still answer yes. And from those two things which I should have granted you would believe that by making use of the same Proofs you might lawfully draw this Consequence, that by my own Confession, Science is Strength. Fair and softly I pray you; I have not granted, neither do I grant that the Puissant are strong, I only say that the strong are puissant. For Puissant and Strength are far from being the same

'Tis an Evasion of the Sophist drawn from the rule of universal affirmative propositions, which are not convertible but by adding some restriction to the attribute, which become the Subject. That's true also, and Socrates *will soon make it appear in the Sequel.*

* To understand *Protagoras*'s way of Arguing, we must know that by *Strength*, he means the natural Disposition of a robust Body; and that by *Puissance*, he means a supernatural Vigour like that of a frantick Person, who in his Fits breaks Chains, and he also means acquired Vigour, like that of a Champion. This is the reason why he grants that the Strong are Puissant, and denies that Puissant are Strong, for Strength is natural, and Puissance springs from Habit, or from an impulse of the mind. But in the Bottom 'tis nothing but a meer Quibble, wherein the Sophist even contradicts himself, as will be seen immediately.

thing.

thing. Puiſſance comes from Science and ſometimes from Choler and Fury; whereas Strength comes always from Nature and from the good Nouriſhment, that is given to the Body. It is thus that I have ſaid that Boldneſs and Valour were not the ſame thing, and that there were, ſome Occaſions wherein the Valiant were Bold, but that it could not be infer'd from thence that all the Bold were Valiant. * For Men become Bold by exerciſe and art, and ſometimes by Anger and Fury, juſt as they become puiſſant. But Valour proceeds from Nature and the good Nouriſhment that is given to the Soul.

† But don't you ſay, my dear *Protagoras*, that certain People live well, that is to ſay agreeably, and that others live ill, that is to ſay diſagreeably?

Without doubt.

And do you ſay that Man lives well, when he ſpends his Life in Tronbles and Grief.

No aſſuredly.

But when a Man dies after having ſpent his Life agreeably, don't you think he lived well?

Yes I do.

After your reckoning then is it not a good thing to live pleaſantly, and is it not very bad thing to live diſagreeably?

* He means that the more Men are diſciplin'd, trained up to roar, or tranſported with Anger, they are the more bold. He compares Boldneſs to Puiſſance and Valour to force. But he does not ſee that in Confeſſing that Valour proceeds from the good Nouriſhment given to the Soul, he acquieſceth with *Socrate*'s Principle, that Valour is nothing but Science. *Socrates* is going to lead him another way.

† To know well what Valour is, one muſt firſt fix well what Grief and Pleaſure is; and this is what *Socrates* is going to do after an admirable way worthy of ſo great a Philoſopher.

* 'Tis according as one delights in what is Decent and Honeſt, ſaid he.

What, *Protagoras*, ſaid I, will you be of the Opinion of the Vulgar, † and will you, with them, call certain things that are agreeable, bad, and ſome others that are diſagreeable, will you call them good?

Yes certainly.

How ſay you? Thoſe agreeable things are they bad in that which makes them agreeable, independantly from all that may happen? And thoſe diſagreeable things are they good after the ſame manner independantly on all Conſequences?

‖ Yes, it is juſt ſo.

∴ Then they are not bad in ſo far as they are diſagreeable.

In Truth, *Socrates*, ſaid he, I know not if I ought to make my Anſwers as ſimple and as general as your Queſtions, and if I ought to aſſert abſolutely, that all agreeable things are good and that all diſa-

* *Protagoras* is aſham'd of what he juſt now confeſs'd, for he ſees the Conſequence of it; therefore he contradicts himſelf all of a ſudden, and he acknowledges that a Man who ſpends his Life in honeſt Things, and who delights therein, lives agreeably, even tho' the ſaid Things be painful. *Socrates* makes good uſe of this Confeſſion, and is going to purſue this Principle which will overthrow the Sophiſt immediatly.

† For the Vulgar are perſuaded that there were ſome agreeable things that are bad, and ſome diſagreeable things that are good. But they reckon them good or bad only by their Conſequences; for to conſider them in themſelves they find the things that are agreeable to be good, and the diſagreeable bad.

‖ This Sophiſt confeſſeth one thing here whereof he is not in the leaſt perſuaded; he alſo retracts it in the following Anſwer, for he foreſees very well that that Confeſſion would ingage him too far. He knows not how to rid himſelf out of the Trouble and Confuſion he is in.

∴ 'Tis a neceſſary Conſequence of what this Sophiſt confeſs'd juſt now. For if diſagreeable things are good independant from what may follow, they can't be bad becauſe they are diſagreeable.

greeable

reeable things are bad. Me thinks that not only in this Diſpute, but alſo in all others that I may have, it is ſureſt to anſwer that there are certain agreeable things that are not good, and that among the Diſagreeable there are certain things that are not bad; and that there is a third kind which keeps the middle and which are neither good nor bad.

But don't you call thoſe Things agreeable that are join'd with Pleaſure, and which give Pleaſure?

Moſt aſſuredly.

I ask you then if they are not good in ſo far as they are agreeable, that is to ſay, is not the Pleaſure they cauſe ſomething of good?

To that, *Socrates*, ſaid he, I anſwer you what you daily anſwer others, that is, that we muſt examine it, and if it agrees with reaſon, and we find that the agreeable and the good are but one and the ſame thing, we muſt acquieſce therewith, if not, there's an open Field for Diſpute.

Which do you like beſt then, *Protagoras*, ſaid I, will you be pleaſed to lead me in this Inquiry, or ſhall I lead you?

It is moſt reaſonable that you ſhould lead me, for you began.

I will do it, ſaid I, and here's perhaps a means, that will make the thing appear plain, as a Maſter of Exerciſe, or a Phyſician ſeeing a Man whoſe Conſtitution he would know, in order to judge of his Health or the Strength and good Diſpoſition of his Body, does not content himſelf with looking on his Hands and Face, but ſays to him, ſtrip your ſelf I pray you, and let me ſee your Breaſt and your Back, that I may judge of your State with the more certainty; I have a mind to uſe the ſame Conduct with you for our Inquiry; after having known your Sentiments of Good and of Agreeable, I muſt ſtill ſay to you as that Maſter of Exerciſes, my dear *Protagoras*, diſcover your ſelf a little more, and tell me your Thoughts of Science. Are your Thoughts of that like thoſe of the Vulgar, or are you of

For the Knowledge of things that are agreeable or disagreeable depends solely upon Science.

other Sentiments? For this is the Opinion of the Vulgar in reference to Science or Knowledge: They think it is a thing that is neither ſtrong, capable of Conduct, nor worthy to command: They can't fancy to themſelves that it has any of thoſe Qualities; and they perſwade themſelves that when Science is found in a Man, it is not that which leads and conducts him, but a quite different thing; that ſometimes 'tis Anger, ſometimes Pleaſure, ſometimes Sadneſs, at other times Love, and moſt frequently Fear. In a word, the Vulgar take Science to be a vile Slave always inſulted and domineer'd over, and drag'd along by the other Paſſions. Are you of the ſame Opinion with them? Or do you think on the contrary that Science is a firm thing, that it is capable of commanding Man, and that it can put him into a State never to be conquered by any Paſſion, and that all the Potentates upon Earth ſhall never be able to force him to do any thing but what Science ſhall command him, for it is alone ſufficient to deliver him?

The Opinion that the Vulgar has of Science.

A fine portraicture of Science, the character whereof was explain'd in the Argument.

The Vanity of the Sophiſt.

* I do not only think all that you have ſaid, *Socrates*, anſwered *Protagoras*, of Science; but I add, that it would ſeem worſe in me than in any other Man not to mentain that it is the ſtrongeſt of all Humane Things.

You have reaſon, *Protagoras*, that is true. However you know very well that the Vulgar don't believe us upon this Subject, and that they maintain that moſt Men do to little purpoſe know what is moſt juſt, and what is beſt, for they do nothing of it, although it be in their Power, and that frequently they act quite contrary. Thoſe of whom I have asked the cauſe of ſo ſtrange a Conduct, have

* Yes, but *Socrates* ſpeaks of another Science far different from that which the *Sophiſt* means, and whereof he boaſts, for he ſpeaks of the Knowledge of God, and of the Knowledge of the Truth, which alone can deliver Man; whereas the *Sophiſt* ſpeaks of Humane Science, which is more capable of diſtroying a Man than ſaving him.

all

all told me that those People are overcome by Pleasure or by Sadness, or vanquished, and carried away by some other Passion. I am apt to believe that those whom I have consulted, are deceived in that, as in many other things. But, let us see, endeavour with me here to teach them, and to make them plainly know what this unhappy Inclination is, and wherein it consists, which occasioneth them to be overcome by Pleasures, and that they do not act that which is best, though they know it. For perhaps if we should say to them, Friends you are deceived, and you have a false Principle, they would ask us in their turn, *Socrates*, and you, *Protagoras*, What! Is it not a Passion to be overcome by Pleasures? Tell us then what it is? from whence it comes, and wherein it consists?

How, *Socrates*, said my Antagonist, are we obliged to stand to the Opinions of the Vulgar, who speak at random all that comes into their Heads.

However, me thinks, answered I, that this serves in some Measure to make us understand the Coherence that Valour may have with the other parts of Virtue. If therefore you will stand to what you at first accepted of, which is that I should lead you through that way which I think the best and the shortest, follow me, if not, as you think fit, I give it over.

On the contrary, said he, *Socrates*, I pray you to continue as you began.

Resuming my Discourse then, if those same People, said I, my dear *Protagoras*, should persist to ask us, how do you call that State which we call to be overcome by Pleasures? What should we answer! For my part this is the way I should take to answer them. I should immediately say to them, my Friends harken I pray you, for *Protagoras* and I, are going to endeavour to give a satisfactory Answer to your Question. Do you think that any other thing happens to you than what really happens, at all times when you are enticed by the

Pleasure of Feasting, or by that of Love, which seems very agreeable to you, you yield to the Temptation, though you know very well that those Pleasures are very bad and very dangerous? They would not fail to answer, that 'tis nothing else. We should afterwards ask them, why say you that those Pleasures are Evil? Is it because they give you a sort of Pleasure in the very minute that you injoy them, and that they are both agreeable? Or is it because in the Sequel they ingender Diseases, that they throw you headlong into Poverty; and that they draw after them a thousand and a thousand Misfortunes that are as fatal? Or suppose they should not be followed by any of those Mischiefs, would you always call them bad, * because they cause Man to rejoice, and to rejoice in Vice is the most deplorable of all Vices, and the Punishment of Sin? Let us consider, *Protagoras*, what other thing could they answer to us, than that they are not bad, by reason of the Pleasure they occasion at the time of injoyment, but because of the Diseases and other Accidents which they draw after them?

† I am persuaded, said *Protagoras*, that that's what all of them almost would answer,

Does not, say I, all that which destroys our Health or which causeth our Ruin, vex us? I fancy they would agree to it,

* For that's what would be needful to say to confess, as *Protagoras* has already done, that agreeable things are bad independant of their Consequences. This is a Principle altogether Divine. *Socrates* does not insist upon this, because he finds it too sublime, for the Vulgar; and that he knew very well that it is not their Opinion..

† And consequently *Protagoras* has spoke against his own proper Sentiments, when he answered *p.* 506. that certain agreeable things were bad by the very same thing that made them agreeable, and independant from all that might happen, and that certain disagreeable things were good after the same manner, independant of all that may follow. We must observe this wonderful art whereby *Socrates* makes *Protagoras* contradict himself so plainly, without ever offending him.

With-

Without doubt, ſaid *Protagoras.*

Then ſhould I continue, you think my Friends as we ſay, *Protagoras* and I, that thoſe Pleaſures are not bad but becauſe they terminate in Sorrow, and deprive Men of other Pleaſures which they deſire to enjoy? They would not fail to acquieſce therein.

Protagoras conſents to it.

But, ſay I, if we ſhould take the contrary ſide, and ſhould ask them, my Friends, you ſay that diſagreeable things are good, how do you underſtand it? Will you ſpeak by example of bodily Exerciſes of War, of Cures that the Phyſicians perform by Inciſion, by Purgations or by the ſtricteſt of Diet? Do you ſay that thoſe things are good, but that they are diſagreeable? They would be of that Opinion.

Without any difficulty.

Why do you call them good? Is it becauſe at the very minute they cauſe the greateſt of Aches and infinite pain? Or becauſe by their Operation, they occaſion Health and a good habit of Body, that they are the preſervation of Cities that they raiſe to Impire, and that they heap Glory and Riches upon certain States? Without doubt they would make no ſcruple to take the laſt Part: And *Protagoras* acquieſceth therein.

But ſuppoſe I ſhould go on and ask if all thoſe things which I have named are good for any other reaſon than becauſe they end in Pleaſure, and that they remove and chaſe away Vexation and Sadneſs? For could you have any other Motive which ſhould oblige you to call thoſe things good, than the removing of Vexation, and the expectation of Pleaſure? I can't believe it.

Nor I neither, ſaid *Protagoras.*

Therefore don't you ſeek after Pleaſure as a good thing, and don't you avoid Vexation as an Evil?

Without contradiction.

And consequently you take Vexation for an Evil, and Pleasure for a Good? You call Pleasure it self an Evil when it deprives you of certain Pleasures that are greater than those which it procures you, and when it causes you Troubles more sensible than all its Pleasures. For if you should have any other reason to call Pleasure an Evil, and if you should find that it had any other end, you would make no difficulty to tell it us, but I am sure you can't find it.

I am also sure that they can't find any, said *Protagoras.*

Is it not the same thing with Grief or Pain? Don't you call it good when it delivers you from certain Anguishes that are greater than those which it occasions you, or when the Pleasures it procures, you are greater than its Vexations? For if you could propose to your self any other end than what I have told you for calling pain Good, you would without doubt tell it us; but you can't.

That is very true *Socrates*, said *Protagoras.*

Suppose, continued I; you should ask me in your Course, why I turn the thing so many ways? I should say pardon me, my Friends, this is my way of examining into Subjects on all sides. For first it is not easie to demonstrate to you what that is which you call *to be overcome by Pleasures.* And on the other hand there is no other Means to make certain and sensible Demonstrations. But you are still at your Liberty to declare unto me if you find good to be any other thing than Pleasure and Evil to be any other thing than Pain and Sadness. Tell me, would not you be very well satisfied to spend your time agreeably, and without Vexation? If you are contented therewith, and if you can't find that Good and Evil are any other thing than what I say, hearken to what follows.

The only way to make sure Demonstrations is to examine into the Subjections on all sides.

That being presupposed, I maintain that there is nothing more ridiculous than to say as you do, that a Man knowing Evil to be Evil, and being able to prevent his abandoning himself thereunto, to ceaseth

not

not to commit it, becauſe he is hurried along by Pleaſure, and that it is no leſs abſurd to advance as you do, on the other ſide, that a Man knowing good yet refuſeth to do it, becauſe of ſome preſent Pleaſure that puts him off from it. The Ridiculouſneſs that I find in thoſe two Propoſitions will viſibly appear to you if we don't make uſe of many Names, which only ſerve to imbroil us, as *Agreeable*, *Diſagreeable*, *Good*, *Evil*. Seeing therefore we ſpeak but of two things, let us make uſe only of two Names: Let us at firſt call them by the Names of *Good and Evils*; and afterwards we ſhall call them by thoſe of *Agreeable and Diſagreeable*. That being granted, let us ſay, *That a Man knowing Evil, and being ſenſible that it is ſo ceaſeth not to commit it.* We ſhall certainly be asked *why does he commit it?* We ſhall anſwer him *becauſe he is overcome.* And *by what is he overcome*, they will ſay? We can anſwer no more *by the agreeableneſs of it*, that is to ſay, *by Pleaſure*, for 'tis a word that is baniſhed, and in lieu thereof, we have agreed to make uſe of that Word *Good.* Therefore we muſt make uſe of that Term only, and we muſt anſwer, *That that Man commits Evil only becauſe he is overcome and ſurmounted. By what?* We muſt cut ſhort the Words, *overcome and ſurmounted by Good.* If he who queſtions us has never ſo little Inclination to raillery, and if he be a Man that can puſh us home, you ſee what a fine Field we give him. He will laugh immediately with all his might, and will ſay to us, in truth that's a very pleaſant thing, that a Man who knows Evil, and is ſenſible that it is ſo, and being able to forbear doing of it, ceaſeth not to commit it, becauſe he is overcome by Good. He will add, do you think that good is uncapable of ſurmounting Evil? Or is it capable of it? Without doubt we will anſwer that it is not capable of it, for otherwiſe he whom we ſay to be overcome by Pleaſure would not have ſinned. But for what reaſon is Good incapable of

For if Good had been capable of surmounting Evil he would have done it, and consequently the Evil would not not have been committed.

surmounting Evil? Or why has Evil the ſtrength to ſurmount Good? Is it not becauſe one is greater and the other leſs? Or becauſe one is more numerous and the other leſs? For we have no other Reaſons to alledge to them.

Then it is evident from this, would he add, that according to you, *to be overcome by Good, is to chooſe the greateſt Evils in room of the leaſt Good.* There's an end on that ſide. Now let us change thoſe Names by calling this *Good and Evil* by the Names of *Agreeable* and *Diſagreeable.* And let us ſay that a *Man does*, we have hitherto ſaid *Evil*, but let us now ſay *diſagreeable things. A Man then does things that are diſagreeable knowing that they are ſo, he does them becauſe he is overcome and ſurmounted by thoſe that are agreeable, and that notwithſtanding are uncapable to overcome and ſurmount.* And what is it that makes Pleaſure incapable of ſurmounting Grief? Is it not the exceſs or the defect of the one in reference to the other? that is to ſay when the one is greater or leſs than the other? When one is more or leſs flat and dull than the other.

But if any body ſhould object to us * that there is a great difference between a preſent † Pleaſure, and a

* That's the laſt refuge of thoſe who maintain that Men commit Evil voluntarily, becauſe they are carried away by Pleaſures, for the Man prefers a preſent Pleaſure to a future one, and this Pleaſure is ſtill more preferable than Pain that he only foreſees. This is what *Socrates* is going to refute after a very plain manner and with much Strength.

† This is *Socrates*'s Anſwer to the foregoing Objection. Pleaſure and Pain differ only in the number or degree of the Pains and Pleaſures. Therefore it is ridiculous to think that a Man ſhould be ſo much an Enemy to himſelf as voluntarily to prefer a ſmall preſent Pleaſure to a great Pleaſure that he is ſure of, and to run after a Pleaſure which he ſees is followed by a certain Pain. For it is agreed that every Man ſeeks the Good and ſhuns the Evil. All that is in queſtion is to take a ballance and to weigh the Good and the Evil, ſeeing they are known. This is not done, and it is a ſure token that they are not known, and conſequently 'tis the want off Knowledge, that is to ſay, Ignorance that precipitates us into Evil. This is without all doubt.

Pleaſure

Pleasure or a Pain that is to come and expected. I ask upon that Head; but do they differ by any other thing than by Pleasure or Pain? They can differ in nothing else. Now I say that a Man who knows how to balance things well, and who puts agreeable things on one side, and disagreeable things on another, as well these that are present as those that he may foresee are to come, knows very well which are the most numerous. For if you weigh the Agreeable with the Agreeable, you must always chuse the most numerous, and the greatest; if you weigh the Disagreeable with the Disagreeable, you must chuse the least in number, and the smallest; and if you weigh the Agreeable with the Disagreeable, and that the last are surmounted by the first, * whether it be that the present are surmounted by the absent, or the absent by the present, we must always chuse the greatest number, that is, the first, the Agreeable: And if the latter, I mean the Disagreeable weigh down the Scales, we must beware of making so bad a Choice: Is not that all the Art to be used? Yes, without doubt they would say. *Protagoras* also agrees to it.

Since that is so, I would say, answer me I pray. Does not an Object appear greater near at hand than at a distance? Don't you understand a Voice better when it is near you, than when it is far off? Without contradiction.

If our Happiness depended upon the greatness of Subjects, every body would measure with all possible exactness.

If therefore our Happiness consisted always in chusing and doing that which is greatest, and in rejecting that which is least, what should we do, and to what should we have recourse to assure us of Happiness all our Life time? Should we have recourse to the art of Measuring, or should we content our

* That is to say, whether the present Pains be less numerous than the Pleasures that are expected, or the Pains that are expected fewer than the present Pleasures, the greatest number ought always to be chosen; In a word, we must run after good when it is greater than Evil, whether that Evil be present or absent. A great Principle.

selves

ſelves with Appearances, and with a ſimple Glance of the Eye? But we know that the Sight has often deceived us, and that when we have judged by the Eye, we have been often obliged to change our Opinion when the Queſtion to be decided has been which is the greateſt? Whereas the art of meaſuring has always removed thoſe falſe Appearances, and by making the Truth appear has ſet the Mind at eaſe, which relied upon this Truth, and has aſſertain'd the Happineſs of our Life. What would our Diſputants ſay to that? Would they ſay that our Safety depends upon the art of Meaſuring, or upon any other Art?

Upon the Art of Meaſuring without doubt.

If our Safety ſhould depend upon numbers there is no body but who would learn to Cipher.

And if our Safety ſhould depend upon the Choice of even and odd, every time that one muſt chuſe the leaſt, and comparethe moſt with the moſt, the moſt or the leaſt with the leaſt, and the one with other, whether they be near or at a diſtance, upon what Art would our Safety depend? Is it not upon the Art of Arithmetick? For the Art of Meaſuring, which teacheth us nothing but the greatneſs of things is no longer the Buſineſs in Queſtion; it would be requiſite to know the Even and the Odd, and nothing but the Knowledge of Arithmetick can teach us that. Would not our People agree to that?

Aſſuredly, ſaid *Protagoras.*

* That's well then, my Friends. But ſince it has appeared to us that our Safety depends upon the good Choice which we ſhould make between Pleaſure and Pain, that is to ſay, between that which in thoſe two Kinds is the greateſt, or the leaſt, the moſt numerous or the leaſt, the neareſt or the furtheſt off; Is it not true that the Art of Meaſuring is the Art of examining the largeneſs of Things, and of comparing their different Reſemblances?

* Our Safety depends upon the good Choice between Pleaſure and Pain. We are only unhappy becauſe we deceive our ſelves in our Choice. Our Misfortunes proceed only from our Ignorance, for no body deſires to be unhappy.

It

It can't be otherwiſe.

Then the Art of Meaſuring muſt be * an Art and a Science, they could not diſagree to it. We ſhall examine another time what that Art is, which at the ſame time is an Art and a Science, now that the Art of meaſuring is a Science, we agree to it, and that ſuffices for a Demonſtration that we ought to give, you *Protagoras* and I, upon the Queſtion that you have propoſed to us; for at the ſame time that you and I have agreed that there is nothing ſo ſtrong as Science, and that wherever it is found it is victorious over Pleaſure and all other Paſſions, you have contradicted us, in aſſuring us that Pleaſure is often victorious, and that it triumphs over Man, even when he knows the Poiſon of it; and as we have not agreed to your Principle, then if you remember it, you have demanded, *Protagoras* and you *Socrates*, if that be not to be overcome by Pleaſure, tell us then what it is, and how do you call that Inclination that carries us away. If we ſhould have anſwered you upon the Spot, that we call'd it *Ignorance*, you would have laughed at us. Laugh on now, and you will laugh at your ſelves. For you have confeſſed that thoſe who deceive themſelves in the Choice of Pleaſure and of Pain, that is to ſay of Good and of Evil, are not deceived, but for want of Knowledge; and afterwards you further agreed not only for want of Knowledge, but for want of that Science which teacheth to meaſure. Now every Action wherein one is deceived for want of Knowledge you know very well your ſelf that it is an Ignorance, and by conſequence it is a very great Ignorance to be overcome by Pleaſure. *Protagoras*, *Prodicus* and *Hippias*, boaſt that they can cure this Ignorance, and you becauſe you are perſuaded that

* It is an Art, becauſe there are Rules and a Method; and 'tis a Science, becauſe its Object are things neceſſary and immaterial, and becauſe it makes its Demonſtrations by Infallible Arguments built upon neceſſary Principles that are inconteſtable and certain.

this

this unhappy Inclination is some other thing than Ignorance; you will not apply your self, and will not send your Children to those Sophists who are such excellent Masters, as holding it for a certain Truth that Virtue can't be taught, and you save the Money which you would be obliged to give them. And it is that fine Opinion that causes all the Misfortunes, not only of the Republick, but also of particular Persons.

That's what we would answer to those honest People. But I apply my self now to you, *Prodicus* and *Hippias*, and I ask you as well as *Protagoras*, if you think what I just now said to be true or false?

They all agreed that they were very sensible Truths.

You agree then said I, that Agreeable is that which is called Good, and Disagreeable that which is called Evil. For as for that Distinction of Names which *Prodicus* would have introduced, I kiss his Hands. In effect, *Prodicus*, call Goodness, Agreeable, Delectable, Delicious, Charming, and invent still more Names if that pleases you, it is alike to me. Answer only to what I ask you.

Prodicus agrees to it, smiling, as do also the others.

Every Action which tends to make us live without pain is fine, and Consequently good and useful.

Then what do you think of this, my Friends, said I, are not all Actions fine, which tend to live agreeably, and without pain? And is it not a fine Action at the same time good and useful?

They agree to it?

If it be true that Agreeable be good, and that it be the Good, then it is not possible that a Man knowing that there are better things than those which he does, and knowing that he can do them, should notwithstanding do the Evil and leave the Good. Therefore to be overcome by Pleasure, is nothing else than to be in Ignorance; and to overcome Pleasuresis nothing else than to have Knowledge.

They

They acquiesced therein.

But, said I, to them, what do you call it to be in Ignorance? Is it not to have a false Opinion, and to deceive one's self in Things that are very essential and very important? *What is it to be in Ignorance.*

Without Contradiction.

It follows then from this Principle, that no Person runs voluntarily into Evil, nor into that which he takes to be Evil. * And it is not at all in the Nature of Man to run after Evil, as Evil, in stead of running after Good. And when one is forced to chuse one of two Evils, you will find no Body who would chuse the greatest, if it were in his power to take the least.

That seem'd to us all to be a manifest Truth.

Then, said I, what you call Terror and Fear, speak *Prodicus*. Is it not the expectation of an Evil, whether you call it Terror or Fear?

Protagoras and *Hippias* acquiesced, that Terror and Fear were nothing precisely but that, and *Prodicus* confess'd it of Fear, but denied it of Terror. But that is no matter, my dear *Prodicus*, answer'd I. The only important Point is to know if the Principle which I just now asserted be true. If it be so, all your Distinctions are useless. In effect, who is the Man who would run after that which he fears, when he might go before that which he fears not? That is impossible by your own Confession; for from the time that a Man fears a thing, he confesseth that he believes it to be bad; and there is no Body that voluntarily seeks after and receives that which is bad.

They agreed to it.

Those Foundations being laid down, *Prodicus* and *Hippias*, said I, *Protagoras* must now justifie and prove the Truth of what he at first asserted; or ra-

* For it is a certain Truth, our Will never inclines to any thing but that which pleaseth it most. And there is nothing but Good, or what it takes for such, that pleases it.

ther

ther I must grant him Quarter for what he advanced at first, for he said that of the five Parts of Virtue there is not one that resembles another, and that they had each of them their own Qualities and a different Character. I will not insist upon that, but let him prove what he said afterwards, that of those five Parts there were four which had some resemblance to each other, and one which was altogether different from the other four, that is to say Valour.

He added, that I should know this Truth by this evident Mark, that is, said he, *Socrates*, that you shall see Men who are very Imperious, unjust, Debauch'd and Ignorant, and yet have a heroick Valour; and you will understand by that, that Valour is extreamly different from the other parts of Virtue.

I confess that at first I was very much supriz'd at this Answer, and my Surprize hath been greater since I examin'd the Thing with you. I ask'd him if he did not call bold and resolute Men, Valiant? He told me that he gave that Name to those bold Spirits who run headlong into danger; for you remember it very well, *Protagoras*, that was the Answer you made me.

I do remember it, said he.

Tell us then wherein are the Valiant bold, is it in Things that the Timorous undertake?

No, without doubt.

Is it in others? In those that the Brave undertake?

Assuredly.

Don't Cowards run on upon those Things that seem to be safe, and the Valiant upon those that seem to be terrible?

So People say, *Socrates*, answered *Protagoras*.

You say true, *Protagoras*; but that's not what I ask you, I would know your Sentiment. Wherein do you say are the Valiant bold? Is it in Things that are terrible, and that they themselves find so?

Don't

Don't you remember, *Socrates*, that you have plainly made it appear already that that was impossible.

For he has made it appear that Terror is the expectation of an Evil, and that no Body runs voluntarily to Evil.

You are in the right, *Protagoras*, I had forgot it. Then it is a Thing demonstrated, that no Body runs upon Things that he finds to be terrible, because it is most certainly an Ignorance to suffer one's self to be overcome by Passions.

'Tis agreed to.

But on the other side, both the one and the other, * the Brave and the Coward run upon Things that seem to be safe and without danger, and by that means the Cowards undertake the same Things as the Brave.

There is a great Difference, *Socrates*; the Cowards do the quite contrary to what the Brave do; without going further, the one seeks War and the other flies from it.

But do they find it to be a fine thing to go to War?

Yes, certainly, most fine.

If it be fine it is also good, for we have agreed that all Actions that are fine are good.

That is most true, said he to me, and I have always been of that Sentiment.

I am very glad of it. But who are those then who will not go to the War which they find to be so fine and so good?

They are Cowards, said he.

* 'Tis a necessary Consequence of what *Protagoras* just now confess'd, That the Brave don't run upon terrible Things because it is an Evil. Then they run upon Things that are safe, and that appear to be without danger; and by consequence they do the same thing as the Cowards, and they tend to the same Mark: That is certain; but here's the difference between the Cowards and the brave Men, that the brave Men acting always by Knowledge, are never deceiv'd in the Side they chuse; for they certainly know what is terrible and what is not. Whereas the Cowards acting by Ignorance, and fixing safety where danger is, and danger where safety is, are always deceiv'd. How many great Truths are cleared by this Principle!

In

In the mean time, said I, to go to War is a fine and a good thing: Is it not also agreeable?

It is a sequel of the Principles which we have agreed to?

They don't know it, then they are in Ignorance.

Do the Cowards refuse to go to that which is finer, better and more agreeable although they know it to be what it is?

But *Socrates*, if we should confess that, then we overthrow all our first Principles.

How, say I, does not the brave run upon all that he thinks to be the finest, the best, and the most agreeable?

It can't be denied.

The Brave fear where one should fear, but not otherwise.

Then it is evident that the Brave have not a shameful Fear when they fear, nor a shameful Assurance when they are firm and assured?

'Tis true.

If they are not shameful, then they are fine and honest; Is it not so? And if they be honest, they are good?

Yes.

Cowards and Fools fear unseasonably, and trust after the same manner.

And are not the Cowards, tho' rash and furious, quite contrary? Have they not unworthy Fears and shameful Assurances?

I confess it.

And from whence come those unworthy Fears and shameful Assurances? Is it not from Ignorance?

That is certain.

But, what do you call that which makes Cowards, Cowards? Do you call it Valour or Cowardise?

I call it Cowardise, without doubt.

Then the Cowards appear to you to be so, because of their Ignorance of sensible Things?

Most assuredly.

Then 'tis that Ignorance which makes them Cowards?

I agree to it.

You have agreed that 'tis Cowardise that makes Cowards.

Assuredly.

According

According to you, Cowardise is the Ignorance of Things that are terrible, and of those that are not? He made a Signal that he agreed to it. At the same time Valour is opposit to Cowardise? He made the same Sign of Approbation.

And consequently the Knowledge of Things that are terrible, and of those that are not in opposition to the Ignorance of the same Things? He gave another sign of his Consent.

Is Ignorance Cowardise?

He pass'd this over with some Difficulty.

And is not the Knowledge of Things that are terrible, and of those that are not, Valour, seeing it is contrary to the Ignorance of the same Things?

Oh, upon that nere another sign, and not one Word.

How, said I, *Protagoras*, will you neither grant me what I demand, nor deny it me?

Come to an end only, said he.

Then I ask you only one small Question more. I ask you if you still think as you did lately, that there are Men who are very Ignorant, and yet very Brave? *He has made it appear that that's impossible.*

Seeing you are so pressing, said he to me, and that you will oblige me to answer you still, I will do you that Pleasure. I tell you then, *Socrates*, that that which you ask me, seems impossible according to the Principles that we have established.

I assure you, *Protagoras*, said I to him, that I propose all those Questions to you with no other Design than to examine narrowly into all the parts of Virtue, and to know well what Virtue it self is: For I am persuaded that that being well known, we should certainly find what we seek for, and what we have discoursed so much upon, I in saying that Virtue can't be taught, and you in maintaining that it can. And at this close of our Dispute, if I durst presume to personate Virtue, I should say that it mightily upbraids us and laughs at us, in saying to us, you are pleasant Disputants, *Socrates* and *Protagoras*!

goras! You, *Socrates*, after having mentained that Virtue can't be taught you are now running to contradict your self, by indeavouring to make it appear that all is Science, to wit, Justice, Temperance, Valour, *&c.* which is just going to draw a Conclusion, that Virtue can be taught: For if Knowledge be different from Virtue, as *Protagoras* endeavours to prove it is evident that Virtue cannot be taught whereas if it passes for a Science as you would have it be acknowledged, * Men will never apprehend that it can't be taught. And *Protagoras* on the other hand, after having mentained that it can be taught, contradicts himself also by indeavouring to persuade us that it is some other thing than Knowledge.

But let us leave the Fiction. For my part, *Protagoras*, I am heartily sorry to see all our Principles so horribly confounded and turn'd topsy turvy; and I could passionately wish that we could disintangle, and explain them; that after having searched

* That is founded upon this Erroneous Opinion which is very common, that every Science can by taught. *Socrates* sensibly proves it to be an Error, seeing be mentaining that Virtue is a Science, he asserts at the same time, and proves after a most solid manner that Men can't teach it: And it is not difficult to see what he aims at: He means that it can be learn'd of no body but God; for he is the God of Sciences,

1 Kings 2. *Deus scientiarum*, as he is call'd in the Holy Scripture; where-
Psal. 119. fore *David* says to him, *Lord teach me Knowledge*, and he assur-
66. eth us that 'tis he who teacheth it to Men, *qui docet hominem*
Psal.94.10. *scientiam*. If that be true of Knowledge, it is also true of Valour, seeing *Socrates* hath already proved that Valour and Knowledge are but the same thing. *Plato* was not the first Heathen who had the Idea of those excellent Truths; above three hundred Years before him *Homer* had said, when he brings in *Agamemnon* speaking to *Achilles*, *If thou be so valiant,*

In the first Book of this H. *from whence comes thy Valour? Is it not God who gave it thee?* And almost 300 Years before *Homer*, *David* had said, *'tis God who teacheth my hands to War, qui docet manus meas ad prelium.* But

Psal. 18. 34. *end* 144. 1. one will say, why does not *Socrates* explain his Meaning? 'Tis because a Philosopher ought to fix what Virtue is before he explains from whence it comes, and who are the Masters that teach it; for Virtue being known, it's Author is also consequently known, and the Proof is made.

into

into all the parts of Virtue, we might plainly shew what it is in it self, and that putting our chief Question at last to a Hearing again, we might examine if Virtue could be taught or not, to the end, we might know what to stand by: For I am very much afraid that your *Epimetheus* has deceived us in our Examination, as you say he deceived, and forgot us in the Distribution he made. I will also tell you frankly that in your Fable, *Prometheus* has pleased me much better than that Lover of Confusion *Epimetheus*; and 'tis by following his Example that I take all Care and Precaution to frame my whole Life well, imploying my self solely in those Injuries, and if you would, as I told you just now, I would most willingly dive into the bottom of all those Matters with you.

We ought to follow Prometheus *and not* Epimetheus, *that is to say, to govern our selves by the Spirit of God, and not by that of the World, which is quite contrary to God.*

Socrates, said *Protagoras* to me, I extreamly commend your good Intentions, and your way of treating upon Subjects. I can boast that I have no Vice, but above all, that I am furthest from that of Envy, no Man in the World is less inclin'd to it than my self: And as for you I have often said that you are the only Person of all those I converse with, whom I admire the most, and that there is none of all those of your Age, but who I think are infinitely below you; and I add, that I shall not in the least be surprized that you be seen one day among the Number of those great Persons who have made themselves famous by their Wisdom. But we shall speak another time of those Matters, and it shall be when you please. At present I am oblig'd to go home about some other Business.

We must then, *Protagoras*, said I to him, put off the Dispute 'till another time, seeing you will have it so; besides, I should have been gone a great while ago, where I am expected; but I tarry'd to oblige handsome *Callias*, who deserved it of me. That being said, every one retired whither his Affairs call'd him.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE RIVALS.

THIS Dialogue is only a Recital of a Conference which *Plato* feigns that *Socrates* had with ſome young People in the School of a Grammarian; or perhaps that *Plato* has preſerv'd it for us, ſuch as *Socrates* actually had it, and ſuch as he related it to his Diſciples. It's intitled, THE RIVALS; for the Ancients quote it by this Name: It is Moral, and treats of Philoſophy. *Socrates* diſputes here againſt two Errors which run in the Heads of the young People of his Time, ſome miſunderſtanding a Paſſage of *Solon*, fancied that Philoſophy conſiſted in knowing all the Sciences. And others believed that to deſerve the Name of Philoſopher, it was ſufficient to have a little ſmack of Sciences and Arts, that they might be able to diſcourſe of them with Maſters, and to acquire the Reputation of an univerſal Man who could judge of every Thing. *Socrates* argues very ſolidly againſt thoſe two Principles. He overthrows the laſt, in making it appear that there is nothing more ridiculous than to fancy the Philoſopher to be a ſuperficial Man, inferior in all to Maſters in each Science, and conſequently fit for none. And he refutes the firſt, by inſinuating that as too much Food hurts the Body, ſo too great a heap of Sciences and Knowledge hurts the Soul; whoſe Health, like that of the Body, proceeds from a juſt Meaſure

ἀντεραται *and not* ἐραται.

Measure of the Food that is given it. The most skilful is not always he who knows most, but he who knows well the Things that are necessary. Which puts me in mind of a fine Saying of one of the most learned Men of this Age, and whose Works are known to every Body, He said, *That he should have been as ignorant as many others, if he had read as much as they.* Mr. *Le Fevre.*

There are Millions of Things useless to lead us to true Philosophy, and which instead of advancing us, put us behind. Philosophy is something greater than Arts, and more admirable than that which is commonly called the Sciences; for it is nothing else but the Knowledge of Things Divine and Human, which disposeth us to submit to the first, and to guide and govern others by the Rules of Prudence and Justice, insomuch as that we may be useful to our Neighbours and to our Selves, in opposing Vice and making Virtue to grow and to flourish. 'Tis by this that one Friend gives good Advice to another; by this a Magistrate does Justice well; by this the Master of a Family governs his House; and in a word, by this a King governs his People: These are the Truths that *Socrates* teaches in this short Conversation which is very valuable. One would say, that he is *Solomon*'s Disciple, and that he had heard what Wisdom spoke from his Mouth: *To me belong Council, Equity, Prudence, and Strength; 'tis by me that Kings Reign, and that Lawgivers establish Laws; 'tis by me that Princes command, and that the Powers of the Earth decree Justice.*

Another very important Truth which *Socrates* also teacheth here, is that the most learned are not always those who are the best disposed to true Wisdom. The most Ignorant is frequently nearer to it, than he who has grown old in Books, and who has seen all and read all. We have Instances of it every day.

THE RIVALS.

Socrates. I went t'other day into the School of *Denis*, who teacheth Learning. I found there ſome of the handſomeſt young People, and of the beſt Families of the City, with their Lovers. I there obſerved above all, two of them who were diſputing together, but I could not underſtand the ſubject of their Diſpute; it ſeem'd to me to be upon ſome Points of the Doctrin of *Anaxagoras* or *Oenopidas*, for they were drawing of Circles, and quite ſtooping; they were imitating certain Turnings and Motions of the Heavens with a wonderful Attention. Curious to know what it was, I addreſſed my ſelf to a young Man who ſate by me; and it happen'd that he was the Lover of one of thoſe who were diſputing together. I asked him then, jogging him a little with my Elbow, what occaſions this great Attention? Is the ſubject of the Diſcourſe ſo great and ſo fine as to require ſuch a ſerious Application?

Socrates *always obſerves the Corruption that raigned at* Athens.

Good, anſwer'd he, ſo great and ſo fine, they are prating of heavenly Things, and they do nothing but ſpeak Folly with all their Philoſophy.

Surprized at the anſwer, how, ſaid I, my Friend, do you think it is Folly to be a Philoſopher? How comes it that you ſpeak ſo harſhly? Another young Man that was ſeated by him, who was his Rival, and who had heard my Queſtion, ſaid to me, In truth, *Socrates*, you will not find your account in applying your ſelf to that Man; and in asking him if he believes Philoſophy to be Folly, don't you know that he has ſpent all his Life in eating, ſleeping,

ſleeping, and in bodily Exerciſes? Can you expect any other anſwer from him, unleſs it were, that there is nothing more ſhameful nor more fooliſh than Philoſophy? He who ſpoke to me thus, had always applyed himſelf to Sciences; whereas the other whom he treated ſo ill, applyed himſelf wholly to Exerciſes.

I thought it convenient to let alone that Champion who had neglected the Mind only to exerciſe the Body, and to keep to his Rival who pretended to be more able. And that I might the better draw from him what I deſired, I ſaid, what I asked at firſt, I asked it of you both in common. And if you think you are more able to anſwer me than he, I apply my ſelf only to you. Anſwer me, do you think that it is a fine thing to be a Philoſopher? Or do you believe the contrary? The two Diſputants, who had heard us, gave over their Diſpute, and drawing nearer, they reſolved to hear us with a deep ſilence. I know not what Influence this Approach had on our two Rivals; for my part, I was ſurprized at it, for it is uſual to me, I cannot ſee handſome young People * without admiring them.

He to whom I ſpoke did not ſeem to be leſs touched than my ſelf; however, he did not fail to anſwer me with ſome ſort of Aſſurance and Self-love: For my part, *Socrates*, if I thought it was a ſhame to be a Philoſopher, I ſhould not believe my ſelf to be a Man: And whoever has that Thought I have altogether as bad an Opinion of him. By that he hit his Rival home; therefore he raiſed his Voice that he might be underſtood by him whom he lov'd.

Then 'tis a fine thing, anſwered I, to be a Philoſopher. Yes aſſuredly, ſaid he. But, anſwered I, do you think it poſſible for one to decide whether a

* It was an Admiration that produced in him the deſire of being able to contribute to the making of them as Virtuous as they were Handſome. See what *Maximus de Tyr* has ſaid on this Paſſage.

thing be fine or ugly, unleſs he knows it before? Do you know what it is to be a Philoſopher? Without doubt, ſaid he, I know it. Then I ask'd him, what is it?

'Tis nothing elſe, anſwered he, than what *Solon* ſaid: *In making my ſelf old, I learn an infinity of Things.* For me thinks that he who would be a Philoſopher ought to learn ſomething every day of his Life, both in his Youth and in his old Age, to the end, that he may know all that can be known.

At firſt me thought he ſpoke ſomething. But after having pauſed a little upon it, I asked him if he held that Philoſophy was nothing elſe but a Polymathie, that is to ſay, a Heap or a confuſs'd Maſs of all the Sciences? He told me it was nothing but that. But, ſay I, do you think that Philoſophy is only a fine thing, or do you believe it is alſo a good thing. I believe it to be very good, anſwered he. Do you think that is particular to Philoſophy, continued I, or do you find the ſame thing in other Arts? For Example, do you think the love of Exerciſes is as good, as it is fine, or are you of Opinion that it is neither fine nor good? In my Opinion, anſwered he, jeſting merrily, for you, that Love is very fine and very good, but as for him, ſpeaking of his Rival, it is neither t'one nor the t'other. And do you belive, ſaid I, that the Love of Exerciſes conſiſts in having a mind to do all Exerciſes? Without doubt, ſaid he, *as the Love of Wiſdom*, that is to ſay, Philoſophy, conſiſts in having a mind to know all things. But, I askt him, do you think that thoſe who apply themſelves to Exerciſes have any other aim than that of the Health of their Body? No, without doubt, ſaid he, they propoſe to themſelves no other end. And conſequently, ſaid I, is it not the great number of Exerciſes that makes People enjoy their Health?

Would it be poſſible, anſwered he, that one could be in good Health by applying himſelf only to a few Exerciſes?

Upon

Upon that I thought fit to ſtir up my Champion a little, that he might come to my Aſſiſtance with the Experience he had in Exerciſes: Then directing my Diſcourſe to him, why are you ſilent, ſaid I my Dear, when you hear your Rival ſpeak of your Art? Do you alſo believe as he, that 'tis the great number of Exerciſes that cauſe Health? Or on the other hand, do you think that 'tis to uſe ſuch of them as you ſhall think fit, and neither to exerciſe your ſelf too much nor too little.

For my part, *Socrates*, he anſwered me, I am ſtill perſwaded, as I have always been, that there is nothing more true than what the common Proverb ſays, that moderate Exerciſes cauſe a good Health, Is not that a fine Proof of it? That poor Man with his Application to ſtudy, and his Deſire to know every thing, ſee how he is: He has loſt his Appetite and does not ſleep: He is as ſtiff as a Stake and as dry as a Match.

At theſe words the two young Men fell a laughing and the Philoſopher bluſh'd.

Seeing his Confuſion I turn'd towards him, what do you pretend to then, ſaid I? Don't you confeſs now that 'tis neither the great nor the ſmall number of Exerciſes that cauſe Health? But moderate Exerciſes, and to keep directly in the mid-way. Will you reſiſt two?

If I had to do with him only, ſaid he, I would make my part good, and I find my ſelf ſtrong enough to prove to him what I have advanced; even though it ſhould be far leſs probable; he's ſo far from being a dangerous Enemy. But with you *Socrates*, I will not diſpute againſt my Opinion. I confeſs then that it is not the great number of Exerciſes but moderate Exerciſes that cauſe Health.

Is it not the ſame with Food, ſaid I? He agreed to it, and I made him confeſs the ſame, as to all other things that relate to the Body, that it was the juſt middle that was uſeful, and in no wiſe the too much nor the too little. And as to what re-

lates

lates to the Soul, ſaid I afterwards, is it the quantity of Food that is given it which is uſeful or is it only a juſt Meaſure?

'Tis the juſt meaſure ſaid he to me.

But, continued I, are not Sciences of the number of thoſe Foods of the Soul? He acknowledged it. And conſequently ſaid I to him, It is not the great number of Sciences that nouriſh the Soul well, but the juſt Meaſure, which is equally diſtant from too much and too little? He acquieſced in it.

To whom then ſhould we reaſonably addreſs our ſelves, continued I, to know exactly what is that juſt Meaſure of Food and Exerciſes that is uſeful for the Body? We all three agreed that it muſt be to a Phyſician or to a Maſter of Exerciſes. And as to ſowing of Seed, to whom ſhould we apply our ſelves to know that juſt Meaſure? To a Husbandman without doubt. And as to other Sciences, I add; whom ſhall we conſult to know the juſt Medium that muſt be kept in ſowing or planting them in the Soul? Upon that we found our ſelves all three equally full of Doubts and Uncertainties. Seeing we can't overcome this Difficulty, I told them ſmiling, ſhall we call thoſe two handſom young Youths to our Aſſiſtance, or ſhall we be aſham'd to call them, * as *Homer* ſays of *Penelope's* Lovers, who not being able to bend the Bow, would not have it that any other could do it?

When I ſaw thatthey deſpaired of finding what we ſought after, I took another Method. What Sciences, ſaid I, ſhall we fix upon that a Philoſopher ought to learn? For we have agreed that he ought not to learn them all, nor even the greateſt part.

The learned Man, anſwering, ſaid they ought to be the fineſt, the moſt Agreeable, and thoſe that

* In the 21 Book of the *Odyſſ.* *v.* 285. the Lovers of *Penelope*, openly teſtifie the fear they were in that the Beggar, who was not yet known to be *Ulyſſes*, ſhould bend the Bow, whereof *Penelope* was to be the Reward.

could

could do him the greateſt Honour, and that nothing could do him more Honour than to ſeem to underſtand all the Arts, or at leaſt the moſt part, and the moſt conſiderable, and that thus a Philoſopher ought to learn all the Arts that were worthy of an honeſt Man's Knowledge as well thoſe that depend upon the Underſtanding as thoſe that depend upon Handiwork.

You mean, continued I, for Example, the Joyners Trade: One may have a very able Joyner for five or ſix Marks. That's a Trade that depends upon Handiwork. And the Art of Architecture depends on the Underſtanding. But you can't have an Architect for ten thouſand Drachms; for there are very few among the Greeks. Are not thoſe the ſorts of Arts you mean? When he had anſwered me yes, I asked him if he did not think it impoſſible that a Man could learn two Arts perfectly, and much more to learn a great number, and thoſe alſo the moſt difficult?

For 15 or 20 Piſtols.

For 100 Crowns. Architects ſcarce in Greece in Socrates time.

Upon that he anſwered me, don't you underſtand me, *Socrates*, 'tis not my meaning that a Philoſopher ſhould know thoſe Arts as perfectly as the Maſters, who practice them, it is ſufficient that he knows them like a Gentleman, ſo as he may underſtand what thoſe Maſters ſay better than the Vulgar ſort of Men, and alſo be able to give his Opinion, to the end that he may make it appear that he has a very fine and delicate taſte of all that is ſaid or done in relation to thoſe Arts.

And I, as ſtill doubting what his meaning was, ſaid, ſee, I pray you, if I apprehend your Idea of a Philoſopher; you pretend that a Philoſopher ſhould be the ſame with the Tradeſmen * as a Pentathle or Champion who does five ſorts of Exerciſes in the Academy.

* This Paſſage is extraordinary fine, and furniſh'd *Longinus* with the Idea of the Compariſon he made of *Demoſthenes* with *Hiperides*, and which I have explained in the Remarks upon that Rhetorician, *Chap.* 28. *p.* 173.

with

with the Runner or the Wreſtler; for he is overcome by all thoſe Champions in the Exerciſes that is proper to each, and holds but the ſecond Rank after them; whereas he is above all the other Champions who enter the Liſts againſt him. Perhaps that's the effect which you pretend Philoſophy produces upon thoſe who follow it; they are truly below Maſters in the Knowledge of every Art, but they are alſo ſuperior to all other Men who pretend to judge of them. Inſomuch, that according to you, we muſt conceive a Philoſopher, as a Man who in every thing is below the Maſter that profeſſeth it. That, I believe, is the Idea that you would give of a Philoſopher.

Very well, *Socrates*, ſaid he to me, you have admirably well comprehended my meaning, and there is nothing more juſt than your Compariſon; for the Philoſopher is truly a Man who does not keep to one thing, only like a Slave, ſo as to neglect all others, as the Tradeſmen do, in order to carry it to the laſt Perfection: But he applies himſelf indifferently to all.

After this anſwer, as if I ſtill deſired to know his meaning more clearly, I asked him if he believed that able Men were uſeful or uſeleſs?

I believe them to be very uſeful, *Socrates*, anſwer'd he.

If the able are very uſeful, reply'd I, the unable are very uſeleſs?

He agreed to that.

But, ſaid I, are the Philoſophers uſeful or not?

They are not only uſeful, anſwer'd he, but alſo very uſeful.

Let us ſee then, reply'd I, if you ſay true, and let us examine how it can be that thoſe Philoſophers, who hold only the ſecond Rank in any thing whatſoever, ſhould be ſo uſeful; for by what you juſt now ſaid, it is clear as the day, that the Philoſopher is inferior to Tradeſmen in all the Arts which they profeſs.

He

He agrees to it.

Oh! ſaid I, let's ſee, if you or any of your Friends for whom you had a great love were ſick; tell me, I pray you, would you call a Philoſopher, that inferior Man, or would you ſend for a Phiſician to recover your Health, or that of your Friend?

For my part, I would ſend for both, anſwered he.

Ah! don't tell me that, anſwer'd I, you muſt chuſe which of them you would rather call?

If you take it that way, ſaid he, I think there is no Body would heſitate, but would much rather call the Phiſician.

And if you were in the middle of the Sea, toſs'd with a furious Tempeſt, to whom would you abandon the Conduct of your Ship, to the Philoſopher or to the Pilot?

To the Pilot, without doubt, ſaid he.

Thus then, both in a Storm and in Sickneſs, and in all other Things, while the Artiſt or the Maſter of every one of thoſe Things is preſent, is not the Philoſopher very uſeleſs? Would he not be as it were a dumb Perſon?

So methinks, anſwer'd he.

And conſequently, reply'd I, the Philoſopher is a very uſeleſs Man: For we have Artiſts in every Thing, and we have agreed that the able are only uſeful, and that others are not. He was obliged to agree to it. Shall I preſume to ask you ſome other Things, ſaid I to him, and will not you look upon it as clowniſh and ruſtick to ask you ſo many Queſtions?

Ask me what you ſhall think fit, anſwer'd he.

I want nothing more than that we ſhould agree again on what we have ſaid. Methinks that we have agreed on one ſide, that Philoſophy is a fine Thing; that there are Philoſophers; that Philoſophers are able Men; that able Men are uſeful; and that unable Men are uſeleſs; and that on the other hand, we have agreed that Philoſopers are uſeleſs when we have People by that are Maſters of every Profeſſion, and there are always ſome. Is not that what we have agreed to? 'Tis

'Tis ſo, anſwer'd he.

And conſequently, ſay I, ſeeing Philoſophy, according to you, is only the Knowledge of all Arts, while Arts ſhall flouriſh among Men, the Philoſophers will not have any Luſtre among them; on the other hand, they will be altogether uſeleſs. But believe me the Philoſophers are not what we have fancied to our ſelves; and to be a Philoſopher is not to meddle with all Arts, and to ſpend his Life in all Shops ſtooping and working like a Slave. Neither is it to learn many things. Upon my word it is ſomething more ſublime and more noble. For that Application is ſhameful, and thoſe who take it upon them are only called Mechanicks and mean Tradeſmen. The better to ſee, if I ſpeak true, anſwer me further I pray you, who are thoſe that can break a Horſe well? are not they ſuch as can make him better?

Yes.

And is it not the ſame of Dogs?

Yes.

Thus one and the ſame Art breaks them and makes them better.

Yes.

But that Art which breaks them, and makes them better, is it the ſame by which one knows thoſe that are bad? Or is it another?

No, ſaid he 'tis the ſame.

Will you ſay the ſame thing of Men replyed I? The Art which makes them better is it the ſame with that which reclaims them, and which knows thoſe who are good and thoſe who are bad?

'Tis the ſame, ſaid he.

Does the Art which judges of many judge alſo of one, and that which judges of one does it alſo judge of many?

Yes.

Is it the ſame, ſaid I, of Horſes, and of all other Animals? He agrees to it. But ſay I, how do you call the Science or Art which Chaſtiſeth and reclaims the wicked Rake Hells that are in the Cities,

and

and who violate the Laws? Is it not Judicature? And is not this Art or Judicature, that which you call Juſtice?

Without doubt, anſwered he.

Thus ſaid I to him, that Art which ſerves the Judges to correct the Wicked, ſerves alſo to make them know who are wicked and who are good?

Aſſuredly.

And the Judge who knows one of them may alſo know more; and he who can't know many of them can't know one? Is it not ſo?

I confeſs it, ſaid he.

Is it not alſo true, ſaid I, that a Horſe which knows not the other Horſes that are good or bad, do's not know what he is himſelf? I ſay as much of all other Animals.

He agreed to it.

Why then, added I, a Man who knows not Men if they be good or bad, is he not alſo ignorant what he is himſelf, tho' he be a Man?

That's moſt true, ſaid he.

Not to know ones ſelf, is it to be wiſe or to be a Fool?

To be a Fool.

And conſequently, continued I, to know ones ſelf is to be wiſe. Thus the Precept that is wrote upon the Gate of the Temple of *Delphos*, Exhorts us to apply our ſelves to Wiſdom and Juſtice. It is the ſame Art that teacheth us to chaſtiſe and puniſh the Wicked; by the Rules of Wiſdom, we know how to know them, and to know our ſelves alſo. *Know thy ſelf.*

That ſeems to me to be very true ſaid he.

And conſequently ſay I, Juſtice and Wiſdom are but the ſame thing. And that which makes Cities well govern'd, and peopled, is the Puniſhment of the Wicked. Is not that the occaſion of good Government?

He agrees to it.

When a Man ſay I, governs a City or State well, what name is given to that Man? Is he not call'd King?

Without doubt.

Then

Then he Governs by a Royal Art, by the Art of Kings, and is not that Art the ſame with thoſe we juſt now ſpoke of?

So me thinks.

When a private Man govern his Houſe well, what name is given to him? Is he not call'd a good Steward or good Maſter?

Yes.

By what Art does he governs his Houſe ſo well? Is it not by the Art of Juſtice?

Certainly.

Then me thinks that King, Politician, Steward, Maſter, Juſt, and Wiſe are but one and the ſame thing: And that Royalty, Policy, Oeconomy, Wiſdom and Juſtice are but one and the ſame Art?

He agreed with me.

What then, continued I, ſhall a Philoſopher be aſhamed when a Phiſician ſhall ſpeak before him, of Diſtempers, or ſome other ſhall ſpeak of his Art, I ſay ſhall he be aſhamed that he does not underſtand what they ſay, and that he can't give his Advice? and when a King, a Magiſtrate, a Politician, an Oeconomiſt ſhall ſpeak of their Art, he ſhould not be aſhamed that he can't underſtand them nor ſay any thing of his own Head?

How ſhould it not be much more ſhameful, *Socrates*, ſaid he to me not to be able to ſay any thing upon ſo great and ſo important things.

But, continued I, ſhall we fix it, that upon theſe ſame things the Philoſopher ſhould be as the Pentathle, whom we juſt now ſpoke of, that is to ſay, always below the Maſters, and that he is but of the ſecond Rank ſo that he will always be uſeleſs when thoſe Maſters are preſent? Or ſhall we rather ſay that he ought to be Maſter himſelf, that he may not be of the ſecond Rank, and may not give his Houſe to the Conduct of another, but that he may manage it himſelf in the Rules of Wiſdom and Juſtice, if he would have it well govern'd, and that it ſhould proſper?

He agreeth with me.

In fine, ſaid I to him, if his Friends ſhould abandon themſelves to his Conduct, or his City call him to the Office of the Magiſtracy, or ſhould order him to be Arbitrator upon publick or private Affairs, would it not be a ſhame for him to be only of the ſecond or third rank inſtead of being the head?

So me thinks, ſaid he.

Then my Dear, Philoſophy wants much of being a Love of all Sciences or an Application to all Arts. At theſe words the learned Man being confounded knew not what to anſwer, and the illiterate Man aſſured me that I was in the right. All the reſt likewiſe ſubmitted to thoſe Proofs.

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